

BRITISH BARODA RELATIONS, 1818 to 1848

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5569

By

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Under the Guidance
of

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MAP OF THE BARODA STATE


SCALE 36 MILES = 1 INCH
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 MILES

POPULATION BY DISTRICTS.

BARODA	707,512
KADI	900,578
NAVSARI	340,372
AMRELI	152,985
OKHAMANDAL	25,475
TOTAL	2,126,922

REFERENCES.

BARODA - 1	[Pattern]
KADI - 2	[Pattern]
NAVSARI - 3	[Pattern]
AMRELI - 4	[Pattern]



AREA BY DISTRICTS IN SQUARE MILES.

BARODA	1,922
KADI	3,046
NAVSARI	1,807
AMRELI	1,077
OKHAMANDAL	275
TOTAL	8,127

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I express my gratitude to the Director of Archives, Maharashtra State, for permission to consult the State papers, to the Superintendent, Baroda Records Office, for permitting me to work there and to the Librarians of the University of Bombay and the M.S. University of Baroda for help in finding reference material.

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Bombay,
June, 1976.

Smt. M.P. Kamekar



PREFACE

(Statement under Ordinance 771)

1818 to 1848 is a very important and significant period for Baroda in the development of its relations with the British. It was also the beginning of British control over western India, and they were searching various ways and means of increasing their power through the Indian Princes. This important period, however, has been studied by very few scholars. In fact no detailed, original study of this period with regard to Baroda exists from the point of view of the study of original documents in the Bombay and Baroda Record office, nor in the India Office Library, London. J.H.Genze and D.R.Banaji end their collection of records in 1820, and the Baroda government selections also end in 1820, except for one slim volume added later covering 1818-1836. I have made use of original State papers in the Maharashtra Records Office, the Baroda Records office and also in the Archives of the India Office Library in London. About the last, I could spend just four days in London, and went through the Secret despatches from the Court of Directors, which throw remarkable light on British policy. I have been able to use only a very few documents from this Library. In future, if possible, I would like to spend time in

the India Office to go through the Secret despatches of this whole period to arrive at a more correct assessment of the policies and directives of the Court of Directors, which lay at the root of British policy in those days.

The State papers studied are mostly in English, except for some from the Baroda Records Office which are in Marathi, and a few in Gujarati. The Yads and Khareetas are originally in Marathi or Gujarati. I have, wherever possible, identified the documents in the volumes by dates rather than page numbers, as the documents were chronologically arranged. The page numbers of the volumes were either illegible, the corners torn or double sets of numbers given. This may have been the result of rebinding when the volumes were transferred from Baroda to Ahmedabad and back due to the Headquarters of the Residency being changed. Also, more records were available in Bombay than in Baroda as, after independence much of the Residency records were shifted to Bombay, and at the time of the transfer of power, many of the records had been destroyed. Also a fire in 1829 destroyed much of the earlier records in Baroda.

This material has enabled me to throw a new light on the History of Baroda with reference to her

relations with the Resident, the Governor of Bombay, and the Governor-General. These documents give a remarkable insight into the development of British policy regarding Indian States. They have enabled me to probe behind the appearance and find the reality of British actions and policies. For instance, an examination of these new records clearly show that the so called 'equal' treaties, were never accepted by the British as such. When Sayajirao, a man of independent opinions and urge for power tried to assert this equality, he was very peremptorily and clearly shown his real position. My aim has been to throw fresh light on British intentions and actions and trace the growth of their domination in Baroda affairs, and show how this affected a proud ruler like Sayajirao, with his own ideas of the Gaekwad's rights and obligations towards himself and his people.

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ABBREVIATIONS

BAR	:	Baroda
BBB	:	Baroda Blue Book
BG	:	Gazetteer of Bombay Presidency, Baroda, Vol. VII.
BRD	:	Baroda Residency Diary
BRO	:	Baroda Records Office
BRO HS	::	Baroda Records Office Historical Selections.
BRO St.Vol.	:	Baroda Record Office State Volumes
BRS	:	Baroda Residency Selections
COD	:	Court of Directors
GG	:	Governor General
GOB	:	Government of Bombay
GOI	:	Government of India
GD	:	General Department
GBS	:	Gazetteer of Baroda State
HPO	:	Huzur Political Office
HS	:	Historical Selections
IOL	:	India Office Library
PD	:	Political Department
PDC	:	Political Department Compilations
PDD	:	Political Department Diary
PDL	:	Political Department Letters
PDMINUTES	:	Political Department Minute Book
PDSC	:	Political Department Selected Compilations
SC	:	Selected Compilations
SD	:	Secret Department
SPD	:	Secret and Political Department
SR	:	Selected Records

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The year 1800 opened a momentous century for British Imperialism. The century was to place British power rapidly astride the Indian sub-continent. Already since the second half of the eighteenth century, the East India Company had, through its victories at Plassey and Buxar, established its power on the eastern coast and the hinterland of Bihar, Bengal and Orissa. By the end of the century, its control extended to Mysore, Tanjore, Satara, the Karnatak, Surat and Oudh acquired through Subsidiary Alliances. In western India also, the British had been expanding their power by direct and indirect means.

The Maratha Confederacy, which was the strongest power on the western coast, was already shaken by the treacherous activities of its chieftains. The Gaekwads of Baroda were one of the major rulers of the Confederacy, having by that time, taken over most of Gujarat under their tutelage. Historically the origin of the state is to be found in the period of the break up of the Mughal Empire and the rise of Shivaji and his descendants, the kings of Satara. Of the early leaders of the period,

one of the most distinguished was Khanderao Dabhade. In 1705, he over ran Gujarat (then a Mughal dominion) and imposed a tribute upon the inhabitants. In 1716, he was appointed Senapati or Commander-in-Chief by the then king of Satara. At the same time, his right hand man, Damajirao Gaekwad was exalted to the rank of Second-in-Command and honoured with the title of Shamsher Bahadur which distinction remained a proud title of the Head of the Gaekwad House till recently.¹ By a treaty in 1729, Bajirao I, the Peshwa, obtained chauth and other dues from the Mughal Deputy of Gujarat, thus encroaching upon the rights of the Dabhades and Gaekwads.² In 1731, Trimbakrao Dabhade and Pilajirao Gaekwad tried to unite all the Maratha leaders in Gujarat against the Peshwa. In the struggle that followed Trimbakrao Dabhade was defeated and slain.³ The Peshwa Bajirao thereafter became the nominal ruler of Gujarat with full claims on chauth and other tributes. At this time, Bajirao was urgently needed back in Poona to face

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1. Chavda, V.K., Gaekwad and the British - A Study of Their Problems, 1875-1920, p. 1.
 2. Aitchison, C.V., Vol. VI, 1929, p. 283.
 3. Elliot, F.A.H., Rulers of Baroda, pp. 30-33.

an attack by the Nizam and, therefore, acted leniently towards the rebels. He installed Yeshwantrao Dabhade, the infant son of Trimbakrao in his father's place as Senapati and Pilajirao Gaekwad was confirmed in his former post with the title of Sena Khas Khel (Commander of the Special Band).⁴ As Yeshwantrao was a mere child, Pilajirao Gaekwad was authorised to act as Regent for him, and manage the affairs of Gujarat. The Peshwa also concluded an agreement, whereby he would be entitled to half the revenue collected by Pilajirao Gaekwad.

The Mughal Emperor later rescinded the treaty of 1729, and sent Abhaysingh of Jodhpur to Gujarat as the new Viceroy to re-establish Mughal authority. Abhaysingh fought the Marathas and had Pilajirao Gaekwad assassinated. Damajirao Gaekwad succeeded his father and wrested the whole of Gujarat from the Mughals, and superseded Yeshwantrao Dabhade, who proved totally incompetent.

Henceforth, the Gaekwads were the real rulers of Gujarat. As yet, however, they were not free from the overlordship of the Peshwas, and Damajirao Gaekwad had to pay a heavy price for supporting the Raja of Satara against the Peshwa. Damajirao was imprisoned by

4. This title had belonged to the Dabhade's upto that time. But since 1731, it had come to be the distinctive title of the Gaekwads.

the Peshwa and freed only after he agreed to pay all arrears of tributes amounting to Rs.15 lakhs and promised the Peshwa an equal share in all future conquests. The Peshwa also got a share of the Gaekwad's tributaries in Kathiawad and a pledge of military support when needed.⁵ In alliance with the Peshwa, a joint assault was successfully made on Ahmedabad in 1755.⁶ This was the end of Mughal power in Gujarat and this area was now shared between the Peshwa and the Gaekwad. Damajirao again interfered with the Peshwa's affairs in 1765 by supporting Raghoba against the new Peshwa Madhavrao. In the war that followed, he was again defeated and had to pay an annual tribute of nearly Rs. 8 lakhs to the new Peshwa, and give annual service with 3,000 Horse during peace and 4,000 during war.⁷

Damajirao died in 1768, and after this the Gaekwads fell upon evil days. Disputed successions, foreign intervention, and endless intrigues followed hard upon one another. Of the four sons of Damajirao, Govindrao, the second son, who was then at Poona, paid

5. Gense, J.H. and Banaji, D.R., Gaekwads of Baroda, Vol. I, p. 31; Also Aitchison, Vol. VI, App. 1-11, pp. XLVI-LVI.

6. Aitchison, Vol. VI, p. 284.

7. Ibid., App. III, p. LVII.

a large Nazarana to Madhavrao and was recognized as successor to his father's rank of Sena Khas Khel. Fatehsingh, the youngest, however, espoused the cause of the eldest brother Sayajirao, and urged his superior claim. Following the favoured policy of rulers all over, that of divide and rule, the Peshwa subsequently admitted Sayajirao's claim, who thus became the de jure ruler.⁸ This naturally created two warring camps who sought support wherever they could find it.

The East India Company's government in Bombay, which was fishing in the troubled waters of the Maratha Confederacy, was approached by Fatehsingh. The British, in their campaign to extend their influence in the coastal region of Gujarat, had captured Broach, a part of whose revenues belonged to the Gaekwad. An agreement was made in 1773, between Fatehsingh and the British, by which the Gaekwad was allowed to retain this revenue.⁹ This agreement gave the British the opening they were looking for in western India. The hinterland of Gujarat was a fruitful and peaceful region which they coveted and they

8. Sayajirao, the eldest son was an idiot, and Fatehsingh had assumed the role of ruling Regent. This assumption had been acquiesced in by the Peshwa.

9. Aitchison, Vol. VI, Treaty with Fatehsingh, 1773, p. 306; Also Elliot, in 'Rulers of Baroda', says that the Gaekwads had acquired a share in the Broach revenues since 1744. The share was about 3/5th of the Broach customs (about six to nine lakhs.).

soon began to take an active and disastrous interest in the affairs of the Gaekwads.

Soon after this, confusion broke out in the camp of the Peshwa due to the murder of Narayanrao by Raghunath's party. The British in Bombay, feeling their way in this field, first sided with Raghunathrao, and by the Treaty of Surat, 1775, agreed to help Raghunathrao and his allies which included Govindrao on condition of acquiring Bassein, Salsette, Surat and the Gaekwad's share of the revenue of Broach.¹⁰ As Elliot has truly remarked, "the British willingly took part in a civil war with which they had no concern and their policy was as rash as it was immoral, and as foolish as it was unjust".¹¹ This time, they took the side of Govindrao against Fatehsingh, abandoning the agreement they had made with Fatehsingh only a few years before in 1773. Later, under orders of their Supreme government, the British concluded the Treaty of Purandhar, 1776, with Nana Phadnavis in Poona. As a result, Fatehsingh, who had already taken the help of Nana Phadnavis in his quarrel with Govindrao had to acknowledge the overlordship of the Poona Court. He had to pay arrears of tribute before he was recognized by the Peshwa as Sena Khas Khel in 1778.¹² Fatehsingh, thus

10. Elliot, Op. cit., p. 62.

11. Ibid., p. 64.

12. Aitchison, Vol. VI, App. VII, p. xxvii.

became the de jure ruler, even though the feeble minded Sayajirao was still alive.

This alliance, however, did not bind him to the Peshwa's side for long. The Bombay government pursuing their policy of expansion, embarked on what is known as the First Maratha War in 1778, brought on by the rejection of the Treaty of Purandhar, and the acceptance of the Treaty of Surat by the Court of Directors. The Bombay government was defeated and had to conclude the humiliating Convention of Wadgaon in 1779. Since Warren Hastings refused to ratify this Convention, war had to be continued. Here Baroda was to play a fateful role. Governor Hornby of Bombay decided to make Gujarat an important base for his campaign. Its accessibility from the sea, the absence of large mountain ranges, and the amenability of the Gaekwad determined Hornby on this policy.¹³ The Gaekwad was considered a safe ally as he was geographically cut off from the rest of the Maratha leaders. In pursuance of its policy, the government sent an army to Gujarat under Colonel Goddard, who, in its shadow, concluded a treaty with the Gaekwad at Dabhoi on the 26th January, 1780.¹⁴

13. Elliot, Op. cit., p. 73.

14. Aitchison, Vol. VI, pp. 308-314.

By this Treaty, the Gaekwad became independent of the Peshwa and promised to help the British with 3,000 Horse. (This was the beginning of the famous Gaekwad Contingent). It was agreed to divide Gujarat including the Peshwa's territories between the East India Company and the Gaekwad. The Treaty was defensive against all foreign enemies and offensive against the Peshwa. If and when, Ahmedabad was captured, it was stipulated that the British should get ^{it} in exchange for certain portions of Surat district. Fatehsingh proved to be an useful and sincere ally, placing his cavalry of three thousand Horse at the disposal of the British. This Treaty was approved by the Supreme Government, after making a few changes. The government affixed its seal and signature on an amended copy which was never sent to Fatehsingh.¹⁵ In reality, therefore, neither version of the Treaty was official or binding. This act of the Bombay government in suppressing the correct version from Fatehsingh is typical of the British-Baroda relations of the period. Treaties, agreements, pacts were all to be interpreted in favour of the British. Honesty and friendship rarely entered into the picture. The British very soon abandoned their obligations to the Gaekwad when, by the Treaty of Salbai in 1782,¹⁶ the Maratha War came

15. Ibid.

16. Ibid., p. 285.

to an end. The Gaekwad once again found himself a tributary of the Peshwa, as the British had renewed their recognition of the Peshwa.¹⁷

Fatehsingh now carried on the administration of Baroda as the sovereign authority owing allegiance to the Peshwa. During this time, he established a body of foreign mercenaries, mainly Arabs,¹⁸ who were to cause great difficulties in the future.

Fatehsingh died on the 21st December, 1789. Manaji, the younger brother was installed as the Regent of Sayaji, and recognised by the Peshwa, inspite of the claims of Govindrao, the elder brother. Internal strife and intrigues continued till 1793, when Manaji died, and Govindrao, at long last, ascended the Gadi.¹⁹ Govindrao had to sign an agreement in 1794 with the Peshwa and pay enormous sums of money to him, as well as give up all his territories south of the Tapti river and his share in the customs of Surat, to gain recognition from Poona.²⁰ The Peshwa, it seems, was out to ruin the Gaekwads. This would

17. Ibid., App. VI., p. LXXIII.

18. Wallace, W.R., The Gaekwad and His Relations with the British Government, p. 65.

19. Elliot, Op. cit., p. 76.

20. Aitchison, Vol. VI, App. VII, p. LXXVI.

not have suited the British who wanted a friendly power in Gujarat, and they peremptorily informed the Peshwa that he could not annex the Gaekwad's territories, as the Treaty of Salbai had guaranteed these to the Gaekwad.²¹ This act put the Gaekwads forever under the obligation of the British who often brought this up as the reminder of the 'extraordinary' boon which they had conferred upon the Gaekwads.

Govindrao's reign was filled with low and cruel plots of various members of the Gaekwad family. As Elliot puts it, "Son strove against father, brother against brother, cousin against cousin, while wives and mothers pushed the interests of their husbands and sons with an entire disregard of justice or common good of the family."²² To begin with Govindrao, on ascending the Gadi, gave no quarter to his brothers and their supporters who had been fighting him for years. So suspicious was he of every one at Baroda that he brought his own servants and advisers from Poona. Foremost amongst these was Raoji Appaji, the Diwan, who was to play a key role in the advancement of British power in Gujarat.

Govindrao began his career indebted to the British. He and his ministers henceforth looked upon

21. Ibid., p. 286.

22. Elliot, Op. cit., p. 79.

the British as friends who could be summoned to their aid. The cost of such help was of course never calculated at this stage. Govindrao asked the British to help him against Aba Shelukar, Nana Phadnavis's deputy in Gujarat. Even though the British prevaricated, their presence alone materially helped Govindrao's chances, as Shelukar thought that the active interference of the British might follow. This matter was resolved with the capture of Aba Shelukar by Govindrao, who, after the death of Nana Phadnavis in 1806, got the full support of Bajirao II.

In 1799, the Nawab of Surat died and his dominions were annexed by the British.²³ Duncan, the Governor of Bombay, went to Surat to arrange these affairs. One of his aims was to get rid of the Gaekwad's influence in this area.²⁴ The Gaekwad had a share of the chauth of Surat and held possession of the paragana of Chorasi around Surat. Govindrao had been willing to give these up in exchange for Duncan's support against Shelukar. Duncan, however, had not done this and the negotiations had come to an end. No agreement had been signed. Yet, it is significant that in Article 3 of the Convention of March 15th, 1802 between the British and Raoji Appaji,²⁵ the

23. Mehta, M.N., Hind Rajasthan, p. 58.

24. Wallace, Op. cit., p. 73.

25. Aitchison, Vol. VI., p. 316.

British expressly state that the chauth and Paragana had been ceded to them by Govindrao "by letters to that effect from the late Govindrao to the Honourable the Governor of Bombay".²⁶ This was blatant misrepresentation, deliberately carried out.

Govindrao had gradually come under the domination of his minister Raoji Appaji and members of Appaji's family, and had been trying to get out of this entanglement when he died on the 19th September, 1800.²⁷ Once again Baroda was plunged into civil war between rival claimants for the Gadi. The treasury had been emptied by Govindrao in order to pay 60 lakhs to the Peshwa as Nuzerana and other dues. In order to get more money, Govindrao had mortgaged almost all the districts of Baroda state to various Bankers under the guarantee of the Arab mercenaries. The condition of the people was miserable as no attention had been given to the administration of justice, the protection and welfare of the people. There was, properly speaking, no government for all real power had fallen into the hands of the 'rapacious and overbearing' Arab soldiery.²⁸ The bankers and ministers decided to raise Anandrao, the eldest son of Govindrao, a weak man addicted to drinking, to the Gadi.

26. Ibid.

27. Elliot, Op. cit., p. 87.

28. Ibid., p. 88.

The state was on the verge of dissolution and greedy eyes were being cast on it from many sides. Holkar and the Peshwa were both ready to usurp it on the smallest pretext. This certainly would not have suited the British plans of expansion in western India. A keen interest in the affairs of Baroda began to activate all the counsels of the Bombay Presidency. Moves were made to find out people around the Darbar of the new Gaekwad who were most amenable to their approaches.

Anandrao and his minister Raoji Appaji were themselves in need of British help. A more or less concerted attack was being mounted by the discontented legitimate and illegitimate members of the Gaekwad family against Anandrao and Raoji Appaji who had now gained the full confidence of the Gaekwad and dominated over him.

At first, the powers of the state were usurped by Anandrao's illegitimate half brother, Kanhojirao, who managed to win over some members of the Maharaja's Council. However, his haughty and overbearing behaviour frightened the Arab mercenaries and the remaining ministers who plotted together and captured and imprisoned him. Malharrao, the grandson of the late Pillajirao Gaekwad now raised the standard of revolt in support of Kanhojirao.

He collected a band of insurgents and made preparations for war. He was reinforced by the supporters of Gajarabai (the late Gaekwad's daughter), and Mukundrao, an illegitimate son of the late Gaekwad. This formidable opposition was further strengthened by the defection of Shivram Gardee, one of the Gaekwad's commanders. The initial victories went to Malharrao.²⁹ In spite of these successes his supporters were diffident. The partisans of Gajarabai and Gardee's officers wanted to sue for British help and they offered to cede the chauth of Surat and the Chorasi districts in return for help.

Anandrao Gaekwad also sought help from the same quarter. His minister, Raoji Appaji, despatched Meer Kamal-ud-Din and two other envoys to the Governor of Bombay with authority to offer highly advantageous terms to him. They made the same offer of the chauth of Surat and the Chorasi district. Besides this, Anandrao had other means with which to sway the British to his side. Through Raoji Appaji's friendship with the Scindia's minister, moves were made by Anandrao to gain the support of Scindia.³⁰ Duncan, the Governor of Bombay, was swayed by this fact as war with Scindia and Bajirao seemed

29. Mehta, Op. cit., p. 63.

30. Elliot, Op. cit., p. 93.

imminent. He decided to intervene in the Baroda affairs, and Major Walker was sent to Baroda with 2,000 troops to arbitrate between the two rival groups.³¹ Walker reached Baroda in January, 1802 and in a series of negotiations satisfied himself that Anandrao's cause was the 'just one' and that the Maharajah had 'good cause to court the goodwill and alliance of the British government'.³² Obviously, the weak-minded Anandrao attracted the British, who anticipated easy ascendancy over him. When he found that Malharrao was not amenable to negotiations, Walker decided to materially help Anandrao's army against the rebel. With the help of additional forces from Bombay, Walker invested the Fort of Kadi and forced Malharrao to surrender in May, 1802. He was also made to surrender his jagir of Kadi to Baroda in exchange for an allowance of a lakh and a quarter rupees a year. The British then in July, 1802, assisted the Gaekwad's forces in crushing the revolt of the other dissident chiefs, Ganpatrao Gaekwad of Sankheda and Murarrao.

These successes did not completely free Anandrao and Raoji Appaji from their difficulties. All along they had been greatly troubled by the Arab mercenaries who had been introduced by Fatehsingh. Raoji Appaji had at first

31. Ibid., p. 92.

32. Wallace, Op. cit., p. 76.

increased their power and privileges so that by this time the Arabs held the forts of Baroda, Barsod, Sankheda and other strongholds. They were selfish and independent, amenable only to the persuasions of their paymasters, Mangal Parekh and Shamal Bechar, and in the Durbar, their insolence disgusted the Sardars.³³ However, they were trusted by the people to keep the government to its promises as the Gaekwad's subjects refused to believe that a promise would be kept or peaceable conduct preserved by the government unless the Arabs had received a promise to that effect.³⁴ This was the infamous guarantee system in which the British replaced the Arabs, leading ultimately to very unhealthy political results. Its immediate effect was to free the Gaekwad from the control of the Arabs, a salvation which was beneficial to that extent.

All the foregoing services had been rendered by the British to the Gaekwad in exchange for a very heavy price. Governor Duncan had negotiated a Convention with Raoji Appaji on behalf of Anandrao, which was signed on the 15th March, 1802.³⁵ On the basis of this convention a subsidiary Treaty was negotiated by Raoji Appaji on the

33. Elliot, Op. cit., p. 89.

34. Ibid.

35. Aitchison, Vol. VI, p. 315.

6th June, 1802,³⁶ and on the 28th July, 1802, Anandrao himself entered into an agreement of 10 articles upholding both the Convention and Treaty.³⁷ These agreements were based on the principle of subsidiary alliances which the East India Company was at the time pursuing. In exchange for the protection of a British force, the states had to accept a British Resident who had general control over their affairs. This force was paid for by cession of territories which enabled the British to extend their military and political frontiers.³⁸ Wellesley, the Governor General at the time, had a frankly annexationist attitude, and he scoffed at the idea that Indian states were independent powers and, high handedly disposed of his 'allies' and 'semi-allies'.³⁹

By the three agreements mentioned above, the British gained considerably in land, money, prestige and power. They got a firm foothold in Gujarat which they henceforth assiduously maintained. In exchange for supporting Anandrao as the proper and legitimate ruler

36. Ibid., p. 317.

37. Ibid., pp. 320-23.

38. Ibid., p. 315; Agreement of 15-3-1802.

39. Roberts, India under Wellesley, p. 36.

of the Baroda State, and as payment for the short campaign against Malharrao, the British had got large sums of money and land. By these agreements, a subsidiary force was imposed on the Gaekwad consisting of 2,000 sepoys, a European artillery company and two companies of lascars, all at the expense of Rs.65,000 per mensem to be defrayed from the Gaekwad's resources. The Gaekwad's share of the chauth of Surat and the Chorasī paraganah, both long coveted by the British, had been granted to them in the March, 1802 agreement under false representation as already mentioned. The British also promised to replace the Arab soldiery both in their defensive and guarantee capacity.⁴⁰ The Arab soldiers were to be paid off in cash and then disbanded. This was to be done by borrowing about two crores of rupees from the British. The Gaekwad had to cede revenue amounting to Rs.11,75,000 from a considerable amount of territory to repay the British.⁴¹

Anandrao also pledged himself to listen to the advice of the British who would grant him "countenance and protection in all his public concerns according to justice and as may appear to be for the good of the

40. Aitchison, Vol. VI, p. 318; Agreement of 6-6-1802, Art.(4).

41. Ibid.

country, respecting which he is to listen to advice."⁴²

A Resident was to reside at Baroda to carry out these duties.⁴³ In the third confirming Treaty of 29th July, 1802, Anandrao had agreed that all power would be taken over by Walker, the newly appointed Resident, if he (Anandrao) ever become a captive of his enemies.⁴⁴

Walker was also to examine the accounts of the state and see that a muster of the troops was regularly taken.⁴⁵

Lastly, the British government was given the absolute right to interfere if the Maharajah committed anything improper or unjust."⁴⁶

Besides this, the British made a private engagement with Raoji Appaji granting the dewanship to him and his descendants in perpetuity, and promising protection to his relatives and friends even against their own sovereign, the Gaekwad.⁴⁷ This was obviously

42. Ibid., Agreement of 6-6-1802, Art.(5), p. 318.
It should be noted that the Marathi version defers in its interpretation of Art.(5) of the 6th June agreement. No mention is made in this version of the British granting its "protection and advice" to the Gaekwad. (H.P.O. Selections No.26, Vol.II, pp.40-42 and 49). This was a major point of protest frequently lodged by the Gaekwad.

43. Ibid., Art.(6), p. 318.

44. Ibid., Agreement of 29-7-1802, Art.(3).

45. Ibid., Art.(6).

46. Ibid., Art. (10).

47. Ibid., Private engagement to Raoji Appaji, p.329.

a beginning of their scheme to raise up subject against sovereign in order to demean and control the latter - a proceeding in which they later became adept. It was an excellent method of controlling recalcitrant or independent minded rulers.

By these treaties, land worth two and a half lakhs of rupees was given over to the Company, and in 1803 and 1805⁴⁸ the most fertile districts of Baroda state were ceded to the British. These included Dholka, Nadiad, Vijapur, Kadi, whose total revenues amounted to Rs.7,80,000.⁴⁹ In addition, the revenues of Baroda paraganah, Koral, Sinor, Petlad and Ahmedabad districts were pledged to the British.⁵⁰ It is interesting to note again the facility with which the Company abandoned inconvenient pledges. In 1782, by the Treaty of Salbai, the British had guaranteed his territories to the Gaekwad. It was under the terms of this Treaty that the Peshwa had been prevented from extorting enormous sums of money and territory from Govindrao as it would not have been possible to pay them without dismembering the state. Now the British were doing exactly this.

48. Ibid., Agreement with Anandrao, 1803, p. 337; and Definitive Treaty, pp. 340-45.

49. Ibid.

50. Ibid.

The most important action that now took place was the reduction of the Arab mercenaries, and the substitution of British subsidiary force instead. Arab mercenary troops, as stated before, were first introduced into the state by Fatehsingh, but with a sparing hand. Govindrao had doubled their number. Raoji Appaji had also in the beginning of his career increased their numbers and powers. They cost the State Rs.2,99,642 per month.⁵¹ All the important Forts of the State were under their control, and they had antagonised the aristocrats and Sardars of the state by their arrogance.⁵² In those turbulent, insecure times, neither the people nor the officers of the government had been prepared to trust their rulers with loans, unless a guarantee was given by either a Bhat, Charan or an Arab. This had naturally invested the mercenary troops with an almost unlimited power of interfering between the government on one side and the officers and people on the other, as they had stood surety for a thousand matters. The British now took over these guarantee engagements from the Arabs, and also entered into new ones with those who advanced fresh loans to the Gaekwad. The

51. Elliot, Op. cit., p. 88ff.

52. Ibid.

foundation was laid here of countless irritants - a big and small - which were to lead to open breaches between the future Gaekwads and the Paramount Power. The Government of Bombay claimed that the guarantee conferred the right of uniform and systematic interference in the internal matters of the Gaekwad's government, even in cases in which the guarantee was not directly given, and the Company began to interfere in the most important public affairs."⁵³

All these rights and powers which the British had acquired made their Resident wield vast and undefined authority. Now began a period of active interference on the part of the British government. Every act of the Baroda administration was closely watched and a strict control over its finances was instituted.

Alexander Walker became the first British Resident,⁵⁴ and started his office by disbanding the Arab forces. He found Raoji Appaji afraid to move quickly in this matter and the Arab mercenaries bordering on mutiny.⁵⁵ The Arabs advanced extravagant claims and made the Gaekwad a virtual prisoner in his own palace.

53. Ibid.

54. Wallace, Op. cit., p. 79.

55. Elliot, Op. cit., p. 105.

To create confusion they allowed Kanhojirao to escape. Malharrao also made good his escape from Nadiad and fled to Kathiawad where he lay hidden.⁵⁶ In December, 1802, a European regiment invested the Fort of Baroda against the Arabs and took it after a seige of 10 days. The Arabs signed an agreement⁵⁷ in which they bound themselves to evacuate the Fort to release Anandrao and to abstain from all future intercourse with the enemies of the governments. They also demanded, and got, arrears of pay due to them before they could be persuaded to leave Baroda. They were released from all guarantees given by them either to persons or property and the guarantees of the East India Company was substituted.⁵⁸ The British strengthened their position in Baroda by the Treaty of Bassein signed between them and Bajirao. As Elphinstone had remarked, the Treaty assured terms which "fixed the establishment of the British, instead of the Peshwa's ascendancy at Baroda, British protection of the Gaekwad, and their interpretation in negotiations with Poona and British guarantee to the Gadi."⁵⁹ It should also be noted that by the 10th Article of the Treaty of

56. Wallace, Op. cit., p. 84.

57. Aitchison, Vol. VI, p. 287.

58. Ibid.

59. Elliot, Op. cit., p. 98.

Bassein the Peshwa surrendered to the British his claims on the chauth of Surat and his rights in the paraganahs of Chorasi and Chickli.⁶⁰ This left the British in full possession of the western coast of Gujarat.

Walker now began actively to reorganise the finances and military structure of the Baroda state. He started making detailed investigations into the method of revenue collection from the tributaries in Kathiawad and other areas and was contemplating a detailed reform, when Raoji Appaji, the old minister, who was largely responsible for calling in and increasing British power died in July, 1803.⁶¹ In Wallace's words, Raoji Appaji had been instrumental in placing the "virtual sovereignty of a magnificent province" in British hands.⁶² Having pledged themselves to maintain him and his heirs,⁶³ the British had to approve of the appointment of his nephew Sitaram as the new Dewan. By now, a regency had been constituted to carry on the administration as the Gaekwad was getting progressively more and more mentally unstable.

60. Ibid., p. 102.

61. Ibid., p. 105 (footnote).

62. Ibid., p. 109.

63. Aitchison, Vol. VI. In addition Raoji Appaji had obtained a nemnook of Rs.40,000 from Anandrao. He had also enriched various members of his family such as Sakharam Diwanji, the Deshmukh of Navsari at the expense of the state, Art.(10), Treaty of 29-7-1802, p. 322.

Of course, the British attempted to fill the regency council with their own supporters.

Walker, the Resident, now faced the two problems mentioned above - the collection of revenue from the tributaries and the military reorganisation of the State.

The Marathas did not directly control Kathiawad, but the Peshwa and the Gaekwad together had extracted a considerable amount of tribute from the 292 states that comprised Kathiawad.⁶⁴ The tributes were extracted in accordance with the strength or the weakness of the chiefs concerned. At given intervals, a Mulkgiri Force was sent by the Gaekwad to collect tribute both for himself and the Peshwa.⁶⁵ The chiefs paid only if the Force was too strong to resist, as otherwise, these Forces would enforce tribute by destroying the crops, burning down villages and by general plunder and devastation. Walker made it his task to end this state of affairs and see that the tribute was collected more systematically. The British decided to intervene between the Gaekwad and his tributaries in the guise of tax-collectors for the Gaekwad. Walker started negotiations for a settlement in 1803 which was

64. Elliot, Op. cit., p. 117.

65. Mulkgiri Force was a revenue collecting army.

concluded in May, 1808.⁶⁶ According to this settlement, the Gaekwad would receive Rs.9,79,882 from the tributaries as his and the Peshwa's share. Although the original settlement was subsequently modified, it formed the basis of all succeeding arrangements on this subject.⁶⁷ This settlement was arrived at partly by negotiation and partly by force. Porbunder, Morvi, Okha had to be coerced. Although the Gaekwad accepted the settlement, Bajirao resented it as an invasion of his rights. Therefore, when the lease he had granted to the Gaekwad to farm his revenues in Ahmedabad districts came to an end in 1814, he sent his own officers to create mischief in the district and made counterclaims on the Gaekwad for the revenues of Broach. Walker's settlement gradually replaced the Gaekwad's influence in Kathiawad with that of the British, as the collection of revenue entailed an influx of a large number of British civil and military officers, who took over the entire control of the country within a few year's time.

Walker's attempts to change or as he claimed reform, the Gaekwad's army brought about many difficulties.

66. Aitchison, Vol. VI, p. 502.

67. Ibid., By arrangements, the petty chieftains agreed to pay the British the Gaekwad's dues on the average of what had been collected during the 10 preceding years.



The army provided an honourable living for the many martial families - the Sardars - who were the descendants of the original Maratha invaders of Gujarat. Most of these families were by now closely related to either the Gaekwad or his minister Sitaram Raoji. Naturally, Walker found that Sitaram was not willing to lend a hand in any drastic reorganisation. To reduce Sitaram's power, Fatehsingh, Anandrao's brother, was made Mutalik and a member of the ruling Council administering in Anandrao's name. Walker had now a pliant will at his command. The main object of the British was to reduce the expenditure on the army from 60 lakhs to 12 lakhs a year. No proposal was made to reduce the subsidiary force. Instead, the British made good the deficiency in the payment of the Subsidiary Force by taking over more of the Gaekwad's lands.

Inspite of the opposition, Walker forced through the reform of the Gaekwad army. It was effectively reduced and its expense brought down to Rs. 23 lakhs.⁶⁸ Lands granted to the principal officers of the army were also resumed. The Mamlatdars, who upto now were in charge of the Forts were deprived of them, and instead Killedars nominated by the British were put in charge. Sitaram was

68. Elliot, Op. cit., p. 134.

one of those deprived of his Fort, practically at the point of the sword. He was thoroughly disgraced and finally ousted in 1808. He was also deprived of his three 'Pagas', and was himself put under restraint.

The Resident obviously had found it difficult to get along with an independent minded person like Sitaram, who was also connected with the vested interests of the older regime.⁶⁹ Sitaram, it was claimed, was involved in a plot with Hafiz Gulam Hussein to subvert British influence in Gujarat,⁷⁰ besides being the chief opponent of reforms.⁷¹ In view of later developments, it is interesting to note the easy abandonment here of a written guarantee given privately to Raoji Appaji on the 8th June, 1802 and also restated in Article 10 of the Treaty of 29th July, 1802.⁷² The guarantee had promised to him and his family, the permanent dewanship of Baroda and protection in perpetuity from any attack. Instead, by systematic planning, the British had deprived Sitaram of all power and influence. The Resident had increased

69. SC(BOM), Vol. 12, Letter No. 305 of 1809: Walker to GOB of 10-1-1809.

70. BG., p. 215. This was part of a bigger plot in which Hafiz Gulam-Hussein sent circulars to the Shah of Kandahar, the chieftains of Sind, and the Maratha Princes to unite in an attempt to drive out the British from India.

71. SC(BOM), Vol. 12, No. 305 of 1809. Walker to GOB of 10-1-1809.

72. Aitchison, Vol. VI, p. 379.

his own influence by introducing the pliant Patehsingh into the Regency Council⁷³ and now recalled Babaji, Sitaram's uncle from Kathiawad giving him Sitaram's work. By 1809, Sitaram had completely lost his position. He and his relatives were either under restraint or exiled to distant places. Sitaram and his adherents naturally formed a bitter anti-British party at Baroda, conspiring against that power whenever possible. Meanwhile, Babaji and the Council worked harmoniously with the Resident who virtually dictated affairs till the former's death in 1810.⁷⁴ Babaji's son, Vithalrao Bhau, became the new Dewan (Khasgiwala). Two years later in 1812, he was succeeded by Gangadhar Shastri.

Gangadhar Shastri had been in the service of the British since 1802, and had been the native agent to the Resident, Walker and Carnac. He had also helped the Gaekwad in reducing the state debts.⁷⁵

An unfortunate series of troubles, however, dogged the footsteps of the new minister. At first, the Gaekwad was faced with the revolt of Kanhojirao and then by an attack from Muhammed Abud, one of the deposed Arabs.

73. Elliot, Op. cit., p. 132.

74. BG., p. 216.

75. Elliot, Op. cit., pp. 136-41.

Later in 1813, a band of Pindaris attacked the Navsari district of the Gaekwad,⁷⁶ when Gangadhar Shastri had to ask for British help to maintain the Gaekwad's authority. This aid was effectively rendered and the British power greatly enhanced.

By 1814, British relations with the Peshwa had reached a crisis. Mountstuart Elphinstone, who was the Resident at the Court of the Peshwas, was skillfully pushing Bajirao into an untenable position. Already in external affairs, the British had pursued a policy independent of the Peshwa regarding the Peshwa's tributaries. One such arrangement they made was regarding the settlement of the tributes between the petty states of Gujarat and the Gaekwad. In some of these states, the Peshwa had a share in the Tribute. These and other claims of the Peshwa against the Gaekwad had remained unsettled since the Treaty of Bassein. The district of Ahmedabad had been leased to the Gaekwad for a fixed amount. As already stated, this lease came to an end in 1813, and the Peshwa made it an occasion to press all his claims on the Gaekwad with a threat to rescind the lease of Ahmedabad. The Peshwa's demands were for more than four

76. BG., p. 216.

and a half crores of Rupees.⁷⁷ Fatehsingh, the Regent, made counter claims of equal value. Since the amounts involved were large, and the British were interested in maintaining a balance of power between Poona and Baroda, arrangements were made to start negotiations between the two Durbars. Gangadhar Shastri was deputed by Fatehsingh to represent Baroda in Poona, and sent under an expresse guarantee of safe conduct given by Elphinstone.

Gangadhar Shastri was kept hanging on in Poona for nearly a year without any success. At last, when he was preparing to leave, the Peshwa suddenly showed friendliness. The falseness of the friendship was soon exposed when Gangadhar was murdered, probably as a result of a conspiracy between Sitaram's party and the Peshwas.

Trimbakji Dingle, the Peshwa's favourite minister, was suspected of being the prime mover in the conspiracy. The British forced his surrender from the Peshwa, and deported Sitaram to Navsari to be kept under their surveillance.

Fatehsingh, during this incident, had gradually lent towards Sitaram's party and had tried to protect him

77. Elliot, Op. cit., pp. 144-49; and BG., pp. 218-19.

against the British. Though he could not keep Sitaram at Baroda, he granted him a Sanad, raising his nemnook by 50 per cent.⁷⁸ This show of independence on the part of Fatehsingh was naturally resented by the Resident. He now tried to find a person, who, like Gangadhar Shastri could make the Prince once again amenable to the British, and picked as his native agent Dhackji Dadaji. Dhackji Dadaji was an unfortunate choice. He was to betray the confidence of both his masters in the near future.

Dhackji was unable to win the confidence of the Regent Fatehsingh, who insisted on secretly taking the advice of the anti-British faction. In the face of a growing conspiracy of the Maratha powers against the British, this was an ominous sign for them. Apart from reorganising the Military machine, and the tributary affairs of the Gaekwads, the Residents were eager to minutely control their financial and judicial administration. The Residents took the credit for liquidating the Gaekwad's debt to the British.⁷⁹ An enormous amount of control over the Council and Fatehsingh was being

78. BG., p. 224.

79. PD(BOM), Vol. 384 of 1812. Letter from Carnac to GOB of 23-3-1812, and PD(BOM), Vol. 463 of 1819. Letter from Carnac to GOB of 22-2-1819.

exercised by them at this time. It is interesting to note that this liquidation proved to be fictitious. Mountstuart Elphinstone, on assuming the Governorship of Bombay in 1820, discovered a debt of a crore of rupees.⁸⁰ After 14 years of so called financial reforms by the Residents, Baroda was in greater debt than before!

From 1815 to his death two years later, Fatehsingh grew more antagonistic to the increasing British influence and refused to be guided by Dhackji or the Resident in most things. Carnac reported to the Bombay government that there was an increasing unwillingness on the part of Fatehsingh to meet the wishes of the British government and that he was being activated by a "spirit of opposition little short of insult to the British government."⁸¹ This was the reaction of the Resident to Fatehsingh's disinclination to accept Dhackji's advice immediately and his inclination to independently consult Mankerdas Bechar and other bankers. Absolute obedience was expected from these so called independent rulers, and this reaction was typical of the British attitude, and set the pattern of British-Baroda relations for the next thirty years. Relations with Fatehsingh were so strained that Carnac, who at one stage eulogised his

80. PD(BOM) 483 of 1820. Minutes by Elphinstone of 18-4-1820.

81. Genze and Banaji - Op. cit., pp. 4-7. Letter from Carnac to GOB of 27-7-1816.

character (so long as he was amenable) threatened him with stern measures.⁸² Carnac and the Bombay government continued to put pressure on Fatehsingh - especially about punishing Sitaram - invoking their guarantee obligations in support of their claims. The Governor General, however, did not agree with this attitude of the Bombay government, and cautioned them about misinterpreting the Treaties. He was not convinced that the limited and specific power of guarantee could warrant the right to demand the punishment of Sitaram.⁸³ It is important to note that he also opined that the guarantee did not confer upon the British "the uniform and systematic participation in the internal authority of the Gaekwad's government."⁸⁴ This salutary advice of the Central Government was not heeded, and the Bombay government continued through the years to stretch their so called rights of guarantee to the utmost limits and thoroughly antagonised the rulers.

In such a strained atmosphere then, the British-Baroda affairs continued for the next few years. In the meantime, the British were engaged in a struggle for power with the Peshwa. Aware of Bajirao's attempts to

82. Wallace, Op. cit., p. 210.

83. PD(BOM), Vol.392 of 1816. Letter from GOI to GOB of 16-3-1816.

84. Ibid.

bring about a strong Maratha opposition, Elphinstone was trying to corner him. An opportunity for this came when Trimbakji Dengle escaped from the Thana Fort with the connivance of Bajirao, who was, at the same time, planning an uprising. Elphinstone forced him to sign the Treaty of Poona.⁸⁵ By this treaty, Bajirao virtually lost all his independence and much of his territories. Two clauses of the Treaty greatly benefitted the Gaekwad.⁸⁶ By article 5, the Peshwa renounced all claims to supremacy over the Gaekwad, and commuted the past claims for an annual sum of Rs. 4 lakhs. Secondly by article 15, the town of Ahmedabad and its district was granted in perpetuity to the Gaekwad on an annual payment of Rs. 4½ lakhs. Later, the Gaekwad was released from the payment of his tributary obligations to the Peshwa of Rs. 4 lakhs. Elphinstone, who negotiated the treaty, felt that the exemption from his tribute was a sufficient reward for the Gaekwad for the military services he had rendered against the Peshwa. He enjoined upon the Resident to make it appear to the Gaekwad as a "free concession" made to him out of consideration for the zealous and faithful performances of his obligations of the alliance.⁸⁷

85. Wallace, Op. cit., pp.220-21.

86. Ibid.

87. PD(BOM), Vol. 308 of 1818. Letter No. 78 to COD.

The British immediately thereafter wanted repayment in some form from the Gaekwad for, what they termed, their "useful services" to him. In fact Elphinstone had got this exemption from the Peshwa with a view to inducing the Gaekwad to assent to his wishes regarding various matters.⁸⁸ Within a month of the Treaty of Poona, the Government of Bombay made demands on the Gaekwad. He was asked to maintain two additional subsidiary regiments and to cede more territory or tribute - preferably that of Kathiawad - for their maintenance.⁸⁹ After much negotiation, the Gaekwad had to cede in perpetuity the town of Ahmedabad to the British.⁹⁰ Certain other territories were also exchanged in such a way that the possessions of the British in North Gujarat were consolidated. All these arrangements were ratified in the Supplement to the Definitive Treaty of 1805 on the 6th of November, 1817.⁹¹ Apart from the addition to the subsidiary Force, the Gaekwad bound himself by article 8 of the treaty to maintain and hold at the disposal of the British a body of 3,000 effective cavalry to be supported exclusively at his expense. He had to take the advice and

88. PD(BOM), Ibid. Letter No. 76 to COD.

89. Genze and Banaji, Op. cit., pp. 60-66. Letter from GOB to GOI of 25-6-1817.

90. Ibid., p. 67. Letter from GOB to Carnac of 25-6-1817.

91. Aitchison, Op. cit., ^{Vol. VI} pp. 354-58.

suggestions of the British government about the formation and equipment of this Contingent of Horse. Every month, one of his officers along with the Resident was to jointly inspect the muster and upkeep of the Contingent.⁹² This additional financial burden and the condition of its implementation was to be another source of conflict between the two governments.

The idea of the British seemed to be to pass on some of the expenses of a patrolling Gujarat and Kathiawad on to the Gaekwad. The British had found that the Bombay Presidency had to spend a considerable amount every year for checking extensive and serious depredations in parts of Kathiawad and the Gaekwad's territories in Gujarat.⁹³ Sir Evan Napier, the Governor candidly put it to the Governor-General that Kathiawad was important from a military and political point of view and that it would be advisable to transfer the administration and defence of Kathiawad to the British government. This would complete their chain of defence and consolidate their power and influence in the western part of their Indian empire.⁹⁴ This was definitely an annexationist policy whatever the protestations of Sir Evan to the contrary and was in no way compatible with the maintenance of 'independence' of

92. Ibid.

93. Genze and Banaji, Op. cit., p. 63. Letter from GOB to GOI of 25-6-1817.

94. Ibid., p. 65.

the Indian rulers.

Fatehsingh now probably realised that Baroda was becoming merely an appendage to the British power, and resentment and frustration made him curt and harsh to the Resident.⁹⁵ In this tense atmosphere, Fatehsingh died after a short illness on the 23rd June, 1818.⁹⁶

The Government of Bombay, inspite of the strained relations of the last few years, remembered his earlier acquiescent attitude and attachment to the British government and ordered the British flag to be hoisted half-mast in the Garrison and the firing of 26 minute guns, the age of Fatehsingh at his death.⁹⁷ Thus ended a more or less peaceful era in British-Baroda relations.

The next 30 years were to see crucial developments in these relationships, the pattern of which had been laid during the last two decades. Most of the seeds of future conflict are to be found here in the growing power of British paramountcy. The awakening to it and reactions to its consequences of Sayajirao forms the story of the next Chapters.

95. Bhagwat, A.N., History of Baroda State, Vol. I, Chapter II.

96. HS(BAR), Vol. V, No. 178.

97. PD(BOM), Vol. 451 of 1818. Resolution of Bombay Council of 1-7-1818. According to the records of the Baroda State, Fatehsingh was born on 3-9-1796, and was, therefore, 22 years old. HS(Bar), Vol.V, No.178.

CHAPTER II

ACCESSION OF SAYAJIRAO AND EARLY YEARS

With the death of Fatehsingh, the British choice fell on Sayajirao Gaekwad^{his younger brother} as the new Regent. Anandrao was persuaded to nominate him to the vacancy in the Council created by Fatehsingh's death. This virtually made him the heir designate. Fatehsingh had no son and Anandrao's son was born of a low caste woman. Sayajirao, who was only nineteen, won the wholehearted support of Carnac, who thought he saw in him a character which he could mould, direct, and ultimately control. The Resident was extremely eulogistic about Sayajirao at this stage and spoke of him as having the ability to comprehend state affairs. At the same time, Sayajirao had already shown an independence of spirit which Carnac hoped to confine to 'wholesome limits'.¹ He thought Sayajirao capable of doing substantial good for the state without degenerating into tyranny or oppressing conduct.² The courtiers had also recognised the trait of independence and realised that Sayajirao would not allow any one to dominate over him and that he would keep power in his

1. PD(BOM), 413 of 1818. Carnac to GOB of 2-7-1818.

2. Ibid.

own hands, considering questions of state carefully on his own.³ They and the other hangers-on of the court, relatives and favourites, who had enjoyed privileges and powers under Fatehsingh, now realised that these could be taken away from them by Sayajirao if he so chose.

The personality of Sayajirao had been shaped by his mother and the circumstances of his life. On the death of his father, Govindrao Gaekwad, he, as the youngest son, was neglected and relegated into the background. It was only in 1806, when the Residency was established that a settlement seems to have been made on him and his mother.⁴ He was taught reading and writing and the things necessary for princely families. However, he was rarely found in the court and seems to have lived secluded life and alone. As a result, he grew up to be morose and solitary, little given to sharing his thoughts or opinions with others.⁵

With these controversial traits in him, conflicts were bound to arise regarding his nomination to the Regency. The leading role played by the British in this

3. Bhagwat, A.N., Shrimant Thorle Sayajirao Maharaj Yanche Charitra, Vol. I, p. 47.

4. Ibid., p. 44. Bhagwat states that it was understood that a fixed stipend and retainers were granted through the intervention of the Resident. No definite information about Sayajirao's childhood is available.

5. Ibid., pp. 44-45.

shows the position they had already assumed. Elphinstone, the Governor of Bombay, under whose jurisdiction the western India states came, decided to recommend Sayajirao to Anandrao as the new Regent.⁶ Elphinstone warned Carnac that he would get opposition from different contending interests, but believed that he was pursuing the only legitimate course.⁷ The British were determined to uphold Sayajirao, as the only other likely claimants would have started a number of intrigues against them.⁸ These claimants being minors, the ministers and hangers-on would have played upon the feeble minded Anandrao to the detriment of the British as well as the Baroda state itself. Carnac felt that the ministers would have encouraged any measures calculated to throw the State government into their own hands.⁹

Soon after the death of Fatehsingh, the Resident was faced with the problem of two other claimants to the title and position of Regent. One of them was the newly adopted son of Radhabai (Fatehsingh's widow) and the other Anandrao's son, Balwantrao.

6. PDD(BOM), No. 451. Minutes of Elphinstone of 22-7-1818.

7. PDSC(BOM), 13 of 1841. Minutes of Elphinstone of 20-7-1818.

8. Gense et al, Carnac to GOB of 30-7-1818, p. 142.

9. Ibid.

As Carnac reported, the first claim arose out of a dramatic situation, calculated to play upon the emotions of the people. Shortly after the death of Fatehsingh, his favourite wife, Radhabai Gaekwad, declared her resolution to commit Sati. The first attempt to dissuade her appeared to produce no effect and Carnac was asked to intervene.¹⁰

Ultimately, it transpired that Radhabai was prepared to forego Sati if Carnac would support her wish to adopt a son.¹¹ Carnac agreed to this, as according to him, he had no right or power to refuse.¹² However, the real intention of the proponents of this plan was soon clear when Carnac was asked to pledge himself to give every countenance and support to the adopted boy, and thus advocate his pretensions to position of Regent. Radhabai's group attempted to make Carnac commit himself in their favour. Carnac, however, publicly and clearly stated that the British looked upon this adoption as a personal matter and not a state affair, and that it in no way weakened the claims of Sayajirao as heir apparent.¹³ In spite of Carnac's stand, the eight year old Govindrao,

10. Ibid., pp. 140-43.

11. Ibid.

12. Ibid.

13. Ibid.

son of Ganpatrao Gaekwad, formerly the chief of Sankheda, was adopted by Radhabai with these ulterior motives.¹⁴ She was supported by the former personal minister of Fatehsingh, Vithalrao (Withobarao) and most of the Sardars.¹⁵

The second claimant - both to the Regency and the position of heir apparent - was Anandrao's illegitimate son, Balwantrao, a boy of fifteen. By the laws of succession he was not eligible as his mother Takhtabai belonged to a low caste. Carnac, in his report, called her a Rajput woman.¹⁶ (The British used to include Bhils etc. in the Rajput tribes at that time).

Carnac, with the full backing of the Bombay government, came out in support of Sayajirao, who, according to them was the legally correct choice, and also one, through whom, they saw the greatest possibility of advancing their power.

These claims and counterclaims created a tense situation in the State for about two months. The attention of all was focussed on the Resident, who, it was obvious, would be the decisive factor. Without the backing of the Resident, no government could hope to survive in Baroda.

14. Ibid.

15. Ibid.

16. Ibid.

The British had become kingmakers.

The ministers, darakdars, sardars and relations of Fatehsingh started secret negotiations with Anandrao to get his support for Govindrao. A few supported Balvantrao's claims but none was found to support Sayajirao.¹⁷ Obviously, this was because Sayajirao already showed a spirit of independence and self assurance which would have rejected any domination by ministers and others.¹⁸

Anandrao was easily persuaded by Carnac and Takhtabai against accepting Govindrao as Regent and heir.¹⁹ Carnac now concentrated his efforts on getting Balvantrao's claims out of the way. Naturally, Anandrao pressed the claims of his own son Balvantrao before the Resident. On three successive visits which Anandrao paid to the Resident he declared his intention of appointing Balvantrao to this position. Carnac was unable to dissuade him. Carnac then concentrated on making Takhtabai amenable. He convinced her that the British government would never recognise her as Regent or heir. She was also made to realise that the Gaekwad's ministers, officers and sardars

17. PDD(BOM), No. 451 of 1818. Carnac to GOB of 14-7-1818.

18. PDD(BOM), No.453 of 1818. Carnac to GOB of 19-7-1818.

19. PDD(BOM), No.453 of 1818. Carnac to GOB of 19-7-1818.

would not support the elevation of a person of defective birth. Carnac convinced her that she would never succeed without the support of the Company, and that her insistence would only create inconveniences for her. She suddenly withdrew, and the field was left open for Sayajirao. He had stood aloof during this controversy, on the advise of Carnac, who had given him an assurance of full support.²⁰

Anandrao was now prevailed upon to appoint Sayajirao as Regent. This was done on the 19th July, 1818, at a Durbar where Sayajirao was publicly invested as Regent before the Resident, Darkdars, Sardars and others.²¹ Anandrao then symbolically placed Sayajirao's hands in Carnac's and advised Sayajirao to listen to the Resident's advice. He also requested the Resident to guide Sayajirao at all times as he had guided him.²² Simultaneously a letter was sent by Anandrao to the Bombay government informing them that Sayajirao had been appointed Regent in consultation with the Resident.²³ A letter of appointment was sent to Sayajirao by Anandrao in which he was advised to work in consultation with his high

20. Ibid.

21. BRO, Outward Register of 19-7-1818.

22. PDD(BOM) 1818, No. 453. Carnac to GOB of 17-10-1818.

23. BRO, Anandrao to GOB of 14-8-1818, Vol. V., Letter No. 179.

officials to maintain the prestige of his government and that he should never be arbitrary and unjust to anyone. Specifically he was told to remember that the 'Company' had given its support to him and would continue to do so. He was exhorted always to work in consultation with the Company.²⁴

Sayajirao was thus formally installed with the help and moral support of the British. The British Governor expected to have his way through Sayajirao, and emphatically impressed on him "the efficiency and utility" of the alliance with the British government. A formal Memorandum of Articles for the conduct of Sayajirao was drawn up on the same day by the Resident and signed by Sayajirao and him. By these articles, Sayajirao promised to uphold the Agreements entered into between the British and the Gaekwads upto that date.²⁵

Though Sayajirao had won the nomination, the rival claimants kept up their intrigues and formed cliques to oppose and harass him, refusing to agree to the settlements he was prepared to make with them and to give up that part of Fatehsingh's treasure which correctly belonged to the Regent. Radhabai refused to accept the settlement

24. BRO, HS., Vol. V. Letter No. 180.

25. SC(BOM), Vol. 13 of 1841. Memorandum of certain articles for the conduct of Sayajirao Gaekwad with the Honourable Company government of 19-7-1818.

proposed by Sayajirao as it contained a clause, seconded by the Resident, stipulating that Govindrao had no title by his adoption to the Gadi.²⁶ These disputes were later on resolved on Sayajirao's accession to the Gadi.

Sayajirao now started working in real earnest as Regent. Carnac had testified that Sayajirao had a habit of rising early and going through a great deal of drudgery, examining every paper till he fully understood it before putting his signature to it.²⁷ The intricacies of accounts, it seems, were not beyond him and he was able to digest and comprehend the problems which were brought before him. Carnac also remarked that the young prince obviously understood what was in his own interest by the "laudable regard" he paid to the problems which now fell under his jurisdiction.²⁸ Carnac declared that it was his intention to keep the Prince within his control while giving him a 'fair latitude of action' by which he would administer to the substantial good of the state, without degenerating into tyranny or oppressive conduct.²⁹ This condescending and superior attitude was to be the cause of future conflicts as Sayajirao's very nature went

26. PD(BOM), Vol. 1470 of 1819. Carnac to GOB of 21-8-1818.

27. PDD(BOM) 1818, No.453. Carnac to GOB of 19-8-1818.

28. Ibid.

29. Ibid.

against such a patronising attitude. He was too proud and independent to remain for long under the restraint of the Resident or Governor of Bombay.

Sayajirao obviously could not continue to keep Vithalrao as his minister since the latter had supported the cause of Radhabai. Sayajirao wanted to recall Sitaram, but Carnac refused to allow this. For the time being, he was allowed to appoint Sitaram's son.³⁰ Sayajirao was not fully satisfied and began to look round for a stronger person, who, he thought, he found in Dhackji Dadaji, the 'native agent' to the British Residency. A 'native agent' was employed by the British as a medium of communication between the Darbar and the Resident. In 1816, Carnac had picked on Dhackji to succeed Gangadhar Sastri in this position, since he felt that Dhackji would be able to successfully carry on the difficult work of keeping an intimate and constant contact with all types of people connected with the Gaekwad. A person like Dhackji, who belonged to the same religion and caste group as the Gaekwad's officers was thought most suitable for such a job. Carnac at that time felt sure of the integrity and honesty of Dhackji who had, he thought, ample personal property. He had been paid a nominal

30. Wallace, Op. cit., p. 228.

salary of about Rs.150 per month.³¹ It was obvious that the salary had not been an inducement, but the opportunities of earning rewards, commercial gains and an honoured name had induced Dhackji to take up the position. Carnac's acquaintance with Dhackji had been through the latter's father, who owned a business in Bombay.³² Dhackji himself had no experience of civil service work until Carnac appointed him as his 'native agent' in 1816. He had till then been prominent in the business circle of Bombay. In December, 1816, Dhackji was also given a share in the Potdaree of the state, i.e., Bankers, and went into partnership with Hari Bhakti and Mairal Narayan.³³ In

31. PDD(BOM) 1816. Carnac to GOB of 10-2-1816.

32. BG., Op. cit., p. 231.

33. PD(BOM), Vol.491 of 1820. Carnac to GOB of 12-5-1820. In Baroda, the state did not retain any money in its possession, and it did not itself make any payments. Instead of retaining a treasury of its own, the state drew upon Bankers for such sums required. It did not lodge money with the Bankers, but granted them letters of credit on farmers of the State Revenues of certain Mahals (districts). The State Bankers thus supplied the government with ready money and recouped themselves from the tax farmed. There were 5(five) Potedars at this time - Hari Bhakti, Mairal Narayan, Samei Bechar, Ratanji Kahandas and Lallu Mangal. The Bankers got $4\frac{1}{2}$ per cent to 9 per cent on their loans to the state. In addition for every Rs.100 paid a deduction of $3\frac{1}{2}$ per cent was made out of which Rs.2 was for Potedari, Rs. $1\frac{1}{2}$ interest, and Rs. $\frac{1}{2}$ agent's interest. On settling his accounts, the Potedar paid back to the government as its share half the Potedari and the interest i.e., $1\frac{1}{2}$. The Potedari also drew manoti (bonus). This was an additional commission from the government for every transaction. In case of this partnership, Hari Bhakti and Narayan Miral put in $8\frac{1}{2}$ lakhs each and Dhackji put in nothing. Dhackji also took up the Potedari of Kathiawar with Ratanji Kahandas. See Gazetteer of Baroda State, Vol.II, Ch.XVI, compiled by G.S.Dastu & A.B.Clerke, p.403ff.

this capacity, he was supposed to have helped the Baroda state make a saving of Rs.96,92,625.³⁴ Obviously all these apparent advantages and connections of Dhackji weighed with Sayajirao in choosing him as his minister, particularly because he believed that Dhackji possessed great influence with Carnac. He was further made to believe that Dhackji had espoused his cause against Govindrao.³⁵

On the 19th February, 1819, Sayajirao wrote to the Governor of Bombay requesting his permission to appoint the 'respectable Dhackji Dadaji' as his minister, citing in support a detailed statement of accounts showing the savings made by the State through Dhackji's Potedaree.³⁶

The matter was referred by the Bombay government to the Governor General.³⁷ Warren Hastings acquiesced in the appointment, provided Dhackji resigned his position in the Residency, as he was of the opinion, that the union of the two offices was undesirable.³⁸ Dhackji was invested as minister by Sayajirao on the 28th September, 1819.³⁹

34. PD(BOM) 491 of 1820. Carnac to GOB 12-5-1820.

35. Ibid., Minutes of Elphinstone, 12-9-1820.

36. BRO. St.Vol. V, Letter No. 138.

37. PDD(BOM) 464 of 1819, GOB to GG, 31-3-1819.

38. PDD(BOM) 467 of 1819, GG to GOB, 7-5-1819.

39. PDD(BOM) 471 of 1819, Carnac to GOB, 29-9-1819.



Before long, however, all sorts of suspicions arose in Sayajirao's mind, and by January, 1820, Sayajirao was asking permission to dismiss Dhackji Dadaji. Fortunately for Sayajirao, the British had not given Dhackji their guarantee which Sayajirao had originally asked for. The complications regarding this will be taken up later.

The Bombay government acquiesced with his request and Sayajirao now tried to get the British to agree to the appointment of Sitaram, Fatehsingh's disgraced minister. Sitaram had been a favourite of the Gaekwads inspite of the British dislike of him. He had been exiled to Navsari as the British had suspected him of treachery and also of being involved in Gangadhar Sastri's murder.⁴⁰ In 1816, Anandrao had, inspite of this, increased his nemnook by Rs.20,000 bringing it to Rs.60,000.⁴¹ In February, 1819, Sayajirao had requested the British government to allow Sitaram to return from Navsari.⁴² This was at first refused, but when Sayajirao pressed for it, the Governor thought it better to permit

40. BG., Op. cit., p. 235.

Sitaram Raoji was the nephew of Raoji Appaji, Anandrao's first minister. He succeeded Raoji as minister in 1803. He was dismissed in 1808 when he was involved in the conspiracy of Hafiz Ghulam Hussain to subvert the British influence in Gujarat. See Chapter I.

41. Wallace, Op. cit., p. 480.

42. Secret Department Minutes Book No. 7, Consultation No. 14 dated 24-3-1819.



his return, provided Sitaram refrained from taking part in public affairs, especially in a way which might be hostile to the British.⁴³ Though he could not be made the minister, Sayajirao consulted him often, and did not nominate any one as minister for the time being.

Sayajirao, by now realised that he was very much circumscribed by the British presence, and this realisation grew stronger as time went on. Sayajirao's first real conflict with the British arose over the matter of the Baroda Contingent. This Contingent, along with the Subsidiary Force, had been employed in Malwa during the British wars with the Maratha Confederacy, and even after the war was over. This had cost the Baroda treasury more than Rs. 40 lakhs.⁴⁴

Sayajirao had relied on the 8th Article of the Treaty of 1817 which says inter alia "His Highness hereby further engages, in case of war, to bring forward the whole of his military resources for the persecution of the war. The Honourable Company, on the other hand, agree to take into consideration and determine the pretensions of the Gaekwad government to benefit by any

43. Ibid.

44. Elliot, Op. cit., pp. 166-67.

future partition of territory acquired in foreign wars. The Gaekwad government also binds itself to maintain and hold at the disposal of the Honourable Company, to act with the subsidiary force wherever it may be employed, and to be subject to the general command of the officer commanding the British troops, a body of 3,000 effective cavalry to be supported exclusively at the expense of the H.H. the Gaekwad and that His Highness will conform to the advice and suggestions of the British government relative to the formation and equipment of the contingent of Horse.⁴⁵ Banking on this clause, Sayajirao asked for a share in the conquered territories. The Resident had many meetings with Sayajirao on this subject and reported to the Bombay government that Sayajirao had pointed out his zeal and faithful cooperation, and that he helped the British by employing a great proportion of his Subsidiary Forces in Malwa, and a considerable body of his own horse and foot.⁴⁶ Sayajirao had inquired whether the British would share any of the territory acquired by them with Baroda, pointing out how in similar circumstances, the Nizam and Salabut Khan of Ellichpoor had obtained territories. Sayajirao made it known that he would regard any 'consideration'

45. Aitchison, Vol. VI, p. 357.

46. PD(BOM), 9/789 of 1819. Carnac to GOB, 24-6-1819.

extended in his interests by the British government as a liberal testimony of their 'generosity and attention' to a claim, he thought, he had acquired by the extent of the expense his government had incurred and the resources he had expended in the war.⁴⁷

Sayajirao's claims were set aside by the Bombay government which was 'astonished and shocked' that their own nominee should dare to ask for such things. The Bombay government acknowledged the 'fidelity and attachment' evinced by Sayajirao for the British interests, but at the same time asked the Resident to draw his attention to the advantages which he had gained through the British who had helped him to resolve his financial difficulties, and keep Baroda in prosperous condition.⁴⁸ Further, they argued that the employment of the Gaekwad's forces in Malwa had been very desirable for him since it protected his possessions against external attack.⁴⁹ Besides this, Sayajirao was reminded that British intervention had exempted Baroda from the payment of Rs.4 lakhs to the Peshwa after the Treaty of Bassein. In fact he was told that he should be immeasurably grateful for all the

47. PD(BOM), 9/784 of 1837. Carnac to GOB, 22-2-1819.

48. Ibid., GOB to Carnac, 20-3-1819.

49. Ibid.

benefits conferred on him thus far and not presume to make demands on an equal footing.⁵⁰ All that Baroda got out of the Malwa expedition was a further debt of Rs.30 lakhs which had to be borrowed to pay the troops.⁵¹

Soon after, Sayajirao was faced with the problem of exchange of territories arising from the clauses of the Supplement to the Definitive Treaty of 1817. By Article 3, Fatehsingh had agreed to increase the Subsidiary Force.⁵² To pay for this, Fatehsingh had to cede the revenue of the Ahmedabad districts. The British, however, wanted suzerainty over Ahmedabad and this they had partly gained by exchange of territories with Fatehsingh. Half the city of Ahmedabad and its districts, and some parts of the Gaekwad's Petlad district had been exchanged by the Gaekwad for Dabhoi, Bahadarpur and Savali.⁵³ The British had acquired these three districts after the defeat of Bajirao, when all the rights of the Peshwa in Gujarat and the annual dues of the Gaekwad to the Peshwas had been ceded to the British.⁵⁴ By this first exchange the British were able to consolidate their possessions in

50. Ibid.

51. PD(BOM), 9/784 of 1837. Carnac to GOB, 22-2-1819.

52. Aitchison, Vol. VI, p. 355.

53. Ibid., Schedule 'B' to Treaty of 1817, p. 358.
Fatehsingh retained Daskroi, the Haveli in the city and the Mahikantha tributes, See Map.

54. Elliot, Op. cit., p. 158.

north Gujarat. The British aimed at consolidating all their areas as profitably as possible. Further exchange of territory had also taken place under Article 6 of the same treaty.⁵⁵ Kapadvanj, Bhalej, Karod and other villages in the district were ceded by the Gaekwad in exchange for Vijapur and Tappa Sami of Kadi. Whilst negotiations for further exchanges for consolidation were going on, Fatehsingh died and Sayajirao had to accede to exchanges agreed on earlier by Fatehsingh, all in favour of the British, who saw to it that their line of communications were consolidated.

The remaining half of Ahmedabad, a city which both parties considered important, because of its historical importance as the old capital of Gujarat had been demanded by the British in exchange for their inconvenient districts. Fatehsingh had more or less conceded to this before his death and it was left to Sayajirao to agree to it, much against his will, in November, 1818.⁵⁶

55. Aitchison, Vol. VI, pp. 354-60.

56. Ibid., Schedule 'C' to Treaty of 1817, p.359.
In Article 6 of this Treaty, the British had promised not to ask for more exchanges.

The British had proceeded cautiously at first, not wanting to disturb the "reciprocal good understanding" subsisting at that time between themselves and Sayajirao.⁵⁷ Carnac had, therefore, been asked to use as much persuasion as possible to convince Sayajirao that his surrender of the possessions in question was profitable to his government and that it was essential to the consolidation of the British territory around Ahmedabad.⁵⁸ Sayajirao stated his position in a Yad to Carnac in which he reminded the British government that in the Supplemental Treaty, they had solemnly stipulated that they would not ask for further exchanges of territory and that the Duskroi and Haveli of Ahmedabad had been studiously kept out of all the previous discussions about cessations to be pointed out. Fatehsingh had made valuable and extensive cessions and substitutions of territory. In this case, he stated the Duskroi and Haveli of Ahmedabad were essential to his dignity as a Sovereign, as Ahmedabad had been the 'seat of government to the Kings of all Hindustan' and its loss would be lead to the downfall of his State. He pointed out that the interests of the chief members of his family and many of the darakdars

57. PD. Diary 1818, No. 451.

58. Ibid.

would be compromised by parting with these territories as the inam villages had been given from them.⁵⁹

Inspite of these objections, when Sayajirao saw the eagerness of the British to acquire these territories, he deemed it expedient to concur in a measure which had no support from any one else around him.⁶⁰ As Carnac reported, Sayajirao begged him "literally and faithfully" to explain to the Governor his feelings as well as the embarrassing situation to which he had been reduced by the frequent demands made on him for concessions. He entreated Carnac to adhere to the terms of the stipulations respecting exchange of territory, and concluded his Yad by an animated avowal of his fervant hope that, if the British accepted the Haveli, it should be the last of the sacrifice he would be called upon to make.⁶¹

In pursuit of the same object, the British began investigating the administration of the petty states of Kathiawad, which were tributaries of the Gaekwad. Through Walker, the first Resident at Baroda, the British had made inroads into the Rights held by the Gaekwads in

59. Ibid., Yad quoted in Consul No.451.

60. Ibid.

61. Ibid.

Kathiawad, by various arrangements regarding the collection of revenues and policing of the States. The British were anxious to get the Gaekwad out of Kathiawad. For at least two centuries before the Maratha domination of Gujarat, the petty chiefs of Kathiawad had been independent in their internal administration, whoever held suzerainty over Gujarat.⁶² They were, however, tributary to that power and paid the tribute (when exacted by the presence of an army) to obtain the forbearance of that power, whose goodwill was necessary for them as they feared the consequences of the enmity of the suzerain.⁶³ In 1806, Walker had made a detailed study and reported that 'except in the payment of Jamabandi (tribute), the chiefs (rajas, rawals, thakurs, Grassias) were in actual possession and exercised every right of sovereignty, the power of life and death, and the administration of justice, within their respective villages'.⁶⁴ In their relations with each other and other rulers, they exercised the same freedom. They formed such connections as might be

62. Gense et al, Op. cit, Report by Carnac on Bhavnagar, 1815, p. 265.

63. Ibid.

64. SR(BOM), No. 39, New Series, Part I, Report of Walker, 1806, p.121f.

necessary for the security and extension of their commerce. They built fortifications and maintained troops. Nor, does it appear that any of the states to whom they paid tribute ever interfered in their transactions, whether foreign or domestic, so long as they were not inimical to them.⁶⁵

After the disintegration of the Moghul Empire, the Kathiawad chieftains stopped being tributaries to any single power, till the coming of the Marathas. During his raids into Kathiawad, Damsji Gaekwad had gained some property through intervening in a quarrel between the chief of Amreli and the Kattri. He also married the daughter of the chief of Lattur and got Damnagar with 10 dependent villages as a dowry. Thus he laid the foundation of territorial possessions of the Gaekwads in Kathiawad. A few more territories were added to these through the years, but the main hold of the Marathas in Kathiawad was through the tributes they extracted which formed a considerable part of their revenues.⁶⁶ This tribute was collected by the Mulakgiri system. The chiefs were called upon to pay tribute less in proportion to their resources than to their powers of resistance,

65. Ibid.

66. Elliot, Op. cit., pp. 116-129.

for the meakest always paid more.⁶⁷ At subsequent intervals, not necessarily yearly, an army was sent to collect the tributes thus agreed upon. No remissions were ever made, but all arrears were strictly called to account.

Sometimes the chiefs paid and sometimes they did not. It enhanced their honour and good name not to pay unless the army enforcing tribute was too strong to be resisted. If the chief agreed to discharge his tribute, or such portion of it as satisfied the invaders, his territory was carefully protected. If he chose to resist before paying, the Gaekwad forces, whose invasions always took place at harvest time, systematically destroyed the crops, burnt down the green villages and detached homesteads and, in short, by plunder and devastation, did all the harm they could to break the will of these tributaries.⁶⁸ Obviously, this system of Mulakgiri imposed untold misery and suffering. Apart from this, the stranger amongst the petty rulers, extracted Mulakgiris of their own.⁶⁹ Many of the petty states were ruined or were on the verge of ruin by this system.⁷⁰

67. Ibid.

68. Ibid.

69. PD(BOM), 448 of 1818. Carnac to GOB, 25-4-1818.

70. Ibid.

The tribute thus collected had been on behalf of both the Peshwa and the Gaekwad, who had shared the tributes of Kathiawad. For many years, since 1800, the Gaekwad alone had been farming this revenue on behalf of the Peshwa under the terms of a Sunnad granted to Bhagwantrao Gaekwad in 1800 by the Peshwa.⁷¹ This was originally for 10 years and fixed at Rs. 4½ lakhs. Due to the dynastic struggles in Baroda after the death of the Gaekwad Govindrao, there was an end to mulakgiri expenditure for some time, resulting in bankruptcy for the State.⁷² When Walker came to Baroda, his attention had been immediately drawn to this problem. Apart from his interest in bringing fiscal stability to Baroda, he must have seen this as an opportunity of increasing the British control over other areas of Gujarat. Having got Anandrao completely under his control, through Raoji Appaji, Walker had pressed his advantage, and introduced into Kathiawad a British artillery, a detachment of European soldiers, and two Corps of 'Indian' infantry in the first instance to 'help the Gaekwad to collect his dues'.⁷³ The British,

71. Aitchison, ^{Op. cit} Vol. VI, Appendix No. VIII.

72. Gense et al, Vol. X, Report by Carnac on Bhavnagar etc. 1815, p. 272.

73. Elliot, Op. cit., p. 121.

however, had been thinking in terms of effecting a permanent settlement with the chieftains by which they could usurp the powers and sovereignty of the Gaekwad. In August, 1807, the combined forces of the British and the Gaekwad encamped at Gutu and a joint letter had been issued to 29 principal chieftains inviting them to attend the camp in order to discuss the issues of a permanent settlement of the Gaekwad's Mulakgiri claims, with appropriate securities.⁷⁴ By May, 1808, the settlements had been completed. Ultimately, the agreements which concerned almost all the big and small chieftains of Kathiawad brought the British very much into the picture as guarantors of the payment as well as guarantors of the Gaekwad's promises. This had been done by a series of engagements entered into on the one hand between the British and the chieftains, and on the other between the Gaekwad and the chieftains.

Each individual tributary had signed an agreement with Walker whereby the chief had promised to pay the 'Jamaband and Khurajat' (expenses) each year at Baroda according to the bond signed by each. An agent was to be sent by the chief concerned without failure, and the

74. Wallace, Op. cit., Circular letter to the Chieftains of Kathiawad from the Honourable East India Company, pp. 105-107.

whole arrangement had the guarantee of the British government.⁷⁵ This 'Bond' was an Agreement between the chiefs and the Banker who stood guarantee for the payment fixed for each particular chief.⁷⁶ Next, each chief gave a 'File Zameen'⁷⁶ or security for good behaviour addressed to the Gaekwad and the Gaekwad then addressed a 'Parwana'⁷⁷, which was countersigned by Walker, who accepted the Agreement and specifically stated that his guarantee was given for the observances of these articles.⁷⁸ The total amount of tribute thus fixed, and agreed upon by Walker and the Gaekwad and the chiefs, was Rs.11,83,643, a large portion of which the Gaekwad received only in his capacity as 'farmer' on behalf of the Peshwa.⁷⁹ This fact was destined to bear the greatest consequences. Walker had fixed the sums which the Chiefs had to pay without consulting the Peshwa whose rights were thus seriously invaded, and who had good cause for resentment.

75. Wallace, Op. cit., Form of a Bond executed by a banker on behalf of the chief, p. 129.

76. Wallace, Op. cit., "File Zameen", pp.130-32.

77. Wallace, Op. cit., Parwana of H.H. the Gaekwad addressed to each chief with list of the chiefs concerned in the settlement with the payments due from each, pp. 132-38.

78. Ibid.

79. SR(BOM), New Series, Pt.I, Vol. 39, No.140.

Though these Settlements were intended to be permanent, the engagements entered into under File Zameen in 1810 were at first only for ten years.

As a result of these Agreements, the British had secretly begun to post their officers and forces in Kathiawad to enforce payment for the tribute for which they had become guarantors. Very soon they were found settling disputes, sentencing criminals, arbitrating and generally assuming the powers and postures of sovereignty. This had been resented both by the Gaekwad and the Peshwa.

In 1817, after his final defeat, Bajirao had surrendered all his claims against the Gaekwad, and had agreed to accept Rs. 4 lakhs a year from him as an equivalent for all past claims. The Peshwa also ceded his tributes in Kathiawad, and all his other rights in Gujarat to the British.⁸⁰ By the time Sayajirao became Regent, Kathiawad was fast becoming a British sphere of influence. At every stage, Sayajirao found his powers being usurped by past Agreements, over which he had had no control whatsoever.

^{Op. cit.}
80. Aitchison, Vol. VII, Treaty of Poona, Dec. 1817, pp. 63-66. By this the British had brought large parts of Gujarat under their control, i.e. Kathiawad, Rewakantha and Maheekantha.

Similar developments had taken place in Maheekantha and Rewakantha. Here also, the Gaekwad had collected tribute on behalf of himself and the Peshwa through Mulakgiri expeditions. In 1811-1812, Lt.Col. Ballantyne, on behalf of the Bombay government, along with the Gaekwad's forces, had met the Chieftains of these districts and made them enter into agreements of the type contracted by the Kathiawad Chiefs.⁸¹ The Rewakantha settlements were made during the regime of Sayajirao. Both these areas were constantly disturbed by the depredations of the Koli and Mehvasi tribes, and the maintenance of law and order in these areas became a bone of contention between the British and the Gaekwad governments and gave the British an excuse to introduce their troops here.⁸²

The British, on acquiring the Peshwa's tribute of Kathiawad, had begun to plan ways and means of increasing their power in this area. They immediately realized that they could now rightfully deploy an efficient and regular force in the name of maintaining the peace of Gujarat and the rights and interests of their government as well as that of the chieftains.⁸³

81. SC(BOM), No. XII.

82. Ibid.

83. PD. Minutes, 1818, 1-4-1819.

The Bombay government decided to assign the collection of the Kathiawad tribute (their share) to the Collector of Ahmedabad, and appointed Capt. Barnwell as the Agent of the British government to look after the British interests in that province.⁸⁴ Capt. Willoughby was given the separate duty of watching over the interests of the Gaekwad in Kathiawad. Upto now, under the dicennial Agreements, the tribute had been jointly collected by the Gaekwad's agent and the British agent with the help of the Gaekwad forces, if necessary. Sometimes, the Gaekwad had allowed the British Agent to be his Agent also.⁸⁵

Besides these immediate changes, the British government were preparing for the renewal of the dicennial Agreements with the chieftains, with changes, beneficial to themselves. This renewal was due in 1820. Grounds were being prepared to prove that the Gaekwad's officers had been incompetent and dishonest, to facilitate a take over. Due to natural calamities, in fact, Kathiawad had not fared well during the last six years preceding Sayajirao's reign. The British, in 1818, tried hard to prove that the decline in Kathiawad had in a great measure

84. Ibid.

85. PD(BOM), 448 of 1818. Carnac to GOB, 25-4-1818.

been^{due} to the heavy exactions of the Gaekwad's officers and the excesses of the Mulakgiri army. The British, they claimed, could not, therefore, any longer be 'silent spectators' of the approaching ruin of Kathiawad.⁸⁶ These accusations were blatantly false and went against Carnac's own report of a few months earlier. He had stated that, after a tour of Kathiawad to institute general inquiries, he had elicited the fact from the Gaekwad's Sarsubah (officer) that there was an outstanding debt of Rs. 19 to 20 lakhs from the chieftains to the Gaekwad and that the Gaekwad's tribute in the past six years had, in fact, been collected through Carnac's assistant.⁸⁷ He had also stated that he had no proof of unauthorised exactions on the part of the Gaekwad's officers and that the continued silence of his assistant on this important question and the absence of any specific accusation had made him hesitate in charging the Gaekwad's servants with acts of serious misconduct.⁸⁸

Sayajirao was now faced with these machinations, on the part of the Bombay government and also the problem

86. PD(BOM), 479 of 1820. Carnac to GOB, 18-2-1820.

87. PD(BOM), 448 of 1818. Carnac to GOB, 25-4-1818.

88. Ibid.

of collection of arrears amounting, as stated, to about Rs.20 lakhs in Kathiawad alone. Part of this could be attributed to the draught and famine of the preceding years, but also, as the Gaekwad stated, to the fact that the different chiefs now had no fear of the consequences arising from the accumulation of their tributary dues and hoped to find a pretext for remission when the sum demanded was large.⁸⁹ They were hoping to get remission through the intervention of the British and had become bold, because they saw how the Gaekwad, their sovereign, could no longer use force against them. The British had not carried out their part of the Agreement of assuring the Gaekwad his tributes, though they were always harping on their obligations to people who made claims against the Gaekwad.

The action of the Morvi chieftain may be taken as a typical case. Claiming to have been badly hit by natural calamities, he had not paid tribute since 1813, and in 1819, he appealed to the British for remission.⁹⁰ It had become a practice for the Chiefs to approach the British for arbitration in such matters, who, in turn, recommended remissions to the Gaekwad government, as

89. PD(BOM), 479 of 1820, Carnac to GOB, 18-2-1820.

90. Ibid.

they had in this case through Capt. Ballantyne. They could thus pose as champions of the Chieftains against their rightful Sovereign. In this case, the annual tribute settled by Walker had been Rs.50,000,⁹¹ and the arrears amounted to about Rs.3,00,000 in 1819. The Raja of Morvi claimed that he was unable to pay the dues because of the depredations of the Wager bandits, the pestilence and the plague,⁹² and his arguments were supported by Capt. Ballantyne.⁹³ The Gaekwad's Sarsubah categorically denied these statements as during the entire period of the alleged 'depredations' by the bandits, Capt. MacMurado, with a body of Gaekwad Horse and Foot under Govindrao, had been stationed in the Morvi territory on the frontiers, and they had effectively protected it.⁹⁴ It was further stated by the Sarsubah that the Raja of Morvi was proverbially faithless and that no merchant could remain in his town, as it was no place for industry or cultivation, since he oppressed his subjects and spent all the funds he realised in dissipation. He would not pay his acknowledged tribute,

91. PD(BOM), 16/78 of 1822. Williams to GOB, 20-4-1822.

92. Ibid.

93. Ibid.

94. Ibid.

the official ^{put} pointed, even if he had a crore of Rupees.⁹⁵
 In fact, Capt. Barnwell, who had succeeded Ballantyne, after seeing the defiance of the Raja and his general behaviour, recommended that no further indulgence whatever should be extended to him and that his possessions be sequestered. The produce should then be ascertained and the extent of the arrears to be paid determined.⁹⁶

In spite of all this evidence, the Government of Bombay decided that remission was due to the Morvi chief. It concluded that the 'distresses' of the Morvi Raja was not exaggerated, and supported the statement made by saying that the Governor had passed through the country and had seen the state it was in 1820. Its villages were deserted and the fields overgrown with long grass. It claimed that although, the Morvi chief might not have suffered from the Wager bandits, yet his territory had been ruined by the Mallia freebooters.⁹⁷ It was claimed that famine and subsequent pestilence had certainly raged more in that quarter of Kathiawad than in any other.⁹⁸ What could Sayajirao do in this case? The government determined that out of the 50,000 Sayajirao claimed

95. Ibid.

96. Ibid.

97. Ibid. These Mallias were tribals who had been reduced in 1809 by Walker, during his Settlement.

98. Ibid.

annually, he should get 33½ per cent in arrears, and in future, the British government, as heirs of the late Peshwa, were to receive the remaining 66½ percent of the tribute.⁹⁹ As pointed out by Williams, this decision left the Gaekwad with an enormous loss in principal arrears, as well as unpaid interest.¹⁰⁰ The actual loss at that time amounted to arrears of Rs.1,90,909, and interest of Rs.1,82,083.¹⁰¹

Sayajirao challenged this decision stating that the Morvi chief had not suffered as much as he showed. Sayajirao reminded the British of the report of Carnac in 1818, when he had found that the Chief could with 'perfect ease' discharge his dues. Sayajirao pointed out that the Chief had boasted to Capt. Ballantyne of his ability to successfully resist him, who was 'fettered' by the British. Carnac's conclusion had been that the Gaekwad had a right to expect full compensation from the Morvi chief or the surrender of his territory.¹⁰² He had also admitted that the Gaekwad had suffered to a serious extent whereas he had had the best reason to suppose his revenues to be permanent and secure.¹⁰³

99. Ibid.

100. PD(BOM) 16/78 of 1822. Wallace to GOB, 20-4-1822.

101. Ibid.

102. Genze et al, Op. cit., Carnac to GOB, 21-5-1818, p. 287.

103. Ibid.

Ultimately, Sayajirao agreed very unwillingly to the remission as directed by the British.¹⁰⁴

Walker's arrangement had, thus, in fact, worked to the detriment of Baroda. Since the Gaekwad had to rely on the Bopds executed by the chieftains under British guarantee, he could not use his mulakgiri forces any longer on his own, and was, therefore, helpless to recover his rights.

The British were, however, bent on making new arrangements, which would further erode the Gaekwad's authority in Kathiawad. Sayajirao found that interference was increasing in all areas of Kathiawad and other big and small tributaries, and also that persistent efforts were being made to force him to assent to a new scheme of collection of tribute when the dicennial agreements were due for renewal.

The most vexatious question arose over matters of jurisdiction in the Gaekwad's tributary States of Rajpipla, Bhavnagar and Jafferabad, and the settlement of internal quarrels between the Siddi of Jafferabad and the Kathi of Dedaun. An examination of these cases will illustrate how the British, through their Agents, and

104. PD(BOM), 16/78 of 1822. Williams to GOB, 20-4-1822.

the Resident at Baroda assumed the role of Sovereign vis a vis those tributaries.

In the Bhavnagar-Junagadh dispute, the Thakur of Bhavnagar laid claim to five villages of Junagadh, which were tributaries of the Gaekwad, and took possession of them. His justification was that these villages belonged to Bhavnagar before the dicennial agreement of 1810, and that they had been captured by Junagadh subsequently. The Nawab of Junagadh gathered troops on the border to resume possession. The Resident interfered and made both sides feel the might of British power and got them to suspend their respective claims till the next dicennial settlement. No reference was made to the Gaekwad - he was just by passed.¹⁰⁵

Similarly in the case of Jafferbad and Dedaun, the Sidi of Jafferbad seized the village of Pal in Babriawar. The Kathi of Dedaun to whom this village belonged gave resistance and defeated the Sidi. The Sidi had been warned by the Gaekwad's Sarsubah, but had turned a deaf ear. On the Resident admonishing him however, the Sidi had agreed to subsist.¹⁰⁶

In the case of Rajpeepla, there were two problems involved - that of the amount of tribute and

105. PD(BOM), Minute of 1819, No.37, 27-10-1819.

106. Ibid.

of succession. In both cases, the British actively participated in matters which came solely under the Gaekwad's jurisdiction, till ultimately, the Gaekwad lost all jurisdiction over this and other tributaries.

Ramsinh, the Raja of Rajpeepla had become insane due to, it was said, inordinate use of intoxicating drugs.¹⁰⁷ Misery and rapine was let loose on Baroda territory due to the depredations of the Girasias from Rajpeepla.¹⁰⁸ The Gaekwad, who was the de jure sovereign, had invested Pratapsinh, Ramsinh's son with the authority of his father. This measure had met the approbation of Carnac, and he was earnestly solicited to give the British guarantee to this arrangement.¹⁰⁹ Ramsinh died in May, 1810, and Pratapsinh was recognised by the Gaekwad as the new Raja. He promised to pay the Gaekwad a Ghasdana of Rs.20,000 annually and permanently ceded Gurdeswar.¹¹⁰

107. Wallace, Op. cit., p. 241.

108. Girasias were the original holders of the land - Bhils, Kolees, Rajputs who had been allowed to retain $\frac{1}{4}$ of their estates at the time of the Muslim conquest. See Chavda, Op. cit., ff.50.

109. Genze et al, Carnac to GOB, 15-12-1815, p. 55.

110. Ibid., Note Wallace's accusation (p.241) that Carnac gave a version different from that recorded by Walker, who had stated that Ghasdana was biennial and that the cession was temporary. Carnac did not also mention the payment of Muzrana to the Gaekwad. Ghasdana was a tax which originated during the early Maratha invasions of Gujarat when the Commanders of their Army made the villagers pay for their 'grass and grain' during their forages. After the establishment of the Gaekwad's State, it became a fixed permanent tax to be exacted from the tributaries. See Gen BS, Vol.VII.

This arrangement, as reported by Carnac, was sanctioned by the Bombay government. Disturbances soon broke out as Pratapsinh's accession was challenged by Narsinh, his cousin, who with the aid of Jeewa Wisawa, the Bhil chieftain of this region, took to armed revolt even attacking British territory. The Gaekwad sent his troops to restore order but he was not able to avert disturbances completely till in 1816, Withalrao Diwanji, the Sarsubah, was deputed to arrange affairs. He relieved both Pratapsinh and Narsinh of their Commands and took over the administration of Rajpipla in the name of the Gaekwad, who was to arbitrate the two claims.¹¹¹ Matters stood at this stage, when Sayajirao became Regent and he was urged to solve the problem by both parties. Obviously, it suited Sayajirao to keep direct possession of Rajpipla. Williams, the former Acting Resident, who had succeeded Carnac in May 1820, urged active intervention by the British in this region.¹¹² Williams urged his government to undertake to arbitrate the rival claims as this principality was included in the decennial arrangements regarding the collection of the Gaekwad's tribute in Kathiawad and especially as it was contiguous to British territory.

111. Ibid. During this time Diwanji aimed to recover the amount spent by his government in quelling the revolt. See Wallace, Op. cit., pp.238-50.

112. PDL(BOM) to COD, 92/1822, 31-7-1822.

It was imperative, he felt, therefore, that good government should be established in Rajpipla.¹¹³ Williams represented the spirit of expansion which the British were manifesting at this time. Instead of the cordiality and mutual courtesy, which had generally pervaded the relations between Carnac and Sayajirao, a sense of superiority and show of haughtiness, always pervaded the actions of Williams, who naturally met with hostility from Sayajirao. Williams, the Acting Resident, after what he claimed was a laborious and searching examination, reported that Pratapsinh had been purchased when an infant by Ramsinh's wife, from a Rajput named Jaisinh Rana, through her father, the chief of Mandwa.¹¹⁴ Since Narsinh was blind, his young son Vereesal was according to Williams, 'satisfactorily' proved to be the rightful claimant.¹¹⁵ This solution was extremely satisfactory to the British as they anticipated full control over the new Raja as he was a minor. Willoughby, the Resident's Assistant was deputed to accompany the young Raja to his country, and was to formally invest him with its sovereignty under the guarantee of the British government.¹¹⁶

113. Ibid., Ramsinh had executed a Bond and File Zameen with the British and Gaekwad officers in 1808 about the payment of tribute as all other chieftains had done in Mahikanta and Rewakanta.

114. PD(BOM), 7/102 of 1823, Williams to GOB, 3-3-1820. Williams who had been Carnac's Assistant started working as Acting Resident from January, 1820 in Carnac's absence, and succeeded as Resident in May, 1820.

115. Ibid.

116. Ibid.

The proceedings related here amply illustrate the way in which the Gaekwad's rights were uncereemoniously pushed aside. As Overlord, the Gaekwad had the right to decide the issue of succession and to invest the rightful ruler. Naturally, when Williams sought discussion with Sayajirao on this issue, he was met with a 'gloomy and sullen air'.¹¹⁷ Sayajirao gave him a memorandum claiming his rights as arbitrator.¹¹⁸ A show was then made of soliciting Sayajirao's opinion on the succession, when it was already a fait accompli.¹¹⁹ Sayajirao, seeing how the land lay gave his decision, also in favour of Vereesal.¹²⁰ As a further show of trying to hide force behind the glove, Sayajirao was allowed to perform the investiture ceremony in his Durbar.¹²¹ This act of the British in deciding the succession brought many other claimants to the British for support against the Gaekwad's decisions regarding succession matters. One of them was the deposed Raja of Aullee who sought British help for his reinstatement.¹²² As a result of their intervention he was reinstated.¹²³

117. PDL(BOM) to COD, 90 of 1822, 14-4-1822.

118. Ibid.

119. Ibid.

120. Ibid.

121. Ibid.

122. PDL(BOM) to COD, 92 of 1822, 20-5-1822.

123. Ibid.

The other vexatious question with regard to Rajpipla was about the arrears of tribute. This was also dealt as arbitrarily as the other issues by the British. According to the Gaekwad, arrears of tribute from 1815 onwards amounting to Rs.21 lakhs were due to him.¹²⁴ He estimated the annual tribute due to him at Rs.94,000, and only part payment had been made by Rajpipla. The British, under the Rewarkantha settlements, claimed their right to arbitrate on this issue, and Willoughby was ordered by Williams to investigate the matter. Apart from the 21 lakhs in arrears, the Gaekwad Bankers claimed repayment of debts amounting to Rs.30 lakhs.¹²⁵ In addition to these claims, the Gaekwad had some 'personal' villages in Rajpipla and his share in the customs of Rajpipla.¹²⁶ Inquiries on all claims were instituted by Willoughby, on whose report, the Bombay government made unilateral recommendations to Sayajirao.

According to Willoughby, the arrears amounted to little over Rs. 8 lakhs.¹²⁷ The Banker's claim of Rs.30 lakhs was dismissed by him on the grounds that they had

124. PD(BOM), 92 of 1822, No. 17. Williams to GOB.

125. Ibid., No. 79. Williams to GOB.

126. Ibid., No. 17.

127. PD(BOM), 7/102 of 1823. Williams to GOB, 3-3-1820.

'fattened themselves upon the distresses' of the people of Rajpipla and had, in fact, in many instances caused them. They were offered a compensation of 4 annas in the rupee in payment of the principal and interest. If they did not accept this, the debt was to be considered annulled.¹²⁸ The annual tribute was fixed at around Rs.60,000. As regards the personal villages of the Gaekwad and custom dues, the Gaekwad, the British decided, should be persuaded to give them up.¹²⁹ Thus the entire arrangements suggested by the British were aimed at reducing the political and economic strength of Sayajirao. Protracted and sometimes recriminative discussions on these issues took place between Sayajirao and the *Acting* Resident.¹³⁰ These questions were ultimately settled during the visit of Mountstuart Elphinstone in 1820, and by 1822, the Gaekwad had to accept the British suggestions, except that he was permitted to retain his personal villages.¹³¹ In most of the cases of arrears of tribute, the British intervened on behalf of the Tributaries with the result that Sayajirao was unable to get out of the

128. Ibid.

129. Ibid.

130. Ibid.

131. Ibid., Letter No. 79, Carnac to GCB.

financial difficulties in which his State found itself. How this financial burden was sought to be overcome will be discussed later.

Sayajirao also found that his rights were being usurped in other ways in his tributaries. His troops, which were stationed there under his officer, Mama Baxi was replaced by a British officer, Captain Inglis.¹³² After a great deal of persuasion, Sayajirao consented to this arrangement.¹³³

Gradually, criminals arrested in the Gaekwad's Tributaries in Kathiawad, became the responsibility of the British Agent, instead of the Gaekwad's Agent, and English law began to be applied throughout the territory.¹³⁴ Captain Burnwell, the British Agent was given the authority by the Governor of Bombay to hold prisoners in his keeping.¹³⁵

Between 1819 and 1820, disturbances took place in the Okhamandal tributary of the Gaekwad. A group of chieftains here decided to challenge his authority.¹³⁶ Captain Burnwell exercised his authority by addressing a circular to the chiefs warning them that any rebellious

132. PDL(BOM) to COD, 4/144 of 1824. Letter No. 73 of 1823.

133. Ibid.

134. PD(BOM), Mixed Record 29/380 of 1828. GOB to Anderson, Judge at Surat.

135. Ibid.

136. PD(BOM), 16/78 of 1822, Pol.A.in Kathiawad to GOB, 17-1-1820.

resistance on their part or commission of outrage would meet with due punishment, and that they had no reason to be violent as any rights they possessed in Oka would be protected by the British if they came under their guarantee.¹³⁷ Ultimately, it was the British Agent who restored order here on behalf of the Gaekwad,¹³⁸ thus once again exposing the weakness of Sayajirao to the Chieftains.

With reference to the Kathiawad tributaries, Sayajirao's minister calculated the outstanding arrears in 1820 at Rs. 92,838 (excluding Morvi).¹³⁹ The British supported the claim of the chiefs to a remission of Rs. 73,937.¹⁴⁰ The question was of how all this was to be recovered. As already stated, the British were planning to take over full control of Kathiawad at the renewal of the decennial engagements, and had sounded the Gaekwad on their various plans in the beginning of 1820. Elphinstone, who was now Governor of Bombay, had suggested these steps, the most important of which was that the British should take over the collection of the entire tribute of Kathiawad - both theirs and the Gaekwad's - solely through their officers and army

137. Ibid.

138. Ibid.

139. Ibid., Pol. A. in Kathiawad to GOB, 1-3-1820.

140. Ibid.

to the total exclusion of the Gaekwad government in this region.¹⁴¹

Inspite of all that has been shown to the contrary, Williams, who was then Acting Resident, insisted that the British were suggesting these new arrangements because of the rapid decline of Kathiawad, due to the 'undue exactions of the Gaekwad's officers, and the excesses of the Mulakgiri army',¹⁴² and claimed that the British could no longer be silent spectators of the Chieftain's 'approaching ruin'.¹⁴³ It was also pointed out to Sayajirao that the expense he incurred in collecting the tribute was more than he spent. In fact, Williams was at pains to show that Sayajirao had to spend three or four lakhs annually from the Baroda treasury for this purpose.¹⁴⁴ If the British could not make Sayajirao accept their plan, Williams was to offer two alternatives. One was to offer Sayajirao the British share of Petlad, Viramgam and Pavanjoti in exchange for his tribute and possessions in Kathiawad. Failing this, Williams was told to offer their cherished possession - Ahmedabad.¹⁴⁵ As Williams

141. PD(BOM), 7/102 of 1823. GOB to Williams, 5-1-1820.

142. Genze et al, Op. cit., Williams to GOB, 18-2-1820, p. 293.

143. Ibid.

144. Ibid.

145. PD(BOM), 7/102 of 1823, GOB to Williams, 5-1-1820.

stated that he knew of nothing that would tempt Sayajirao more except the restoration of Ahmedabad.¹⁴⁶ Kathiawad was obviously considered extremely valuable and the British looked forward to the advantages which would accrue to them from all the chieftains coming under their authority. The British claimed they would free the tributaries from various exactions levied by Baroda and that consequently there would be a revival of trade and increase in the prosperity of the country, especially with the encouragement that the British would give to the breeding of horses for which some of these districts were so famous.¹⁴⁷ Sayajirao's immediate reaction to these proposals was of course one of surprise, and he emphatically stated that for him to give up his possessions in Kathiawad would be a 'lasting disgrace and stigma to his character', and that the annual loss of three or four lakhs of rupees that he was incurring could not be compared to the loss of reputation which his government and himself, as head of it, would sustain by giving his consent to such a proposal.¹⁴⁸ Here the matter rested, awaiting final settlement of the issue in April, 1820, when

146. Genze et al, Williams to GOB, 18-2-1820, p.293.

147. PD(BOM), 7/102 of 1835, GOB to Williams, 5-1-1820.

148. HPO(BAR), Vol. IX, Note of meeting with Williams, p. 89.

Elphinstone, the Governor would pay a visit to Baroda.

Sayajirao had to contend with another financial loss on account of the Ghasdana from the territories ceded by the Treaty of 1817, the territories exchanged recently, and the British resumption of the Peshwa's territories.¹⁴⁹ The Gaekwad government claimed that even if a territory changed hands, the ghasdana rights remained with the original owner and thus Sayajirao demanded that the British should pay him a yearly 'tribute' which was considered extremely objectionable by them.¹⁵⁰ This was unthinkable - financially as well as politically. It would be 'infra dig' in a power that was beginning to claim supremacy over all in that part of India.

According to Williams, the Acting Resident, the British had, at first, accepted in principle the Gaekwad's right to ghasdana, even in the districts assigned to them for payment of subsidiary troops.¹⁵¹ It was also exacted by the Gaekwad officers collecting revenue on the Peshwa's territories. Williams was, therefore, at that time convinced of the "propriety and justice of the Gaekwad's claims".¹⁵²

149. See footnote No.110.

150. Genze et al, p. x.

151. Ibid., Williams to GOB, 9-8-1819, p.109.

152. Ibid.



In fact, he suggested that there should be 'no objection' to those dues being collected through the Company's officers, and that the amount should be arbitrated by Captain Ballantyne.¹⁵³ By the idea of arbitration, the British were usurping one more prerogative of the Gaekwad, prior to depriving him of the right in full. The Bombay government did not agree with William's interpretation of the Gaekwad's right. It opined that since ghasdana was forcibly exacted by troops on forray, it could not be treated as a regular tax.¹⁵⁴ The Government of Bombay decided that the Gaekwad's claim to ghasdana on the Peshwa's former territories, now British tributaries in Kathiawad, were inadmissible.¹⁵⁵ The British claimed that while fixing the tributes from Kathiawad in perpetuity, during the Settlements, Walker had estimated the amount of ghasdana in commuting all the pecuniary claims which the Gaekwad or Peshwa previously possessed. If they now admitted his claims to ghasdana from the Kathiawad chieftains, the amount would exceed the tributes fixed by Walker.¹⁵⁶

153. Ibid.

154. PDL(BOM) to COD, 10/1819, Minutes of GOB, 28-3-1819.

155. Ibid.

156. Ibid.

The Governor also pointed out the 'impropriety' of placing the British government in the situation of a 'tributary' to any other State.¹⁵⁷ He further stated that in the Agreements made regarding cessions of territory, this matter had not at all been brought forward, and that if it had been, the Gaekwad would have been called upon to formally relinquish the claim at that time. He concluded by deciding that a discussion about this should take place with Sayajirao during his visit to Baroda.

Apart from this problem of the British ^{interference} ~~tributaries~~, the Gaekwad had trouble with some of his ~~other~~ tributaries regarding the collection of tribute, and sometimes this had to be enforced by the army.¹⁵⁸ The most prominent of these was the Nawab of Khambat (Cambay). Since 1800, the Nawab had resisted the payment of ghasdana to the Gaekwad's troops during the Mulakgiri operations. Fierce fighting had many times taken place. Walker in 1810 decided to intervene and tried to bring about a settlement. He had not succeeded in this, but had only incited the Nawab into further resistance to the Gaekwad.¹⁵⁹ The Nawab paid nothing for the next 4 years. In 1814, therefore, the Gaekwad had forcibly seized 17 villages in lieu of the payment.¹⁶⁰ The British at that time admitted the Gaekwad's

157. PDL(BOM) to COD, 10/18. Minutes of Elphinstone, 20-5-1819.

158. PDL(BOM) to COD, 22/1822, 2-3-1822.

159. Ibid.

160. Ibid.

right to do so, and had refused to intervene when the Nawab had appealed to them.¹⁶¹ The Gaekwad had insisted on a yearly payment of Rs.25,000 and Carnac thought Rs.25,000 fair enough. The Nawab himself was prepared to compromise on Rs. 5,000.¹⁶² Matters had remained unsettled, when Sayajirao became ruler. He showed an adamant attitude, insisting that for the recalcitrance shown by the Nawab, he should be made to pay at least Rs.10,000 per annum. This problem was also taken up by Elphinstone with the rest of the ghasdana question.

Before, however, referring to the visit of Elphinstone, it is necessary to refer to two events which created complications in Baroda, the death of Anandrao, the de jure reigning Gaekwad, and the dismissal of Dhackji.

In the midst of the tributary and other problems, Anandrao Gaekwad died on the 2nd of October, 1819.¹⁶³ Sayajirao, as the heir apparent, performed the necessary rites and immediately after this, anticipating rival claims, Sayajirao placed his own guards over the treasury and took charge of the keys.¹⁶⁴ Sayajirao claimed that

161. Ibid.

162. Ibid.

163. Genze et al, Op. cit., Williams to GOB, 2-10-1819

164. Ibid.

the property of the late Gaekwad devolved on the State, and as such belonged to him. This claim was disputed by Takhtabai, who took possession of Anandrao's room, which contained the treasure, and threatened Sati, the moment Sayajirao took it away.¹⁶⁵ Upon this, Williams, Acting Resident, took possession of the treasure, pending a decision by the Governor of Bombay.¹⁶⁶ Claims on the gadi were also immediately put forward by Takhtabai on behalf of her eldest son, Balwantrab. Takhtabai asserted that the right of her son Balwantrao to Anandrao's gadi had been assented to in a 'paper' which had been given to her late husband by 'some English gentleman'.¹⁶⁷ She further stated that it was because her son was too young that Fatehsingh had been appointed Regent.¹⁶⁸ She tried in all ways to convince Williams, the Acting Resident that the British should allow Balwantrao to succeed to the Gadi. She also laid claim to the entire treasure left by Anandrao. Williams, whilst assuring her that a proper maintenance would be fixed on her, treated her 'pretensions' about her son and her threats of immolation as 'preposterous and criminal' and only calculated to

165. Ibid.

166. PD(BOM), Minutes 37 of 1819, 12-10-1819.

167. PDL(BOM) to COD, 20/1820, 19-4-1820. No such paper was ever produced.

168. Ibid.

excite Sayajirao's enmity.¹⁶⁹ It was Williams, who negotiated the Settlement regarding her maintenance on behalf of Sayajirao.¹⁷⁰ During these negotiations, there was no doubt that Williams overstepped his powers, when he agreed to the very generous settlement of nearly Rs. 2 lakhs on Takhtabai.¹⁷¹ On Sayajirao remonstrating about the amount, Williams, who was of quite a different mould than Carnac, and who seemed to embody in his person, the new pretensions the British were assuming, made some pointedly threatening remarks. He said that in his opinion the nemnook was too small, and that the British government would probably be of the same opinion.¹⁷² Sayajirao had naturally objected to such a large settlement, especially as it exceeded his personal income.¹⁷³ Williams further remarked that though in the Gaekwad State a legitimate offspring of a Rajput had not yet ascended the gadi, in other Maratha States, this had occurred.¹⁷⁴ Sayajirao immediately realised the way Williams was heading and agreed that Williams "was no

169. Ibid.

170. Genze et al, Op. cit., Williams to GOB, 20-10-1819.

171. Ibid.

172. Ibid.

173. Bhagwat, Op. cit., p. 128.

174. Genze et al, Op. cit., Williams to GOB, 20-10-1819.

doubt right", and that he would agree to the Settlement.¹⁷⁵ However, acrimonious discussions continued between the parties concerned for nearly six months and things were settled only after Elphinstone's visit.

In his reports on this question, Williams had unequivocally shown his hostility to Sayajirao. Since it was already obvious how much the fate of a native Prince depended on the Resident, William's opinions were valuable. He did not agree with Carnac's praise of Sayajirao and his capacity for hard work and desire for the welfare of the people. According to him Sayajirao was alive only to his own interests and decidedly indifferent to the welfare of his government except where ~~it~~ affected his immediate interests. Williams opined that Sayajirao was ambitious of power for no other object than to enrich himself. He accused him of not caring for the prosperity of his country or the happiness of his subjects.¹⁷⁶ According to Williams, Sayajirao's severity was accompanied by extreme timidity of character. With Williams having such an opinion, things boded ill for Sayajirao. The first years of his reign were made

175. Ibid.

176. Ibid., In fact, Sayajirao cared quite a lot for the welfare of his people. A few instances of this will be cited at the end of the Chapter.

tolerable by the understanding, under limitations, of Mountstuart Elphinstone.

Radhabai, the widow of Fatehsingh, also reasserted her claims for her adopted son Govindrao. As already shown, this claim had categorically been denied by the British, when she had been allowed to adopt a son on Fatehsingh's death. At that time, she had tried to place the minor boy as the Regent. Now she made claims on his behalf for the gadi.¹⁷⁷ The British had all along refused to recognise such rights. In fact, both Carnac and Williams, on the authority of the Bombay government, had stated that the British government would never admit that Govindrao had the smallest pretension to the throne.¹⁷⁸ Carnac and Sayajirao had insisted on a clause to this effect being inserted in the Nemnook that had been given to Radhabai.¹⁷⁹ As a result, Radhabai had refused to accept the settlement and was being extremely obdurate. At the time of Sayajirao's accession, Radhabai's family continued their efforts and even sent a deputation to Bombay, and it was obvious that they had not relinquished their hopes of seating the boy upon the gadi.¹⁸⁰

177. Ibid.

178. Ibid.

179. Ibid.

180. Ibid.

In the midst of all this commotion, Sayajirao went through the official ceremonies of accession in the presence of all his officials and the Resident on 5th October, 1819.¹⁸¹ Throughout these proceedings, Sayajirao had the firm support of the British government, and Elphinstone had categorically stated that Sayajirao should have no doubt of the support of the British government so long as he fulfilled in good faith the engagements by which the two governments have been so firmly united.¹⁸²

The question which arose immediately after the accession ^{was} the extent of British control over Sayajirao. So long as Anandrao had been alive, the Council and Regent had functioned under the guidance of the Resident in all affairs. Now, with the ascendancy of Sayajirao, this necessity disappeared. Elphinstone immediately spoke of reducing their 'detailed interference' in Baroda affairs. The Governor was of the opinion that the reports of Sayajirao's business and administrative acumen, the sagacity which was said to have manifested in judging the character of those by whom he was served, and the firmness with which he had counteracted intrigues which

181. Genze et al, Op. cit., Williams to GOB, 6-10-1819, p. 159.

182. PD(BOM), Minutes 37 of 1819, 1-11-1819.
Elphinstone recapitulates the events since October, 1819.

had threatened him in the exercise of his authority, all pointed to Sayajirao's ability to take over control.¹⁸³ The Governor was thinking in terms, therefore, of reducing the British interference in the 'details' of the Baroda government affairs, especially as Baroda had been placed on the road to a desirable prosperity.¹⁸⁴ When this decision was communicated to Sayajirao, he did not welcome the idea of decreasing British control as he took it as 'desertion' at a time he badly needed their support against the intrigues against him and protested to the Resident.¹⁸⁵ He also wrote to Elphinstone urging active support by the British.¹⁸⁶ After seeing Sayajirao's reaction to the proposal and also the intrigues for succession that were going on, Elphinstone agreed that it would be prudent to delay its adoption. He also came to feel that at this 'critical junction', to withdraw British control would be 'replete with hazard' not only to Sayajirao personally, but to the interests of the government generally.¹⁸⁷ He now believed that Sayajirao looked forward 'with confidence and anxiety' for the support and advice of the British government.¹⁸⁸ Sayajirao, by his timidity, lost an opportunity to carry out his own affairs, though it is a moot point whether he would have been allowed to do so. Elphinstone wrote

183. Ibid.

184. Ibid.

185. Ibid.

186. BRO Outward Register, 21-10-1819.

187. PD CBOM, Minutes 37 of 1819, 1-11-1819. Elphinstone recapitulates the

188. Ibid. events since October, 1819.

to Sayajirao reaffirming his friendship and assuring him so long as he showed the desire he had now evinced for the assistance of the British government, it would be unreservedly extended to him.¹⁸⁹ He was also told that the British had confidence in his ability to overcome the obstacles raised by interested persons, and that they were sure he would prove himself 'a valuable ally' to the British government.¹⁹⁰ The 'obstacles', probably referred to the financial and the tributary issues.

Sayajirao's lack of judgment regarding Dhackji Dadaji brought about a financial crisis. As already stated, Dhackji had been appointed by Sayajirao as his Minister, as he had thought that Dhackji had an inordinate influence over Carnac. Sayajirao probably guessed, if not knew of the nefarious activities of this person, but had thought that he could use them for his purposes. Being a diligent ruler, Sayajirao very soon found out that his State was in an embarrassed financial position,¹⁹¹ and further investigation revealed the hand of Dhackji behind this situation. Instead of the vaunted 'saving' to the State, Sayajirao found himself with an enormous debts. He came

189. PDL(BOM) to COD, 19/1819, Elphinstone to Sayajirao, 5-11-1819.

190. Ibid.

191. Bhagwat, Op. cit., p. 129.

to the conclusion that the major part of responsibility for this was Dhackji's. In January, 1820, he informed Williams that he was thinking of dismissing Dhackji.¹⁹² Here again, Sayajirao was afraid to move against the wishes of Williams, and proceeded further only on getting an assurance from Williams that he had no personal interest in Dhackji's welfare.¹⁹³ Williams informed Sayajirao that as soon as he knew of his wishes he had without delay intimated them to Elphinstone.¹⁹⁴ Elphinstone had replied that Sayajirao was free to exercise his 'free and unbiased judgment on the question at issue.¹⁹⁵ Being now convinced that the Bombay government would support him, Sayajirao made his indictment against Dhackji originally on four counts, most of them arising from Dhackji's activities as Potedar to the State.¹⁹⁶

In 1816, soon after Dhackji was nominated native Agent, he had been appointed Potedar of the State along with Hari Bhakti and others.¹⁹⁷ Dhackji himself had no money to finance the Potedari, and had persuaded Carnac that it was Fatehsingh's wish that Mairal Narayan

192. Genze et al, Op. cit., Williams to GOB, 19-3-1820.

193. Ibid.

194. Ibid.

195. PD(BOM), 9/784, GOB to Williams, 3-3-1820.

196. See foot note 83, p.

197. BG, Op. cit., pp. 396-99.

and Hari Bhakti should take an equal share with himself in the concern. This had totally been a false claim as Fatehsingh had not, in fact, wanted Dhackji associated with Potedars as he did not trust him.¹⁹⁸ (The state bankers at this time had been Hari Bhakti, Gopalrai Mairal, Ratanji Kahandas, Lalu Mangal and Sahiel Bechar). What had actually happened was that both Hari Bhakti and Mairal Narayan put in eight and a half lakhs each, while Dhackji put in nothing.¹⁹⁹ Similar transactions were made for the Kathiawad Potedari with Ratanji Kahandas. Dhackji showed an immediate and apparent gain to the Baroda state and was showered with great praise by Carnac, whose judgement, in this case, was certainly incorrect. Dhackji was able to show this by reducing the interest to 9 per cent from 12 per cent. He had frightened the Bankers into agreeing to this by threatening to borrow money from firms outside Baroda.²⁰⁰ In fact, Dhackji's 'moderation' was a ruse to rob both the State and the people.²⁰¹ He had compelled the farmers of revenues to pay him a percentage for guaranteeing their payment at a fixed date, and had carried forward instalments of

198. Bhagwat, Op. cit., p. 131.

199. BG, p. 398.

200. PD(BOM), 9/784. Minutes of Elphinstone, 10-4-1820.

201. Ibid.

revenue paid in by them to his own private account. He had also been in the habit of refusing to cash the Darbar notes unless he received a high commission.²⁰² As a result the Potedar accounts showed a debt of Rs. 60 lakhs *according to* the State.²⁰³ Sayajirao very carefully based his accusations on these factors and made four distinct charges. These were: (1) embezzlement of Rs. 2,75,000 under the name of brokerage and making false entries in the Potedar's books, (2) misappropriation of sums meant for the payment of the pagadars, (3) the exaction of Rs. 1½ lakhs a year from the farmers of revenue as security for their payments, and lastly (4) that he had on certain occasions taken bribes from the Bankers.²⁰⁴ All these charges were put forward and later examined during Elphinstone's visit.

In the process of investigating the frauds of Dhackji, Sayajirao and Williams discovered the enormous deficit and debts into which the State had fallen. This discovery came about when Sayajirao tried to get loans from Bankers and found a great reluctance on their part to grant him any.²⁰⁵ At the same time, Elphinstone sent the Baroda State accounts to the Accountant General for examination, as he found difficulty in reconciling the

202. Ibid.

203. Ibid.

204. Genze et al, Minutes of Elphinstone, 18-4-1820, p. 349.

205. BRO File 5, HH to GOB, 22-1-1822.

→ Ibid.

actual state of the Gaekwad's affairs with the views presented of them in the official documents of *the British* government.²⁰⁶ The result of this investigation was unbelievable in view of what Carnac had reported only a few months earlier. He had very confidently reported in February, 1819, that at the end of the year, calculating upon the same receipts and disbursements as in the previous year, there would be an excess of Rs.15 lakhs over the expenditure.²⁰⁷ The sorry state of affairs was, in fact, that Baroda found itself in debt of over a crore of rupees.²⁰⁸ The whole financial fraud started with the inability of Walker to understand the intricacies of the Indian accounting system, and his trust in his own native agent Dhackji Dadaji, who obviously was much too clever for Walker.

Writing to the Bombay government as far back as in 1809, Walker confidently predicted that in 1811 the debt would be Rs.3½ lakhs and 'would be discharged in the course of that year'.²⁰⁹ Walker, however, had been not happy at this prospects as he had felt that a considerable

206. PDL(BOM) to COD, 80/1820, 19-4-1820.

207. Genze et al, Op. cit., Carnac to GOB, 22-2-1819.

208. Ibid., These debts were to the Bankers who had forwarded twenty lakhs under the British guarantee.

209. PDL(BOM) to COD, 80/1820, 19-4-1820.

portion of the influence which the British had acquired with the Gaekwad had come from the "pecuniary assistance" which they had given him, and that their control over him during the ^{brought}various reforms had ^{come} on this dependence of the Gaekwad.²¹⁰ Walker had feared that once the Gaekwad was free from debts his government would become independent of the British.²¹¹ This attitude of the British is fundamental to their relations with the Indian States. They had found that financial strings were the best way to tie the Princes to them. The same spirit was to be exhibited in 1828 by Sir John Malcolm when he became Governor of Bombay. These remarks show how ^{little} much the British were really interested in the welfare of the Indian States and the people. Financial help rendered by them, the British thought, kept the princes securely tied to the British government with a connection that was strengthened by the "gratitude added to the obligations of public faith."²¹² Once again, it is worth noting the disparity between appearance and reality. Whilst appearing to help liquidate the Baroda debts, they had ^{kept} a firm financial control in one way or another over it. The financial position of Baroda, however, had

210. Ibid.

211. Ibid.

212. Ibid.

actually started to deteriorate from 1813 onwards, though unnoticed by both Walker and Carnac. Through these years, though there was an apparent surplus, the disbursements had increased fourfold and there had been a fall in the total revenue collection.²¹³ The last was due to a severe famine and pestilence in Kathiawad in 1812-1813, which wiped out about one third of the population and devastated the entire villages.²¹⁴ Then in 1814, the Gaekwad lost the farm of the Ahmedabad districts (the Peshwa resumed them) and his territories were invaded by Pindharis. None of these seems to have given any realisation to the Residents that the finances were not what they appeared to be.

It was not surprising, therefore, that in 1816, Carnac had to report a debt of Rs.94,19,654.²¹⁵ Carnac claimed that this debt could also be liquidated by 1819 through the 'exertions' of Dhackji. Dhackji had offered Potedari transactions at 9 per cent i.e. at a reduction of 3 per cent.²¹⁶ This would bring about a reduction, according to Carnac, of Rs. 30 lakhs. Secondly, Dhackji had forced the former Potedars to grant remissions since

213. BG. Op. cit., pp. 395-98.

214. Ibid.

215. Ibid.

216. PD(BOM), 435 of 1817, Carnac to GOB, 20-2-1817.

he claimed the principles had in some cases been 'trebly repaid'.²¹⁷ These remissions would amount to Rs.9,21,964.²¹⁸ Thus the Gaekwad State would be left with a debt of Rs. 54,97,690 in 1818. To this was to be added presents to the Bankers of Rs.1,23,000/. Thus according to Carnac, the debt would be 'practically liquidated' according to his expectation of the revenue of that year of Rs.46,89,508. This would leave a debt of Rs.9,31,182 which in addition to a new loan proposed by him of Rs.24,24,775 to pay the Army would definitely be wiped out at the end of 1819, through the expected revenues of that year, and leave the State with a surplus of Rs.15 lakhs.²¹⁹

How imaginary and fictitious all this was! The real state of affairs was brought out by the report sent back by the Auditor General to Elphinstone.²²⁰ The State now owed the Potedar - Hari Bhakti and others - Rs. 1,07,66,297.²²¹ How such a grave error of accounting took place under the so called an 'ever-vigilant' British Resident is difficult to understand. Under the pretext

217. Ibid.

218. Ibid.

219. Ibid.

220. PDL(BOM) to COD, 20/1820, 19-4-1820.

221. Ibid.

of Anandrao's imbecility, the British had formed a Regency Council with the Resident having overall supervisory powers, especially over financial matters. They had proved nothing if not inept. The revenues estimated by Carnac had been far above, what was actually received in 1817 and 1818, and the expenditure was much more than that calculated by him.²²² Carnac's ignorance of Indian book-keeping lay at the root of the matter. He was deliberately allowed to remain in this ignorance by Dhackji, who, as his Agent was supposed to enlighten him on these affairs. It was the practice amongst Potedars to omit certain debts in the annual accounts of the Gaekwad government submitted to the Resident. These debts, of course had to be discharged.²²³ The major part of the debts, however, were due to the wars which the Gaekwad had had to wage as an ally of the British. Arrears to the troops and debts due to the Bankers who had advanced money for the Malwa campaign amounted to Rs. 7,25,3009. In spite of this, as already stated, the British had refused to make any compensation to the Gaekwad for the Malwa campaign.²²⁴ The arrears to the troops arose because the Bankers refused to advance

222. Ibid., Minutes of Elphinstone, 18-4-1820.

223. Ibid.

224. Ibid.

money at Dhackji's reduced rates, and because they distrusted Dhackji - another indictment against this man!

Sayajirao had made this discovery in 1819, when probing into the Dhackji affairs, and had made out a statement of the real facts, and tried to make arrangements for a loan on his own initiative.²²⁵ However, none of the Bankers had been willing to enter into any negotiation on this score without the British guarantee.²²⁶ The matter was, therefore, held over till Elphinstone's visit. This rebuff from the Bankers created a bitterness between Sayajirao and them, and made him clearly realise where the real power lay in Baroda.

225. Ibid.

226. Ibid.

CHAPTER III

ELPHINSTONE'S VISIT AND AFTERMATH

The British felt it necessary to settle all these points of dispute, and Mountstuart Elphinstone, the Governor of Bombay, decided to pay a visit to Baroda in 1820. This was a momentous visit in the course of which it became evident, beyond doubt, that, inspite of all talk of the 'independence' of Sayajirao, he was, already a subordinate and not an equal. The subsidiary alliance was really a 'subordinate' alliance.

Mountstuart Elphinstone arrived in Baroda on April 2nd, 1820¹ and on April 3rd, Sayajirao went to meet him. At their subsequent meetings all the problems mentioned before were discussed and a 'solution' was arrived at in most cases.

At the first meeting, Elphinstone informed Sayajirao that since the death of Anandrao, the necessity of the British retaining the management of his government in their hands had ceased as it had been necessitated by Anandrao's weakness. The British government, he said,

1. Bhagwat, Op. cit., Vol. I, p. 146.

was now desirous of entrusting Sayajirao with the 'entire administration of his own affairs' in internal matters provided he satisfied the British that the Engagements into which they had entered would be strictly adhered to.² Here lay the snag. The Engagements were of four types: the Treaty Agreements, the guarantees given for the allowances of his ministers, Agreements with his tributaries and guarantees to the Bankers and sundry other persons. All 'foreign intercourse' was to be exclusively in the hands of the British government. This meant that Sayajirao could have no direct contact with other Indian Princes and, in particular, the Raja of Satara. As Elphinstone himself put it to the Court of Directors, there was scarcely a person connected with the Baroda government who had not some sort of claim on the British to support arrangements made with the Gaekwad as no one had been prepared to place entire reliance on the Gaekwad's word.³ The Bombay government showed pretended concern at the extent to which they had entangled themselves in the Gaekwad's affairs which had

2. PDL(BOM) to COD, 20/1820, 19-4-1820; and Genze et al, Elphinstone's Minutes, 18-4-1820, p.349.

3. PDL(BOM) to COD, 20/1820, 19-4-1820.

left the Gaekwad with a very limited degree of freedom to exercise his authority.⁴ They actually wanted even now to impress upon the Gaekwad the necessity of making the Resident acquainted with all the proceedings and accept his guidance in almost all matters.⁵ Sayajirao was to be guided by the Resident's recommendations in cases where he thought it necessary to offer them.⁶ Under such circumstances, all professions of giving Sayajirao any independence were meaningless. In fact, an examination of the outcome of the visit strengthens the convention that Sayajirao was further bound down. Elphinstone was, it seems, predisposed towards interference. As he reported to the Court of Directors, the Treaties of April 5th, 1805, June 5th, and July 29th, 1802, all expressly gave the British right to interfere in the Gaekwad's internal government and he seems to have been bent on doing so.⁷

Sayajirao had already in the past two years realised the way things were shaping and had tried to make the best of them. He protested that he would always

4. Aitchison, Vol. VI, Elphinstone to Sayajirao, 3-4-1820, p.360.

5. Ibid.

6. Ibid.

7. PD(BOM) to COD, 20/1820, 9-8-1820.

ask for and work according to the advice of the Resident, but tried to maintain a semblance of real power by requesting Elphinstone at the first meeting that all such advice should be made to him in private and that all administrative action should emanate directly through him.⁸ He also asked Elphinstone to put down in writing the limits of his and the Resident's authority.

With regard to Dhackji Dadaji, Elphinstone accepted the Gaekwad's proposal to withdraw all his allowances as he had ceased to be the minister, but decided that Dhackji should be allowed to retain his Inam villages till he made further inquiries into Dhackji's affairs and decide on the 'equitableness' of the final settlement.⁹ This, inspite of the fact that no British guarantee had been given to Dhackji!

To replace Dhackji, Sayajirao proposed Sitaram as the new Diwan (minister). As shown, Sitaram had been in the bad books of Elphinstone and the British since the murder of Gangadhar Shastri. He was suspected of being a party to the conspiracy, and Sayajirao's proposal was summarily dismissed by Elphinstone.¹⁰ Sayajirao had no

8. Genze et al, Op. cit., Minutes of Elphinstone, 18-4-1820, pp. 349-59.

9. Ibid.

10. Ibid.

interest in any other particular person and suggested either Vithalrao Bhau, a former minister of Fatehsingh and one who had supported Radhabai's pretensions to the Gadi, and Vithalrao Divanji, the Sarsubah of Kathiawad. Sayajirao's suggestion of the first name was obviously to use him as a 'de jure', but not de facto minister. His idea was probably to secretly consult Sitaram in all matters. Elphinstone realised this and was inclined to prefer Divanji's candidature. Besides this, Divanji was an able and clever man and his removal from Kathiawad would take away one of the principal obstacle to the sort of settlement the British desired to make in that province.¹¹ Sayajirao decided in favour of Vithalrao Bhau whom Elphinstone considered 'unexceptionable', though he would have preferred the Divanji.¹² Elphinstone, however, assented to this wish of Sayajirao with a warning that if he did not ~~adhere~~ to the Agreements he would lose the confidence of the British from whom he was about to derive so much benefit.¹³ To avoid the previous excessive interference on the part of the Resident, Sayajirao got Elphinstone to consent to the procedure that the new minister would not be removed 'without a fault' and that,

11. Ibid.

12. Ibid.

13. Ibid.

if he gave 'good ground' for offence, he was not to be removed directly by the British but by himself.¹⁴

Sayajirao also insisted that none of his ministers should ever visit the Residency 'without his leave' and that none of them should be 'sent for by the Resident', except through him.¹⁵ Sayajirao was indeed anxious to retain the semblance of power if not the reality. In fact it was Elphinstone's intention that future ministers should always be appointed after consultation with the Resident, who would check on the 'reliability' of the person named.¹⁶

Elphinstone also took up the question of the family dissensions which have been described. Even in these intimate family affairs, it was the British who became arbitrators. Taktabal had refused to part with the treasure, claiming it was all hers as it was accumulated from the savings of Anandrao out of his personal allowance.¹⁷ She again threatened to kill herself, but finding this made no alteration in the British decision to take charge of the treasure, she agreed to hand it over to them. Capt. Ballantyne was deputed to take possession, but found the door of the treasury barred by private troops of the late Fatehsingh.

14. Ibid.

15. Ibid.

16. PDL(BOM) to COD, 20/1820, 9-8-1820.

17. Genze et al, Op. cit., Minutes of Elphinstone, 18-4-1820, pp. 190-93.

They were easily dispersed with promises of payment of their arrears.¹⁸ After this, it was Capt. Ballantyne who took an inventory of the treasure, after which a distribution was made of the treasure, much of it going to Sayajirao, as most of it belonged to the State.¹⁹

The more difficult problem was that of Radhabai and her adopted son Govindrao. Radhabai and her family had, as has been seen, held out for recognition of Govindrao as the true heir to the Gadi. She had refused to waive this claim and as a consequence had not yet been given a nemnook. Elphinstone tried to convince her and her adherents that the British government would not recognise her pretensions and that without this recognition, her claim had no standing.²⁰ In spite of this, Radhabai stubbornly refused to renounce all claims to the Gadi on behalf of her adopted son. Elphinstone then decided to withdraw the British guarantee to Radhabai and her family, but recommended to Sayajirao that he should give to each member of the family separately the allowance originally meant for them, on each admitting that the adoption gave the boy no title to the Gadi.²¹

18. Ibid.

19. Ibid.

20. Ibid.

21. Ibid.

The Kathiawad question was also taken up by Elphinstone. He now formally put forward his plan of the British collecting the tribute and administering the tributaries on his behalf. In fact, ever since the British had gained the Peshwa's share of Kathiawad in 1818, they had been aiming at taking over the whole of it under their control. Earlier Governor Napier had pointed out that the territories of the British and the Gaekwad were not 'distinct' but intertwined, and that difficulties could easily be removed if they were under one authority.²² Elphinstone reiterated the Bombay government's unfounded accusations that the State of Kathiawad had deteriorated due to the 'excesses' of the Gaekwad officers, and that the Chiefs were incapable of protecting themselves against this harassment.²³ He pointed out that the British had found it necessary to step in to restore order and to uphold the guarantees given to the Chiefs by Walker in many instances.²⁴

Mahikantha had also been covered by the same arrangements, and the British were more than eager to gain direct control there also because Mahikantha stretched along the British frontiers for about 100 miles

22. PDD(BOM), 401/1818, 14-1-1818.

23. PDL(BOM) to COD, 20/1820, 19-4-1820.

24. Genze et al, Op. cit., Minutes of Elphinstone, 18-4-1820, pp. 355ff.

and its acquisition was of great interest to the British.²⁵ It was, therefore, proposed to Sayajirao that the British should collect his tributes both in Kathiawad and Mahikantha and that he should have 'no concern' with his tributaries.²⁶ As Sayajirao rightly put it to Elphinstone, his acceptance of such a proposal would 'lessen his importance' and even occasion a risk of his ultimately losing the original rights themselves. Sayajirao, however, could not stand up to Elphinstone and the power he represented. At the end of their discussions, he gave his consent to the proposals and it was decided that the Chiefs were to pay their tribute at Amreli and Baroda without any direct dealings with the Gaekwad government.²⁷ In case of minor disturbances, it was decided, the Gaekwad forces were to be used, and in 'important cases' British troops were to act against the tributaries concerned.²⁸ A British officer, assistant to the Resident at Baroda, would be posted in Kathiawad and Mahikantha to supervise these arrangements. The Gaekwad, however, managed to salvage a semblance of his power by getting Elphinstone's consent to keep up both his troops

25. Ibid., p. 356.

26. Aitchison,^{Op. cit.} Vol. VI, Treaty between British and Gaekwad governments, 3-4-1820, p. 361.

27. Ibid.

28. Ibid.

and establishment in Kathiawad, without any duties of course.²⁹ Sayajirao had to agree to sign a memorandum giving details of these arrangements.³⁰

On the question of Ghasdana, Sayajirao after putting forth the claims as stated, also tried to prove that this tax had been collected by the Gaekwads for the last fifty years. Elphinstone agreed that if this claim could be proved, he could receive his dues.³¹

The most vexatious question to be settled was the financial one. As already shown, Sayajirao, after taking over control had discovered debts of over a crore of rupees. Nearly the whole of this debt was due to the wars in Malwa. Thirteen (13) lakhs were due to Sir John Malcolm as payment for advances, 13 lakhs to the Banker who had made advances for the troops, and 25½ lakhs as arrears. Two lakhs went towards the expenditure against the Khosas. The pay of troops in Mahikantha and Kathiawad were also in arrears amounting to about 10 lakhs. More than half of the debt consisted of arrears to the troops or debts to those who had advanced money for the campaign in Malwa.³²

29. Genze et al, Op. cit., Minutes of Elphinstone, 18-4-1820, p. 355ff.

30. Ibid.

31. Ibid.

32. Ibid.

Where Sayajirao had failed to raise loans, Elphinstone brought pressure and succeeded. The Bankers agreed to 3 separate loans to pay back the debts and for current expenses.³³ The interest on all these loans was to be 10½ per cent plus premiums to be paid to the Bankers on all rates.³⁴ Though Elphinstone claimed to have made a via media between Dhackji's 9 per cent and the original Potedari interest of 12 per cent, his settlement came close to 11½ per cent.

First a loan of Rs. 50 lakhs was raised to be paid back at the rate of 12 lakhs per year from the revenues, the second loan of Rs. 20 lakhs was raised to pay off the Kathiawad debts for payment to the troops and officials. This was to be paid back at the rate of Rs. 3 lakhs per year, from the Kathiawad revenues, and lastly a loan of Rs. 30 lakhs for the purpose of paying the expenses of the current year to be paid in full from the revenues of the next year.³⁵ This arrangement left the Gaekwad with no surplus from his revenue. The repayment of the loans and interests consumed most of the net revenue of the state.³⁶ It would be necessary to raise new loans every year to pay for the current year's expenses.³⁷ These

33. Ibid.

34. Ibid.

35. Genze et al., Op. cit., Minutes of Elphinstone, 20-4-1820, pp. 335-342.

36. Ibid.

37. Ibid.

loans did ^{not} cover the entire arrears of pay of the army as a whole year's pay was left pending. As a result the troops took advances from Bankers on high interests, which put them at a double disadvantage. Elphinstone did not find these terms very satisfactory and had suggested during the negotiations that the matter be postponed till he returned to Bombay and arranged more advantageous loans. Sayajirao resisted this move to postpone these matters as, according to Elphinstone, he feared that such a step would 'render his emancipation uncertain', whatever that 'emancipation' was.³⁸ Sayajirao had realised by now that the Bankers would not grant him loans directly, and therefore, must have pressed for an arrangement whilst Elphinstone was in Baroda.

Accordingly, agreements were negotiated with the chief Bankers, with a British guarantee attached to them.³⁹ Elphinstone went on to discuss ways and means of reducing the expenditure of the State. He found that great reductions had already been made in Sayajirao's establishment wherever it was possible. Sayajirao also suggested reduction in the salary of his present minister, and in the allowances of his ex-minister. This could not

38. Ibid.

39. PDL(BOM) to COD, 20/1820, 9-8-1820; Also see BG, p.299 Footnote (2). The Bankers were Hari Ehakti and Mairal Narayan, Samel Bechar, Khushalchand, Sakhidas and Kahandas, ^{amongst} the traditional bankers of the State. Dhackji had been removed from the partnership.

be agreed to as these persons were guaranteed their allowances by the British. On the one hand the British talked of economy and claimed that they were helping the State out of difficulties, on the other, they were imposing a heavy burden on the State by the institution of guarantee. Elphinstone ended these arrangements by a warning that if Sayajirao did not discharge his debts according to this plan, and carry out the other arrangements agreed to, the British would again resume their old administration of his government.⁴⁰

Elphinstone then proceeded on his tour of Kathiawad and on his way back in April, 1821, visited Sayajirao again at his request.⁴¹ A few unsettled points, as well as some new points were then discussed. Elphinstone found that during the past year the conduct of Sayajirao and the general administration had improved and he remarked on Sayajirao's 'prudence' in matters of the State.⁴²

Sayajirao had now decided to remove Vithalrao Bhau and appoint the more talented Vithalrao Diwanji, who had won his confidence as his minister.⁴³ Elphinstone

40. Genze et al, Op. cit., Minutes of Elphinstone, 20-4-1820, p. 338.

41. Wallace, Cp. cit., Elphinstone's Minutes, 16-4-1821, pp. 319-324.

42. Ibid.

43. PDL(BOM) to COD, 22/1822, 2-3-1822.

was pleased with this decision and agreed to his formal investiture.⁴⁴

Elphinstone took up the Ghasdana question which he had shelved pending investigations. The general system of Ghasdana was not reopened, but the Khambat question was taken up. Sayajirao's claim of Rs.10,000 was not admitted by Elphinstone. Although the Nawab had been prepared to pay upto Rs.5,000 per year, Elphinstone decided on Rs.4,200 as the proper amount.⁴⁵ The Gaekwad was also required to give up the villages that had been taken in lieu of the payments and after deducting arrears, repay the amount of revenue collected from these villages since their seizure in 1814. The Nawab was required to deposit Rs.70,000 with the Gaekwad as a surety. Elphinstone himself doubted the justice of the settlement, which obviously was made as one more show of 'paramount' rights. In his minute he states, "I can not but feel that prince ^(Khambat) is very fortunate in recovering those lands and still more in obtaining the repayment of any part of the produce".⁴⁶

44. Wallace, Op. cit., Minutes of Elphinstone, 16-4-1821, pp.319-324.

45. Ibid.

46. Ibid.

Elphinstone also had to help Sayajirao raise two fresh loans to cover another debt of Rs.20 lakhs which had come to light.⁴⁷ Elphinstone expressed certain doubts about Sayajirao's financial dealings and once again warned him before he left Baroda.

Both the meetings of 1820 and 1821 had been carried on in a cordial atmosphere, but had undoubtedly left Sayajirao at a disadvantage. Though, ostensibly, British control was declared as 'withdrawn', in reality, Sayajirao's position was weakened. He lost his suzerainty in all but name in Kathiawad and Mahikantha, his initiative with his Bankers, his freedom in dealing with his fellow princes, and his right to settle family dissensions. Through the financial guarantees given by the British, the Resident's powers were increased rather than decreased. Sayajirao's attempts to free himself from these shackles was to bring him into open conflict with the Bombay government.

Sayajirao, after Elphinstone's departure from Baroda, was thus left to carry on his government in equivocal circumstances. Claiming to have granted him 'independence', Elphinstone had actually deprived him of

47. PDL(BOM) to COD, 22/1822, 2-9-1822.

a major part of it. The effects of such a policy gradually lead to illwill and distrust on both sides. Sayajirao attempted to ignore British restraints and to act on his own. When his defiance lead to further loss of power, he became vindictive and irresponsible both towards his own people and the British.

Elphinstone on reaching Bombay, sent a detailed letter to the Resident regarding his responsibilities at Baroda.⁴⁸ He was told to abstain from any interference in the internal affairs of the Gaekwad except in certain circumstances. These included the British guarantees, and cases involving dependents of the British government. The Resident was also asked to extend his advice to Sayajirao whenever he considered his line of conduct likely to be attended by serious 'injury' to the State.⁴⁹ He was particularly told to offer advice where the finances were likely to be 'deranged and the Gaekwad's power of fulfilling his engagements to the bankers impaired'.⁵⁰ He was told to frequently inspect the accounts and take measures to prevent any new expenses being incurred without his knowledge. He was in fact asked to probe deeply into

48. Wallace, Op. cit., GOB to Williams, 3-5-1820, pp. 309-315.

49. Ibid.

50. Ibid.

the accounts to look out for 'separate accounts and clandestine terms',⁵¹ by which Sayajirao might try to fool the British. He was advised to make a regular report on the repayment of the loans arranged by Elphinstone. Further, he was asked to 'observe and report',⁵² on Sayajirao's actions in general and on his ministers, agents and advisers. Lastly, he was instructed to keep control over the tributaries by employing British troops rather than the Gaekwad's and preventing interference of the Gaekwad's officers in these territories.

These instructions were interpreted by Williams as rather strengthening his right to interfere in the Gaekwad's affairs than otherwise. Unlike Carnac, he had already shown his dislike of Sayajirao, and was eager to assume the role of a representative of a paramount power.

From 1820 to 1826, Sayajirao gave Williams little chance to complain. Williams on the other hand interfered in many affairs of the State from which he should have remained aloof. His actions were warnings to Sayajirao of things to come. Some cases will illustrate this point.

51. Ibid.

52. Ibid.

Sometime in March, 1823, Col. Prother, commandant of the subsidiary force, decided not to allow cultivation in the vicinity of the British camp. The complainants, instead of going to the Gaekwad approached the Resident for redress.⁵³ Unaccountably, Sayajirao and his ministers also did the same.⁵⁴ Sayajirao even addressed a 'yad' to the Resident.⁵⁴ Col. Prother had obviously gone beyond his limits, and as Williams said had ignored the rights of the individual and the government, in whose territory the camp was situated.⁵⁵ The result of William's intervention was that the ban was removed. Unfortunately, the incident created the impression that even in such small disputes, the Gaekwad had allowed the Resident to assume the superior role.

As noted, the Gaekwad had been made to give up his rights in Kathiawad in everything but name. In the next few years, his power was further eroded by the British taking over the maintenance of law and order in his tributaries, many times making use of the Gaekwad's troops, but not his officers. Elphinstone saw nothing wrong in making the Gaekwad to pay for these services which the British forced upon him, whilst depriving him of his prerogatives.⁵⁶ The Mehwasis were petty chiefs and

53. PD(BOM), 7/102 of 1823 No.328, Williams to GOB, 18-4-1823.

54. Ibid., No. 329, Sayajirao to Williams, 20-3-1823.

55. Ibid., No. 328, Williams to GOB, 18-4-1823.

56. PD(BOM), 26/25-1 of 1826, Minutes of Elphinstone, No. 49 of 1825.

zamindars living on the banks of the Narbada, and in the vicinity of the Mahi river, usually in the wild tracts of the forests in these regions. The chiefs each possessed one to twelve villages.⁵⁷ In 1822, the chiefs were in rebellion paying tribute only at the point of the sword, plundering villages and stopping all trade on the highways.⁵⁸ The British took it upon themselves to take over the Gaekwad's duty of bringing the chiefs to order. Under the direction of Willoughby, who had succeeded Capt. Barnwell as the British Political Agent in Kathiawad, the Mehwasis were brought to order and by 1825, they had all given bonds of good behaviour to the Gaekwad under the British guarantee.⁵⁹ The Gaekwad was also asked to declare that in future all Mehwasi disputes would be settled through the Political Agent.⁶⁰

When rebellion broke out in Okhamandal, the British took the responsibilities of bringing the rebels to book. In 1822, the Gaekwad's officer in charge of the troops in Kathiawad found that he could not function

57. BG., pp. 335-37.

58. Ibid.

59. PD(BOM), 26/25-1 of 1826, Minutes of Elphinstone, No. 39 of 1826.

60. Ibid.

properly because of the restraints imposed on him by the British. He, therefore, wrote accordingly to the British Political Agent in Kathiawad, Capt. Barnwell, who, instead of reducing interference, sent a warning to the chief rebels stating that any rebellious resistance on their part or commission of outrage would be met with due punishment.⁶¹ He also informed them that if the Gaekwad officers had encroached on their rights, all they had to do was to appeal to him on any subject 'where the British guarantee had been interposed'.⁶² The rebels, however, broke out in violence and Capt. Elwood took over charge of Okhamandal from the Gaekwad officer and suppressed the rebellion.⁶³ After the restoration of peace, an attempt was made by the British to retain the Province, but met with resistance from Sayajirao, who refused to part with it.

When a succession dispute arose in Radhanpur, a tributary of the Gaekwad, the Resident took charge of matters, though it was the right of the Gaekwad to nominate a successor.⁶⁴ Williams even suggested that the state should lapse to the British. Fortunately though the

61. PD(BOM), 16/78 of 1822, Barnwell to GOB, 17-1-1822.

62. Ibid.

63. Ibid.

64. PDL(BOM) to COB, 26/1826, 1-9-1826.

Governor settled the succession, and the state was kept intact.

In February, 1825, the British had to use force to make the Raja of Ahmednagar pay the Gaekwad's tribute.⁶⁵ Similar interferences occurred in Chhota Udaipur and Rajpipla.⁶⁶

These incidents clearly indicated the way in which things were working to the disadvantage of Sayajirao. The agreement by which Elphinstone had stripped the Gaekwad troops and officers of any real power could lead to nothing but further loss of the Gaekwad's de facto power in Kathiawad and Mahikantha.

Dhackji Dadaji had been discharged as Sayajirao's minister with the consent of Elphinstone in 1820. All his allowances had been annulled, except for his Inam villages. Further action against Dhackji had been held back by the British till Sayajirao could prove the charges he had levelled against Dhackji.⁶⁷ Sayajirao did this by the end of 1820 to the satisfaction of Elphinstone. The first charge of appropriating to himself Rs.2,75,000 as commission was proved by examining the annual accounts

65. Ibid.

66. Ibid.

67. Ibid., 20/1820, 9-8-1820.

of the State, where Dhackji had made false entries, showing Rs.45,000 as remitted to the treasury and Rs.2,30,000 as arrears due from Mahikantha.⁶⁸ Dhackji could easily interpose such statements as it was his duty, as native agent, to frame the financial report from the statements submitted by the Gaekwad ministers.⁶⁹ Dhackji admitted his guilt to Capt. Barnwell, Williams and to the Governor.⁷⁰ Elphinstone condemned this action as 'little short of robbery', and felt that to charge it falsely in the public accounts was a 'complicated piece of perfidy'.⁷¹ He also opined that it was a violation of faith on the part of Dhackji as Potedar, whose business it was to prepare the accounts, and as British agent, whose duty it was to detect any false charges.⁷² Elphinstone concluded that Dhackji's appropriation of Rs.2,75,000 was 'fraudulent and corrupt'.⁷³ He was of the opinion that Sayajirao should be 'permitted and even encouraged to take it back'.

Dhackji's guilt was also proved on the second charge of misappropriation of money meant for the pagadars.

68. Ibid.

69. Ibid.

70. Ibid.

71. Ibid.

72. Ibid.

73. Ibid.

Of the sum of Rs.4,00,000 due to the pagadars, it was found that only Rs.2,10,000 had been paid to them and that Rs.1,90,000 had been misappropriated, whilst showing this in the accounts as having been paid to Fatehsingh's creditors.⁷⁴ They were, in fact, never paid. The third charge was that of exacting money from the farmers of revenues as securities. Dhackji used to take upto 2 per cent on this account. It was proved that in three years, he took Rs.3,00,000. Sayajirao pointed out that Dhackji's plea that he took this money as security for the risk he ran was unacceptable. As Sayajirao pointed out in all cases where the farmers of revenue were not so rich, and therefore, needed security, counter-security had been given to Dhackji, so that in reality he was answerable to the government for 'nothing which had not already secured, by the wealth of the farmers or by the security they had given.'⁷⁵ The whole of his commission was, therefore, all useless expense and as Elphinstone stated, it must have fallen on the State as the farmer must either have deducted the amount from the payments to government or have exacted it from the ryots.⁷⁶ The last charge was

74. Ibid.

75. Ibid.

76. Ibid.



that of taking bribes from the bankers and others. This, it was proved, he took in the form of 2 per cent premium on the payment to be made to the Bankers.⁷⁷

Elphinstone was satisfied that all charges had been proved and informed Sayajirao that the British government would 'readily admit of the recovery from Dhackji of any sums which appear to have been unjustly appropriated', and, in fact, Elphinstone expressed the hope that he would do so, though he maintained the right to decide how far the Gaekwad was to be allowed to proceed against Dhackji.⁷⁸

The Governor General had expressed an opinion that even the inam villages which Elphinstone had allowed Dhackji to retain should have been taken away along with his emoluments, when he was dismissed.⁷⁹

In 1821 Sayajirao took the opportunity he had been waiting for and resumed the inam villages, obtained and tore up Dhackji's Sanad, and made him part with Rs. 7,75,000, which Sayajirao calculated as the illegal

77. Ibid.

78. Ibid.

79. PD(BOM) to COD, 4/144 of 1824, No. 202 of 1824.

gains Dhackji had so far made.⁸⁰ According to Sayajirao, Dhackji had in all earned 17½ lakhs during his tenure in Baroda.⁸¹ This statement had^{been} corroborated by Williams in his report to the Bombay government.⁸²

In spite of all these conclusive proofs, the Court of Directors gave ear to Dhackji's appeals, and, in the face of the facts stated, censured the Bombay government in December, 1823, for allowing Sayajirao to take the steps described.⁸³ The Court dissented entirely from the decision of the Bombay government. This started a voluminous correspondence between the Court of Directors and all those concerned for the next 10 years. Sayajirao must have been left bewildered and shaken when his actions, sanctioned by one branch of the British government was sought to be undone by another.

During his visit to Baroda in 1820-21, Elphinstone had arranged new loans for Sayajirao. By 1823, it was clear that Sayajirao was neither desirous, nor in a position to make the specified repayments. Since these loans were contracted under a British guarantee, Elphinstone's

80. BRO No.2 of 1824.

81. Ibid.

82. PDL(BOM) to COD, 22/1822/24, 2-5-1822.

83. PDL(BOM) from COD, 5/1823/24, 4-12-1823.

interference became necessary. The state debts instead of decreasing had increased by a crore and a quarter rupees.⁸⁴ The reasons for this were the corrupt practices of the farmers of revenue and the greed of Sayajirao. The Mamlatdars and other farmers of revenue had given vast sums of money to Sayajirao, which he had taken as his 'Khasgi daulat', and not as 'Sarkari' or public daulat. There was no doubt that Sayajirao and his mother Gahenabai were avaricious to the detriment of the State.⁸⁵ He received nazaranas from the farmers of revenues, each giving him Rs. 15,000 to Rs. 40,000 on taking on the lease. Farmers charged with faults or oppression had them connived in the same way. Nazaranas were also taken from heirs of Sardars and others on assuming the title, and on being granted the right of adoption.⁸⁶ It was calculated that by this means, Sayajirao got Rs. 2 lakhs a year. Secondly, his private villages gave him a lakh a year.⁸⁷ His private grass lands, taxes on firewood, lapses of pensions and allowances gave him an additional Rs. 40,000.⁸⁸ Sayajirao also kept private banks, which yielded him a lakh and a quarter a year.⁸⁹ By all this he was able to increase his personal

84. BG, p. 400.

85. Bhagvat, p. 300.

86. SC(BOM), 18. Memorandum by Williams, 18-7-1827.

87. Ibid.

88. Ibid.

89. Ibid.

wealth by ^{nearly} 5 lakhs a year.

According to Williams, Sayajirao possessed Rs. 41 lakhs of what he called 'public property improperly received'.⁹⁰ In addition the Gaekwad possessed Rs. 55 lakhs worth of jewels and money inherited from Anandrao.⁹¹

In 1825⁹² The Resident was asked to investigate and a series of meetings took place between the Maharaja and the Resident where an attempt was made to arrive at some conclusion.⁹² Sayajirao was quite cordial and to please the Resident, asked for his advice as to what should be done. Williams suggested that Sayajirao should use his private treasure to pay back the guaranteed loans as well as make changes in the farmers of revenue.⁹³ Sayajirao, however, refused to touch his private wealth, but agreed to a reduction in the expenses of government and the army. He also agreed to change the system of the farming of revenue by giving them to respectable bankers and zamindars, and to make agreements with them.⁹⁴

The negotiations were extremely protracted. It had taken about fourteen months to come to this conclusion. This was because Williams had been bent on making use of

90. Ibid.

91. Ibid.

92. PD(BOM), 26/25-1-1826, Minutes of Elphinstone, No.49 of 1825.

93. BRO File 460/301/189, p. 201.

94. Ibid.

Sayajirao's private wealth and in granting the farming of revenue to people of his own choice. Williams also complained that delay occurred because of Sayajirao's insistence that nothing should be done without 'his full assent - privately and publicly',⁹⁵ an attempt on the part of Sayajirao to assert his rights. At first Sayajirao had proposed that a new loan of Rs. 22 lakhs should be raised and that he himself should hold the 'mahals' for some years.⁹⁶ The Governor had refused to accept this suggestion, as he had no confidence that any money would thus reach the public treasury. As the bankers refused to advance a single rupee without the British guarantee, Sayajirao was obliged to consider the alternative suggested by Williams.⁹⁷ He ultimately gave up his own schemes and agreed to allow Williams and his minister to devise a scheme without 'reference to himself',⁹⁸ provided his private wealth was not touched.

Williams and the minister, Vithalrao Diwanji spent a great deal of time together examining various plans. At Sayajirao's insistence, all the meetings were held secretly in the Residency as the Maharajah wanted

95. Ibid.

96. Ibid.

97. PDL(BOM) to COD, 20/1826, 1-9-1826.

98. SC(BOM), Williams to GOB, 31-5-1827.

to keep up appearances.⁹⁹ The Resident's frequent visits to the Palace would have exposed the fact of the extent of British control over him and that the plan had been imposed upon him.¹⁰⁰ He also issued a proclamation that all petitions and complaints were to be written on a stamp paper and sent to the Durbar and not to the Residency.¹⁰¹ Vithalrao Diwanji with Sayajirao's confidential clerk, the darakhdars, the Bankers and farmers all went to the Residency where the whole scheme was prepared.¹⁰¹ Not much secrecy could have been maintained about all these comings and goings. Throughout these long negotiations, the Diwanji's position was extremely delicate. He had a hard task pleasing Sayajirao and the British at the same time. Unlike other ministers, he did not possess a British guarantee and was open to the hostility of the Gaekwad, who made him responsible for any part of the scheme he disliked. One of the most vexatious part of these proceedings was the examination of the accounts of the Lascars and Zamindars and to compare them with those of the farmers of revenue. Many of the farmers were in fact been given a remission in their dues to the State,

99. BRO File No. 460/301, V/189, p. 210.

100. Ibid.

101. Ibid.

when they had proved that they had paid sums to Sayajirao.¹⁰²
 The plan ultimately arrived at by 1826 was to give
 Septennial leases to farmers of a portion of the Gaskwad's
 territories.

When Sayajirao had found that he could not have
 his way, he had given in and entered into ^athis new agree-
 ment with the Bankers and Zamindars, approved and
 guaranteed by the British, granting them the farm of
 certain districts for seven years at once. These leases
 were given mainly to the main State creditors and taken
 away from persons of doubtful means and position. The
 Bankers - Hari Bhakti, Mairal Narayan, Samel Bechar,
 Kushalchand, Mangal Sopkhidas, and Ratanji Khandas -
 were given Kalambandis by the Maharajah for seven years
 lease on the 6th November, 1826.¹⁰³ Similarly fourteen
Kamavisdars, whose farms were continued were also given
 the same conditions and guarantees.¹⁰⁴ The Varats were
 given on the following prants: Patan Kadi, Vadnagar,
 Vishnagar, Banliyet, Padhre, Dabhoi, Sankheda, Koral,
 Baroda athavasi, Vijayapur, Surat, Navsari, Savli,
 Khairalu, Sinor, Chandod, Dhandevi, Tilakvade, Ghalhe,
 Petlad, Amreli.¹⁰⁵ Varats were also granted on the

102. Ibid.

103. Hist.S.(BAR), Vol. 1, pp. 14-26. *These came to be known*

104. Ibid. *as Septennial Leases.*

105. Ibid., p. 8.

Kathiawad revenues to the five bankers.

By these agreements with the attached guarantees, Sayajirao had lost a considerable source of private income which he had got through the nazaranas and patronage. He could not reconcile himself to this and he looked around for someone on whom to vent his anger. He made charges against the Acting Resident, Willoughby (former British Agent in Kathiawad), and the native agent Sarabhai for sending unfavourable reports about him to Bombay.¹⁰⁶ It was on his own ministers, however, that the brunt of his wrath and suspicion fell most heavily. Instigated by interested parties and personal advisers, who had also profited by the previous arrangements, Sayajirao thought that the new plan could be put aside if he made an effort towards this end. Therefore, at first secretly and then openly he sent representations to Elphinstone complaining of the injustice he had suffered.¹⁰⁷

Intrigues were set afoot to remove the Diwanji from his office and to free Sayajirao from the Septennial leases. Relations between the Resident and Sayajirao became markedly strained and the minister Vithalrao Diwanji's position was dangerous. Veneeram Aditram and

106. Ibid., pp. 59-65. Sayajirao's notification, 10-5-1828.

107. PDL(BOM) to COD, 27/1827, No. 7 of 1827.

Prabhakar Dixit known as Bhau Puranik were the secret advisers of Sayajirao and carried on behind the scenes to oust Diwanji. In fact, upto the 1st April, 1827, the Diwanji was in favour with Sayajirao, who even increased his allowances on the 1st April, 1827.¹⁰⁸ The loss of his personal gains and powers must, however, have preyed on Sayajirao's mind and his anger was skillfully directed by Veneeram and Puranik against Diwanji. Knowing, however, that the Diwanji was much respected by the Resident and Elphinstone, Sayajirao hesitated to make any direct accusations. Instead, he tried to manoeuvre Elphinstone into demanding the dismissal of Diwanji by sending confidential messengers with an ambiguous letter to the Governor on May 10th, 1827. The messengers informed Elphinstone that the Gaekwad desired a personal interview with him as his whole government was in the hands of the Diwanji, and he was deprived even of the means of communicating his situation to the Governor.¹⁰⁹ Elphinstone got this statement recorded by his 'persian' secretary. They also suggested that Elphinstone should write and ask the Gaekwad to open his mind. Elphinstone realised that this was a means to get him to initiate a complaint against the Diwanji.¹¹⁰

108. Ibid., The minister's original allowance was Rs.66,500.

109. SC(BOM), 58. Minutes of Elphinstone, 10-5-1827.

110. Ibid.

Elphinstone, thereupon, wrote to Sayajirao saying that he doubted the authenticity of the messengers as what they reported was not 'consistent' with Sayajirao's 'real situation', in which all proceedings regarding his government were openly discussed, and he was free to take any action he chose.¹¹¹

Sayajirao now had no other alternative but to make direct accusations against the Diwanji, which he did in two letters addressed to the Governor.¹¹² In these, the Gaekwad made several complaints, starting with the statement that he had been opposed to the Septennial leases, but had been forced to accept them by the joint pressure of Vithalrao Diwanji, the Resident, and the native agent Sarabhai. Next he stated that he had not been received at the Residency by William though he had gone there about four times. He also asserted that he had been prevented from writing letters and was placed under strict restraint and that his confidential servants were turned out of the State. He also accused the Diwanji and Williams of intimidating him by threats that he would be deprived of his sovereignty if he did not accede to the plan. He concluded by asking the Governor to personally come and settle matters.

111. Ibid., Letter dated 10-5-1827.

112. Ibid., Khareetas from Sayajirao, dated 28-5-1827, and 29-5-1827.

113. Ibid., Elphinstone to Sayajirao, 10-7-1827.

Elphinstone called for explanations from Williams and Willoughby, the assistant Resident, after which he wrote to Sayajirao in a most conciliatory manner.¹¹³ He gave Sayajirao as much appearance of power as possible, saying that if he was dissatisfied with Vithalrao and wanted to remove him from his office, there was nothing to prevent him from 'reducing Vithalrao in a single moment to a private station'.¹¹⁴ He pointed out that the minister had been sent by Sayajirao to formulate a plan with the Resident for the fulfilment of his engagements, and therefore, had had no choice but to give his full assistance to the Resident. In fact, he pointed out, Vithalrao, by making the settlement had kept off the necessity of the British interference and in a few years, Sayajirao could be 'master' of his whole revenue.¹¹⁵

Elphinstone laid stress on the difficult role Vithalrao had played in seeing that the instalments were paid to the bankers, sometimes having to disregard all private interests and insisting on measures that were disagreeable. He warned Sayajirao that it would be easy to find a minister who would comply with all his wishes,

113. Ibid., Elphinstone to Sayajirao, 10-7-1827.

114. Ibid.

115. Ibid.

bypass every difficulty and repel every disagreeable proposal. The result, however, would be that, at the end of the year, the bankers would remain unpaid and then neither the minister, nor Sayajirao, nor the British government would be able to postpone the necessity, as Elphinstone put it of 'placing the whole government under strict control and supervision.'¹¹⁶

This letter, however, did not have the desired effect of reconciling Sayajirao to the Resident and the Diwan. Instead, as reported by the assistant Resident, the Maharajah went into secret confabulations with Veneeram and Bhau Puranik.¹¹⁷ Vithalrao Diwanji was kept in suspense and he feared for his life. The relations between Willoughby, the Assistant Resident and Sayajirao were further aggravated by his overbearing patronising attitude. Willoughby started a tirade of complaints against the Maharajah and tried to impress on Elphinstone the need to keep Vithalrao Diwanji and to oppose the ascendancy of Veneeram. He also complained of plots and intrigues set afoot at the Court against the Diwanji and the new farmers of revenue.¹¹⁸ According to him everything was being done to defeat the objects for which the

116. Ibid.

117. SC(BOM), 18. Willoughby to GOB, 18-7-1827.

118. SC(BOM), 58. Willoughby to GOB, 11-7-1827.

reforms had become necessary, and to injure the character of those through whom they were being carried out.¹¹⁹

According to Williams, Sayajirao wanted to get out of this new financial arrangement, as he found that he could no longer subvert public funds to his private purse. His aim was to discredit the new arrangements by showing their inefficiency, and to this end he delayed payment to the military and his dependents in order to produce complaints.¹²⁰

Sayajirao and his secret councillors, now set about discrediting Vithalrao Diwanji in order to show that he could be justifiably removed. In spite of the Governor's letter, Sayajirao obviously hesitated in dismissing the Diwanji without an ostensible cause, as this it is alleged by Williams would expose his true intentions. The chief intriguers as reported were Veneeram and Bhau Puranik, aided by the family of Gangadhar Sastry, the Resident's native agent Yeshwantrao Bapuji, Bhaichand Desai, the family of Sunderji Sewji and Vithalrao Bhau, and most surprising of all, Dadaji Dhackji.¹²¹ Some of these people held British guarantees for their nemnooks, and were later supported in their claims against their sovereign.

119. Ibid.

120. Ibid., Memorandum of J. Williams, 18-7-1827.

121. Ibid., Willoughby to GOB, 20-7-1827.

According to Willoughby, with the help of these people, witnesses were fabricated ^{to prove that} against the Diwanji was receiving bribes. An amount of about Rs. 2 lakhs was also remitted to Bombay through the firm of Hari Bhakti.¹²² The Assistant Resident took these remittances as 'proof presumption' of bribery and corruption.¹²³ Sayajirao, it is claimed, sent emissaries to offer bribes to officials in Bombay, thinking they could influence the Governor and his councillors. Through these agents, a constant communication was maintained between Bombay and Baroda. Most damaging of all to Sayajirao was the discovery by Willoughby that he was trying to utilise the services of Balvantrao Baba, an employee of the Raja of Satara to aid his party in Bombay.¹²⁴

The Governor decided to warn those intriguers, who held British guarantees that if they continued in these intrigues, the British would withdraw their guarantee. Such warnings were issued to Sunderji Sawji, Bhaichand Desai, Vithalrao Bhau and the Shastri family.¹²⁵

When Sayajirao realised that the British had discovered the intrigues, he sent a very humble and

122. Ibid.

123. Ibid.

124. Ibid.

125. Ibid., Minutes of Elphinstone, 3-8-1827.

conciliatory letter to Elphinstone asking him to visit Baroda as nothing could be settled except by Elphinstone "honouring Baroda with his presence".¹²⁶ Sayajirao also hinted at a new plan to solve his financial difficulties, but stated that it could not be committed to writing.¹²⁷ He ended the letter saying, "should you not come, then the reproach of whatever befalls me in future will rest with you. Sir..."¹²⁸ The new plan Sayajirao hinted at was, according to the Resident, to use his private treasure to pay off a portion of the debt. A day later, a statement was sent by Sayajirao detailing his scheme to liquidate his debts.¹²⁹

The Governor's reaction to all these events and circumstances was to take a moderate course. He did not accept the suggestion of Willoughby that the British should insist on retaining the Diwanji and demand the dismissal of Veneeram and Puranik. Elphinstone opined that all experience had shown him the impossibility of supporting a Minister in his employment against the will of his master, without so effectually limiting the power of the latter as to render him a mere pageant. Such a course, therefore,

126. Ibid., Sayajirao to Elphinstone, 9-8-1827.

127. Ibid.

128. Ibid.

129. Ibid., Sayajirao's statement of accounts, 10-8-1827.

could never be resorted to, except when there were just grounds for temporarily depriving a prince of the exercise of his sovereignty.¹³⁰ He also stressed the point that it would be against the engagement of 1820 which had given the Gaekwad the right to choose his own minister subject to any person on whom the British had grounds of suspicions of disloyalty.¹³¹ Elphinstone was not prepared to use this right of discrimination at this moment. He thought that since Veneeram and Puranik were not suggested as Ministers, they were 'nuisances' and not 'dangerous'. He dismissed their intrigues as worthless, and ordered Willoughby not to interfere as it would be inconsistent with 'justice or expediency' if he did so.¹³²

Sayajirao followed his first letter by another explaining his plan more fully. Sayajirao proposed to pay off the huge loan in two years by drafts on the revenue and by a running loan without a British guarantee.¹³³ Elphinstone reacted favourably to the new plan contemplated by Sayajirao. He felt that Sayajirao would have to use his private treasure to pay off a portion of his debt and also

130. Ibid., Minutes of Elphinstone, 26-8-1827.

131. Ibid.

132. Ibid.

133. SC(BOM), 18. Sayajirao to Elphinstone, 19-8-1827.

by arranging to pay the rest in his manner, the British government would be released from its guarantee. A great 'advantage' he felt would be gained by 'freeing' the British from the necessity of interfering in the internal affairs of the Gaekwad. Sayajirao could be left to govern his country according to his 'own pleasure so long as he abstained from intrigues with foreign states'. Elphinstone felt that such an arrangement would at once remove all the present grounds of irritation and place British relations with the Gaekwad on the most desirable footing.¹³⁴ What a statement to make after having interfered in minutest detail! Elphinstone's grasp of the situation, however, inspite of this was more correct and sympathetic than that of Willoughby, and other petty officers of the Company, who had begun to assume an overbearing attitude towards Indian Princes in their zeal for showing off British power. Elphinstone preferred to conceal this power and, was willing to show consideration and allow the maximum amount of freedom within the restrictions laid down. Elphinstone was anxious to settle the problems equitably as he was due to relinquish his post and return home. He replied to the two letters in as conciliatory a manner as possible.¹³⁵

134. Ibid.

135. Ibid., Elphinstone to Sayajirao, 10-9-1827.

He informed Sayajirao that nothing could be more desirable than that Sayajirao should at once liquidate his guaranteed debts and thus remove the necessity of interference between him and his creditors. Elphinstone insisted that the 'free consent' of the bankers should be obtained to give up the guarantees, or otherwise, the full discharge of the debt to them alone could release the British government from the necessity of a close supervision.¹³⁶ He also pointed out the risk Sayajirao was taking in undertaking to pay off Rs. 45 lakhs per year instead of Rs. 15 lakhs, since the failure of paying off one instalment, when it was of a such a magnitude, would 'render it imperative' on the British government to take the 'exclusive management' of the finances into its hands until the debt was discharged.¹³⁷

On receipt of this communication, Sayajirao started a series of negotiations with the Bankers to get them to agree to the new scheme, whereby the Septennial leases would be liquidated by the debt being paid in two years.¹³⁸ Willoughby was also ordered by the Bombay government to call the Bankers to the Residency and inform them about the approval by the Governor of Sayajirao's

136. Ibid.

137. Ibid.

138. Ibid., Willoughby to GOB, 26-9-1827. Willoughby was acting Resident during Williams absence on leave from August 1827 to December 1827.

scheme.¹³⁹ In spite of this, Willoughby considered it 'infra dig' to allow the guaranteed leases to lapse and, in fact, encouraged the bankers to resist Sayajirao's demands. He felt that he must act with authority to restore the 'lost influence and authority' of the Resident, which was being undermined according to him, by the Governor's attitude of moderation.¹⁴⁰ When Sayajirao saw that the Bankers were not responding to his demands, he started intimidating them, calling them individually to the Court and using various means of pressure on them. The Bankers became apprehensive about what would happen if the British guarantee was withdrawn. According to Willoughby, they feared 'every species of abuse and oppression against them.' They, therefore, according to Willoughby, appealed for the support and protection of the British government to 'extricate' them from their difficult situation and save them from ruin.¹⁴¹ Even at this stage, Elphinstone ^{displayed} showed enough balance to show his disapproval of Willoughby and to inform him that Sayajirao should be allowed to pursue his own schemes, even if failure were sure.¹⁴² He was in fact, censured for not attempting to persuade the bankers to accept the scheme

139. Ibid., GOB to Willoughby, 22-10-1827.

140. Ibid., Willoughby to GOB, 26-9-1827.

141. Ibid., Willoughby to GOB, 11-10-1827.

142. Ibid., GOB to Willoughby, 22-10-1827.

'freely and cordially'.¹⁴³ The Bankers naturally took whatever advantage they could of Willoughby's attitude, and refused to give in to Sayajirao. Nothing can prove better the evils of the guarantee system which supported subjects against their sovereign. In the meantime, Willoughby naturally found that Sayajirao was becoming less cordial to him and even rude at times.¹⁴⁴ His idea of his own importance did more than anything else to wreck Elphinstone's attempts to reach some solution acceptable to Sayajirao. The ^{Acting} Resident kept on harping at the loss of prestige he and the British government were suffering due to the importance given to Sayajirao by Elphinstone. Instead of, therefore, attending to his duties, in the spirit Elphinstone wanted him to, he kept up a series of complaints to the Governor.¹⁴⁵ Instead of trying to persuade the Bankers to accept Sayajirao's plan, he encouraged them to come to the Residency and complain about the 'force and intimidation' used by Sayajirao to make them give up British guarantees and accept his biennial scheme.¹⁴⁶

143. Ibid.

144. Ibid., Willoughby to GOB, 5-11-1827.

145. Ibid., Willoughby to GOB, 5-11-1827 and 26-11-1827.

146. Ibid., Willoughby to GOB, 5-11-1827. The complainants included Agents of Mairal Narayan, Hari Bhakti, Samel Bechar, Mangal Sankerdas and Kahandas.

Elphinstone was now on the eve of leaving India, and was extremely disappointed that Willoughby had not succeeded in concluding the new arrangements with Sayajirao. He upbraided Willoughby for his short-sighted policy which was bound to have adverse reactions.¹⁴⁷ Realising the restrictions under which Sayajirao was working, Elphinstone felt that Sayajirao should be allowed to pursue his own plans, provided of course, British guarantees were not infringed. Elphinstone had instructed Willoughby to try to persuade the Bankers to acquiesce as Sayajirao seemed willing to discharge the whole of his debt to them earlier.¹⁴⁸ Elphinstone had felt that it would be easy to get the Bankers to consent, as the repayment would have opened more profitable employment for their money.¹⁴⁹ He had thought that the command of ready money which Sayajirao possessed and the means he had of raising the interest on his loans from the low rate to which the Resident had reduced it, and the profit likely to arise to the moneyed classes by a revenue system entirely free from control, would have tempted the Bankers to give up the septennial lease.¹⁵⁰

147. Ibid., GOB to Willoughby, 10-11-1827.

148. Ibid., Minutes of Elphinstone, 7-9-1827.

149. Ibid.

150. Ibid.

Above all, Elphinstone had stressed the need to show goodwill. He wanted to convince Sayajirao of this. He had specifically asked Willoughby to exert 'zealous endeavour to effect the proposed measure',¹⁵¹ and to show by his attitude that he was really anxious to 'promote the attainment of Sayajirao's wishes'.¹⁵² He wanted to convince Sayajirao that his plan had had a fair trial, and that it had not been foiled from any want of assistance on the part of the British government.¹⁵³

Instead, the Acting Resident had stood on what he thought was his 'dignity', and harped on how 'disrespect' had been shown to him and the 'total want of confidence' in him on the part of Sayajirao.¹⁵⁴ All this, according to Willoughby, led to the 'total destruction of that respect and influence hitherto possessed by the Residency'.¹⁵⁵ He disrespectfully informed the Governor that Sayajirao's plan was not one in which the 'honour and faith' of the British government could be upheld.¹⁵⁶

151. Ibid., GOB to Willoughby, 7-9-1827.

152. Ibid.

153. SC(BOM), 9. GOB to Willoughby, 8-10-1827.

154. Ibid., Willoughby to GOB, 26-9-1827.

155. Ibid.

156. SC(BOM), 18. Willoughby to GOB, 11-10-1827.

The entire proceedings had been vitiated from the very start by Willoughby's dislike of Sayajirao, probably occasioned from what he thought was insolent presumption on Sayajirao's part in 'daring' to contradict British arrangements.¹⁵⁷ On assuming charge at the Residency as Acting Resident, he had written to Bombay of the impossibility of dealing with Sayajirao as 'no one is more devoid of the least principle of honesty or fair dealing, and no one's promises, however, solemn can be less relied upon than those which proceed from the lips of His Highness'.¹⁵⁸ He ended by saying that he would have to be on his guard against the "low, cunning and over reaching dissimulation His Highness knows so well to practice".¹⁵⁹ No wonder then that the negotiations failed with Willoughby predisposed as he was. Instead of persuading the Bankers to accept the new terms offered by Sayajirao, his attitude had encouraged the Bankers to resist the offer. They realised that they were more likely to get their dues from sticking to the British guarantee, as well as gain in influence and power by siding with the Acting Resident. No doubt, they also

157. Ibid., Willoughby to GOB, 20-9-1827.

158. Ibid.

159. Ibid.

had genuine fears that though Sayajirao held out inducements to them of higher interest and immediate payment, this would be offset by the Nazaranas and other payments they would have to make to the Durbar.¹⁶⁰ They were encouraged to feel that they would entirely be at the mercy of Sayajirao if deprived of the British protection.¹⁶¹

By November, 1827, Sayajirao realised that he was not getting anywhere with the Acting Resident and decided to act on his own. Sayajirao sent a note to the Residency, stating his intention to liquidate the debts immediately.¹⁶² Sayajirao's scheme was to appropriate Rs.4,16,50,000 of the current year's revenue and liquidate the balance with ready money and jewels.¹⁶³ Willoughby, before consulting the Bombay government informed Sayajirao that the plan was 'altogether impracticable'.¹⁶⁴ On the 23rd November, Sayajirao informed Willoughby that he intended to annul the existing Potedari.¹⁶⁵ Willoughby remonstrated that a unilateral decision could not be taken. Sayajirao, according to the Acting Resident, became irritated and incensed and used 'interperate,

160. Ibid., Willoughby to GOB, 11-10-1827.

161. Ibid., Willoughby to GOB, 26-11-1827.

162. Ibid., Yad, 3-11-1827. (to Willoughby).

163. Ibid.

164. Ibid., Willoughby to GOB, 12-11-1827.

165. Ibid., Willoughby to GOB, 26-11-1827.

if not intimidating' language.¹⁶⁶ Willoughby, in turn, threatened to send a formal protest. How little Willoughby tried to really understand Sayajirao is seen from the fact that he reported to the Bombay government that it was unlikely that Sayajirao would carry out this scheme and that the move was intended as a 'vain attempt' to force the Resident into compliance.¹⁶⁷

Following this communication, Sayajirao, on the 4th December, 1827, broke the old Potedari granted to Hari Bhakti and pledged new ones to the House of Lukman Myral.¹⁶⁸ Two days later, he began to draw cheques on the other bankers and to assign revenue for the payment of these drafts.¹⁶⁹ Willoughby went to the palace to expostulate, and warn Sayajirao of the 'evil consequences of his action'.¹⁷⁰ He next sent a written protest and warning.¹⁷¹ According to this ^{communication} all official intercourse between the Durbar and the Residency would cease till the Gaekwad again upheld the British guarantees. The

166. Ibid.

167. Ibid.

168. Ibid., Willoughby to GOB, 6-12-1827.

169. Ibid.

170. Ibid.

171. Ibid.

guaranteed bankers were alarmed at these as they feared retaliation from Sayajirao, and Willoughby went out of his way to assure them of British protection.¹⁷²

Sayajirao, however, remained adamant and followed up his first step by arranging a new Potedari and pledged the revenue of Surat Athavarsi in repayment.¹⁷³ He also

opened a new bank in Surat, and performed public and religious ceremonies at its opening.¹⁷⁴ Obviously,

Sayajirao was prepared now to go to any length against the British. According to Willoughby, these acts of Sayajirao created a feeling of insecurity amongst his subjects who 'hated' him and would have revolted against him, except for the presence of the British.¹⁷⁵ No

evidence of this is to be found ^{from} ~~in~~ any other sources.

Willoughby was smarting under what he thought was humiliation to the British, and he felt that Sayajirao had "insulted their honour and violated British pledges".¹⁷⁶

In the meantime, Elphinstone had left Bombay on the 28th November, 1827 and was succeeded by Sir John

172. Ibid.

173. Ibid., Willoughby to GOB, 8-12-1827.

174. Ibid.

175. Ibid.

176. Ibid.

Malcolm.¹⁷⁷ The new Governor was of a different mind altogether regarding the treatment of Indian princes. Though he started off with some show of moderation, he quickly thought it necessary to adopt the 'severest coercive measures' in order to break what he called the 'naughty spirit' of Sayajirao.¹⁷⁸

On taking over charge, he first ordered Williams, who had returned to take charge of the Baroda Residency, to limit his interference on behalf of the guaranteed persons to the points to which the British were bound to them.¹⁷⁹ Williams was told ^{not} to listen to complaints of the Gaekwad's subjects against him but to direct them to Sayajirao. What is more, no officer of Sayajirao was to be supported contrary to the wishes of Sayajirao.¹⁸⁰ However, Williams was told to inform Sayajirao that the British government was resolved 'to redeem its faith down to the minutest pledge'.¹⁸¹ Malcolm in the beginning showed a remarkable understanding of Sayajirao's position. He felt that Sayajirao's actions stemmed from 'a very poignant sense of his want of real power'.¹⁸² Malcolm

177. BG, p. 240.

178. SC(BOM) 18, GOB to Williams, 12-12-1827.

179. Ibid.

180. Ibid.

181. Ibid.

182. Ibid.

pointed out that only the minimum amount of interference would make the Gaekwad a 'competent instrument of rule'. At the same time, he was prepared to show consideration only on minor points, but not to give in on points of substance like the present dispute. These were to be dealt with 'unyielding firmness'.¹⁸³ Malcolm insisted that where the 'faith' of the government was pledged 'it must be redeemed', even at the expense of lowering the Maharajah in the eyes of his subjects or embarrassing his administration.¹⁸⁴ Williams was asked to communicate this to Sayajirao. On the question of Vithalrao Diwanji, Malcolm at first felt that if he was personally disliked by Sayajirao, and if his removal would make Sayajirao adhere to his engagements, then his wishes ought to be gratified, provided proper provisions were made for Vithalrao Diwanji.¹⁸⁵ If, however, Sayajirao proved adamant in defying the British, Malcolm felt that there was no remedy but to make a settlement on ^{Sayajirao} him by which he would be left in the enjoyment of a fixed sum for the purpose of maintenance of his dignity whilst the whole administration of the State would be carried on under the

183. Ibid.

184. Ibid.

185. Ibid.

directions of the British government.¹⁸⁶ Though Malcolm, at this stage, was reluctant to take this step except in extreme circumstances,¹⁸⁷ it is significant that he thought of it at the very beginning of his Governorship.

Sayajirao obviously had become too independent and did not know the new Governor. He ignored the communications on this made to him by Williams, and continued in his efforts to find new Bankers and Potedars. On January 7th, 1828, he negotiated a new loan, one with the widow of Kushalchand, a partner of Myral Narain, without reference to Myral's House.¹⁸⁸ Before this, she had given a release to Sayajirao for her share of the guaranteed loan. The new loan was for Rs. 7 lakhs without the British guarantee. Repayment was to be over five years and for this varats were granted on Baroda which was already pledged to the guaranteed Bankers.¹⁸⁹ Following this, a meeting of the other guaranteed Bankers was called at the Residency, when they were asked if any of them were also disposed to follow the widow's proceedings.¹⁹⁰ Williams noted that they said that "they had no wish to abandon paradise for Hell."¹⁹¹

186. Ibid.

187. Ibid.

188. SC(BOM) 19, BRD, 16-1-1828.

189. Ibid.

190. Ibid., BRD, 19-1-1828.

191. Ibid.

The Resident then addressed a memorandum to Sayajirao embodying the instructions sent by the Governor and informing him that he would be responsible for the consequences of his action.¹⁹²

Sayajirao had now become desperate and decided to go along his own way. He refused to listen to or give in to the demands made upon him. On the other hand, the guaranteed Bankers fell back on the British for protection, encouraged as they had been by Willoughby. Malcolm had been predisposed against Sayajirao, and showed very little patience or understanding. Without caring to really come to any understanding, he accepted the reports of Willoughby, and Williams and decided to show the might of the British power to Sayajirao and the extent of British protection to the guaranteed persons. On the 28th March, 1828, he issued a proclamation sequestering certain districts of the Gaekwad to repay the guaranteed Bankers. The occupation of these territories was declared to be temporary till the guaranteed debt was paid off. They were to be returned to the Gaekwad subsequently after the British had also recovered what they considered due to them for the expenses that they had been 'exposed' by Sayajirao. It

192. Ibid., Williams to Sayajirao, 19-1-1828.



was also stated that ample security would also be taken to adjust any future violation by Sayajirao of the ¹⁹³ Treaties and Agreements.

At the same time, as this proclamation was made, the Gaekwad was also called upon to maintain his Contingent of Horse on ^a better footing, to enter into ^a commercial treaty and to reform his coinage.¹⁹⁴ Soon after this, the ¹⁹⁵ septennial leases were cancelled by the British government. Later on, however, Sayajirao was held bound ^{to} indemnify the farmers for the losses incurred by the abandonment of the contract. A contract, in fact, which this time had unilaterally been broken by the British, and after having disallowed Sayajirao to do so, even when he was prepared to pay back the entire amount in two stages! These actions initiated by Malcolm were to lead to one crisis after another - all brought upon by the British - for reasons calculated to enhance their own powers.

Vithalrao Diwanji was also protected by Malcolm against his lawful Sovereign. He extended the British

193. Baroda Precis of 1853, paras 160-169. By this sequestration, the British took over some of the most fertile territory of the Gaekwad. In all the paraganahs of Petlad, Bahiyal, Kadi, Dabhoi, Bhadrapur, Sinor, Amreli, Shiyanager, tributes of Kathiawad - Mahikantha, Rewakantha, Rajpipla, Udaipur and Sankheda. All these yielded an annual revenue of Rs.15,47,725.

194. Ibid.

195. Ibid.

guarantee to him and his family and property. A pension similar to that granted to former Gaekwad ministers was granted to him to be paid from the sequestered revenues. Malcolm confirmed Vithalrao under British guarantee in his first nemnook granted by Sayajirao in 1821. An additional allowance of Rs.2,653 per month and a paga of 110 horse and the adoption of a son were granted. All this was done without any consultation with Sayajirao. He was only informed of the decision by the Governor.¹⁹⁶ Malcolm had put Sayajirao to scorn by these harsh and degrading measures. They had arbitrarily usurped the Gaekwad's hereditary prerogative as Sovereign in favour of a subject and former servant of his. Sayajirao's helplessness was now publicly exposed by the British support of his one time minister, whom he had come to think of as a traitor, and, whom he was about to remove. To compound the injury, the sequestered Kathiawad districts were put in his charge. This was done as Malcolm avowed to show the country at large the regard the British had for the Diwanji's "merits and integrity", but also, more important, to show the manner in which such loyalty to the British was rewarded.¹⁹⁷ No louder

196. IOL(LOND), LPS05/573, Secret Despatches, 1827-28.
Malcolm to Sayajirao, 25-1-1830.

197. Ibid.

call could have been given to encourage disaffection and deceit amongst the 'guaranteed' subjects of Sayajirao.

Amongst these ^{were} Govindrao and his supporters. Govindrao was the adopted son of Fatehsingh, whose right as heir had been specifically denied by the British at the time of his adoption. Ill feeling between the two families had been fomenting ever since. Sayajirao had, in 1826, made a settlement of life pensions of Rs.10,400 and Rs.12,400 respectively on Radhabai and Govindrao in consideration of the withdrawal of all claims of Govindrao to the gadi. He had also promised to release the servants of the family whom he had imprisoned.¹⁹⁸ However, on Govindrao's party not abiding peaceably, Sayajirao had withdrawn these concessions. Seeing the weakened position of Sayajirao, Govindrao on 22nd July, 1829, broke into open revolt and took refuge in the former house of Col. Ballantyne, near the Residency, and gathered around him a following of about 1,000 persons, and had, according to Sayajirao, committed various acts of violence against his subjects and property, such as occupying the Kedareshwar and abusing and intimidating his officers and men. The Resident refused to interfere even on a request from

198. BG, BS. Vol. I, p. 546.

Sayajirao, and ultimately when Govindrao began advancing on the Surajnarain temple, Sayajirao was forced to blockade the whole area with his troops.¹⁹⁹ When this happened, the Resident had written to Sayajirao asking him first to withdraw his troops, after which, Govindrao would be asked to disperse.²⁰⁰ Sayajirao naturally reacted to this hostilely. As he stated the rebel was pointedly being shown to be the injured party, and threatened to take steps to restore his honour, unless the British forced Govindrao to withdraw.²⁰¹ Williams letter commenting on the note of Sayajirao was that all points were incorrect and that Govindrao had simply taken refuge from Sayajirao as he suspected foul play!²⁰² In fact, it was strongly rumoured that Vithalrao Diwanji, Sarabhai and the guaranteed bankers had formed a conspiracy to depose Sayajirao and put Govindrao on the gadi though this was never proved. The two groups remained facing each other beligerantly till Malcolm's visit to Baroda on 28th December, 1829.²⁰³ During his visit to Baroda,

199. Wallace, Op. cit., Sayajirao to Williams, 14-11-1829, pp. 388-394.

200. Sc(Bom) 117/5, Williams to GOB, 20-11-1829.

201. Ibid., Sayajirao to Williams, 14-11-1829.

202. Ibid., Williams to GOB, 20-11-1829.

203. Wallace, Op. cit., p. 397.

discussions took place on this matter between Sayajirao and Malcolm.²⁰⁴ As a result Malcolm directed the Resident to pay off the mercenaries of Govindrao and to recover the amount from his person. The claims of these persons amounted to Rs.1,30,000. Williams was told to make attempts to reach a compromise. As a result about half of these men agreed to settle at 25 per cent of their claims. The others, however, insisted on full compensation and threatened Govindrao with dire consequences if this was not granted. A show of force was made by Williams and ultimately, what Malcolm now called 'the rabble' was discharged for Rs.10,000 more than the 25 per cent first offered, and Govindrao also was exiled to Surat.²⁰⁵

Another result of the visit of Malcolm was reorganisation of the Residency and general and judicial administration of Gujarat.²⁰⁶ The office of the Resident at Baroda was abolished as a separate appointment, and from December 1st, 1838, Williams was appointed Political and Judicial Commissioner in Gujarat, and vested also with the powers of Resident at Baroda. He was to have his headquarters at Ahmedabad. He was from there to

204. IOL(LOND), Op. cit., Journal of Malcolm, 28-12-1829 to 15-1-1830.

205. Ibid.

206. Ibid.

maintain supervision over the Gaekwad, especially on to the observance of treaties and engagements. The Political Agencies at Pahlampur and Mahikantha were also abolished, and with the Political Agency at Kathiawad, they were placed under the supervision of the Commissioner. The ostensible reason given by Malcolm for the change was to stop what he called 'minute interference' on the part of the Resident in the Gaekwad's affairs and the intrigues generated by the Residenty 'Native' agents.²⁰⁷ What Malcolm had actually done was to strengthen British administration in Gujarat and by centralising control at Ahmedabad. He had also drawn a distinct line between Sayajirao and the British, clearly indicating where the source of real power lay. All official work with the Gaekwad would now have to be directed via Ahmedabad and direct approaches to Sayajirao would be circumscribed. As a result of this transfer, the guaranteed Bankers and their hangers on of the British migrated to Ahmedabad much to the disadvantage of their other business affairs, and what is more, separated them further from their Sovereign.

Sayajirao was to have one more severe blow dealt at him by Malcolm. On the 25th January, 1830, Malcolm sent

207. Ibid.

a note to Sayajirao demanding that his 3,000 Contingent of Horse should be made more efficient, specifically, at least, 2,000 of them should be fit for service.²⁰⁸ The charges made were that the forces were not paid regularly and musters were not properly kept. It was further charged that the number of 3,000 was not also maintained at par. Only about 2,500 were actually kept.²⁰⁹

Malcolm warned Sayajirao that if the requirements were not carried out, the British would begin reorganising the Contingent.²¹⁰ There seems to be some truth in that the Contingent was in a bad state. Since the cancellation of the Septennial leases, the payments had definitely been low as well as the discipline.²¹¹ Before, however, Sayajirao could make any reforms, even if he wanted to, Malcolm ordered Williams ^{take over and} to reorganise the Contingent and issued a proclamation sequestering more districts for payment of the Contingent on March 1830, so as to yield Rs. 10 lakhs revenue yearly.²¹²

By this reorganisation Sayajirao was deprived of all authority over a portion of his army and his influence

208. Ibid., Note from Malcolm to Sayajirao, 25-1-1830.

209. Ibid., Memo. No.2 of Malcolm relating to the Gaekwad Contingent.

210. Ibid., Malcolm to Sayajirao, 25-1-1830.

211. BSG, p. 646.

212. Baroda Precs, Op. cit., paras 160-169.

over a portion of the high military classes curtailed. This action still further lowered Sayajirao's position in the eyes of his subjects and affected his pride and spirit to a large extent. This can be seen in his letters to Lord Clare later on. By the end of 1830, Sayajirao had become a helpless Sovereign with no real power. His subjects were growing restless and unsettled. Conspiracies and intrigues were rampant. The most conspicuous amongst these was an abortive attempt made at Baroda to dethrone Sayajirao. As reported by Williams, Sayajirao's relatives and even some of his wives, fearing that the British would take over the entire State, had plotted to seize Sayajirao and his favourites and place his son Ganpatrao on the ²¹³gadi. The plot was discovered by Sayajirao and the conspirators arrested and the ring leaders executed. ²¹⁴

It is any wonder then that a man such as Sayajirao, who started his reign with a sense of independence and vigour, should lose his sense of responsibility, become vindictive, and cherish protracted hatred towards those who had opposed him or denied his authority? From 1828, onwards the two parties - British and the Gaekwad - were at daggers drawn and no weapon

213. PD(BOM), 549 of 1831. Williams to GOB, 16-2-1831.

214. Ibid.

was considered mean enough to be used. Having nothing to fear from the hatred of his subjects (since the subsidiary troops protected him), he lost all sense of responsibility towards his subjects. As an example of the inefficiency and disregard that had crept into the Baroda state affairs, its relations with the Bhils of Gujarat and on the Khandesh-Baroda border, along with the peaceable people whom they harassed, can be examined.

Having no initiative left of his own, Sayajirao, it seems, now lost all interest even in the maintenance of law and order. Not that he was incapable of solving these problems or understanding their course, but because he felt like a hunted animal who had been pushed into a corner, and obviously, wanted to harass the pursuer at all costs.

The Bhils were about 56,000 in number and scattered in the hilly parts of Baroda state. They were aborigines, probably indigenous to India. At that time, it was used as a generic term meant to include all those who lived by hunting in the forests. The very word 'Bhil' is derived from the Tamil word 'Bhilawai' or a Bowman.²¹⁵ They were a people who refused to settle

215. Majumdar, D.N., Races & Cultures of India, p.32.

down peaceably, but were given to constant plunder and terrorism. A similar group of Khandesh Bhils ^{had been} were brought to civilized control and life through the remarkable exertions of Capt. Outram.²¹⁶ This was one of those many achievements of the British administrators of the 1830's and 1840's which have left their enduring mark on the progress of India. In Baroda, it was quite different at this time. As already stated neither the will nor the desire to do anything constructive was there.

The first problem with these people arose in 1827-28. Certain Bhil chieftains of the Dang region had claims on the Gaekwad which he paid them annually. As the strain in British Baroda relations got worse, the Gaekwad stopped paying his 'hucks' to the Dang chieftains.²¹⁷ As a result these chieftains, some of them with followers ranging upto 1,000 began to exercise despotic power and held the peaceful population at the foot of the Dang hills - both Baroda and British - at ransom. Any village which incurred their displeasure was rushed to and plundered and scene after scene of oppression and devastation met the eyes.²¹⁸ The British tried to settle the matter by offers of amnesty and payment of money from

216. PD(BOM), Mixed Vol.172/11 of 1829, p.146.

217. Ibid., 572/11 of 1829, p. 146.

218. Ibid., 228 of 1826, pp. 25-26.

the Khandesh treasury in lieu of the Gaekwad's payment.²¹⁹
 The prominent chieftains amongst whom were Devi Singh Rajah, Silput Rajah, Khem Rajah were approached.²²⁰
 Through various emissaries, Hodge, the Acting Collector of Dhulia (Khandesh region) tried to bring them to terms but the Rajahs, all insisted on a written statement by the Gaekwad that they could take the money from the British officers.²²¹ Silput Rajah was most insistent on the Gaekwad's permission to accept money from the British hands. Letter after letter was despatched to the Resident at Baroda from Hodge but the Gaekwad refused to give an ear to these requests.²²² The result of his refusal was to further increase the disturbances of the region. All suggestions of aiding the British government to preserve the peace in Khandesh were refused.²²³ In fact, Sayajirao showed a determined opposition to every wish of the British government.²²⁴ The sufferings and misery of the peasantry whom these Bhils harassed was pitiful. Entire villages were razed, their cattle robbed, their grain looted and the people held at ransom.²²⁵ The Gaekwad was

219. Ibid., 5/228 of 1826, pp. 22.

220. Ibid., 172/4 of 1829, p. 218.

221. Ibid.

222. Ibid., 172H of 1829, p. 11.

223. Ibid., p. 6.

224. Ibid., p. 7.

225. Ibid., p. 100.

actuated in his refusal by the dual factor that if the British paid the Hucks, one more prerogative power of his would be snatched away from him, and also by his wish to harm the British reputation. The people were the inevitable sufferers in this hopeless struggle for power.

The matter was ultimately settled without references to the Gaekwad, thus frustrating his very object. The poor inhabitants of the Dang were given some peace and the Bhils some rehabilitation. Most of the Bhil chiefs were ultimately, by 1829, brought round to receiving their 'hucks' from the British without the Gaekwad's sanction.²²⁶ The Silput Rajah who had refused British intervention so far was given his 'hucks' by the Gaekwad.²²⁷ Lastly, the British tried to bring the Bhils into line with their Khandesh Bhil corps, and it was suggested that a police force should be formed of these Bhils.²²⁸

Disturbances of a similar nature, but more serious and prolonged, broke out in ^{the plains of} Gujarat. Here, wherever the borders of British and Gaekwad territory were common, Bhil gangs would plunder and harass the

226. Ibid., 172H of 1829, p. 23.

227. Ibid., p. 103.

228. Ibid., pp. 51-52.

inhabitants of the British villages and return with impunity to the Gaekwad territory where they were neither apprehended nor punished in any other way.²²⁹ In fact, it was stated that these gangs and their leaders were tacitly and openly encouraged by the Gaekwad authorities.²³⁰ By 1830, the position in these territories had become intolerable. The course, the Bhils took was quite unprecedented. As the Magistrate at Kaira remarked in March, 1830, the high roads were almost entirely blocked up with bands of Bhils for the purpose of plunder, and caused many injuries to the British sepoys on duty.²³¹

The Magistrate at Ahmedabad corroborated this state of affairs where also, large gangs of Bhils were continuously showed themselves in different parts of the district for plundering. As a consequence the roads were getting quite unsafe for travellers of every description. Robberies had been committed to an alarming extent on the property of certain Bombay merchants trading to Malwa and property estimated at Rs.1,27,823 had been plundered during 1830-31.²³²

According to the British, the Gaekwad authorities were accused of levying large sums annually from the Bhils

229. Ibid., 8/1837, Letter No. 5.

230. Ibid., Letter No. 30, pp. 11-12.

231. Ibid., No. 17, p. 17.

232. Ibid., 8/1837, No. 16, p.26.

for permission to commit plunder.²³³ On request for help being made by the British authority to the Gaekwad authorities in the villages and paraganahs, no adequate response was made. Ostensibly orders were issued by the Gaekwad to apprehend and hand over the culprits, but as the Broach Magistrate stated, it was inevitable to come to the conclusions that the order for their seizure was a nullity or that the Gaekwad's authorities paid no attention to the orders.²³⁴ This was the darkest period in the reign of Sayajirao. Terror reigned along the borders and murders became common.²³⁵ The Gaekwad had made things worse and had brought approbrium on himself by letting the Contingent Force deteriorate to the extent that they were ill paid, ill equipped and ill disciplined.²³⁶ They had been of no use in keeping peace in the disturbed territories even if the desire to do so were there. These, then were the dubious ways of protest Sayaji was reduced to using at the expense of the suffering of both the Bhil community and the public at large. Request after request went unheeded by the Gaekwad and when forced, he sent half-hearted, probably secretly contradicted

233. Ibid., No. 26, p. 53.

234. Ibid., No. 5, p. 7.

235. Baroda State by S. Setti, p. 36.

236. PD(BOM), 8/1837, No. 44, p. 93.

instructions to his Kamavisdars. The situation deteriorated to such an extent that petty wranglings tended to cover up the main issues. Complaints were made by the British of the discourteous tone of the letters and behaviour of the Gaekwad officers,²³⁷ and at one stage, correspondence stopped between the British agent and the Gaekwad officers due to instructions of the latter.

In a moment of reflection, Sayajirao put his finger on the real trouble and suggested remedies which he knew the British would not accept.²³⁸ He was very near the truth when he stated that the British judicial system with its prolonged trials and insistence on impossible proofs were responsible for encouraging these robbers. Instead, he suggested rather the arbitrary but effective method of using village securities to prevent these brigands. It should be remembered that India, very reluctantly accepted Western justice. It was not very far from the days of Lawrence in 1803, when the whole population fled in terror not from the 'brutal and licentious soldiery' but from the High Court which was believed to be accompanying them.²³⁹ These useful suggestions of the Gaekwad, of course, held no water

237. Ibid., No. 262, p. 413.

238. Ibid., pp. 181-189.

239. Thomson and Garrett, Op. cit., p. 226.

with the British at this time. They instead were planning a Bhil Corps in the surrounding Native State, making each Prince pay for it, and to use their military force to do so, even without their consent.²⁴⁰

All in all, this was a sorry state of thing which went on till 1832, when a slight improvement occurred due to the change in the British administration. Some superficial adjustments were made, but the evils of the entire system could not be remedied. Where position is without power or responsibility there can be no motive for good government. The people are inevitably the sufferers. The problems related here go towards indicating the system of Subsidiary Alliances, and British Indian statesmanship in the early 19th century.

240. PD(BOM), 80/1837, p. 181.

CHAPTER IV

ADVENT OF LORD CLARE AND RECONCILIATION

The Court of Directors had approved the first sequestration, and at first tacitly the second also.¹ In their communication, they had suggested that the Bombay government might annex the tributaries by 'persuading' the chiefs to 'relinquish' their 'independent sovereignty', and then consolidate the territories into large districts under one uniform British administration.² It was suggested that they could be bribed into agreement by reducing the amount of their annual tribute. They also suggested that the Contingent could be reduced to 2,000.³ At the same time a note was sounded of the possibility of reconciliation and sympathy for Sayajirao. Malcolm might have carried out these suggestions, but fortunately for the Gaekwad, he was succeeded as Governor of Bombay on March 21st, 1831 by the Earl of Clare.

Clare took the view of a liberal that he was, and opted for a spirit of consideration and reconciliation. He was able to win over the Court of Directors from their vacillating policies to one of consistent goodwill - at least for some time.

1. IOL, Op. cit., COD to GOB, 24-11-1831. 4-9-1830

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

He had been instructed in London to make speedy reconciliation with the Gaekwad. After settling down to affairs in Bombay, Clare visited Baroda in November, 1831, and established an amicable understanding between the two governments and brought about personal reconciliation between the heads of two governments. Sayajirao was treated with the utmost consideration and respect and a settlement was arrived at in April, 1832, on most points of disputes. By keeping out any discussion of personal guarantees, and refusing private negotiations with these persons, Clare could speedily made arrangements for a settlement.

On 14th August, 1831, Sayajirao sent a present to Lord Clare in Bombay on the occasion of a birth of a son to His Highness. Along with, ^{his} he sent a memorandum in which he pointed out his grievances. This was followed by an invitation to Clare to visit him at Baroda.

The memoranda contained his grievances against the action of the previous Governor and the Resident. It also accused Sarabhai and Vithalrao Deoji of having given wrong information to Williams. Sayajirao went on to explain how Malcolm had not accepted Sayajirao's offer to pay off his debt, but instead had insisted on certain

conditions which lead to the sequestration of his territory.⁴

Finally, Sayajirao offered to pay the 3,000 Contingent of Horse according to the agreement and ended the memorandum beseeching Clare to free the sequestrations and his sufferings.⁵

It was in response to this memorandum and the invitation that Clare agreed to visit Baroda on his way to Ajmer to meet the Governor-General in early December, 1831.

Clare was prepared to be extremely fair with the Gaekwad and wanted to follow the new instructions of the Court of Directors to treat the prince with the utmost 'distinction and consideration'.⁶ Clare, therefore, began the visit by an exchange of presents and received ceremonial visits from Sayajirao. According to Clare, he did all in his power to convince Sayajirao that he was actuated by a 'friendly feeling' for the State of Baroda which was the only one of the Maratha power that had on most 'prime' occasions been invariably steady in its alliance with the British.⁷

4. SC(BOM), 107/15 of 1831-32. Sayajirao to Clare, 14-8-1831.

5. Ibid.

6. Ibid., Minutes by Clare, 3-12-1831.

7. Ibid.



Clare thus began the meeting with Sayajirao by first establishing good personal relations between them. This visit lasted for six days and, in all, Clare had three public and three private interviews with Sayajirao.⁸ Clare described these visits as, on the whole, satisfactory, though nothing definitive or conclusive was agreed upon. He felt these meetings were valuable for the better understanding between the two governments which they produced.⁹ His main object was to hear Sayajirao's grievances about those questions that had led to sequestrations of his territory. Without a personal reconciliation between the heads of the two governments, Clare realised that it would be quite useless to attempt even to begin negotiation. It was essential to show a disposition on his part he thought to treat Sayajirao with utmost attention and respect and listen patiently to all that he had to say.¹⁰

Sayajirao discussed the main disagreement between him and the British which had lead to the two sequestrations. Regarding the first sequestration, Sayajirao pointed out his adherence to his obligations though he acknowledged the right of the British to safeguard their guarantee, if he had broken faith with his creditors. Sayajirao insisted

8. Ibid.

9. Ibid.

10. Ibid.

that he had not broken faith and that, therefore, the British interference had put him to great deal of hardship and humiliation.

Without entering into the details, at first, Clare pointed out to Sayajirao, in a general way, that, had the obligation been maintained on his part, the British government would not have taken the measures he alluded to. Clare decided to first get the correct accounts of the sequestration,¹¹ whereupon, Sayajirao complained that no accounts of the sequestrations had been given to him. Clare promised to have them sent to him, and decided to take up this question later. Another complaint of Sayajirao was that of the evil effects of the British guarantees to individuals. Each of these individuals, he pointed out, had abused the guarantee by treating their Sovereign in an 'annoying and vexatious' manner, and particularly discussed the conduct of Govindrao. Clare assured Sayajirao that he would do all in his power to uphold his authority over his own subjects, and would study the circumstances of each particular case before giving a final opinion.¹²

Sayajirao's third complaint was about his being deprived of the command of the Contingent of Horse, although

11. Ibid.

12. Ibid.

he had kept it up regularly in respect of pay and equipment. The Contingent, he pointed out, had always had the approval of the former Residents, Walker and Carnac. He reminded Clare of how the Contingent had co-operated with the British troops in Kathiawad, Malwa and other places. Sayajirao, according to Clare, was very agitated over this question, and insisted that the Contingent should be returned to him.¹³

Sayajirao wanted Clare to discuss the Treaty of 1817, which, he claimed, he had not violated. Here also Clare was not in a position to discuss details till he had made a fuller study. He, however, promised to inquire fully into the "representation" and to see that the terms of the treaty were fulfilled by the British government.¹⁴

Clare felt that his visit was well received by the Gaekwad and as proof of this, the Gaekwad released one Jhan Mohamed, a principal officer of the Contingent and a Sardar of rank, who had been imprisoned by Sayajirao when the officer was on a visit to a friend at Baroda. As a sign of goodwill towards the British he was released.¹⁵ All this obviously helped to create the spirit of cordiality and friendship and opened a period of comparative peace between the two parties.

13. Ibid.

14. Ibid.

15. Ibid.

Clare did not waste much time to start investigations. In Ajmer itself, he started discussing the problem of the Gaekwad with his officials. He realised that it was very desirable to restore good understanding with Sayajirao, and was prepared to acknowledge that the British had used 'harsh measures' against him during the previous regime.¹⁶

The first question he went into was the sequestration of March, 1828. At that time, it was calculated that under this arrangement, the debt could be liquidated in five years. After investigation, Clare found that William had no hope of paying it back for five years more and Clare doubted even that.¹⁷ Commenting on this arrangement, Clare opined that nothing could have been more disadvantageous to the British government than to the Gaekwad, and the population of the district than the present state of affairs, where the country, de jure belongs to the Gaekwad, but in de facto to the British.¹⁸ It was difficult for Clare to unravel under what code of laws the territories were governed. Since the lawful Sovereign had protested against the sequestration, he had not interfered to maintain law and order within the districts which had been taken from him. According to

16. SC(BOM), 107/15. Minutes of Clare, 18-1-1832.

17. Ibid.

18. Ibid.

British regulations, they had not appeared amenable to their courts. There was, as Clare pointed out, a 'general immunity of crime' throughout these territories generating as a necessary consequence, unbounded licence, which he feared would eventually demoralise the whole population, and the contagion would spread to the British territories.¹⁹

In addition to these evil consequences, Clare realised that the inhabitants did not know to whom they belonged whether to the British or to the Gaekwad, as a consequence, the people were living in a state of uncertainty. Clare hoped that for the 'welfare of this fine country', the problems would soon be solved.²⁰ The law and order problem created has been illustrated with reference to the Bhils.

On his way to Ajmer, the Governor had stopped at Ahmedabad to discuss these matters with the Political Commission, where he also met the principal Bankers. He discovered from them that the Bankers were making heavy losses living away from Baroda and that they would now be very glad to receive their money from the Gaekwad and return to Baroda, provided they could be secured against illtreatment from Sayajirao. The Bankers had realised that living outside Baroda, they could not recover

19. Ibid.

20. Ibid.

large sums of money owed to them by individuals there. Clare was convinced that the Bankers would now agree to repayment whenever it was offered to them,²¹ and he looked into the Agreements with the Bankers, and contrary to Malcolm's interpretation, Clare was of the opinion that there was no stipulation whatever in them which could be construed to mean that the money 'shall not' be paid off till seven years from November, 1826. There was nothing to prevent the whole debt being liquidated before the expiration of seven years.²² Clare was now convinced that the dispute could be easily resolved as Sayajirao was ready to repay the money immediately. It was now only a matter of making up the accounts and reaching an Agreement with Sayajirao to the actual amount to be paid by him to the Bankers. In the annual returns, of the sequestered territories, Clare found that the accounts for the first two years had been completed, but the third and the fourth year accounts were still pending. He ordered Williams to send them without delay to him and furnish a copy to the Gaekwad. At the same time, Clare himself examined the outstanding claims against Sayajirao and came to the following decisions. He first decided to

21. Ibid.

22. Ibid.

strike off the amounts of all unguaranteed claims as the British were not entitled to interfere with them. He then examined each ^{guaranteed} claim and came to certain a decision ^{to recommend the following to Sayajirao:}

1. Firm of Hari Bhakti:

A claim of 20 lakhs was outstanding. This debt seems to have been kept on from the early years when loans were raised to free the Gaekwad government from its debts. Clare suggested that the claims of Hari Bhakti be adjudicated by a panchayat of respectable Bankers at Baroda. Both parties should abide by their award.

2. Balwantrao Gaekwad:

Rs. 10 lakhs was outstanding. The same proposal for adjudication was made.

3. Farmers of Septennial Leases:

The amount due to them from the Gaekwad amounted to Rs. 20 lakhs. Adjudication by a Panchayat was recommended here also.

4. Dues to the British for taking charge of the Sequestered districts, including dues of the military force:

The British claimed Rs. 5 lakhs as their expenses.

Clare expressed his doubts as to whether a large military force had been used for taking possession of the sequestered districts as there had been no appearance of resistance. He, however, quickly added that it had probably been justified as a measure of precaution. He stated that Sayajirao should not be allowed to object to the charge incurred for taking military possession and for keeping the British troops there for one year after the sequestration. He, however, expressed strong doubts as to whether the British could 'fairly' make the Gaekwad pay any part of the expense of their regular troops employed in his district after it had become evident that there was no intention on his part to resist the British occupation. Clare felt that from March, 1829, British troops were not required in these districts. He could not, therefore, charge Sayajirao with the cost of keeping them there.²³

Clare also pointed out that the Gaekwads had already ceded territory to the British for the payment of a Subsidiary force and ^{they} had also bound ~~them~~ to maintain an efficient Contingent of 3,000 Horse. This Contingent of Horse had been taken from him and additional territories had been sequestered to maintain it. Clare felt that the British could keep the country in a state of 'tranquillity' without any further demand of a military nature on the Gaekwad.²⁴

23. Ibid.

24. Ibid.

Clare ^{remembered} reminded himself that the British had made Sayajirao pay his own Contingent for doing duty in the British districts. In view of that he questioned whether the British could charge him at all for using their troops in these sequestered districts. He also wondered as to why any necessity had arisen for employing such a great number of Company regular troops, instead of employing the Gaekwad's own Contingent of Horse.²⁵

5. Allowance (Nemnook) of Rs.60,000/-
per annum plus Paga of 110 Horse
guaranteed by Malcolm in February,
1830 to the late Vithalrao Deoji
and his adopted son:

This allowance and that of the Paga of Horse amounted to nearly one lakh of Rupees annually. The Gaekwad had pointed out that, at his meetings with Elphinstone in September, 1827, he had been informed that he was free to reduce Vithalrao's salary as it did not concern the British government. Clare, therefore, questioned Malcolm's decision to guarantee such a sum to Vithalrao Deoji. Clare, however, accepted the British responsibility to pay this amount to Vithalrao Deoji and his family, if Sayajirao refused to do so. It may be recalled that Sayajirao regarded Vithalrao as a traitor and consistently refused to sanction such a large amount

25. Ibid.

26. Ibid.

to him.²⁶

Having thus studied the background of the first sequestration, Clare expressed his willingness to accept Sayajirao's offer to make payments to the guaranteed bankers on the basis of Agreements reached between the two. He felt that the guaranteed creditors should be allowed to come to terms with the Gaekwad on their own and that the Bombay government had no right to pry into the matter any further once it had assured itself that the creditors were satisfied. He decided to advise Sayajirao to arrive at a general and cordial reconciliation.

Clare then went into the question of second sequestration. By now the Court of Directors had begun to question the policy of sequestration and had written to Clare that such an action continued from year to year amounted to a forcible appropriation of the Gaekwad's districts. It was most disadvantageous as it kept alive a feeling of enmity in the Gaekwad, and at the same time, afforded no means of giving a stable administration to the people.²⁷

This sequestration had taken place, as seen, *because* ^{of the} in so called 'default' in the maintenance of the Contingent

26. Ibid.

27. PD(BOM), IX-A/393A of 1836. COD to GOB, 4-9-1831.

of 3,000 Horse in an efficient state and fit for service. These districts had been sequestered to cover the expenses of the Contingent. Malcolm's allegations had been that the Gaekwad had made promises and broken them so often regarding the Contingent that no other possible step was possible. Clare, therefore, did not expect to see this force in an efficient state of payment and formation, if it was left altogether to Sayajirao.²⁸

The Contingent of Horse was a matter of great pride to Sayajirao and he was not likely to accept the proposal suggested by the Court of Directors that he should secede certain territories permanently for the payment of 2,000 Horse and that he should have undivided command on the remaining third, without any interference from the British.²⁹ If this was not acceptable Clare thought that the Gaekwad should be asked to give security of some substantial bankers of Baroda for the regular payment and equipment of the Contingent according to the Treaty. Certain regulations should also be issued which the Gaekwad should bind himself to observe to secure the efficiency of this Contingent.³⁰ Clare meant to discuss all these details with Sayajirao and was determined to

28. SC(BOM), 107/15. Minutes of Clare, 18-1-1832.

29. IOL, Op. cit., COD to GOB, ~~24-11-1831~~, 7-1830.

30. SC(BOM), 107/15, Minutes of Clare, 18-1-1832.

arrive at a favourable conclusion by putting everything before Sayajirao in the 'fairest and the most conciliatory manner'.³¹

When Clare consulted his Council about these affairs, he found that members of the Council were not as sympathetic to the Gaekwad as he himself was. The Honourable Mr. Sutherland, for example, was of the opinion that this unfortunate state of things had entirely proceeded from the 'perverse disposition' of a prince who, with his family, owed everything to the British government. Gratitude and honour, according to Sutherland, was unknown to Sayajirao, and it was only after having felt the full force of the 'chastisement' which had been inflicted on him that ^{he} had become repentant so far as Sayajirao's words were to be relied on. Such rabidly hostile attitudes were to creep in every now and then to upset relationships between the two States. Broadly, however, they agreed with Clare, but were upset about the 'awkwardness' of the British position in many of these matters. Sutherland had brought out the fact that on the death of Vithalrao, his adopted son had been recognized by the British without the previous consent of Sayajirao which was customarily required to validate

31. Ibid.

32. Ibid., Minutes of Sutherland, 6-2-1832.

the solemn act of adoption and to establish the adopted as the heir of Vithalrao. Sutherland pointed out that the British would be at the mercy of Gaekwad in this matter, if he declined to recognize the act, and that it would devolve on the British government, in support of its guarantee to the adopted son, to maintain all the right his father had enjoyed at its own expense.³³ Some of the members felt obviously 'squeamish' about making a volte face!

Clare, after ^{making} following these various decisions asked Williams to proceed to Baroda and to make certain arrangements and have preliminary talks with Sayajirao. Williams was instructed to state the main points of dispute clearly. Clare instructed Williams to abstain from any discussion with Sayajirao regarding past causes of complaints and asked him all his conferences with the Gaekwad to use the most friendly terms. On all and every occasion Williams was asked to assure Sayajirao of the anxiety of the British to remove all causes of past complaints and to settle everything in the future in a most amicable and satisfactory manner.³⁴ This was a complete change of attitude from that of the previous

33. Ibid.

34. Ibid., Minutes of Clare, 24-1-1832.

Governor, Sir John Malcolm. It was a shock to Williams to be told to behave in this manner towards Sayajirao, with whom, so far, he had adopted an extremely high-handed tone. These instructions of Clare show the careful preparations he was making for the meeting he was to have with Sayajirao.

Williams found it extremely difficult to change his attitude and get rid of his prejudices. He still harboured a superiority complex so far as the Gaekwad was concerned. He complained that during negotiations, "he was not met on the way" by Sayajirao and that the Gaekwad had refused to discuss anything except payment to bankers and the return of sequestered provinces.³⁵ Williams was disappointed at the lack of immediate response from Sayajirao. It was quite apparent that he was not yet convinced of William's sudden friendship after the bitter experiences of the last few years. In fact, Williams reported that Sayajirao insisted that the accounts of the sequestered districts and the books of accounts of the bankers should be examined in their presence with both the British and Baroda representatives present.³⁶ Thus, it was upto Clare to bring about change and settlement.

35. Ibid., Williams to GOB, 21-3-1832.

36. Ibid.

Clare again visited Baroda on his way back from Ajmer and held consultations with Sayajirao from March 22nd to April 6th, at the end of which an agreement was arrived at between the British and the Gaekwad government. Clare, it seems, had found some difficulty during the negotiations, though they were always friendly. In spite of himself, Clare's mind had obviously been prejudiced by what had been written and said against the Gaekwad. With his other British colleagues, he concurred with their prejudices that the Gaekwad like all Indians "did not pay much regard to truth".³⁷ Clare, was however, pleased with Sayajirao's response and frank line of conduct. According to Clare, he was, for an Indian prince, beyond all comparison better conducted - both as a man and a ruler - over his people than the majority of chiefs in India.³⁸ During the 16 days of their meetings, Clare discussed the major disputes already indicated, between the two governments.

As seen, Clare had come to Baroda with the determination that something like a 'personal reconciliation' between the heads of the two governments should be brought about.³⁹ Unlike Malcolm, he was

37. PDL(BOM) 33/1832 to COD.

38. Ibid.

39. SC(BOM), 107/15, Minutes of Clare, 14-4-1832.

determined not to carry on with what is called "such is my will and command manner",⁴⁰ as he was convinced that such an attitude had thoroughly antagonised this 'very obstinate' prince.⁴¹ He was also convinced that being the stronger power, it was more becoming to begin the negotiations on terms of perfect reciprocity, giving way where Sayajirao had good reason on his side, but insisting at all times on the performance of anything which he thought the British government had a right to claim from Sayajirao.⁴² In this way, Clare was able to win over Sayajirao and was able to carry on the negotiations in perfect good humour.

The first subject of dispute was solved by the Bankers agreeing to receive the amount due to them from the Gaekwad after settling direct with Sayajirao the actual sum owed to them. The Bankers were thereafter summoned before Clare to ascertain whether a "fair and satisfactory" payment of their dues had been made to them by Sayajirao or not. The Bankers assured him that they had been satisfied and that they had 'freely consented' to the arrangements with Sayajirao. On

40. Ibid.

41. Ibid.

42. Ibid.

being asked regarding the Septennial leases, the Bankers informed Clare that the British were released from the guarantee and that they had no further pecuniary claims on the British government.⁴³ Thereupon, the guarantee deeds with the Company were cancelled in the presence of Sayajirao on April 5, 1832, when all the prominent Bankers were present. On this occasion also, Clare publicly ascertained that the Bankers had accepted this new arrangement. Clare wrote to Sayajirao confirming this, and specifically stating that the Bankers had ^{from Sayajirao} received the amount due to them for which the British had been guarantors, and that the deeds had been destroyed.⁴⁴ This settlement, mutually agreed upon without any pressure, between the Bankers and the Gaekwad, brought about a real reconciliation, and the Bankers were all extremely glad to get back to Baroda as most of their business was there. Hari Bhakti, for instance, had to recover from private individuals in Baroda about Rs.20 to Rs.30 lakhs which he had realised he could not recover so long as he was away from Baroda.

When Clare had started investigating the account of the debts in 1832, he discovered that Sayajirao owed

43. Ibid.

44. Ibid., Clare to Sayajirao, 5-4-1832.

the Bankers Rs.38,77,659, of which Hari Bhakti was due Rs.14,65,175, Gopalrao Mairal Rs.19,78,798, and Ratanji Maneckchand Rs.4,33,685.⁴⁵

Sayajirao paid back part of this amount by withdrawing Rs. 25 lakhs from his personal treasury and for the remaining amount he assured repayment to the Bankers.⁴⁶ Clare thought it fit not pry into the matter any further once he had assured himself that the creditors were satisfied. He refrained from unnecessary interference between the Gaekwad and the Bankers in the settlement of their accounts after having required only that the latter should declare to him freely and unreservedly that their claims were settled to their satisfaction. This declaration had been given in the fullest manner by the Bankers to Clare personally. He now thought it was unnecessary to inquire as to the manner in which Sayajirao had satisfied the Bankers since he had received the unbiased declaration of the creditors of the State that they were satisfied.

On the 20th April, 1832, the territories sequestered under the first sequestration of 1825, were restored to the Gaekwad.⁴⁷ Ending this part of the transaction, Clare pointedly remarked on the "apparent

45. PD(BOM), 33/1832 to COD, 13-6-1832.

46. Ibid.

47. Ibid.

ease and facility" with which Sayajirao and the Bankers had settled this old debt, which had for so many years been a source of annoyance and vexation to Sayajirao and the British government.⁴⁸

Clare's attitude and honest appraisal brought out more than anything, the imperious attitude of the earlier Governor with regard to Baroda and the Indian States in general. The ill effects his policies had wrought were also highlighted by the change in outlook of Sayajirao and the prospects of good relationships which seemed to be opening up, when such imperious policies were abandoned under the new regime.

Apart from the personal satisfaction that Clare got from this part of settlement, he was also able to satisfy the Court of Directors. The Court had now come to realise the folly of Malcolm's policy towards native States and had directed Clare to bring about a settlement.

Having disposed of the major dispute, Clare now turned his attention to the second group of claims which referred to the adjustment of various types of debts between the Gaekwad and the persons guaranteed by the British government. Clare emphatically declared that he

48. SC(BOM), 107/15, Minutes of Clare, 14-4-1832.

49. Ibid., ^{Minutes of Clare} 18-1-1832.

would not consider any matter in which the British government had not hitherto become involved. He had already declared that all unguaranteed claims must be struck off the accounts as he felt the British were not called upon to insist on their payment.⁴⁹ Many of these matters covered old and intricate affairs and rested on ancient rights and prescription. These matters required establishment by evidence and could not be satisfactorily settled in a limited time. Clare, therefore, decided that as these claims had remained 'unadjusted' for so long, and as the British government had pledged generally to see that justice was done and not, to effect a particular settlement, it would sufficient if Sayajirao engaged to settle the debts in a manner satisfactory to the British and in a specified period.⁵⁰ Accordingly, an agreement was reached between the two governments by which the Gaekwad undertook to settle these disputes within one year. Clare also stipulated that if a satisfactory settlement was not agreed upon within that time, the British government would consider itself at liberty to adjust them at its own accord.⁵¹ Two claims in this group, however, were settled during the meetings

49. Ibid., 18-1-1832.

50. PDL(BOM) to COD, 13-6-1832.

51. Ibid.

in April, 1832. These were regarding the Nemnuks of Radhabai, the widow of Fatehsingh Gaekwad and that of her adopted son Govindrao. An arrangement had been made by Sayajirao through the Resident in 1826, *by which*, Radhabai had been assigned the Nemnuks of Rs.10,400 per annum and Govindrao Rs.12,400 per annum. Sayajirao had not carried out this Agreement fully, as the other family had remained obstreperous. Subsequently, Govindrao had also raised a small revolt in Baroda. Clare, however, felt that the British were pledged to the execution of the Agreement and 'strenuously' urged upon Sayajirao the fulfilment of these conditions.⁵²

Clare had realised that the hostility between the parties, particularly between Sayajirao and Govindrao was so "inflammable and inveterate" that there was no hope of effecting an adjustment to their mutual satisfaction. He also acknowledged that Govindrao's conduct had been most objectionable, particularly as he had never accepted his fault nor asked for pardon from Sayajirao for his misconduct. On the contrary, Govindrao had in fact persistently denied Sayajirao's right to the Gadi and advanced his own unfounded pretensions. Sayajirao was now determined to keep Govindrao out of his State.

52. Ibid.

Clare ultimately persuaded Sayajirao to enter into an agreement with Govindrao on the following lines:

- 1) An annual payment of Rs.12,400 was to be paid to the British government for Govindrao with arrears from 1822. On this point of arrears, Sayajirao had tried to resist but was over ridden by Clare.
- 2) The British engaged to retain Govindrao at Surat.
- 3) Govindrao agreed not to enter the Gaekwad's territory without his permission.
- 4) Govindrao agreed to renounce all claims on the Gadi within 3 months or forfeit the Nemnuk.

On this last issue Govindrao was clearly told by Clare that the British government were convinced that he had no claim whatsoever to the Gadi. Clare had very fairly condemned the act of ^{Govindrao} Malcolm and had concluded that having committed the British government, the British faith would have to be kept 'inviolable'. If the Gaekwad refused his concern, the British could not force him to comply and the amount would have to be a charge against the British. ⁵³

With regard to the question of Radhabai's Nemnuk, Sayajirao emphatically protested against British interference.

53. SC(BOM), 107/15, No.1530. Memoranda interchanged between Clare and Sayajirao on 23-3-1832.

He pointed out that she had no personal guarantee of the British government, and could only be considered in the same light as the other widows and was entitled to no higher provision. He also added that she was "a very mischievous and ill disposed woman and had always been exciting sedition."^{53a} Sayajirao reminded Clare of the long series of intrigues she had been involved in. At this stage, Clare promised to 'admonish' Radhabai, but reminded Sayajirao that he was bound by the Treaty of 1820 to give 'honourable' treatment to all members of the late Gaekwad's family. At last, Sayajirao agreed to grant her the Nemnuk provided he was given the right to punish her in case she misbehaved. Clare resisted this demand as he was convinced that such a condition would have been converted into an instrument of oppression by Sayajirao who would not have failed to fabricate some stories of disturbance excited by Radhabai and thereupon⁵⁴ deprived her of the whole or part of the Nemnuk. Clare solved this question by stating that if Radhabai was proved guilty of such misconducts to the satisfaction of the British government, she would be punished for it.⁵⁴

53a. Ibid. PDL (Bom) to CDP, 13-6-1832.

54. Ibid.

One other claim belonging to this class was also found extremely difficult to adjust that of Vithalrao Diwanji and his adopted son Krishnaji. As already stated on the death of Vithalrao Diwanji in 1830, Malcolm had given the British guarantee to his adopted son Krishnaji. It is significant that Sayajirao was not a party to the guarantee of 1830. Neither had the Gaekwad's permission been taken with regard to the adoption quite contrary to all custom, and ^{-his} had relieved Diwanji from paying a Nazarana to the Gaekwad. In 1830, Malcolm wanted the help of Diwanji to administer the sequestered territories and, on his own had granted the British guarantee to the original settlement of Rs.60,000 conferred on the Diwanji by the Gaekwad in 1821. Malcolm had then increased his income by various additions, and had given the British guarantee in perpetuity.⁵⁵ Clare acknowledged the "greatest embarrassment" about this matter as he had obviously realised the injustice of the case. He felt that Malcolm had been unjustified in giving Vithalrao Diwanji a guarantee without the consent of Sayajirao, at whose expense the Nemruk was to be paid.⁵⁶ He questioned the proceeding of the British government in compelling Sayajirao to recognise a grant to a man whom he considered

55. Ibid., Memorandum by A. Mallet of the present Nemruk received by Krishnaji Diwanji, date not legible.

56. Ibid., Minutes by Clare, 14-4-1832.

a traitor and oblige him to give his consent to the adopted son about whom he knew nothing.⁵⁷ Clare was aware that the Gaekwad had lost about 3 to 4 lakhs of rupees which he would have got by way of Nazarana for the adoption in the regular course of things. Clare was indeed candid when he acknowledged that being a stronger power, the British could undoubtedly oblige the Gaekwad to obey their orders, but unless "might can be called right", he could not understand how he could, with justice, force Sayajirao to grant the Nemruk to Vithalrao whom he had invariably called a traitor.⁵⁸ Clare believed that Sayajirao would rather do anything than sanction the grant made without his concurrence.⁵⁹ He was, however, unwilling to take a decision on his own in the matter and decided to refer the problem to the Court of Directors for a decision.

Apprized of the position, the Court of Directors decided against the guarantee to Vithalrao and his adopted son. In reply to the query of Clare, the Directors referred to Malcolm's agreement as "an incautious engagement".⁶⁰ They were of the opinion that it was by no means a matter

57. Ibid.

58. Ibid., Minutes by Clare, 18-1-1832.

59. Ibid.

60. PDL(BOM)from COD, 8/1827-1836, 6-11-1833.

of surprise that the Gaekwad should have considered it highly injurious to himself that such acts of favour at his expense and without his consent had been granted to his former servant whom he denounced as a traitor.⁶¹

They also accepted the fact that, according to the Indian customs, every case of adoption was a State prerogative, and that no adoption was legal without the consent of the Sovereign. By the Indian law Sayajirao was entitled to the property of such of his subjects who died childless or was entitled to a Nazarana in case of an adoption.⁶²

In Vithalrao's case, Elphinstone had informed the Gaekwad that it was in his competence to fix the payment to Vithalrao or even to reduce it. Under such circumstances, the Court of Directors opined that there was no justification for the British government to hold the Gaekwad responsible for the payment of any allowance made to Vithalrao and his successor. The Court of Directors rowdly condemned Malcolm by saying that this engagement was most "indiscreet and unauthorised".⁶³ They were, however, not willing to completely reject his actions as they felt duty bound to uphold "the inviolable appearance of British engagements" in the eyes of Indian

61. Ibid.

62. Ibid.

63. Ibid.

Princes.⁶⁴ They suggested that the matter should be dealt with as "expediently" as possible, and that the Governor should decide some liberal provision for Krishnarao Diwanji to be paid to him by the British government and left it to Clare to effect such an engagement.

Some of the disputes in this group were regarding guaranteed rights, ^{were of} old arrears of Hari Bhakti, the claims of Balwantrao Gaekwad, and the repayment to the farmers' ^{of} septennial leases. On all these, Clare had suggested arbitration before the relevant Panchayat.⁶⁵ These claims were to be settled, as already stated, within one year after Clare's departure, from Baroda.

The third and the last point of dispute, was with reference to the Contingent of Horse. The second sequestration of territory had taken place during Malcolm's regime to cover the cost of this Contingent of Horse. Clare was eager to come to some definite conclusion about this and restore the sequestered territories. This was also the wish of the Court of Directors, who had advised that the second sequestration should be released as soon as possible.⁶⁶

64. Ibid.

65. SC(BOM), 107/15, Minutes of Clare, 18-1-1832.

66. PDL(BOM) 8/1827-1836 from COD, 4-9-1830.

This part of the negotiations became rather prolonged and difficult. Sayajirao pledged himself repeatedly at the meetings to fulfil the obligation of Article 8 of the Treaty of 1817 under which he was obliged to keep up the Contingent, but did not at first offer any particular guarantee to fulfil this condition. Clare put before Sayajirao certain proposals. The first was that of a cession of territory sufficient enough to enable the British government to maintain a force of 2,000 Horse, a suggestion made earlier by the Court of Directors.⁶⁷ The second proposal was that the Gaekwad should ^{keep 2000 Horse, and} give a written promise that he would, in future, punctually fulfil the obligations of the Treaty. Any failure on his part, of which the British government was alone to be the judge, would be followed immediately by a cession of territory from him to pay for the Force of 2,000 Horse. The third alternative Clare proposed was that the Gaekwad should assign certain districts to the Bankers to pay the troops regularly every month according to the Treaty.⁶⁸ Sayajirao rejected all these plans. He attached great importance, naturally, to his possessions and was not prepared to consider any proposal which required cessions of his State.

67. Ibid.

68. PDL(BOM) to COD, 33/1832, No.15, 30-8-1832.

It is interesting to note here that Clare remarks here that the Gaekwad, like "all natives", attached "greatest importance to the possession of territory, territory being in fact of great consequence in the eyes of the natives".⁶⁹ This remark is astonishing coming as it does from a British Governor at a time when the British were still busy expanding their possessions. Sayajirao strongly objected to the clauses which required cession in the event of his failure to fulfil his obligations to the treaty, as he felt that a hostile Governor like Malcolm could accuse him of not fulfilling his obligations on the flimsiest of reasons. The question of giving security of the bankers was also rejected by him, as he naturally felt that it was derogatory to a sovereign to offer security of his subjects.⁷⁰ On the last day of the meeting, the Gaekwad sent a memorandum to Clare putting forth his own proposals.⁷¹ He proposed that he would place in continuous deposit with the British government Rs.10 lakhs in cash without interest, as a security. He also pledged that he would pay the 3,000 Horse a monthly pay according to the Treaty and that, if he failed to do so, the British government could pay this amount from the

69. Ibid.

70. Ibid.

71. SC(BOM), 107/15, No. 1528, Memorandum from Sayajirao to Clare, 6-4-1832.

ten lakhs deposited with them. He further pledged to repay the amount used, so that there could always be ten lakhs in deposit. This proposal was a pleasant surprise to Clare who, considering the proposal objectively found it "unobjectionable", and saw that it had the further advantage of coming from Sayajirao himself. He felt himself obliged to accept the proposal, because by this the Gaekwad acknowledged the obligations of the Treaty and bound himself to fulfil them. He had also tendered a security of a large deposit from his own private treasure to guard against any violation of his engagement. Clare felt he had no right to exact more from Sayajirao than that which would secure the future performance of the obligations of the Treaty, which were as binding on the British government as they were on the Gaekwad.⁷² A settlement was arrived at between the two governments according to this proposal and the territories sequestered in 1830 were returned to the Gaekwad.⁷³

Having thus, at least for a short time, brought about a change for the better in the relationship between the British and the Gaekwad, Clare left Baroda. Sayajirao

72. PDL(BOM) to COD, 33/1832, No.15, 30-6-1832.

73. Ibid.

on his part attempted to reorganize his recovered possessions and put his own house in order.

These actions of Clare were approved by the Court of Directors who congratulated him on arriving at such an amicable settlement, especially because they had now very much felt the injustice of Malcolm's actions. They urged Clare to now enter into a commercial treaty with the Gaekwad as soon as possible.⁷⁴ Gujarat was an extremely prosperous State which the British would have wanted to exploit economically to the full.

The removal of the Residency from Baroda to Ahmedabad was ranking in the mind of Sayajirao who now urged Clare to restore the Residency to Baroda as he felt this would increase the importance of his State.⁷⁵

The proposal was reasonable, and Clare could not but agree that from an administrative point of view it was better to make Baroda, again, the headquarters of the Residency. The whole of Gujarat including Kathiawad was divided between the British and the Gaekwad, and the territories of both were interposed. The Governor thought it a very difficult country to manage without ready communication and a perfect understanding between the principal powers. Clare thought that, the permanent

74. PDL(BOM) from COD, 8/1827-1836, 6-11-1833.

75. PDL(BOM) to COD, 42/1835, 30-12-1835.

influence which the Resident formerly possessed at Baroda had been a happy circumstance for Gujarat. He expected the personal intercourse between the Resident and the Gaekwad in his own capital would restart the 'weight' of British advice, which was required for the good government of that "fine country", and for the preservation of right understanding between the two States. Clare referred the matter to the Governor General on 4th October, 1834.⁷⁶ In reply, the Governor General on 24th October, 1834, agreed with the transfer, which was immediately carried into effect.⁷⁷ Williams was transferred back to Baroda, but retained his position of Commissioner for Gujarat with that of the Resident. He was also given permission to erect a new house further from the palace in order to give an appearance of greater freedom to the Gaekwad. Williams looked upon this as a better way to 'spy' on the Gaekwad and his associates, who would not be able to see anything going on in the Residency.

In spite of his good feeling, and change of manner reflected by Clare, his attitude differed from that of the Resident only in degree and not in kind.

76. Ibid., GOB to GOI, 4-10-1834.

77. Ibid., GOI to GOB, 24-10-1834.

There was no mistaking the superiority of the British position vis a vis the Gaekwad in his action and words, giving as they do, glimpses of his innate belief in the general correctness of the British position and a sense that he was bound to uphold, even injustices committed by his predecessor in the name of the British "honour and integrity".

CHAPTER VTHE GUARANTEE SYSTEM AND ITS CONSEQUENCES

After Clare's departure from Baroda in April, 1832, there was cordiality between the Bombay government and the Gaekwad for a very short time. Difficulties soon arose over the second part of the agreement between Clare and Sayajirao. This was regarding various charges levelled by the Gaekwad's 'guaranteed' subjects against their sovereign. It is impossible to deal with all the cases. A few of the most important cases can only be dealt with to bring out the major factors. As will be seen, after the beneficial effects of Clare's personal visit on both Sayajirao and the British officers were out, misunderstandings began to grow apace. Sayajirao found himself checked time and again by Williams, and other British officers whenever he tried to make his own decisions. Sayajirao reacted by not entirely keeping to his part of the agreements with Clare and refused to compromise the unsettled cases.

The first of these disagreements arose from the guarantee claims against the Gaekwad. Clare had probably shied away from getting involved in these disputes as they would have led him into the extremely

embarrassing position of either acknowledging the rights of the Gaekwad against the British or of upholding the British position at the expense of his sense of fair play and justice.

An explanation is necessary at this stage about the meaning of and implication of this term. In the native states at the end of the eighteenth century and earlier, conditions were extremely insecure. People were not prepared to enter into any agreement with regard to money, property or administration without the guarantee of a third party. Even rulers could get loans and collect taxes only under a guarantee of another person. In western India, i.e., in Kathiawad and Gujarat, the Bhats and Charuns were the traditional guarantors. The system of bhandari was in full force in the Baroda State from the late eighteenth century.

We have already seen in an earlier chapter how the Arabs mercenaries had become guarantors in Baroda, and how, by the beginning of the 19th century, this body of Arab mercenaries became all powerful and even enforced their guarantees by force sometimes holding the rulers and the ministers in vigorous confinement.¹ The entire

1. BG, Op. cit., p. 256.

administration and economic transactions had fallen into their hands. Not a rupee could be got by the Gaekwads without the express guarantee of the Arab Jamadars. When the British entered into relations with Baroda, they clearly appreciated the implications of this system. During the regime of Fatehsingh, as described earlier, the British took over all the guarantees from the Arabs and drove them out of Baroda. This was a remarkably easy manner of acquiring and enhancing their own power. As early as 1793, the British, instead of the Arabs, had guaranteed the rights of the Desai of Navsari at the request of the Gaekwad himself. Again on the 8th June, 1802, J. Duncan, Governor of Bombay, stated in a special agreement with Raoji Appaji, the Devan, that "... It is the intention of the Government that the Diwanship of Raoji Appaji shall be permanent and that his sons, brothers, nephews, relatives and friends shall be duly protected and supported by the Bombay government in their just rights, and, if the Gaekwad or anybody else should unreasonably treat them ill, the company shall protect them by interfering on their behalf."² The British acquired such enormous influence by placing a minister of a State under their obligation that, as Elliot says, his "wellbeing for the future" depended on their favour

2. Aitchison, Op. cit., Vol. VI, p. 285.

rather than that of his sovereign.³

These guarantees were amongst the real sources of British power in Baroda along with the subsidiary force and the Resident. For the next forty years the guarantees were to cause many heart burnings, jealousies and disagreements between the Gaekwads and the British. The guarantee system was an intolerable and mischievous instrument, which in the hands of wilful and arrogant representatives of the British power drove Sayajirao into an untenable position. Subjects were supported by the British against their Sovereign time after time. Clare obviously realised all this when he made some tentative settlement regarding the Vithalrao Diwanji family and preferred not to involve himself further in these matters. In this way, he was able to bring about a feeling of friendship and cordiality between himself and the Gaekwad.

The case of ^{the} Vithalrao ^{loan} Deoji family was ^{the} first to come up. As mentioned earlier, the Court of Directors had asked the Governor to decide some liberal provision for Krishnaji Diwanji which was to be paid by the British government. Clare had decided after consultation with the Government of India to grant Vithalrao's adopted son,

3. BG., p. 254.

Krishnaji a stipend for life of Rs.24,000 per annum with retrospective effect from 26th May, 1834.⁴ This was an enormous reduction from the original guarantee of Rs.50,000 assured to him by Malcolm. Clare also decided that whatever amount the adopted son had received from the Gaekwad's treasury after the death of Vithalrao was to be refunded to the Gaekwad State.⁵ The Resident, Williams was of the opinion that this refunding was to be from the sanctioned Rs.24,000.⁶ With reference to the property of the brothers and relations of the Diwanji, Clare had taken it that since they were not guaranteed by the British, there was nothing to justify the interference by the British.⁷

On Clare's departure in the beginning of 1835, Sir Robert Grant took over as Governor of Bombay. His interpretation of most of the disputes with the Gaekwad were on the same lines as those of Malcolm, and the effect of the new policy made itself quickly felt in Baroda. A note dated 14th September, 1835 was sent by Krishnaji to the Governor petitioning the interference of the British government on his behalf with a request

4. PDL(BOM) to COD, 30-12-1835.

5. Ibid.

6. PD(BOM), 5A/531 of 1832-36. Williams to GOB, 3-12-1835.

7. Ibid., Minutes by Clare, 2-12-1834.

that the memorandum he was forwarding be sent to the Court of Directors.⁸ Grant's instantaneous reaction was one of sympathy. He strongly supported the action of Malcolm and opined that the memorandum proved that the British had not kept the faith which was "pledged to the memorialist in the name of the British government."⁹ The entire question ~~was~~ once again became a ground for differences between the two governments. It also proved that the opinions of a person like Clare were an exception to the rule where British policy was concerned. Grant's view was opposed on every point in this matter to Clare's. The former questioned the right of Clare and the Court of Directors to set aside an Agreement made by a former Governor, who had proclaimed at the time of his visit to Gujarat that he was to be considered as "concentrating in himself the functions of the whole government".¹⁰ Grant doubted whether the British government had any "valid" defence if the family decided to proceed against it in law. He was also very much upset because he thought that no one would ever repose 'confidence' in the British government if a settlement "concluded by the highest authority under the Presidency "could be so suspended".¹¹

8. Ibid., Memorandum from Krishnaji Diwanji to COD, 14-9-1835.

9. Ibid., Minutes of Grant, 4-7-1836.

10. Ibid.

11. Ibid.

Grant went so far as to censure the Court of Directors for cancelling the British pledge because of their disapproval of what had been done by their subordinate. He maintained that the amount of Rs.24,000 per annum sanctioned by the Governor General and Clare was totally inadequate. He conceded that the British could not exact from the Gaekwad the fulfilment of the pledge, but had to redeem "as complete an equivalent"¹² was practicable from their own resources.¹² He suggested, therefore, that the British government should pay Krishnaji the original grant of Rs.60,000 per annum.¹²

As regards refunding the Gaekwad of the amount due to him, Krishnaji had petitioned that Rs.70,354 was to be deducted, as this was the expense of a paga and an establishment which the family had maintained.¹³ The actual amount to be refunded, therefore, according to Grant, was Rs.1,43,388.¹⁴ As already seen, Williams had concluded that this refunding was to be paid through the pension assigned to Krishnaji which would have worked out to the value of the pension for the next six years. Grant on the other hand claimed that Williams had not been instructed by Clare as to the source from which the

12. Ibid.

13. Ibid., Memorandum from Krishnaji Diwanji to COD, 14-9-1835.

14. Ibid., Minutes by Grant, 4-7-1836.

refunding was to be made, nor according to him had the Governor General said anything about this.¹⁵ In fact, Clare in his minutes of November 22, 1834, had stated that the amount should be refunded by the British government.¹⁶

Since Clare had not communicated to William in what way this was to be charged to the British government, it was left to William to interpret it in his own way. Grant immediately jumped to the conclusion that the Gaekwad was to be repaid from the British treasury. He, however, referred this question to the higher authorities. At the same time, he proposed that Williams be authorized to pay the full amount of the pension agreed by Clare from 26th May, 1834, under adequate security from the family to refund a quarter of the amount, and in the event of its being established that the family was unwilling or unable to furnish such a security, a quarter of their pension was to remain in deposit.¹⁷

Grant's comments on the whole case are worth quoting in detail since they reflect the overbearing attitude of the majority of the British administrators in India during this period. According to him even Malcolm's guarantee did not compensate for the "advantages and emoluments" which the family had lost.

15. Ibid.

16. Ibid., Minutes of Clare, 22-11-1834.

17. Ibid., Minutes of Grant, 4-7-1836.

He deeply sympathised with them, who, according to him, were now exiled from their homes, persecuted by their prince, and literally destitute of everything. The Diwanjis had sought refuge in the British territory but were now liable for their debts and could be dragged to the Courts and suffer imprisonment if unprotected by the British. Grant maintained that all this suffering was visited upon the family because of Vithalrao's wholehearted support of the British, in full confidence that he was aiding those who were "too powerful and too honourable" to desert a faithful ally, instead his family had been rewarded with ruin, disgrace and banishment.¹⁸

With reference to the resumption by the Gaekwad of the property of the brothers and relations of the Diwanji, Grant was of the opinion that they were also victims of that minister's "fidelity" to the British interests and friendship.¹⁹ Grant went so far as to state that all those who had stood fast as the British government's friends, and adherents at the Gaekwad Court had been destroyed.²⁰ In the same tone as Malcolm, he lamented that the "utmost kindness lavished" upon

18. Ibid.

19. Ibid.

20. Ibid.

Sayajirao by the British had failed to elicit any spark of "gratitude or generosity", and was affronted that in reply to complaints and remonstrances, the British had received only "sheets after sheets filled with subtlety and invectives".²¹ This refers to the memoranda sent by Sayajirao to the Governor stating his point of view. These sentiments expressed by Grant are surprising, coming from a man who had been adorning the office of the Governor since only a few months, and therefore, could not have had any deep knowledge of the affairs on which he was so glibly commenting, except that it reflected the tone of imperial policy with reference to subsidiary allies. On April 14, 1836, Sayajirao had again sent another note that the guards stationed by the Resident at Khrishnaji's house at Baroda should be withdrawn in order that the paga and other property of the Diwanji family could be confiscated by his government.²² Grant described this request as an "act of spoliation" and once again invoked the original guarantee given to the late Vithalrao.²³ The whole question revolved around a thoroughly ill advised and the misconceived idea of the guarantee system. The Diwanji family dispute was kept

21. Ibid.

22. Ibid., Kharita from Sayajirao to Grant, 14-4-1836.

alive by charges and counter charges and references to and from the Court of Directors, and was never solved during Sayajirao's life time. The disputes cropped up every now and then and only served as an irritant and constant reminder of the British ascendancy. The family was, however, confirmed in their pension of Rs.24,000 per annum in 1838 by the Court of Directors.²⁴

The cases of the families of the Desai of Navsari and that of Gangadhar Shastri further illustrate the working of the guarantee system and its deleterious effects on the parties concerned.

The main points in ^{the Desai's} this case concerns the validity and the meaning of the guarantee. Sayajirao refused to accept the guarantee as valid, as there was no such document forthcoming nor had the Gaekwad's Durbar been given any notice about it when it was supposed to have been granted. He particularly disputed the hereditary character of the guarantee. This case particularly illustrates the utter ignorance of the British about the system of land tenure existing in India. They interpreted land ownership in India ^{according to} in their own concept of hereditary landlordism and made the confusion worse confounded by guaranteeing a false interpretation.

23. Ibid., Minutes of Grant, 4-7-1836.

24. BBB(BAR), COD to GOB, 14-3-1838.

As far back as 1779, during the early days of British relations with the Gaekwad, when the British were already interfering in the internal affairs of the Gaekwad, Colonel Goddard had addressed a letter to Mancherji Desai saying that he might return to Navsari without the least fear and that he could rely upon the Colonel that there would be no molestation to a single individual.²⁵ It is difficult to state on what grounds such an assurance was given to the Desai at this time. According to the Desais in 1786, the British next, without the sanction of the then Gaekwad Fatehsinghrao affixed their seal to a guarantee of security of tenure to Mancherji Desai.²⁶ After the death of Fatehsinghrao, a new guarantee was issued to Mancherji Cursetji Desai and then the fact was communicated to the new Gaekwad Govindrao. In 1793, Govindrao Gaekwad himself granted a Sunad to Mancherji Desai promising him justice and security. This was renewed again in 1801.²⁷ All these favours had obviously been given to the Desai family in return for the help they had rendered to the British during the early stages of their connection with Baroda. Upto 1829, there was no

25. PD(BOM), 11/454 of 1831-36, No. 596. Tehmulji Jamshedji Desai to GOB, 29-1-1835.

26. Ibid.

27. Ibid., Letter No.25 of 1835. Williams to GOB, 6-1-1835.

interference from the Gaekwads in the rights of Desais of Navsari. As Desai of that district, he had been "farmer" of the taxes for that region. In 1829 differences developed between him and his immediate superior, the Sarsuba of Surat. As a result, the Desai was removed from the management, and his hereditary possession, were confiscated by Sayajirao pending the settlement of the accounts. The Desai immediately appealed to the British government for protection and assistance. Malcolm, the Governor at this time, decided to befriend the Desai family. Sayajirao was informed of the determination of the British government to support the Desai of Navsari in the possessions he was entitled to enjoy under its guarantee.²⁸ Malcolm went so far as to instruct Mr. Andrews, Assistant Collector of Surat to stop at Navsari and "to place the Desai in possession of his right" in relation with the Sarsuba and to inform the Gaekwad officer that no departure from this order would be tolerated without the sanction of both the governments.²⁹ An implied threat to the Gaekwad was given by assuring the Desai that any damage hitherto sustained by him would be considered when "the penalty" for the infraction of the guarantee was settled and

28. Ibid., Letter No.1547 of 1830. GOB to Williams, 2-11-1830.

29. Ibid.

adjusted.³⁰ Sayajirao^{had} protested strongly against all these thoroughly unjust actions of Malcolm. The matter remained at this stage till 1832 when Sayajirao assured Clare that he would try to resolve the dispute, and Clare did not pursue it further. Williams, however, was asked for comments on the problem. William wrongfully assumed that the Watandar was a hereditary office and as such possessed hereditary property which would descend to his heirs. He, therefore, presumed that the guarantee also descended to future generations of the Desai family. He, however, acknowledged that the guarantee to Mancherji Desai in 1801 had been given to him alone and that the words, "generation to generation" had not been included. He averred that it was for the government to decide how to interpret it. Contradicting himself, he commented that, according to the "custom" of the country, such a guarantee was not considered binding during the life of all the family after the death of the person to whom it was given, but at the most, only on his widow.³²

Williams had only partly understood the land tenure system prevailing during most historical times

30. Ibid.

31. Ibid., Tehmulji Desai to GOB, 29-11-1835.

32. Ibid., Letter No.25 Williams to GOB, 6-1-1835.

in India. Land always belonged to the State and not to the individual. Grants of land were always made for a service performed. Once the holder of this grant died the service for which it was given ended and the land reverted back to the State. Hereditary ownership of land never existed till the British introduced it through their Permanent Settlement Regulation. The difference in understanding these basic facts had resulted in Clare deciding that the British could not refuse to recognise the guarantee.³³ According to Sayajirao, the original possessor of the guarantee of 1793 was by this time dead and that no mention had been made in that Parwana that the guarantee was hereditary. The guarantee had never been renewed by Sayajirao. He also claimed that the Desai family could not produce any genuine document to validate their claim and that whatever papers they had produced were forged.³⁴

Grant fully supported the Desai family and summarily dismissed the arguments of Sayajirao. He took no notice of the glaring discrepancies in the Desai's case, and decided to call upon the Gaekwad to do justice to the Desai family within a very short time. Because the guarantee had continued undisputed, Grant concluded that

33. Ibid., No.592. Minutes by Clare, 17-1-1835.

34. PD(BOM) II/454 of 1831-36. ^{Ibid.} Yad from Sayajirao to Grant, 16-4-1835.

it was impossible to permit the reigning Gaekwad to "question its validity".³⁵ He decided to refer the case for final decision to the Governor General with the remark that the British government was bound to protect the Desai and his family in virtue of the guarantee of 1801.³⁶ He further recommended to the Governor General that if the Gaekwad failed to do "justice" within a given number of days, the Bombay government should be authorised to place under sequestration the district of Navsari and reinstate the Desai in his "just right and possession".³⁷ In the typical Malcolm's style, he was convinced that the Gaekwad would not accede to this or any other "just demand" unless it was accompanied by a 'demonstration and the intention to compel a compliance'.³⁸ Sayajirao refused to settle, and in February, 1838, the district of Navsari was placed under sequestration by the British.³⁹

Without going into the intricacies of the guarantee system, this case illustrates the utter lack of a sense of "equality" where subsidiary "allies" were

35. Ibid., Minutes of Grant, 22-6-1836.

36. Ibid.

37. Ibid.

38. Ibid., Grant to Sayajirao, 20-11-1837.

39. HPO File No. 72/78A.

concerned. The Indian princes were looked upon by the British generally as underlings, who, if they showed even the slightest independence, were to be shown their correct place. In dealing with such princes, the British seemed to have lost all sense of justice and truth. As in this case, the Gaekwad was branded as a "fraud" rather than the petitioner Desai who obviously had not a leg to stand on. To oppose a subject against the ruler was the worst possible insult that the British could have offered to Sayajirao.

The other case concerns the Shastri family. Gangadhar Shastri had been appointed 'native agent' by Colonel Walker in 1806. The earlier history of this family has already been discussed in the first two chapters. It may be recalled that Gangadhar Shastri was murdered while on a mission to negotiate with the Peshwa in 1813. He had gone to Pandharpur for this purpose under a British guarantee of safe conduct. The British had demanded redress from the Peshwa at this time, and had been anxious to make provisions for the heirs of Shastri. They had managed this by inducing Fatehsingh Gaekwad to install the eldest son as his father's successor in the Gaekwad's services with the grant of Rs.60,000 per annum and other benefits.⁴⁰ The British had, however,

40. BHB. Wallace, Op. cit., pp. 641-665.

not granted a formal guarantee to the sons of Gangadhar Shastri even though at that time, Fatehsingh Gaekwad had asked for this. By 1827, the Shastri family had lost favour - both with the Gaekwad and the British. It had been agreed between the Resident and Sayajirao to reduce the allowance of the Shastri family to Rs.8,000 per annum. Elphinstone, the then Governor, had refused to interfere, categorically declaring that the British had no right to interfere in the absence of a guarantee.⁴¹

The Shastri family had vigorously protested against this cut and had appealed to the Governor General and the Court of Directors.⁴² As already recorded, the Governor ^{had thought} ~~did not think~~ that the British could interfere in this case. The family persistently continued to send such petitions. The Court of Directors consequently in 1832 pronounced a decision in favour of the Shastri family and had asked the Governor of Bombay to demand from the Gaekwad the restoration of the cut.⁴³ Clare had made this demand in May, 1833, and Sayajirao had in retaliation, stopped any allowance to the Shastri family since 1833. Sayajirao had also sent a memorandum to Williams protesting

41. Ibid. PD(BOM) 11/454 of 1831-36 No. 592, Minutes by Clare, 17-1-1835.

42. PD(BOM), 9A/393A, Petition of Bhimshankar Gangadhar Shastri and others to GG and COD, 16-8-1827.

43. PD(BOM), 8/1827-36 from COD, October, 1832.

against such a demand.⁴⁴ As a compromise offer, Williams had, as directed by Grant, offered to repay the ten lakhs of Rupees that the Gaekwad had deposited with the British, on condition that he would make a bountiful provision for the Gangadhar Shastri family. Grant had been confident that this would "bribe" Sayajirao into compliance of the British demands on behalf of the Shastri family.⁴⁵

Sayajirao had accused the British of protecting servants of his government who had acted improperly and who were not guaranteed to be protected by them. He made an offer to pay the arrears due to the Shastri family out of the refund of the Nemnuk made by the Vithalrao Diwanji family. He, however, disputed the amount claimed by the family and the British. To all this, the British had given no heed. The Government of India was itself uncertain about the case and after much lapse of time, it informed the Government of Bombay in 1835, that the Governor General was not yet convinced of the 'justice' of requiring the Gaekwad to make a provision for the family.⁴⁶

The question had been referred back to the Court of Directors by Clare who did not agree with them.⁴⁷

44. PD(BOM), 9A/393 of 1830-36. Yad, 16-4-1835.

45. Ibid., Minutes of Grant, 7-5-1836.

46. Ibid., GG to COB, 11-3-1835.

47. PD(BOM), 5A/531 of 1832-36. Minutes of Clare, 22-11-1834.

The Court of Directors seemed to have taken a very perverse view of this case, which was contradictory to their earlier instructions to Clare. In reply, they stated that according to them, it was incumbent upon the British government, on grounds, equally of "justice and pledged faith" to enforce payment of the arrears from Sayajirao and to insist upon the restoration of the cut and future punctual payments of the stipulated Nemnuk. They considered the sons of the late Shastri to be as much under the protection of the British government as if it had formally afforded them its guarantee. Consequently, it was imperative to call upon Sayajirao to immediately restore the Nemnuk to its proper amount of Rs.60,000 per annum and to pay all the arrears which might be due to the family. In the event of Sayajirao not complying with this call, the Governor was asked to pay the same to the family, deducting the amount from the Kathiawad and Mahikantha tributes collected by the British.⁴⁸

These new demands were made on Sayajirao by Grant. Another impasse was now created which seemed unsoluble except by force as indicated by the Court of

48. PD(BOM), 9/A393A of 1830-36, No.5476. COD to GOB, 27-7-1835.

Directors. The case as it stood was totally untenable vis a vis the Shastri family. Even Grant realised this, and confessed that he found himself in a very embarrassing position, though he maintained that there was a "clear though not great prepondence" of evidence in favour of the Shastri family, and paid tribute to the Court of Director's 'sense of judgment'.⁴⁹

However, he had to accept the fact that there was a "negative side of the question".⁵⁰ He was referring to the facts that ~~one~~ Fatehsinghrao Gaekwad had not given a written engagement to the Shastri family. Secondly, that the British had not affixed their formal guarantee on the sons of Gangadhar Shastri. Thirdly, Elphinstone had agreed to the reduction of allowance in 1827, and lastly, neither Malcolm nor Clare had involved the British in any such guarantee. It was only in 1833, after the Court of Directors had decided in favour of the Shastri family that a demand for recovery of the cut had been made. Grant did not think that the British could reasonably call on the Gaekwad to pay up the arrears from 1827.⁵¹

49. Ibid., Minutes of Grant, 17-5-1836.

50. Ibid.

51. Ibid.

Grant, however, felt that this could be asked only from May, 1833, after Clare had made the demand on the Gaekwad. The Government of India obviously realised the injustice of all this, and suspended the execution of the order pending further investigation.⁵²

This case like the earlier one proves that in the eyes of the Court of Directors and their servants in India, their princely "allies" were treated not as 'equals' with whom they had made "treaties" but as 'instruments' to be used to further their authority in India. High-sounding terms such as justice, honour, integrity were used obviously with regard only to the British and never with regard to the people they had conquered. To pose subject against ruler was one of the meanest weapons used by the British.

A great deal has already been said in the earlier chapter about Dhackji Dadaji. Elphinstone had been convinced that Dhackji's action had been little less than robbery and full of perfidy. It has been shown how he had misappropriated a sum of Rs.2,75,000 from the Gaekwad's treasury. Both Elphinstone and the Governor General had agreed in 1820 ^{to} ~~permitted~~ Sayajirao to dismiss Dhackji.⁵³

52. Ibid.

53. PD(BOM), 20/1820, Elphinstone to COD, 9-8-1820.

Dhackji had after that sent a series of petitions to the Court of Directors. These also have been discussed in the earlier chapters. The Court of Directors opened their ears to these petitions and continued to disagree with the Bombay government's assumption of Dhackji's guilt. In 1835, they ultimately ordered the Bombay government to force the Gaekwad to restore Dhackji's inam villages.⁵⁴ These were villages granted to Dhackji by Sayajirao in 1819 as part of his fixed salary on his appointment as minister. The revenue of these 22 villages amounted to Rs.300000. On his ceasing to be his minister, Sayajirao withdrew these villages, along with the rest of his salary. The Court of Directors, it seems, had accepted the representations made by Dhackji, and had come to the conclusion that the Gaekwad had originally valued the services of Dhackji and had wished to retain him, and that the Resident had interfered to prevent this. Dhackji had convinced them that the Resident had held out prospects to Sayajirao of getting large sums of money from him, and that when this was not forthcoming, Sayajirao had taken over the Inam villages and dismissed him. They expressed their opinion that if the Resident had observed a strict non-interference between the Gaekwad and Dhackji, Dhackji would have remained in undisturbed

54. PD(BOM), 8/1827-1836 from COD, 26-8-1835.

possession of his emoluments, his Inam villages, and the confidence of the Gaekwad.⁵⁵ The Court of Directors, therefore, instructed ^{the} Bombay government that it should inform the Gaekwad that the Court of Directors considered that the faith of the British government had been fairly pledged to Dhackji Dadaji in the matter of the Inam villages that they felt it incumbent upon them to require that these villages should immediately be restored to him with arrears from the date of resumption.⁵⁶ They informed Grant that if this was not immediately complied with, the amount of arrears and the annual amount of the rent of the Inam villages were to be deducted from the Kathiawad and Mahikanta tributes.⁵⁷ On receipt of these orders from the Court of Directors, Grant asked Williams to make the demand for these restorations to ^{the Gaekwad,} Dhackji. Sayajirao, on receipt of these demands, started sending memorandum after memorandum to the Governor and the Court of Directors, detailing the whole course of the dispute between him and Dhackji. He showed clearly in these memoranda how Dhackji had defaulted and how Elphinstone had allowed him to take the particular step against Dhackji.⁵⁸

Grant had sent these memoranda to the Court of

55. Ibid.

56. Ibid.

57. Ibid.

58. PD(BOM), 9A/393A of 1830-36, No.663, Memoranda Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6, 3-10-1836.

Directors along with his recommendation. Before the Court of Directors could reply, however, the Governor General informed the Governor that he was bound to carry into effect the "definitive decision" of the "paramount authority" as conveyed, expressly and with "imperative directives".⁵⁹ Grant was constrained to protest against such an order. In spite of his general overbearing attitude, in this case, Grant had come to believe that, to implement the orders of the Court of Directors, would be to break faith with the Gaekwad, since the Gaekwad had been solemnly told by Elphinstone that no guarantee had been given by the British government to Dhackji and that he was perfectly at liberty to ~~redeem~~ ^{reclaim} the inam villages.⁶⁰ Grant opined that the British could not now demand such a restoration from Sayajirao. His feeling of pride in the British made him remark that this would be a blot upon the "national honour and character of the British."⁶¹ He also urged that before enforcing such a demand, the accusations against Dhackji, made by Sayajirao should be investigated. Grant, therefore, decided to refer back the matter to the Governor General as well as to the Court of Directors.⁶² Writing to the Court of Directors,

59. PD(BOM), 9/874 of 1837, GG to GOB, 10-4-1837.

60. PD(BOM), 9/784 of 1837, Minutes of Grant, 1-6-1837.

61. Ibid.

62. Ibid.

he earlier ^{he} had stated that he had little expectation of Sayajirao acquiescing ⁱⁿ to these demands.⁶³ After further investigation, Grant asserted that the claims of Dhackji were not only "unfounded and unjust" but to enforce them on Sayajirao without the inquiry he challenged the British to make would "compromise the honour and the character of the British government".⁶⁴ The Court of Directors, however, paid no notice of these opinions and pressed on their own point. In July, 1838, the Government of Bombay was again ordered by the Governor General to carry out the orders of April, 1837. As a result the British paid Dhackji out of the tributes they collected.⁶⁵ Sayajirao protested against these orders, and refused to comply with them or to give credit in his accounts for any sums disbursed to Dhackji.⁶⁶ In 1840, a threat of further reduction in his tribute and realisation that things would go very ill with him, if he did not submit to the British convinced Sayajirao that he had to accede to the British demands regarding the inam villages of Dhackji Dadaji. This did not put an end to this vexatious problem. Dhackji made further claims, and the question was kept alive till Sayajirao's death.

63. PDL(BOM) to COD, 44/1836, No.16, 2-11-1836.

64. PD(BOM), 9/874 of 1837. Minutes of Grant, 1-6-1837.

65. PD(BOM), Mixed Records 13/800 of 1838. Minutes of Grant, July, 1838.

66. HPO, File 72/82.

An examination of the persons covered under the guarantee system is very revealing. These were bankers, Firms, the Gaekwad's family, merchants, Girasias, and various individuals such as Gangadhar Shastri, Deoji⁽¹⁸⁰⁷⁾ and others. This last group mostly covered persons from the educated middle class. The guaranteed persons formed a pressure group whose support bolstered up the economic and political stranglehold that the British were attempting over India. They mutually relied upon one another to benefit themselves.

In May, 1827, Williams had submitted a list of all guarantee engagements entered into by the British government from the commencement of the year 1801, specifying the date and purpose for which each was granted, and the nature of each, compiled from the English and Marathi records of the Baroda Residents.⁶⁷ In 1828, Williams further submitted a historical account of the circumstances which had lead to the introduction of the system in Gujarat. He again enumerated the Guarantees then existing. This list is, however, of questionable veracity as William in the same letter informed the Government of Bombay that the Record Room in which these documents were kept was destroyed by fire, so that a

67. BBB(BAR), Williams to GOB, 31-5-1827.

regular series of papers were not available, but that by "enquiry" of the holders of these guarantees, a list had been procured.⁶⁸

Later on in 1840, Boyde, the then Resident and Commissioner of Gujarat, basing his findings on Williams report submitted a list of guarantees in force at Baroda, which numbered 25 in all.⁶⁹ The important thing to note here is that in many of the cases the original guarantee papers were not available. When challenged about their existence by the Gaekwad, neither the British nor the claimants could offer any proof by way of documents. This opened the door to all types of claims against the Gaekwad, which the British were only too eager to support. They were prepared, as seen, to support the word of the subjects against the Gaekwad.

An analysis of these guarantees show that there were seventeen so called hereditary guarantees for personal protection and situation, Nemnuk, property, trade, watan and "Huq" to certain families. ^{Of these,} Nine were guaranteed pensions or Nemnuk or provision for life. Another set of guarantees also covered girasias. An examination of

68. Ibid., Williams to GOB, 14-2-1828.

69. Ibid., W.H.Boyde to GOB, 18-11-1841 (vide Appendix "A")

the four cases discussed in this chapter and also the discussion in the previous chapter of the case of Ganpatrao and his family, and the earlier ones of guarantees to the Bankers clearly brings out the interest of the British in maintaining these untenable guarantees. The Court of Directors at this stage exhibited a very contrary attitude. Whilst willing to show a more liberal attitude towards the Gaekwad in other matters (as witnessed in their instructions to Clare), they were unwilling to give up this enormous ^{instrument} means of power which they held. From their letters, already quoted, to ^{the} Government of Bombay regarding the cases of Gangadhar Shastri and Dhackji Dadaji, they seemed to have looked upon the guarantees as representing their sovereign authority.

What this institution in practice meant was that the British undertook not only to protect "for all the time to come, the life, honour, and property" of the descendants of certain persons against their own sovereign, but also to enforce in perpetuity the payment to them of large and onerous allowances from the Gaekwad State as the salary of nominal offices of which no duties were performed.⁷⁰ This indicated the singular fact that

70. Ibid., PDL(BOM) from COD to GOB, 2-7-1840.

sovereignty lay elsewhere and not in the Indian State or its Ruler.

Another problem which these personal guarantees had produced was one of law and order. In many cases, the British had supported these persons against the jurisdiction of the Gaekwad in matters of law so that, as the British themselves acknowledged, the guaranteed persons and the general public presumed to enjoy an immunity from all law. When complaints were against them to their own sovereign, he was powerless to enforce justice because they were under British protection, while at the same time the British government had apparently no power effectually to punish them.⁷¹ It was only at a late stage, after Sayajirao had suffered untold personal humiliation and political losses that the Court of Directors were able to see his problems in a clearer light. It must have been a comfort to Sayajirao just before his death to see a glimmer of justice, though not reparation in these matters. In 1848, the Court of Directors at last came to the conclusion that if the guaranteed persons had been allowed to claim, this sort of immunity from punishment, it was through a "complete misrepresentation" of the nature and meaning of the Guarantee system, which had never been intended to secure such immunity for all offences. The British intention had been merely

71. Ibid., from COD to GOB, 18-3-1849.

to give them the benefit of an investigation by the British⁷² own officers before they could be subjected to punishment. This in itself was usurpation of the Prince's power. The Gaekwad, the Court of Directors admitted, could not without great injustice be deprived of the right to punish his own subject in case of real misconduct on their part. If it had ever been held that he was not at liberty to do so, the Bombay government was told to⁷³ make proper amends.

With regard to the hereditary guarantees such as those given to the Diwanji and the Shastri families, the Court of Directors acknowledged that the system was most vicious as situations of trust and importance were made hereditary and devolved on persons wholly incompetent to perform their duty.⁷⁴ The mischief lay in this that certain powerful subjects of the Gaekwad had obtained the protection of the British government and then expected, since they had rendered that Government service in the past, that they and their dependents would continue under all circumstances to be the proteges of the British. Of all the different kinds of guarantees, none had been more mischievous than the hereditary ones which had not only

72. Ibid.

73. Ibid.

74. Ibid.

extended to purses and property but guaranteed the
 continuance of offices to particular families.⁷⁵

Malcolm, who, when Governor of Bombay, had actually supported these individuals against the Gaekwad, later realised the inequity of the institution. Referring to the interferences of the British government on behalf of the guaranteed subjects, he acknowledged that it was not politic to institute checks and interferences on the Ruler, though the complaints of discontented or even agrieved subjects. On the contrary, it was dangerous as the Prince and his family realised the "mockery and degradation of his position and as a result lost all motives for good or great action. Malcolm concluded that "the nominal prince" was thus reduced to an "incompetent instrument of rule".⁷⁶ This hindsight on the part of Malcolm came only after the British had completely broken the Gaekwad. The next chapter will show to what extent such an institution could destroy a ruler.

75. Ibid., Memorandum of Willoughby, Pol.Sec. to
 GOB, 4-8-1837.

76. HPO(BAR), Vol. X, Minutes of Evidence before the
 Select Committee of East India Company.

CHAPTER VI

DETERIORATION OF RELATIONS BETWEEN BRITISH AND SAYAJIRAO AND ITS REPERCUSSIONS

The reaction of the Gaekwad to the affronts once again heaped upon him by the British was to revert to the previous position of antagonism and hostility. He withdrew his co-operation to them in all fields where the two had to work together, sometimes resulting in harm to his own subjects more than to the British. Being deprived of real power, he also gave up his responsibility towards his subjects, behaving many times cruelly and unjustly towards them. The area of dispute which particularly affected his subjects was that concerning law and order. This was an area which was often jointly the responsibility of both the Governments because of the territorial juxtaposition of their possessions. The Gaekwad's territory lay scattered over Kathiawad and Gujarat. His possessions in Gujarat were divided into three Prants of Navsari, Baroda and Kadipattan. In the Navsari district, the major division of the State, the aththavisi or 28 districts of Surat were partitioned between him and

the British (the British having taken over the Peshwa's share of Surat). Besides this, the British held the seaboard of the district, ~~and~~ Navsari itself, the chief town of this division was surrounded by British territory. The southern part of Navsari district which lies south of the Tapti river was mixed up in the Dangs over which both the Gaekwad and the Collector of Khandesh claimed authority. On the north east, the boundary of Navsari touched the Rajpipla State. The Central Baroda division was fairly compact and lay between the Mahi and Narbada rivers. On the north-eastern boundary of this division lay the main portion of the British district of Baroda. On the eastern side of the Baroda division, the boundary could not be easily traced. The Gaekwad villages here were interposed up with those of the petty chiefs of Vajria and Sankheda. On the eastern side it was bounded by Chhota Udaipur, the Panch Mahal and part of Rewakanta - all tributaries to the Gaekwad.

The north-west division of the Baroda State was Kadipattan, the main portion of which lay west of the Sabarmati river. One part of this division, however, was to the east of the river called Dehgaum and was so scattered that the Gaekwad villages were interspersed

with those of the Ahmedabad districts and that of Mahikanta territories. Like Surat, part of the Ahmedabad districts belonged to the British. On the north, this district was bounded by the Palanpur State, but many Gaekwad villages were inside the main boundaries of Palanpur. It is important to remember that the territories of Rewakantha and Mahikanta were in the hands of petty chieftains who were actually tributaries to the Gaekwad.

The Gaekwad also had possessions in Kathiawad which was divided into the Amreli sub-division and the district of Okhamandal. Amreli was further divided into five sub-divisions which stretched in an irregular manner across Kathiawad from Bhel to the Arabian sea. The divisions were detached by the possessions of nineteen independent Kathi-Girasias and Mul-Girasias. These were actually petty chieftains and tributaries to the Gaekwad. Okhamandal formed the north-west corner of the province of Kathiawad bounded by the gulf of Kutch and the Arabian sea.¹

With such disconnected territories and the proximity of the British, it was very easy for misunderstandings and problems to arise. These can be divided into those directly affecting the British

1. BG., Op. cit., pp. 1 to 26. Map of Baroda State is attached in the Appendix. The terms are explained in Chapter VII

territory, and those in the territories of the petty chieftains who were tributary to the Gaekwad, but where both the British and the Gaekwad disputed jurisdiction. These disputes arose because the British upheld the rights of petty chieftains and the Girasias in their stand against the Gaekwad, guaranteeing them rights and properties against their tributary overlord.

Disturbances in British possessions in Surat and Broach afford a good example of the problems created. The extent of the misunderstandings are a good barometer of the relations between the two. The disputes here arose mainly because of people committing offences in the British territory and taking refuge in the Gaekwad's and the petty chieftains' territory. The Gaekwad's officers and the chieftains refused to extradite the criminals or to help in their punishment. One group of offenders and sufferers in this wrangle for power were the Bhils of Gujarat and the Khandesh-Baroda border of the Navsari division. This problem has already been discussed in Chapter III.

In 1831, when Sir John Malcolm was Governor of Bombay, relations between the two governments, as seen, were very bad. We find Mr. R. Mill, Magistrate of Broach, reporting that the facility of escaping into the

neighbouring State and the subsequent delays in apprehending offenders had become a great cause of the number of gang offences which took place in these districts.²

A similar report was made by James Sutherland, Judicial Commissioner for Gujarat in 1831 regarding the Kaira and Ahmedabad divisions of the British. He informed the government that businessmen and travellers could no longer proceed through the division without a private guard.³ On receipt of these letters, the Bombay government councillors opined that this situation was the result of "the unfortunate posture" of their relations with the Government of Baroda.⁴ Mr. W. Newnham, another Councillor, agreed with Mr. Romer that the disturbances were to be traced "in a material degree" to the state of affairs at Baroda. This minute of Mr. Newnham was subscribed to by the Governor Malcolm.⁵

District administrators, such as the Magistrate of Broach, pointedly put the blame for these disturbances on British policy. He stated that the position which the British government had assumed in regard to Baroda would always be a bar to the active administration of justice

2. PD(BOM), VIII/782 of 1837. R. Mill to the Collector of Surat, 17-1-1831.

3. Ibid., Sutherland to GOB, 16-2-1831.

4. Ibid., Minutes of Mr. Romer, No. 688.

5. Ibid., Minutes of W. Newnham, No. 689.

in their own dominions, and that their subjects would be the sufferers. The British government would also be losing considerable capital and production every year.⁶

From a report of Mr. Einstein, another Judicial Commissioner at the same time, the chief disorders were those of highway robberies which made communication between village and village practically impossible and travelling on the highways impractical, without a private guard, particularly in the British districts of Kaira and Broach.⁷ Most of these gang robberies were committed by Bhils who were well aware that they would not be traced in the Gaekwad's territory by the British police, and that, even if an order from Baroda was procured for their apprehension, they could easily evade it.⁸

The judges of the Sader Adalat also complained bitterly to the Bombay government about the refuge given by the Gaekwad to the Bhils, and the non-cooperation of the Gaekwad district officers in this matter. They also recorded that the Gaekwad officers were bribed by the Bhils, who were thus getting additional protection. The Gaekwad officers, according to them, did not pay attention

6. Ibid., R. Mill to Principal Magistrate of Surat, 20-3-1832.

7. Ibid., Einstein to GOB, 16-1-1832.

8. Ibid., Letter from the Magistrate of Broach, 27-1-1832.

even to orders sent from Baroda directing them to deliver up the offenders.⁹

When all this came to the notice of Clare, when he was Governor of Bombay, he opined that though Sayajirao was bound by the Treaties of 1805 and 1817¹⁰ to seize and deliver criminals and offenders to the British, he did not think it would be 'politic' to make any sudden or abrupt demand on the Gaekwad. He instructed Williams that on a fitting opportunity he should allude to these problems and discuss the matter with Sayajirao to the mutual satisfaction and advantage of both the governments in the spirit of "amity and cordiality" which according to Clare "happily existed between them."¹¹

However, these improved feelings between the two governments did not bring any amelioration in the state of things in this quarter, and disturbances of the type discussed continued.¹² The complaints continued to be received by the Bombay government and remonstrances went forward to the Gaekwad from the British officers in Gujarat from the Surat and Ahmedabad districts. From 1832 to 1835, thirteen representations were made by them

9. Ibid., Sadar Adalat to GOB, 7-4-1836.

10. Aitchison, C.V., Op. cit., Vol.VI, Treaty between the Gaekwad and the British, 6-11-1817, Article 9, pp. 340 and 354.

11. PD(BOM), VIII/782 of 1837, GOB to Williams, 31-7-1832.

12. Report of the Judicial Commissioner of Gujarat, 2-1-1834.

through Williams to the Gaekwad regarding robberies and crimes committed in their territories by gangs of robbers, consisting of Bhils and others, who later on took refuge in his territory, and therefore, could not be brought to book.¹³

Most of the British districts, such as Ahmedabad and Surat, had to increase their police establishments.¹⁴ In fact, the Magistrate of Ahmedabad had to request for further increases in ^{March, 1832,} August, 1833, and February, 1835, at a considerable loss to the British treasury.¹⁵ This obviously rankled with the British, who instead of ^{getting} making any monetary gains out of what they considered a very fertile province were making losses. The British accused the Gaekwad officers of levying large sums annually on the Bhils for permission to plunder.¹⁶ Their complaint was that the Gaekwad officers did not give them any help, but at the same time, many of the ^{British} officers admitted that the Gaekwad sent orders to his officers to help the British

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13. PD(BOM), 783 of 1837, Political Consultations, 1-3-1832, No.784. Williams to Sayajirao: (1 & 2) 5-3-1832; (3) 31-7-1832; (4) 29-1-1833; (5) 10-3-1833; (6) 15-7-1833; (7) 13-8-1833; (8) 17-1-1834; (9) 25-1-1834; (10) 14-4-1834; (11) 26-6-1834; (12) 25-9-1834; (13) 2-1-1835.
14. Ibid., Vibart, Magistrate of Ahmedabad to GOB, and Ironside to GOB, 11-2-1832.
15. Ibid., Magistrate of Ahmedabad to GOB, March, 1832, 30-8-1833; Feb., 1835.
16. Ibid., Magistrate of Surat to GOB, 31-7-1832.

and hand over the offenders to them.¹⁷ In certain instances, the Gaekwad's horsemen had been ordered to proceed to the aid of British as in the case of the Waghpur village in Ahmedabad district.¹⁸

Whatever the reasons for the failure of the British to maintain law and order in their territory, the common people suffered enormously, as may be seen from the reports of the Magistrates concerned. In 1832, Mr. Vibart, the Magistrate of Ahmedabad, reported that the gangs of robbers had taken possession of the property of certain Bombay merchants trading in Surat and that the loss of property, just for the three months from January to March was estimated at Rs.1,27,823.¹⁹ Similarly, in another report from the Magistrate of Kaira in February, 1832, it was reported that in fifty criminal cases about 200 persons were involved within one year. The total property loss was Rs.24,500.²⁰ The Magistrate at Ahmedabad had also continually reported serious destruction and outrages during the years 1834 and 1835, which included attacks on merchants taking their goods from Ahmedabad to Kathiawad, resulting in

17. Ibid., Minutes of Grant, 4-1-1837.

18. Ibid.

19. Ibid.

20. Ibid.

a loss of Rs.18,000, and injury to five people. In another case, he reported an attack on a house of a Bania in Ahmedabad district who was plundered of Rs.1,500, and which resulted in the killing of one person and wounding of four others. He also reported that two villages had been attacked by a Koli gang resulting in the death of four persons and the wounding of many.²¹ Any proposal of the British for settling these difficulties was always fraught with compulsion. In 1832, Mr. Ironside, the Judicial Commissioner for Gujarat, recommended that the British should 'either compel' or persuade the Gaekwad to co-operate.²² He suggested that the British should "show a vigorous exertion of authority" towards the Gaekwad and his officers.²³ In spite of reports to the contrary, like most British officers, he was convinced that Sayajirao was conniving at the lack of co-operation shown by his officers to them.²⁴ In 1833 also, the Subedar of the Fouzdari Adalat in Ahmedabad was making similar remarks about the Gaekwad and his officers. On all these occasions, as already stated, Williams was

21. Ibid.

22. Ibid., Letter from Ironside to GOB, 11-2-1832.

23. Ibid.

24. Ibid.

directed to call on the Gaekwad in the "most urgent manner" to adopt measures to check these outrages.²⁵ A demand was also made by the British that Sayajirao should send a detachment of his Contingent to aid the British in preserving law and order.²⁶ It seems that at times this sort of help was given and at times not. The Bombay government claimed that the Gaekwad was clearly bound by the fourth and sixteenth Articles of the Treaty of 21st April, 1805, and by the second and eighth Articles of the Treaty of 1817 to grant the aid of the Subsidiary Force and also of the Contingent to put down all disturbances in his and British territories.²⁷ The Gaekwad did not accept this interpretation, and had on certain occasions refused such help.²⁸

As relations worsened between the two, the British prepared to show their might, and the visiting Judicial Commissioner for Gujarat in 1834 putting all the blame for the disturbances on the Gaekwad, insisted that the Gaekwad should pay the whole cost of the additional force required by them to maintain peace and security. For, according to him, Sayajirao was

25. Ibid., Minutes by Grant, 4-7-1837.

26. Ibid.

27. Aitchison, Vol. VI, pp. 340-354.

28. PD(BOM), VIII/782 of 1837. Minutes by Grant, 4-7-1837.

responsible, because his laxity and corrupt officials had created their insecurity. He suggested that each State in Gujarat should be compelled to keep up a competent force of Bhils and Kolis to be raised and superintended by a European officer as in Khandesh. The cost of this could be defrayed from the tributes collected by the British for the Gaekwad. Lastly, he maintained that the Gaekwad and the petty chieftains should be obliged to make good all the losses due to robbery traced to towns or villages within their territory on failure of their delivering up the offender.²⁹

These proposals were a pointer as to which direction the British were moving. Upon receipt of this report, the Governor asked Williams to send another representation to Sayajirao, which he did on 26th June, 1834.³⁰ Williams had been instructed to negotiate a plan with Sayajirao to correct the evils complained of.³¹

In the meantime, during this period matters were growing more and more hostile between the British and Sayajirao and neither side seemed to have any genuine wish to find a solution. Sayajirao on his part

29. Ibid., Report of the Judicial Commissioner for Gujarat, 2-1-1834.

30. Ibid., Williams to Sayajirao, 26-6-1834.

31. Ibid., Minutes by Grant, 4-7-1837.

was continuously under threat of his powers being eroded, and the British on their part were anxious to show more of their imperial might.

Sayajirao, in reply to the suggestions received from Williams, sent two memoranda on 9th and 10th March, 1835. In these he laid the blame for these frequent robberies squarely on the judicial system of the British which required so much evidence and bred such delay.³² He complained that the criminals had no fear of the Gaekwad government now because, as he said, they had become well acquainted with the regulations of the British government. People who committed open robbery and had been seized in the act by his officers were still proceeded against by the British officers according to their regulations by which the original charges were made to appear false. Because of this, robberies had become frequent and discussions were constantly pending on this subject between him and the Political Commissioner.³³ He pointed out the fact that his officers immediately, on receipt of the information of robbery by his subjects, inquired into the affairs, and if the robbery was proved, made compensation for the theft. Otherwise, the suspected persons were forwarded to the British officers for further

32. Ibid., Yads from Sayajirao, 9-3-1835 and 10-3-1835.

33. Ibid.

investigation. In spite of this, the British kept on sending him letters of complaints.³⁴ He also contended that the village officers of the British falsely implicated people from the Gaekwad villages, and that the British officers reported this to their government, causing constant unpleasantness between the two.³⁵

Even if the indigenous system of justice had been arbitrary many a time, it had also been quick and effective. The settlement of most cases by the local Panchayat with all available local testimony had been effective, quick, and understood by the people. It was no doubt many times irregular, and innocent people were wrongly punished. On the other hand, it did not generally permit the escape of criminals through technical and legal flaws, resulting from the requirement to produce impossible proof by the prosecution. The Gaekwad had also gone to the trouble of suggesting a remedy for the prevailing lawlessness. He proposed that both the governments should take security from those villages which were implicated, ^{crimes} and secondly that every village should be made responsible for robbery committed within its limits without reference to the actual perpetrators of the deed.³⁶ The plan

34. Ibid.

35. Ibid.

36. Ibid.

suggested by the Gaekwad was in fact being put into practice in his territories and in many parts of the petty States of Kathiawad quite satisfactorily. It had also been practiced formerly in the now British territories. Williams, while conveying these memoranda, did not agree with the entire recommendation but suggested that the recommendations could be adopted by the British with some modification.

The modification suggested was that if the villages satisfactorily proved that the robbers had come from any other village and that particular village had done everything in its power to prevent such a robbery, it should be reimbursed the security taken from it. Williams felt that this proposal with the punishment of the offender as usual would produce a good effect.³⁷

On receipt of these memoranda, the Governor's reaction was typical. He did not wish to understand the problem from the Indian point of view, and dismissed the Gaikwad's suggestion without even bothering to ask for expert advice from his administrators. He also paid no attention to Williams recommendation and opined that such a mode of procedure generally or indiscriminately adopted would not only fail in effecting the desired object but

37. Ibid., Williams to GOB, 2-4-1835.

would aggravate the evil by creating an "unnecessary alarm and insecurity".³⁸ He also observed that the Gaekwad had proposed no effectual measure, but had made merely vague declarations.³⁹ The Governor, obviously, was determined to increase his pressure on the Gaekwad and to enhance British control in this region by maximising the liabilities of the Gaekwad and minimising his own.

The disturbances and crimes taking place were obviously the work of miscreants - both from the Gaekwad and the British territory. The British admitted that their jails were overflowing and their Magistrates and the Police Departments were constantly baffled.⁴⁰ The Magistrate of Ahmedabad stated that most of the crimes had been committed by large gangs from the Baroda and other petty States in conjunction with "the turbulent" from their own districts.⁴¹ He further acknowledged that the British police was quite inadequate to check disorders of this kind.⁴²

Such an insecure position was obviously extremely detrimental to the lives of the people at large both in

38. Ibid., Minutes of Grant, 4-1-1837.

39. Ibid.

40. Ibid.

41. Ibid.

42. Ibid.

the Gaekwad and the British territories, and was the result of the conflicting attitude and policy of these two powers. Sayajirao, no doubt, if not conniving with his officers, was certainly not asserting his authority strongly enough over them. At this time his minister, Veniram Aditram^{it was alleged,} was interested in personal aggrandisement at the expense of the public, which included nominating his men to important positions through whom he collected illegal wealth, including payments made by the Koli and the Bhil gangs.⁴³ Sayajirao had no desire to interfere as he had deliberately appointed Veniram as a challenge to the British who had tried to prevent his appointment. That law and order suffered in consequence was not very material to him. In the eyes of Sayajirao, his subjects came after his selfish motives were served. They were also pawns in the struggle for power between the two groups.

The British too, as is evident ^{from} the Governor's minute, were not seriously interested in settling the differences or in improving their administration. What they wanted was to increase their hold over this territory for political and economic reasons. A major reason for the increase in crimes was the abrupt change in the Indian economy, brought about

43. See the next chapter.

by the introduction of the British trade, and English land tenure system. All these were quite contrary to Indian interests and upset the entire economy of Gujarat including the Gaekwad's territory. The traditional village community and holdings were disturbed producing poverty and unemployment.

Grant, therefore, made no change in the British policy and continued to expect co-operation from Sayajirao without any action on his part. In fact the relations became more complicated with the introduction of the bureaucratic measures introduced by both sides. Sayajirao instructed his officers not to deal directly with the British agents and officers but to route all correspondences through the Political Commissioner of Gujarat.⁴⁴ The British claimed that the law and order situation was deteriorating further during the year 1835-36. The Governor cited reports from the Divisional Judicial Commissioner for Gujarat, the Sadar Fouzdari Adalat, Ahmedabad, the Commander-in-Chief, Northern Division of the British Army, and from Sutherland.⁴⁵ It is significant that he does not recognise the reports from Sutherland acknowledging that when he had informed the Gaekwad through his Sarsuba at Navsari on 28th

PD(Bom) VIII/782 of 1807,
44. Ibid., Sutherland, British Agent at Surat to Assistant Political Commissioner, Gujarat, 14-8-1836.

45. Ibid., Minutes of Grant, 4-1-1837.

January, 31st March, and 25th June, 1836, about the plunders committed by the Bhils in the Mandvi territory, the Gaekwad had sent orders to the Sarsuba on 18th June, 20th, 29th and 30th July, 1836 to take appropriate action after investigating jointly with the representatives of the Rajah of Mandvi into the cases of plunder. A copy of the investigation had been handed over to Sutherland.⁴⁶ Ignoring all this, the Governor stressed the fact that after this the Sarsuba did not pursue the orders of the Gaekwad to punish the culprits, and suggested that the Gaekwad should be required to pay reparation to the Rajah of Mandvi. If this was refused, the British should afford it themselves and as usual, deduct the amount from the Gaekwad's tribute collected by them.⁴⁷ This recommendation was a direct infringement of the Gaekwad's right as overlord. The British were also affronted by what they considered the "incivility" of the Gaekwad in requiring their officers to communicate to him through the Political Commissioner. No indignity was to be accepted even by the smallest British officer. Here, it is worth recalling that earlier the British had removed the Resident from Baroda and forced the Gaekwad to communicate all matters to the Government through the Political

46. Ibid., Sutherland to Assistant Political Commissioner, Gujarat, 24-8-1836.

47. Ibid., Minutes of Grant, 4-1-1837.

Commissioner of Gujarat, Ahmedabad.

By 1836, it is thus clear that the British were trying to oust the Gaekwad's authority from his tributaries also. They had begun actively interfering in these tributaries on behalf of the petty chiefs, complaining about crimes in their territory by the Gaekwad's subjects, forgetting that only a year ago they had complained of criminals taking shelter in the same petty States.

In view of all this, it is not surprising that Grant decided to recommend the following measures against the Gaekwad to the Governor General:⁴⁸

First: That each Magistrate in Gujarat be required to frame a list of offenders known to be residing in the Gaekwad territory, who have committed offences within the previous five years.

Second: That a similar list of property plundered by Gaekwad subjects during the same period be compiled.

Third: That the surrender of the former and full compensation for the latter be immediately demanded, and exacted from the Gaekwad government.

Fourth: That on all future occasions, Magistrates

48. Ibid., Minutes of Grant, 4-1-1837.

be instructed to report direct to the Government of Bombay, cases wherein British subjects suffered injury from those of the Gaekwad, and also names of offenders who escaped into the Gaekwad territory. In all such instances the course above recommended to be followed.

Fifth: That the Gaekwad be required to issue the most positive instructions to all his officers to co-operate with the British in matters of police, and to permit British police authorities to enter his territories in the pursuit of offenders.

Sixth: That until the Gaekwad afforded satisfaction to the above extent, the payment of the Kathiawad and Mahikanta tributes be suspended.

The most damaging recommendation was the sixth and the last. Such a step would thoroughly damage the Gaekwad's position vis a vis his tributaries, which the British were already trying to do, in order that their direct and indirect rule in these areas could be strengthened. Relations, therefore, between the two parties deteriorated very fast. Grant forwarded similar recommendations to the Court of Directors and urged that there should be immediate and decisive action to protect British interest from the dangers to which they were exposed by the present "unhappy position" of their

relations with the Gaekwad.⁴⁹

Grant was determined on the slightest pretext to take over the tributaries of the Gaekwad and called upon Sutherland, who had succeeded Williams in November, 1837, as the Political Commissioner of Gujarat to report on whether the Gaekwad had redressed the wrongs he was called upon to do by Malet and Captain Outram regarding the Mandvi and Mahikanta territories. If not, Sutherland was told that he should proceed to redress the wrongs sustained by persons entitled to British protection out of the Mahikanta collections.⁵⁰ Similar steps had already been taken with reference to the Kathiawad tributary.⁵¹

On receipt of these threats from the British, Sayajirao protested in a number of memoranda to the British government explaining what he had done in these matters. He pointed out that on every occasion, when complaints had been received from the British agents in the Mahikanta and Kathiawad tributaries, he had immediately ordered enquiries to be made and warnings to be given to the criminals. He complained that

49. Ibid., GOB to COB, 25-3-1837.

50. Ibid., GOB to Sutherland, 3-6-1837. Position of these tributaries has been discussed in Chapters I and II.

51. Ibid.

Captain Outram, the British Political Agent in Mahikanta, had overlooked the Resident and had written directly to the Government of Bombay, giving an impression that there was lack of friendship between the Resident and himself.⁵² The Gaekwad protested also at the petty complaints made by Captain Outram, citing a case when he had complained that when he had visited the village of Mankey, the Thanedar of the village had not given him accommodation and he had taken shelter in the house of the School Master, where he had been nicely attended to. Outram had also stated that in return he had sent a "fine cap" for the School master's child. Sayajirao explained that the Thanedar had not refused help to Outram, but was unable to give it, because the building of the Thana had given way and the alternate place suggested by the Thanedar was not approved of by Outram. Outram had taken shelter in the school master's house, and since he had arrived in the village at 11 O'Clock at night, milk etc. was not available. This was sent to him in the morning. Sayajirao, therefore, remonstrated that the demand for the removal of the Thanedar on such flimsy ground was not proper. He also objected to the gifting of a cap to the school master's child because, the teacher was his

52. PD(BOM), Mixed Records 781/1837, Yad from Sayajirao to Robert Grant, 8-8-1837.

subject and his good conduct was not something astonishing, which necessitated the gift of a cap.⁵³ According to the Gaekwad, the twelve anna cap was returned and thus the business was ended.

These details serve to illustrate the petty type of complaints, which in fact should never have reached him, with which Sayajirao was harassed. They show that even in the eyes of the petty British officers an Indian prince was held in total disrespect, demanding as they did that he should attend even to their most minor complaints.

Malet, who since 1835 had been the Assistant Political Commissioner of Gujarat was asked to hold personal interview with the Gaekwad in October, 1837, with reference to new complaints connected with the Gaekwad's subjects in the territories bordering that of the British and the Gaekwad. Some complaints were about cuts in the dams made by the Gaekwad's farmers in the Petlad district. Other complaints were about the Galles case, the remission of tribute from Mahikanta, the cases of Poonjaji Joraji, and his minister Veniram Aditram. The report submitted ^{of} in all these meetings by Malet only

53. Ibid.

prove that the British were determined to increase their own control over Baroda.⁵⁴ Malet, who was acting at this time in the place of Williams was predisposed against Sayajirao and obviously looked upon himself as the representative of the imperial power.

With regard to the first case of the Petlad farmers, Sayajirao was able to produce a note from his officer accusing the British farmers of doing the same thing, and therefore, he submitted that since great loss has been incurred by the subjects of both the governments, it was not fair that he alone should be obliged to give compensation. He suggested that Malet should wait for the report of his officers who had gone to the Kaira Collector, the British officer responsible to get redress. Malet was forced to agree to this as there was obviously nothing else he could do.

Regarding the Gallea case, which referred to certain giras dues from Rewakanta. In the confusion which had occurred between the fading Moghul power and the Marathas in Gujarat during the late eighteenth century, the petty chiefs, especially of Rewakanta and Mahikanta had descended on the rich plains of Gujarat,

54. PDL(BOM) to COD, 48/1838. Memorandum of Malet of private conferences with Sayajirao, 24-10-1837.

and exacted from the open villages various dues which were levied in cash or kind and bore the general name of Giras. Under the Gaekwad's regime these became regular payments ^{to} from the petty States. When the British brought about the settlements for collection of the Gaekwad's tributes in these areas, it may be recalled that each chief was required to execute a bond to pay regularly and to abstain from lawlessness. In return the British had guaranteed that their 'giras' dues from the Gaekwad ⁵⁵ to them would be secured. In this particular case, Sayajirao had not paid the 'giras' dues to the Gallea chieftains of Rewakanta because of a breach of peace for which Sayajirao held them responsible. ⁵⁶ The British Agent had decided against the Gaekwad, and held his officers responsible, and had paid the dues from the tributes collected. ⁵⁷

The Gaekwad protested to Malet that the British decision against him was most unjust. He informed him that he had issued the necessary orders for investigation and had even removed his officer on a demand from the British government, and had ordered his officers to accede

55. See Chapter I and also Chavda, Op. cit., pp.50-51.

56. PDL(BOM) to COD, 48/1838, Memorandum of Malet, 24-10-1837.

57. Ibid.

to all requests of the British Agent. In spite of this, the British had made compensation to the Chieftains out of his revenues and the persons whom his officers had sent for trial to Rajkot ^{responsible} for the disturbances, had been returned without investigation. Sayajirao protested that this was inconsistent "with the friendship between the two governments", and wanted to send petitions about it to the British government. Malet arbitrarily refused to forward them, as when the British government, he claimed, had decided on a subject, he could not, without any new argument send fresh representations. The orders of the British government were final and ^{these} orders had been issued after due deliberation. Sayajirao maintained that by such acts as stopping his tributes his character had been diminished in the eyes of his people, and it was derogatory to his dignity. He also tried to explain that his officers had been proceeding according to old customs and traditions. He particularly invited Malet's attention to the fact that all questions were being determined ex parte against him, adding that all his explanations were disregarded and that nothing was ever decided in his favour. He finally stated that he realised that he had no remedy in this case, but that he would never give his consent to the tributes being stopped.⁵⁸

58. Ibid.

Another set of disputes ^{were these} was the dealings with so called British subjects, who had committed crimes in the Gaekwad's territory. The British claimed that the Gaekwad did not have a right to try ^{or} and punish these people. One such case was that of Poonjaji Joraji. He had been for many years a resident of Baroda and was in fact in the service of the Gaekwad. He was alleged to have committed some misconduct, and was put into prison on that account. It seems that Poonjaji had made some claims for 'giras' for the village of Sajmal in the Gaekwad territory. He had been seized by a Gaekwad officer, and judged guilty of making false claims and his hands were cut off above the wrist. Poonjaji on this had appealed to the British government and claimed that all this had been done to him on the orders of Veniram who hated him.⁵⁹

The matter had been taken up by Malet, and considered by the Governor of Bombay in 1836. At this stage, as has already been seen, Grant was eager to put the Gaekwad in the worst possible light. Both from the legal and humanitarian point of view, he considered it obligatory for the British government to demand redress. On the legal ground, he claimed that under Section 3 of

59. PDL(BOM) to COD, 45/1837, 29-3-1837.

Regulation 11 of 1827, Poonjaji, who was born within the British dominion and of a father who had settled there, was undoubtedly a British subject.⁶⁰ Malet had, however, opined that Poonjaji could become amenable to the Gaekwad's jurisdiction by possessing rights within his territory on the ground that every man who enters a country places himself under the protection of the law of that country.⁶¹ Grant, however, held that by usage firmly settled between the British and the Gaekwad, British subjects, accused of committing crime within the Gaekwad's territory were not amenable to his jurisdiction but to that of the British.⁶² The Governor was determined to adopt measures "to vindicate the honour" of the British government for such an outrage committed upon one of its subjects.⁶³ He had referred the matter to the Government of India with the following recommendations:⁶⁴

(1) To demand redress for the cruel loss suffered by settling upon him a sum of Rs.3,000 and Rs.100 per month from December, 1834 when the punishment was meted out to him;

60. PD(BOM), 11/706 of 1836-37. Minutes of Grant, 21-5-1836.

61. Ibid.

62. Ibid.

63. Ibid.

64. PD(BOM), VIII/783 of 1837. Minutes of Grant, 4-1-1837.

(2) That this money should be paid from the Gaekwad's tribute collected by the British government;

(3) That since the Gaekwad by his conduct had violated principles which should "never have been compromised" and had infringed upon rights he was bound to respect, and had caused grievous "insult and gross injustice". The Government of India should demand a large sum of moneys which would henceforth deter Sayajirao from "invading their sovereign right or at all events teach him that he can not be allowed to do so with impunity";⁶⁵

(4) The British government should call upon Sayajirao to dismiss Veniram, who, Grant was convinced, was chiefly responsible for the unhappy state of relations with Baroda, and whom, according to the Treaty of 21st April, 1805, the Gaekwad was prohibited from entertaining in his service without the consent of the British government.⁶⁶

Veniram was a native of Ahmedabad, and as such a British subject. The Bombay government, therefore, claimed it had authority to make these demands on Sayajirao, who flatly refused to pay anything to Poonjaji.

65. Ibid.

66. Ibid.

He claimed that Poonjaji was his subject and he would not consent to pay him any compensation. He also refused to dismiss Veniram at this stage. At a later stage, in 1838, Grant, after having done his worst, as we shall see in the next chapter, acknowledged that in this case, perhaps the British had hastily assumed on the authority of Malet that the sufferer in this case was entitled to the privileges of the British subject,⁶⁷ though, in actual fact, it was Malet who had hesitated, and the Governor who had persisted. Going through the case again, he changed his mind, and acknowledged that since Poonjaji had been a resident of Baroda, and was in the service of the Gaekwad, as Malet had earlier pointed out, it meant that the person had voluntarily "placed himself under the Government and in the service of a foreign power".⁶⁸ Grant felt in that case Poonjaji's status as a British subject had in many respects been suspended for the time being by his spontaneously attaching himself to a foreign service, and till he should fully discharge the obligations which he contracted by thus attaching himself, he could not, on the plea of being a British subject, withdraw from the control and jurisdiction of "his acknowledged master".⁶⁹ On this ground, Grant recommended that the

67. PD(BOM), Mixed Records 13/800/1838. Minutes of Grant, 1838.

68. Ibid.

69. Ibid.

further step contemplated of demanding the surrender of Poonjaji should be suspended.⁷⁰

Another case of such an interference is that of Dadabhai Ratanji of Bombay. He was a Parsi inhabitant of Bombay, who in February, 1837, went to Bilimora to visit his late father's house. He stayed there for about a month and was preparing to leave when a complaint was made against him to the Gaekwad Subah of Navsari by Jamshetji Pestonji, another inhabitant of Bilimora, accusing him of some lapses in a commercial transaction. The Subah thereupon ordered Dadabhai to furnish a security for good behaviour, which was furnished by him. He also convinced the Subah that it was necessary for him to go to Bombay where all the accounts and papers of all the transactions between him and Jamshetji Pestonji were kept. He promised to return with them, and offered to put the whole matter before the Subah.⁷¹ However, the man who had stood security for him refused to let him go to Bombay unless he got back the security bond, which had been given to the Subah at Navsari, and was prevented from leaving Bilimora. Dadabhai Ratanji then sent a petition to the Governor of Bombay, saying that he had

70. Ibid.

71. PD(BOM), Mixed Records 6/781. Yad from Dadabhai Ratanji to Subah of Navsari, 1-9-1837.

been forcibly detained at Bilimora. He also claimed that Jamshetji Pestonji was very closely connected with the Gaekwad's minister Veniram, who according to him, had instigated his arrest.⁷² The British government immediately asked Williams to demand an investigation from the Gaekwad on the subject of the detainment of Dadabhai Ratanji.⁷³ The Gaekwad had asked his Sarsubah at Surat to make a report, and Gopalrao Mairal, the Sarsubah reported that Dadabhai Ratanji had represented to the Subah at Navsari that he was an inhabitant of the Gaekwad's territory, and had his house, family and relations at Bilimora, and that there was no objection to the security bond being returned to him.⁷⁴ On his making a petition, the bond was returned, and Dadabhai was permitted to proceed to Bombay.

Dadabhai Ratanji was, on his own admission, an inhabitant of the Gaekwad's territory and had property in his domain. He was thus obviously a Baroda citizen. As in the case of Poonjaji, the British had jumped to a hasty conclusion in its eagerness to assert their authority over the Gaekwad and had demanded an investigation.

72. Ibid., Petition of Dadabhai Ratanji to GOB, 10-3-1837.

73. Ibid., Yad from Williams to Sayajirao, 5-5-1837.

74. Ibid., Yad from Gopalrao Mairal to Sayajirao, 1-9-1837.

How this affected the Gaekwad is obvious. Tension between the two parties continued to mount.

Another case worth mentioning is that of the Vallabhdas Maneckchand family. It was alleged that this family was imprisoned for many years at Baroda by the Gaekwad. Vallabhdas Maneckchand himself committed suicide and the rest of the family were released in April, 1836.⁷⁵ In 1837, the British turned their attention to this family and decided to take up their cause for the reason that the persons who were imprisoned were born in Bombay, and were consequently British subjects.⁷⁶ The whole matter was blown up to appear as a most heinous crime on the part of the Gaekwad, and the Governor, writing to the Court of Directors about this, bemoaned the most "melancholous reflection" on the nature of the Gaekwad's policy and illustrating the ^{or small} degree of attachment which he felt towards his British ally!⁷⁷ The Governor proceeded on the assumption that the British government was clearly entitled to demand satisfaction for the violation of the "rights" of these persons.⁷⁸ An acrimonious correspondence had taken place between Williams and the Gaekwad, without anything being settled till 1840.⁷⁹

75. PDL(BOM) to COD, 45/1835-38, No. 8, 29-3-1837.

76. Ibid.

77. Ibid.

78. Ibid.

79. PD(BOM), Mixed Records, 13/800/1838, Williams to Sayajirao, 21-12-1836, and Sayajirao to Williams, 25-10-1837.

Ultimately, as in the case of Poonjaji Joraji, the British admitted that the family could not be taken as British citizens, but that realisation as in the earlier case cited above came too late.

Another case in the same category is that of Virji Kookshah Rij who was imprisoned by Sayajirao. It was claimed that, since he was born in the British section of Ahmedabad, the British had the right to protect him.⁸⁰ On a petition from the prisoner's son, Sutherland had sent a note to Sayajirao that the prisoner was a British subject and that since security was offered for him by his son he should be sent to the Residency for inquiry.⁸¹ Receiving no reply to this, the Commissioner again wrote on the 11th December, repeating the facts and urging consideration due to the illness of the prisoner.⁸² To this the Gaekwad replied explaining that the prisoner in question had been employed as a clerk in the Bakshi's office in Baroda, and had lived for about 15 to 20 years in Baroda, and was thus a citizen of Baroda. He had been found guilty of embezzling both the Gaekwad government and the Bakshi, and had been imprisoned pending payment by him

80. Ibid., Sutherland to GOB, 23-12-1837. *Sutherland had succeeded Williams in November, 1837.*

81. Ibid., Yad from Sutherland to Sayajirao, 6-12-1837.

82. Ibid., Yad from Sutherland to Sayajirao, 11-12-1837.

of the sum determined against him.⁸³ In spite of this Sutherland insisted that since the prisoner's son, who was a British subject had given certain security to the Gaekwad, he should be released or he should be sent to the Residency to be examined ^{in the presence of} with one of the Gaekwad's officers.⁸⁴ When he received no reply to this either, he again wrote to the Gaekwad expressing surprise that the prisoner had not yet been given up to him.⁸⁵ To this the Gaekwad replied reiterating his previous statement and also categorically maintaining that the prisoner could not be a British subject as all persons of whatever country who were in his service were liable to his law.⁸⁶ He ended by advising Sutherland not to trouble himself further in this matter.⁸⁶ Sutherland, apart from asserting his right to protect a British subject, was also anxious to obtain the release of the man for his own ulterior motives. As he put it, the prisoner was a man, who was said to have been in the confidence of the Bankers - both at Baroda and Ahmedabad. This fact, along with his position in the Bakshi's office made the prisoner a potential source of valuable information which Sutherland hoped to tap, in his search for the roots of corruption in the Baroda administration.⁸⁷

83. Ibid., Yad from Sayajirao to Sutherland, 12-12-1837.

84. Ibid., Yad from Sutherland to Sayajirao, 17-12-1837.

85. Ibid., Yad from Sutherland to Sayajirao, 20-12-1837.

86. Ibid., Yad from Sayajirao to Sutherland, 21-12-1837.

87. Ibid., Sutherland to GOB, 23-12-1837.

Here again no compromise could be arrived at and the matter dragged on for years till the British changed their attitude.

Another set of disputes pending between the two governments were those of the boundaries between their territories. As already described, the territories of the British and the Gaekwad were interspersed and their boundaries ran into each others.⁸⁸ A perusal of the list of these disputes show that the disputes were of a very petty nature such as a dispute on account of a boundary mark or a claim for waste land from five bigahs to 1,500 bigahs. These disputes could very easily have been settled amicably and in favour of the good of the people concerned. These disputes had been going on for a long time but, now the Bombay government decided to make a big issue of them. Malet had been asked to demand immediate settlement of the disputes from the Gaekwad in April, 1836.⁸⁹ To this note Sayajirao replied proposing a detailed plan.⁹⁰

Sayajirao suggested that both the British and his government should appoint independent officers who should go together to every village of the different districts where the boundary disputes existed and settle

88. PD(BOM), Mixed Records 6/781 of 1837. List prepared by the Asstt. Collector, Ahmedabad, 11-8-1836. Thirty disputes have been listed.

89. Ibid., Malet to Sayajirao, 22-4-1836.

90. Ibid., Yad from Sayajirao to Williams, 28-9-1836.

the matter on the spot placing landmarks on the different boundaries agreed upon and take written agreements from the inhabitants of those villages embodying the settlements. This arrangement should be a permanent feature of their administration.

No boundary disputes should be entertained hereafter by the officers of the areas concerned as these had only been prejudicially settled so far, since each officer had felt bound to favour on his own people. If this arrangement was accepted, Sayajirao was sure there would be no further disputes on this score.⁹¹

Needless to say these very useful suggestions on the part of Sayajirao were not at all welcomed by the British, who continued through their petty officers, to send such petty squabbles on to the Gaekwad for settlement. All the various types of differences and conflicts discussed in this chapter and the last were to lead on to a new crisis in the affairs of the Gaekwad.

91. Ibid.

CHAPTER VII

BRITISH INTERFERENCE AND DEVELOPMENT OF CRISIS

The last two chapters have illustrated how the situation was fast deteriorating between the British and the Gaekwad. The good that had come from Lord Clare's visit had very quickly disappeared and once again there was a stalemate. Obviously this was leading to a further aggravation in the British-Baroda relationship and to the degradation of Sayajirao. Whilst discussing the problems in the previous chapters, some of the causes for this have been exposed. The major reason for the change of attitude and the growing hostility was the change of officers and prejudices. Clare was succeeded by Grant who, from the very outset was completely inimicable to everything that Clare had done in Baroda, and step by step, as we saw, he alienated the Gaekwad and was now pushing him further into an untenable position.

To make matters much worse, Williams, who had some times shown understanding, had fallen seriously ill by 1836. His assistants, Malet and his successor, Sutherland were imbued with strong ideas of British imperium and were definitely hostile in their attitude

to Sayajirao. What is more they began to treat him as if he were on par with them, paying no respect to him and expecting undue respect themselves.

Unfortunately for Sayajirao, William died on 18th October, 1837.¹ In his place, Sutherland was appointed the Political Commissioner for Gujarat and Resident at Baroda on a salary of Rs.45,000 per annum plus Rs.125 as travelling allowance while on duty.² Sutherland belonged to the same class of official as Malet. Every act of Sayajirao was to him suspect. Obviously the succeeding period was not going to be easy for Baroda.

Actually, the relations further deteriorated, leading to very severe action against the Gaekwad. This was precipitated by two major areas of disputes, one concerning the Gaekwad's tributaries of Mahikanta, Rewakanta and Kathiawad, and the second regarding the Contingent of Horse. At the same time, British interference in the internal affairs of Sayajirao on smaller issues continued. How the Political Agent of Kathiawad interfered is given below.

Since 1833, piracy had been going on along the Okhamandal and Kutch coastline on British and other ships.

1. PDL(BOM) to COD, 47/1837, No.60, 29-11-1837.

2. Ibid.

The British claimed that these pirates were from the Gaekwad's territory of Okhamandal and were instigated by the Gaekwad's officer in charge of the district. The first case according to the British occurred on 15th December, 1833, when the Magistrate of Thana reported that a vessel laden with sundries bound from Bombay to Surat was practically seized when at anchor off Dahanu. The ship was attacked by a vessel with 25 men, who according to the Magistrate, from their dress and appearance, belonged to the Jafrabad tribe in Kathiawad.³ Further investigations were made by the British, and the officiating Superintendent of the Indian Navy sent a report stating that he had obtained information that the pirate boat had been fitted out from a place on the southern side of the gulf of Kutch and manned by the people of the Wagher caste.⁴ Another complaint of a similar piracy had been made by the Collector of Customs in Gujarat, who reported that four ships proceeding from Bombay to Broach had been plundered off the Konkan coast, and another boat had been plundered off the ^{Surat} Konkan coast, and another boat had been plundered off Tankaria bunder. The total property lost was estimated Rs.5,000. It was also

3. PD(BOM), 43/1835-36, No.670. Minutes of Grant, 20-6-1836.

4. Ibid., Officiating Superintendent, Indian Navy to GOB, 3-2-1834.

reported that the passengers described the pirates as having "large turbans and clothes like Kutch people".⁵ On receiving these complaints, the Bombay government had asked Willoughby, the then British Political Agent in Kathiawad, to make investigations and to take measures to prevent repetition of such acts.⁶ Willoughby after investigations came to the conclusion that the piracies had been committed by some Waghers, a tribal people of the village of Sonalaspur in Okhamandal.

His suspicions about this was supported by the Assistant Resident at Bhooj who also charged that the Gaekwad's officer at Okhamandal had received a share of the booty obtained from the plundered vessels.⁷ On this information, Willoughby had written to Williams to ask for orders from the Gaekwad to direct his officers to send the pirates to Rajkot, his headquarters, for examination by him. Willoughby further stated that the pirates were traced to the island of Bet from where they worked with the aid and abetment of the Okhamandal officer, Narayanrao Venkatesh. The goods were either disposed off in the villages of Bet or sent off to some other place. His findings also showed that, under

5. Ibid., Letter No.3285, Collector of Customs, Gujarat, to GOB.

6. Ibid., GOB to Willoughby, 15-2-1834.

7. Ibid., Letter from Assistant Resident of Bhooj to Willoughby, 7-2-1834.

orders from Narayanrao, a boat belonging to the Gaekwad government had been used by the pirates.⁸ On receipt of this letter, Williams had written to the Gaekwad asking him to help the British to put down the pirates. Sayajirao was further asked to inform him of the proceedings held in this case, and the punishment that had been meted out on the offenders.⁹ Williams had also threatened Sayajirao that if the British were convinced that piracy was prevailing in Bet, they would find it "requisite" to take over the management of the island and of Okhamandal in their own hands.¹⁰

On receiving this note, Sayajirao^{had} summoned Narayanrao to Baroda and kept him under arrest whilst investigating the various charges. On investigation, Sayajirao reported that he found that, Narayanrao had not been a party to the piracy nor had he helped the Wagher pirates.¹¹ According to him, the Waghers concerned were not from Sonalaspur, but from Samkeshwar village, and they were professional robbers. Two of the Waghers had promised to give Narayanrao information about the pirates of this region if he allowed them to use the government vessel. Hoping to gain some

8. Ibid., Willoughby to Williams, 21-4-1834.

9. Ibid., Yad from Williams to Sayajirao, 13-5-1834.

10. Ibid.

11. Ibid., Memorandum from Sayajirao to Williams, 20-9-1834.

information, Narayanrao had agreed to this. Unfortunately, the Waghers treacherously used the vessel for plunder and loaded with these plundered goods in it and brought it to the Island of Bet where they placed themselves at the mercy of Narayanrao. According to Narayanrao, he agreed to pardon them and help them with camels to bring the goods to Samkeshwar where they were placed under guard. According to the Gaekwad, the custom of his government was to place such plunder^{ed} or looted goods under proper custody in the villages and to hold them in deposit till the party plundered applied for it, and, on verification of ownership, the plundered property was returned to the proper owners, while at the same time the offenders received punishment.¹² He also pointed out that if a property belonged to a British subject, the custom was to apply through the Political Commissioner to the Gaekwad. Therefore, to claim that Narayanrao had appropriated the plundered goods for himself was totally wrong. Narayanrao had only extended his protection to the Wagher robbers in order to make them appear before him for trial etc. In the meantime, two British officers had been deputed by Willoughby to Okhamandal who had accused the Gaekwad's officers in a most "disrespectful manner".¹³ This had

12. Ibid.

13. Ibid.

created "public rumour" in the district that at Narayanrao's instigation the Waghers had committed piracy.¹⁴ As a result some Waghers had taken this opportunity, and had falsely implicated Narayanrao.¹⁵ According to Narayanrao, these Waghers informers bore implacable enmity towards him as they had formerly committed various evil deeds and had been punished by him.¹⁶

Narayanrao, according to the Gaekwad, felt that Willoughby had been greatly prejudiced by these reports and, instead of appearing before him at Rajkot as demanded by Williams, he offered to go before the "Governor-in-Council", where an impartial trial could be made.¹⁷ Narayanrao had stated that if by this procedure he was "rightly convicted", he would be willing to submit to whatever punishment the members of the Council would inflict on him.¹⁸ Till then, Narayanrao claimed that "it was an act of tyranny" that he should suffer on a false representation of others when he was quite innocent.¹⁹

Sayajirao also pointed out that the Waghers had absconded, and though not British subjects, they had presented themselves before the British agent. This

14. Ibid.

15. Ibid.

16. Ibid.

17. Ibid.

18. Ibid.

19. Ibid.

very fact, according to him, threw considerable doubt upon their veracity. He had, however, complied with the wishes of the British agent and had immediately removed Narayanrao from office and imprisoned him without making any inquiry and sent another Manager to Okhamandal to apprehend these Waghers who had absconded by any means possible. He had also ordered the restoration of all the seized property to the rightful owners. A request had then been made to Willoughby that two guards from the British garrison should be sent to the new Manager of Okhamandal to escort the absconding Wagher, whom he had managed to arrest, to Baroda for the purpose of standing trial.²⁰

The British replied that they had "given a guarantee" to the Waghers that they would not be arrested and that they would be set free.²¹ They also sent a letter ^{without Sayajirao's permission} to the Gaekwad's manager of Okhamandal ordering him to set the Wagher, whom they had guaranteed to be set free, otherwise, they feared the Waghers would raise disturbances.²² The British had followed this up by another threatening communication dated 16th October, 1834.

20. Ibid.

21. Ibid., Williams to Sayajirao, 4-10-1834.

22. Ibid., British Agent at Okhamandal to the Manager, Okhamandal, 15-10-1834.

Sayajirao wrote a detailed account to the Governor, pointing out that as a result of these constant demands, he had no other alternative but to hand over the culprits to the British Agent.²³ He claimed that Willoughby had been misrepresenting the situation to the government. *and really had no right to interfere.* As he pointed out to the Governor, the Waghers were his subjects and he had every right to arrest them and punish them. What is more, the British had first asked that these prisoners should be sent to the British Agent at Rajkot to be tried and now they had demanded their release.²⁴

The Gaekwad forcefully protested to the Governor that the Political Agent, Willoughby had afforded his protection to the Waghers and had opposed their punishment. He also protested that he had not been told anything whatsoever at the time about the British pledge to the Waghers, thus causing his officers four or five months of fruitless labour to catch these robbers. Had such a communications been made, he observed, his government would not have put to such great hardship to secure them. Accordingly, the Gaekwad came to the conclusion that by the guarantee, the Waghers had been saved from just punishment. He also pointed out that the British had no right whatsoever to extend this sort of pledge to

23. Ibid., Sayajirao to Governor of Bombay, 28-10-1835.

24. Ibid.

his citizens. The only evidence, according to the British, against Narayanrao was the testimony of the very Waghers, who, to save themselves, had easily been led to give such evidence as the Agent had suggested. The Waghers would have lost all fear of Narayanrao if he had really been implicated in their piracies as the British claimed, instead of running away from him. As to the validity of the guarantee given by the British to the Waghers, Sayajirao contended that the date on which the pledge was given was not registered in the district office, which was very inconsistent with the rules and regulations of the British government. The Gaekwad also pointed out that when the Agent was asked as to when and to whom the guarantee had been given, he had received a reply that the guarantee had been granted between 19th May and 15th June, and that a particular date had not been entered in the records. This again was very inconsistent with the rules and regulations of the British. Sayajirao also drew the attention of the Governor to the fact that, under such circumstances, his government would not know whom to punish, and if a guilty individual enjoyed the guarantee of the British, the Gaekwad would be placed in a very awkward position by being forced to liberate such offenders. As he put

it, he would "lose the glory" of his name over them.²⁵ On the other hand, if he did not set them free, the Agent would complain to the Bombay government. The Gaekwad's real feelings came out when he writes, "We are in a state of great depression".²⁶ The insecurity in which the Gaekwad found himself is made clear when he stated that "we are greatly suffering day and night from anxiety because we cannot conceive what other false charges may hereafter be brought against the people of this government, with a view to shake the friendship now existing between the two States and what losses this government may be subjected to".²⁷ The Gaekwad put himself and his officers at the mercy of the Governor and reiterated his offer to send Narayanrao to the Governor for trial. He also suggested that, because of all the prejudicial circumstances, the Governor should appoint some "confidential, upright and worthy gentleman" to institute an independent inquiry.²⁸

On receipt of this letter from the Gaekwad, the Governor, instead of trying to find out the truth,

25. Ibid.

26. Ibid.

27. Ibid.

28. Ibid.

it, he would "lose the glory" of his name over them.²⁵ On the other hand, if he did not set them free, the Agent would complain to the Bombay government. The Gaekwad's real feelings came out when he writes, "We are in a state of great depression".²⁶ The insecurity in which the Gaekwad found himself is made clear when he stated that "we are greatly suffering day and night from anxiety because we cannot conceive what other false charges may hereafter be brought against the people of this government, with a view to shake the friendship now existing between the two States and what losses this government may be subjected to".²⁷ The Gaekwad put himself and his officers at the mercy of the Governor and reiterated his offer to send Narayanrao to the Governor for trial. He also suggested that, because of all the prejudicial circumstances, the Governor should appoint some "confidential, upright and worthy gentleman" to institute an independent inquiry.²⁸

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25. Ibid.

26. Ibid.

27. Ibid.

28. Ibid.

bent backward in support of his officers and condemned Narayanrao's defence as a most "miserable defence".²⁹

He also characterised Sayajirao's letter as a "tissue of injurious injunction against Willoughby".³⁰ He stated that "every feeling of justice and honour called on earth, I think to support our officers thus unjustly and calumniously assailed".³¹ We see a complete loss of real communication between the two governments and a determined attempt by the Governor to widen the breach by always upholding British power right or wrong. No attempt was made to give any consideration whatsoever to the arguments put forth by the Gaekwad. Instead, the Governor asked the permission of the Governor General to take the following measures:

1. That the Gaekwad should be required to deliver up Narayanrao to the British government to be placed on trial before the political Agent's Court in Kattyawar with the full understanding that every facility was to be afforded for the attendance at Rajkot of such persons residing in Okhamandal as may be necessary to summon or to give evidence on the occasion.

29. Ibid., Minutes of Grant, 20-6-1836.

30. Ibid.

31. Ibid.

2. That full compensation be demanded from the Gaekwad government on behalf of those who suffered from the piracies and that the amount of such compensation be paid to them by the British government and deducted from the Kathiawad tribute.

3. That the Gaekwad should be called upon to extract the unfounded insinuations and reflections against the late Political Agent in Kathiawad, contained in his letter to the Governor.

4. That he be admonished that, on the recurrence of such piracies, the British government would be constrained to take possession of and retain the district of Okhamandel and the Island of Bet, both of which were ceded to him by ^{the British} us under the Article VII of the Supplemental Treaty of 1817.³²

These recommendations of the Governor were sent on to the Gaekwad. One can only imagine the frustration and anxiety this created in his already anxious mind. Similar types of complaints and interferences on the part of the British went on throughout this period in ^{of Kathiawad, Mahikanta and Rewakanta,} the three provinces mentioned and in all the cases the Gaekwad's officers were held guilty and the British

32. PDL(BOM) to COD, No.43 of 1835-36, Vol.670.
Minutes of Grant, 3-8-1836.

right to interference supported.³³ This case illustrates how besides the Political Commissioner Gujarat, the Political Agent at Kathiawar was taking on himself to demand action from the Gaekwad.

By the agreement between Clare and Sayajirao regarding the Contingent of Horse, the Gaekwad had been given charge of it, after he had deposited Rs.10 lakhs as a guarantee for their regular payment. For about a year or two after this, the Contingent of Horse was properly maintained by Sayajirao. Clare reported in 1834, a little before his departure, that the efficiency of the Force was as favourable as could be expected.³⁴ Clare also opined that the British had no right whatsoever to oblige the Gaekwad to keep up his Contingent like a British cavalry. He reported that no complaint of the troops not being paid since April, 1832, had been received by him. At this stage Clare even suggested that the Rs.10 lakhs deposit should be returned to the Gaekwad, as this money was just lying idle and it would show the confidence the British government had in the Gaekwad.³⁵

Within a very short time after this, as we have seen, the situation began to change for the worse between the Gaekwad and the British. This naturally affected the Gaekwad's Contingent of Horse also. The British began to point out faults in the Gaekwad's arrangements, and as in other matters began to harass him with demands on this

33. See Appendix PD(BOM) 43/1835-36, No.676. Memorandum of Williams discusses five cases.

34. PD(BOM), 5A/531 of 1832-36. Minutes of Clare, 22-11-1834.

35. Ibid.

issue. Sayajirao was accused of keeping the Contingent below the right standard, and he was informed that the government had the means in its power to enforce proper attention to its discipline.³⁶ The Governor proposed that three British officers should be appointed to the Contingent of Horse for the purpose of maintaining correct discipline. The Governor claimed that these officers would not exercise any control over the Gaekwad's Contingent, and that their only duty would be to see that the Contingent was efficient and regularly paid.³⁷ The Gaekwad protested against this proposal and pointed out that there was nothing in the Treaty of 1817 to force him to accept such a proposition.³⁸ In spite of this protest, the Bombay government appointed three officers to the Contingent Force, but paid them from their own funds. The Gaekwad took this action of the British deeply to heart and looked upon it as a further infringement of whatever little power he had left. He felt himself driven into a corner by the extremely harsh action of the British who seemed to be bent on destroying him, finding pretext where there was no proof against him. With reference to the Contingent of Horse there

36. PDL(BOM) to COD, No.48/1838, 30-12-1835.

37. Ibid.

38. PD(BOM), 8/1837, Sayajirao to Malet, 24-8-1836.

was no real proof offered to show that it had deteriorated. It was a blatant show of power by the British, though, according to Sayajirao, he had implicitly obeyed and agreed to all the orders of the British government with regard to the Contingent. He had followed what was laid down in the Treaty, and he was not aware that there was any ground for complaint.³⁹

After Clare left Baroda, disputes arose between the British and the Gaekwad with reference to the payment of arrears to the Contingent amounting to Rs. 4 lakhs and on the question of complaints made to the British by certain Sardars. According to the British some Sardars of the Contingent Force who had obeyed Malcolm, and had been promised British protection, were now having to face the wrath of the Gaekwad. On their return to Baroda from outside posts, they were superceded and in some cases dismissed. The Nawab Amiruddin was superceded by Ganpatrao Gandhere. Mir Sarfaraz Ali and Hamid Jamadar were dismissed. Ganpatrao Bapat, Commander of the 3rd Paga, was also dismissed, while Bhaskarrao Vithal was deprived of his Paga. A large number of common soldiers were similarly treated on their return to Baroda. Others

39. Ibid.

were made to pay large sums as Nazarana.⁴⁰

Mir Sarfaraz Ali had fallen into disgrace during the first sequestration. After the agreement with Clare, he was called upon to pay a large Nazarana of Rs.1,25,000 as a price for his loyalty to Malcolm.⁴¹ Mir Sarfaraz Ali was ready to give it but Sayajirao found him unreliable and broke the arrangement, and instead confiscated his property.⁴² Mir Sarfaraz Ali thereupon appealed to the British who, as was usual, at this time interfered on his behalf, claiming that Sayajirao had been most harsh and oppressive towards him.⁴³ Sayajirao protested that the British had no right to interfere in this affair as Mir Sarfaraz Ali did not possess their guarantee.⁴⁴ In spite of this, the Resident was asked to intervene on behalf of Mir Sarfaraz Ali, and he tried to compel the Gaekwad to restore his property.⁴⁵ This case became one of the reasons for the extreme action taken against him later. However, in 1838, the Governor General informed the Government of Bombay that they could not compel Sayajirao in this matter, as Mir Sarfaraz Ali did not possess a British guarantee and regretted that

40. PDL(BOM) to COD 47/1837, 27-12-1837.

41. Ibid.

42. Ibid.

43. Ibid.

44. PD(BOM), 48/1838. Sayajirao to Governor of Bombay, 5-7-1837.

45. PDL(BOM) to COD 47/1837, 27-12-1837.

he could not suggest any measure for his relief.⁴⁶

Matters had thus come to a head and obviously the British were looking for some reason or other to take over more direct control of the Gaekwad's State. None of the problems discussed in this and the earlier chapters had been resolved due to the extremely recalcitrant and high-handed attitude of the British officials with whom Sayajirao had to deal at this time. Both Sutherland and Willoughby were convinced that Sayajirao was somehow an irrevocable enemy of the British. On the other hand Sayajirao felt that both these officers had been misrepresenting matters to the Governor and the Governor-General. In every letter that he had addressed to these officials he had always declared his "loyalty and everlasting friendship" towards the British. Unfortunately for Sayajirao, at this stage, the Governor also was also hostile to him.

Most of the cases discussed in the last chapters bring out the growing sense of helplessness of Sayajirao against the unreasonable demands of the British, who since 1835 were deliberately building up their own power in

46. PD(BOM), 51/1839, GG to GOB, 30-8-1838.

Gujarat and doing everything possible to strip the Gaekwad of his sovereignty in his relationship with his subjects, his tributaries, his officers and his Contingent of Horse. They accompanied all the actions by threats to deprive him further of his sovereignty and territory for the flimsiest reasons. The subsidiary alliance was turning quickly into an alliance of subservience for the Indian rulers and paramountcy was strengthening for the British.

It has been pointed out in the previous three chapters, how in various instances the Gaekwad had been pushed into a corner, from where he had no way out. In this way, the British were preparing for their next take over in Baroda. Accusation upon accusation was built up against Sayajirao. The British officers now in charge, as already shown, were hostile and seemed to be making a concerted effort to strip him of all possible defence. We shall now trace the events and conditions leading to the next stage of relation between the two.

We have shown in an earlier chapter how irreconcilable the problem had become consequent on the law and order dispute between the Gaekwad and the British. Attention may now be drawn to the problem in the Gaekwad's tributaries of Mahikanta and Kathiawad. Originally,

early in the 1800's, the Gaekwads had given the British the right to collect tribute for them but nothing else in the tributaries.⁴⁷ By these agreements, the former had not surrendered their sovereignty,^{which included the maintenance of peace,} and in the instructions given to the British Agent in Gujarat at that time, care was taken to advise him to maintain the Gaekwad's "nominal superiority and the remembrance that it still exists".⁴⁸ From 1835 onwards, the British had begun to question the Gaekwad's authority on other aspects such as law and order in these areas and had used the tribute as a weapon against him. Their aim was to deprive him of all power in these regions and to deny his sovereignty completely. Innumerable persons suddenly found themselves entitled to British protection in these regions when they were actually the subjects of the chieftains and ultimately of the Gaekwad who was their overlord. In 1835, one of the Mahikanta chieftains, Nursinh Thakor died, and his mother asked the British for permission to adopt a son.⁴⁹ The question should never have been entertained by the British who, however, began seriously to consider the adoption and whether Nazarana should be paid to them or to the Gaekwad. Sayajirao deeply resented this

47. See Chapter I.

48. PDL(BOM) to COD, 42/1835, 31-12-1835.

49. Ibid.

interference, rightly as an infringement of his sovereignty,
and a bitter dispute between the two followed.⁵⁰ Needless
to say the British triumphed and saw that their nominee
was adopted by their consent, completely overriding
Sayajirao.⁵¹

The British were also not averse to taking up
the cases of outlaws against the Gaekwad as in the case
of Pratapsinh and his uncle Daulatsinh of Mahikanta.
These two, along with a band of Kolis, had committed
gang robberies and terrorised the population leading to
an insurrection of the Kolis under their leadership in
this region.⁵² Sayajirao declared these two as outlaws
and sent a note to all the chieftains in Mahikanta
denouncing Pratapsinh and Daulatsinh and ordering that
no refuge should be given to them, and adopted
precautionary measures to prevent their receiving aid from
these chieftains.⁵³ Pratapsinh upon this made representa-
tions to the British government, who were only too ready
to support him. Pratapsinh in his petition had given a
list of grievances against the Gaekwad, and the British
were readily convinced that Pratapsinh had suffered great
oppression.⁵⁴ He also claimed that he had made strenuous

50. Ibid.

51. Ibid.

52. PDL(BOM) to COD, 47/1837, Williams to GOB, 3-3-1837.

53. Ibid.

54. Ibid., GOB to COD, 27-12-1837. The Gaekwad, as sovereign, had
the duty to maintain peace over the entire tributary territories,
and to interfere wherever intra-chief disputes occurred, or
where the particular chief was not able to maintain law and order.
An officer was posted in each of the tributary regions. Similarly, the
British had also their Agents who were trying to usurp the Gaekwad's powers.

efforts to obtain redress by peaceable means and as a last resort had proceeded to the commission of violent deeds.⁵⁵ The Governor was convinced that "the air of truth" prevailed in the whole of the representation, and recommended contrary to the opinions of his officers that the British should lend support to the outlaws against Sayajirao who was making them "instruments of tyranny and oppression".⁵⁶

To create further confusion in the mind of Sayajirao, the British officers on the spot had taken a contrary decision. Captain Outram, then the Political Agent of Mahikanta, and Williams had already decided to help the Gaekwad against the insurgents,⁵⁷ without consultation with the Bombay government. This was probably because Williams took it as part of his duty as Political Commissioner for Gujarat to support the Gaekwad in maintaining peace, and he generally seemed to have had a more balanced view point. Captain Outram had reported that he had been watching the progress of the insurrection and for a long time past had been in constant correspondence with the Gaekwad's officials of the district of Vijapur. According to him his object

55. Ibid.

56. Ibid.

57. Ibid., Outram to Williams, 21-4-1837.

had been to display every readiness to help an 'ally' in the suppression of lawlessness and show his determination not to screen such of 'their' chiefs as had taken part in the disturbances against Sayajirao. His intention had also been to prevent any further aid being given to its insurgents from Mahikanta.⁵⁸ He had further reiterated that he considered himself bound to interfere in aid of Sayajirao's officers to suppress the disturbances, since the tranquility of Mahikanta was in danger.⁵⁹ Williams heartily agreed with this opinion and had taken it for granted that they were doing the correct thing, since they were acting according to the Treaties between the two powers. Outram and the Gaekwad's Commanders decided to attack the outlaws on May 1st, 1837, before the Bombay government could interfere.⁶⁰ In this attack, a number of Kolis were wounded and killed, and a number of the Gaekwad's soldiers were also killed and wounded. 104 prisoners were taken by Outram and handed over to the Gaekwad's officers, since they were Gaekwad's subjects seized in actual conflict.⁶¹ The Bombay government, as has already been seen, was taking the opposite view, and

58. Ibid.

59. Ibid.

60. Ibid., GOB to COD, 22-12-1837.

61. Ibid.

were to come out in support of Pratapsinh and the rebels. The Governor was in fact taken by surprise and mortified by the quick turn of events that had taken place before he could send instructions to Williams and Outram.⁶²

In fact, the Governor of Bombay had come to the opinion that Sayajirao had brought ⁶³out this rebellion "by misrule and oppression of his subjects". After this concerted attack on the rebels, the Government of Bombay expressed surprise that Outram had "lost sight of correct maxims". It was the essence of the defensive alliance, it was pointed out to avoid an appeal to arms as far as possible.⁶⁴ The Bombay government informed these officers that they should not have gone to the aid of the Gaekwad until the latter had shown that his officers had done no wrong, and that he was willing to submit any claims or grievances of the aggrieved party to British arbitration. They ^{It} maintained that otherwise the British government might often become the "instrument of the grossest injustice".⁶⁵ Following upon this, Williams was told to inform the Gaekwad of the "disapprobation of the British government",⁶⁶ and also to demand redress

62. Ibid.

63. Ibid.

64. Ibid.

65. Ibid.

66. Ibid.

for Pratapsinh and to insist that all the prisoners should be released on security as they had been seized through the "instruments of the British troops".⁶⁷ The Gaekwad was also informed that he should submit Pratapsinh's case for arbitration to the British and that Pratapsinh should be immediately released on security of future good conduct.⁶⁸ This incident brings out very clearly the length to which the British went in their interference with the Gaekwad's affairs in his tributaries. In this particular case, it is interesting to note that Outram who since 1835 had been the British Political Agent in Mahikanta and Kathiawad, had taken this step in support of Sayajirao simply on his interpretation of the Treaty,¹⁸³⁷ and not from any particular affection for the Gaekwad. An impartial reading of the Treaty will prove that he was right.⁶⁹ *Sayajirao had to allow Pratapsinh to go free.*

Another case of such interference was in the tributary of Kathiawad in the affair of the Chulala chieftains. The Gaekwad resumed their villages for a breach of their obligations to him in 1830.⁷⁰ Blane, the British Political Agent in Kathiawad at that time

67. Ibid.

68. Ibid.

69. Aitchison, Op. cit., Vol. VI, p. 354.

70. PDL(BOM) to COD, 45/1837, 1-3-1837.

had arranged a settlement with the parties, which endorsed the action of the Gaekwad. Because of certain disagreements about this settlement, the Gaekwad had, however, not ratified it.⁷¹ On petitions received from the Chulala chieftains, the Governor, in 1837, decided to take up their case ^{and} to demand that the Gaekwad return their villages and pay their arrears. He maintained that since the Gaekwad had not ratified Blane's agreement, they should go back to Colonel Walker's original settlement regarding the collection of tribute etc.⁷² He rejoiced that "the folly of the Gaekwad" thus enabled the British to redeem "their good faith" so far as the chieftains were concerned.⁷³ The Gaekwad was threatened that if he did not accept the British decision, their Agent in Kathiawad would be ordered to carry it out and to pay the arrears from his tribute.⁷⁴

The case of Bawa Kumaun of Kathiawad concerned another outlaw. He was driven out by the Gaekwad's officers at Amreli, because he had committed excesses ^{there} of a serious nature. Seeing how the land lay between the two powers, Bawa Kumaun appealed to the British for

71. Ibid.

72. See Chapter I.

73. PDL(BOM) to COD, 45/1837, 1-3-1837.

74. Ibid.

protection. They recommended to Sayajirao that he should pardon the outlaw and redress his grievances by restoring any rights of which he may have been "unjustly deprived".⁷⁵ All these recommendations were made unilaterally, and without any effort to find out both sides of the case. The Gaekwad's officers were never asked for the details of the case.

Even in cases where Sayajirao co-operated fully, the British displayed their arrogance and made impossible demands upon him. For instance, property of villagers had been plundered by certain miscreants in the Vedaun territory of Kathiawad.⁷⁶ As reported by Williams, the Gaekwad had issued orders to his officers at Amreli to take urgent action in the matter.⁷⁷ Mehboobkhan, the Manager of Amreli had, before he received the orders, on suspicion imprisoned certain farmers and confiscated their property from Vedaun. On representations made by the British to whom the farmers appealed, the farmers had been released, their property restored and Mehboobkhan recalled.⁷⁸ The British were not satisfied, and had called upon Sayajirao "to inflict some suitable punishment" on Mehboobkhan.⁷⁹

75. Ibid.

76. PD(BOM), 48/1838, No.6, Williams to GOB, 5-7-1837.

77. Ibid. *Vedhavan territory was overlooked by the British authorities.*

78. Ibid.

79. Ibid.

Sayajirao had ordered that a fine of Rs.8 should be taken from one of the prisoners before releasing the farmers concerned. The new Political Agent, Mr. Erskine, was told to insist on the refund of ^{even} this fine.⁸⁰

Regarding the case of Manju Manik of Okhamandal also the British made peculiar demands. In this case, the Gaekwad sent his Manager of Okhamandal to Rajkot along with some Waghers responsible for Manju Manik's murder, to be tried before the British Court at Rajkot, as this had been the British demand. This demand had been made by the British on representation by the family of Manju Manik. The British took it upon themselves again to interfere in matters which really did not concern them. The Gaekwad, however, had not granted any compensation to Manju Manik's family which now the British insisted that he should make.⁸¹ This led to a long and acrimonious discussion which went on till Carnac settled it in 1840.

When a gang of robbers had attacked the village of Jhalia in Kathiawad, the Gaekwad had ordered his officers to apprehend the criminals, and sixteen persons had been arrested.⁸² The British unnecessarily interfered

80. Ibid., GOB to Erskine, Political Agent in Kathiawad, 19-10-1837.

81. Ibid.

82. Ibid., Political Agent in Kathiawad to GOB, 5-7-1837.

and informed Sayajirao that too long a period had elapsed ^{since the crime} and justice could not now be done, just because the ^{accused} villagers had approached them. Instead, the Government of Bombay instructed the Political Agent to reimburse the sufferers from the Gaekwad's tribute of Kathiawad.⁸³ Sayajirao sent a note to the Governor protesting against this and requesting him to reconsider the case on the explanations set forth before cutting the tribute.⁸⁴ The Governor, however, dismissed the whole affair by saying that the Gaekwad's excuse of not arresting the offenders sooner was "not acceptable".⁸⁵

Thus, whether Sayajirao co-operated or not, the British proceeded to strengthen their own position and made use of every possible means of doing so. Taking advantage of all these many disagreements mostly petty, between them, they ^{British} were now to make demands on the Gaekwad which would require direct British action in his territories. After considering the many prejudicial reports of the Bombay government, the Governor-General agreed with the Government of Bombay that "decided measures" were "imperatively" required to remedy the disorder which the "misrule of the Gaekwad" had occasioned in the British territories. He accepted the Bombay

83. Ibid., GOB to Political Agent, Kathiawad, 19-8-1837.

84. Ibid., Yad from Sayajirao to GOB, 16-9-1837.

85. Ibid., GOB to Political Agent, Kathiawad, 19-1-1838.

government's suggestion that the Gaekwad should be asked to punish the offenders on the orders of the British, and that if this was not done immediately, British officers should be allowed to pursue the offenders into the Gaekwad's territory immediately after the commission of the offence.⁸⁶ The Gaekwad naturally protested against the proposal and refused to give in to a demand which would have deprived him of his sovereign right to maintain law and order in his own state.⁸⁷

After 1835, the British had been claiming that they had the right to grant remissions in the tributes collected from Kathiawad and Mahikanta for various reasons including debts, bad crops and other natural calamities.⁸⁸ According to the British government, the agreements for collecting tributes had given them this right of remission.⁸⁹ Sayajirao had disputed the claim and had in fact stated that the tribute should be paid to him entirely and that he would make whatever remissions were to be made to the different chieftains concerned.⁹⁰ When Captain Outram took over as Political Agent in Kathiawad at the end of

86. Ibid., GG to GOB, 20-12-1837.

87. PD(BOM), Mixed Records 13/800/1838. Sayajirao to Governor of Bombay, 15-12-1837.

88. PD(BOM), 50/1848, Letter from British Agent, Kathiawad to GOB, 24-1-1836.

89. Ibid.

90. PD(BOM), 48/1838, No.6. Sayajirao to Government of Bombay, 16-9-1837.

1837, he maintained that the original settlement by Colonel Walker had been "most favourable" to the Gaekwad government, but greatly disadvantageous to the tributaries and "calculated to cause their ruin!"⁹¹ Sayajirao continued to protest against the British claim to grant remissions and demanded that the management of Mahikanta should be given back to him. He made similar claims about the Kathiawad also.⁹² He informed the British that he would never "consent to remit one pie". According to Colonel Walker's agreement, Sayajirao maintained, he should receive collections without expense and without deductions and in fact, by the terms of the agreement, he should receive interest on all the balances. He quickly added, however, that he would not ^{ask for it,} do so, because of the "friendship" between the two States.⁹³ He complained that the tributes had been fixed at low rates to prevent⁹⁴ the possibility of dissections concerning their payment. On the other hand, the Assistant Resident, Malet had reiterated the British stand that they fully recognized the need for remission and that they would never give up this right. Thus obviously an impasse was being created⁹⁵ in this case also.

91. Ibid., Outram to GOB, 13-12-1837.

92. Ibid., Yad from Sayajirao to GOB, 15-12-1837.

93. Ibid.,

94. Ibid.

95. PDL(BOM) to COD, 48/1838. Memo of Malet of private Conferences between him and Sayajirao, 24-10-1837.

The British did not agree with Sayajirao and continued to make remissions, and informed him that if he refused to grant them remission, the British government would be compelled to act independently of him.⁹⁶

Another source of trouble were the constant allegations against the Gaekwad's minister Veniram whose dismissal the Bombay government had been demanding since early 1837. Williams had been instructed to demand Veniram's dismissal as the British had felt all along that he had been inciting the Gaekwad to take a defiant attitude and maintain his own prestige.⁹⁷ According to them, they had a right to do this as Veniram was a British subject, and they were "at full liberty to object to his appointment under the IX Article of the Treaty of 1805."⁹⁸

Sayajirao was informed that he must accede to the orders of the British government, and that Veniram's dismissal was a demand which was "firmly insisted" upon by the Governor-General who would no longer consider it "a light matter" to be treated as Sayajirao pleased.⁹⁹ An implied threat was also added by informing Sayajirao that "ruinous consequences" would ensue from his refusal.

96. Ibid., Minutes of Grant, 24-2-1838.

97. Ibid.

98. Ibid.

99. Ibid.

The Gaekwad's answer was that Veniram was one of his many Councillors and that he was not particularly swayed by his counsel alone.¹⁰⁰ He told the Assistant Resident that if he proved any particular offence against Veniram, he would dismiss him but otherwise he could not do so.¹⁰¹

According to Sutherland, Sayajirao had been "egged on by Veniram by false hopes" of winning his independence of the British. Veniram, according to Sutherland, had prevented Sayajirao from making any concessions to the British, and had "strictly enjoined" him not to give in on any point as the object in view would be defeated thereby. Sayajirao was encouraged to bear with any violence, if necessary and even tolerate confinement in his palace,¹⁰² for the sake of his independence. Sutherland was also convinced that "disrespect and lack of courtesy" had been shown to him by Sayajirao at the instigation of Veniram. These complaints about discourtesy throws an interesting light on Sutherland's expectations as a "representative" of British power. On one particular occasion when Sayajirao's household was busy entertaining a new bride of the household, no one had come to meet Sutherland at the gate, except some 'menial' servant. Sutherland

100. Ibid., Memorandum of Malet of private Conference with Sayajirao, 24-10-1837.

101. Ibid.

102. PD(BOM), Mixed Records 13/800/1838, Sutherland to GOB, 23-12-1837.

immediately construed this as a "great insult" to the British.¹⁰³ Sutherland's hostility to the Gaekwad had already been mentioned and in every communication he made similar comments. Whilst referring to Sayajirao he described him as the "avaricious greedy Sayaji" and other such prejudicial remarks.¹⁰⁴

On orders from the Governor, a list of demands regarding all the matters in dispute ^{had been} were placed before Sayajirao by Williams in June 1837.¹⁰⁵ The latter reported that Sayajirao had rejected the demands and had in fact accused Willoughby, Outram and Malet of misrepresenting him to the Governor and the Governor-General.¹⁰⁶ Following this, Sayajirao had sent a letter in July to the Governor-General appealing to him to intervene, making similar complaints against Willoughby and the Governor of Bombay.¹⁰⁷ The Governor General had, of course, already endorsed the opinions of the Government of Bombay and had in fact instructed the Governor not to forward any further documents in which such complaints were made.

The British had created a situation which was bound to lead to an impasse. In every case, as Sayajirao

103. Ibid.

104. Ibid.

105. PDL(BOM) to COD, 48/1838. Williams to GOB, 2-8-1837.

106. Ibid.

107. Ibid., Khakeeta from Sayajirao to Governor-General, 28-10-1837.

had put it, he had been judged guilty "ex parte".¹⁰⁸ In most of the cases cited in the last two chapters, wherever disagreements arose, the British had always claimed to be in the right and had closed the case by threatening the Gaekwad arbitrarily to withhold part of his tribute from Mahikanta and Kathiawad. By May 1837, it had become clear that the Government of Bombay had become unreasonable and extremely hostile to Sayajirao. The Governor instructed Williams that in all the cases against the Gaekwad, he should demand immediate redress and if such redress was not forthcoming he should repeat the demand, and if Sayajirao again refused or evaded the issue, Williams was to proceed to redress the "injured persons" out of the Mahikanta collections.¹⁰⁹ Williams was to do the same thing in regard to the "wrongs suffered" by Kathiawad tributaries.¹¹⁰ Earlier the Governor had complained to the Court of Directors that there had been a complete failure of the 'measures of conciliation' adopted by Clare towards Sayajirao.¹¹¹ The Governor had also accused Sayajirao of "ungratefulness" and gave his opinion that

108. PD(BOM) 43/1835/36, Vol.670. Sayajirao to the Governor of Bombay, 28-10-1835.

109.. PD(BOM) 4/1837. Minutes of Grant, 23-5-1837.

110. Ibid.

111. PDL(BOM) to COD, 48/1838, 29-3-1837.

"some immediate and desirable changes to protect British interests from the danger in which they are exposed", should be made. He insisted that urgent steps should be taken to bring, in his words, "this obstinate and infatuated prince to a proper sense of his duty".¹¹² His meaning from all the foregoing was clearly that the British should take over parts of the Gaekwad State.

In an interview between Malet, the Assistant Political Commissioner, and the Gaekwad held on 24th October, 1837, Sayajirao made it clear that he realised the hopelessness of his position. He told Malet that whatever the British officers wrote was always approved by their governments, while all his explanations had been disregarded. He totally disagreed with the British that their decisions were made on merit. He was convinced that nothing was ever decided in his favour and cited the cases of Okhamandal and Mahikanta tributaries.¹¹³

The first hostile act was taken in November, 1837, when in concurrence with the Governor-General, the Government of Bombay took action to make restitution to the Desai of Navsari.¹¹⁴ In October, 1837, the Governor General wrote to the Governor concurring with him that

112. Ibid.

113. Ibid., Memorandum by Malet of a private Conference with Sayajirao, 24-10-1837.

114. See Chapter V.

the Desai's guarantee was hereditary and that necessary measures should be taken for securing to the Desai of Navsari the "full benefits of the guarantee" to which he was entitled.¹¹⁵ On receipt of this communication, the Governor sent instructions to Malet, the Assistant Political Commissioner, to inform Sayajirao of this decision of the Governor-General, and that it was final.¹¹⁶ The Governor further informed Malet that the Gaekwad should be given one month's time within which to restore the Desai's right, after which necessary measures would be adopted for restitution. The Gaekwad refused to comply with the demands, as he was convinced of his own position regarding the Desai of Navsari.¹¹⁷

The result was that the British sequestered the Navsari division in the middle of February, 1838, and paid the Desai from the taxes collected.¹¹⁸ The Gaekwad naturally became extremely sullen and upset after these proceedings, and withdrew practically all co-operation with the British.

The next twelve months were, therefore, a period of great trial and suffering for the Gaekwad when disputes were exaggerated out of proportion by the British in order

115. Baroda Blue Book (BAR), Baroda Guarantees, 1840-53, GOI to GOB, 20-10-1837. *See Chapter I.*

116. Ibid., Minutes of Grant, No. 5465, 29-11-1837.

117. PD(BOM), Mixed Records 13/800/1838, Sutherland to GOB, 21-12-1837.

118. Ibid., Sayajirao to Sutherland, 13-3-1838.

to precipitate matters. They kept on sending memoranda and complaints about old and new disputes making the same demands and getting the same refusals.

An examination of some of the cases makes this clear. The British were still refusing to give up Pratapsinh to the Gaekwad, and Sayajirao kept on insisting that he should be given up to his government, and informed them that till this was done, he would not co-operate with them in any matter regarding the Vijapur district.¹¹⁹ The British had also asked the Gaekwad to reprimand his officer in Vijapur as, they claimed, he had acted in an "improper and unusual" manner and had evaded giving them any answers. The Gaekwad explained that his officers had informed the British Political Agent that he had written to his own government about the matter, which was not at all improper. In fact Sayajirao pointed out that it was highly improper for the British to give his officer a bad name, and require that he should be reprimanded.¹²⁰

In another matter concerning Mahikanta, the Political Agent had asked the Gaekwad to send a near relation of the Thakur of Amleera, one of the many

119. Ibid., Yad from Sayajirao to Sutherland, 13-3-1838.

120. Ibid.

petty chieftains of Mahikanta, to Amleera to witness his installation.¹²¹ Sayajirao had refused permission, according to Sutherland, on no particular ground except dissatisfaction with the British. Sutherland characterised this action as a "design to exhibit a disobliging disposition," which in this instance bordered on the "offensive".¹²² Every act of Sayajirao was interpreted in this venomous manner, *when actually the British were usurping his powers.*

To add to the Gaekwad's trouble, one of his relatives Raghunathrao Mahipatrao died and one of his widows committed "Sati". Sutherland reported that he had done his utmost to stop this and admitted that he had got the co-operation of Sayajirao in trying to dissuade the widow. Unfortunately, neither of them was successful, and the widow immolated herself.¹²³ Unfortunately, Sutherland did not stop here, but threatened one of the Gaekwad's subjects with action against him for helping the 'Sati'. He claimed that the act was "self murder" and those concerned in it were guilty of aiding in the crime of murder.¹²⁴ It was to this threat of action to which Sayajirao objected, as it infringed upon his sovereign rights as a ruler. The British kept on harping

121. Ibid., Sutherland to GOB, 5-4-1838.

122. Ibid.

123. Ibid., Sutherland to GOB, 23-3-1838.

124. Ibid.

on this point as another instance of non-cooperation.¹²⁵

Another question involving the Gaekwad's sovereignty was with reference to his hereditary villages in the Deccan. In September, 1835, a question had arisen regarding police and criminal jurisdiction over these villages.¹²⁶ It seems in August, 1835, the Gaekwad had represented that the farmers of these villages had been summoned to appear before a British Court in a certain civil case, and since these villages had descended to him through many generations, he had sovereignty over them. He had requested, therefore, that his jurisdiction over these possessions should not be interfered with.¹²⁷ In reply he had been told that the same rules would apply to his villages as applied to those of Scindia and Holkar.¹²⁸ The Gaekwad had not been satisfied with this reply, and sent another note in 1838 to the Governor drawing his attention to the fact that the British had continuously been interfering all these years in his villages.¹²⁹ In reply to this, Sayajirao was informed that it was the British government's considered opinion that he could hold the three villages in the Deccan only under their sovereignty and the general British regulations regarding administration

125. Ibid.

126. Ibid., Sutherland to GOB, 15-5-1836.

127. Ibid., Sayajirao to Grant, August, 1835.

128. Ibid., Grant to Sayajirao, 25-9-1835.

129. Ibid., Sayajirao to Grant, 12-5-1838.

of police, civil and criminal justice would extend over th^m.¹³⁰ Sutherland expressed his opinion that Sayajirao would never consent to this arrangement and "as usual, in such cases", would not stop his arguments so long as he was listened to.¹³¹ How Sutherland expected Sayajirao to take such insults lying low is, inexplicable, except in terms of his concept of British imperial rights.

Whenever possible, as it has been seen, the British had been depriving the Gaekwad of his dues even in very petty matters. In 1838, the Gaekwad had made complaints to the Governor that he had not received certain allowances due to him from the Chickli and Chowras divisions of Navsari district, and from the Surat port.¹³² According to Sayajirao, these divisions had been gifted to the British as a free gift in ^{Tunc}April, 1808, by the then Gaekwad. However, the gift had been made on condition that certain dues were to be paid to the Gaekwad for maintenance of Brahmins, temples and certain persons.¹³³ To prove this, the Gaekwad sent a copy of the original memorandum.¹³⁴ He also enclosed

130. Ibid., Sutherland to GOB, 15-5-1838.

131. Ibid.

132. Ibid., Sayajirao to Grant, 12-5-1838.

133. Ibid.

134. Aitchison, Op. cit., Vol. VI, Memorandum between the Gaekwad and the Hon^{ble} Company, 4-5-1803, p. 320

an account of the several items to which he made claims and demanded that henceforth, an annual sum of Rs.1,167 and 2 Paise should be annually sent to him.¹³⁵ The memorandum specifically states that these dues "are to be continued to be paid annually by the British government according to the former arrangements".¹³⁶ Sutherland, of course, was not willing to accept even this evidence. He opined that the British government was not bound to pay this amount to the Gaekwad, and suggested that those to whom particular sums were assigned should directly approach the British government for their claims. The transfer made by the Gaekwad in 1803, according to him, left no control over these places in the Gaekwad's hands.¹³⁷ Sayajirao was informed accordingly by Sutherland in July, 1838.¹³⁸ In this note, Sutherland specifically informed Sayajirao that the memorandum on which he had made his claim was merely a memorandum of payment to different persons, and not to him. Besides, it was the custom in all countries that when any portion of territory was given in full sovereignty, the donor gave up all claims over it.¹³⁹ The Gaekwad refused to accept this

135. PD(BOM), Mixed Records, 13/800/1838. Sayajirao to Grant, 12-5-1838.

136. Aitchison, *Op. cit.*, Vol. VI, Memorandum between the Gaekwad and Hon'ble Company, 4-6-1803, p. 20.

137. PD(BOM), Mixed Records 13/800/1838, Sutherland to GOB, 18-7-1838.

138. *Ibid.*, Sutherland to Sayajirao, 22-7-1838.

139. *Ibid.*

construction and wrote back protesting against such an interpretation.¹⁴⁰ In this note Sayajirao further elaborated the claims due to him. Sutherland again refuted this in a note to the Government of Bombay and informed the government that Sayajirao's entries were vague and that he understood that "sums make their way annually to His Highness's private purse from exactions under such fictitious names."¹⁴¹ Sutherland maintained that it would be necessary for British government to assure themselves that the parties claiming allowances were "substantive persons and not fictitious", and such rights should be properly claimed before the respective local authorities.¹⁴² The accusation made by Sutherland may or may not be true, but the agreement of ^{June} February, 1803 very specifically stated that such customary dues, according to former arrangements, were to be paid to the Gaekwad. Again Sutherland was blatantly exhibiting a very prejudicial outlook, bound to lead to further aggravations.

Disputes regarding the rights of the British police to enter Gaekwad's territory and to demand that

140. Ibid., Sayajirao to Sutherland, 3-9-1838.

141. Ibid., Sutherland to GOB, 28-10-1838.

142. Ibid.

the Gaekwad's officers appear before the British Courts continued, and it is impossible to discuss each and every case. A few examples are cited. In April, 1838, two Kolis belonging to Mahikanta had been put to death by eight horsemen coming from the Gaekwad's territory.¹⁴³ Capt. Outram, the Political Agent, Kathiawad, admitted "doubts" to Sutherland regarding the exact rights of the British to demand the surrender of these men who were the Gaekwad's police horsemen acting within their own limits.¹⁴⁴ But he remarked that the "barbarity" of the Gaekwad's police made it imperative that they should be produced before him.¹⁴⁵ As relations worsened between the two powers, it seems that the Gaekwad's officers showed extreme cruelty in certain cases, this being one of them. In this instance, the two Kolis were not only put to death, but their heads were severed and sent to Pattan.¹⁴⁶ According to Sutherland, the Kolis had been respectable persons and not likely to engage in highway robbery of which they were accused. He supported Capt. Outram, and had sent a demand to the Gaekwad for the surrender of these officers.¹⁴⁷ To this, Sayajirao complained of the

143. PD(BOM), 15/901. Sutherland to GOB, 29-6-1838.

144. Ibid.

145. Ibid.

146. Ibid.

147. Ibid., Sutherland to Sayajirao, 25-4-1838.

"great injustice" done to him, and stated that the Kolis had definitely plundered and attacked his horsemen. He chided Sutherland for constantly discussing a subject as "inconsistent with the mutual friendship of the two Sarcars",¹⁴⁸ and suggested that the Commissioner should drop the discussions about sending his horsemen to the British. He, however, offered that if the British were still anxious for enquiry, he was willing to let the heirs of the persons murdered come to him, and promised to make a full enquiry.¹⁴⁹

The other case concerned theft of property of certain British soldiers and their servants who had been attacked by some of the Gaekwad's subjects in January, 1837. The property robbed amounted to Rs.1317-75 annas. Since that time innumerable demands - oral and written - were made to the Gaekwad for restitution.¹⁵⁰ Sayajirao refused to answer these notes, though he had ordered some enquiry to be made in April, 1837.¹⁵¹ Ultimately, in October, 1837, Sayajirao sent a note stating that he had called upon the people of the Booner village to give

148. Ibid., Sayajirao to Sutherland, 12-8-1838.

149. Ibid.

150. Ibid., Sutherland to Sayajirao demanding redress from the Gaekwad, 25-1-1837, 27-1-1837, and 25-9-1837.

151. Ibid., Sutherland to GOB, 28.9.1838.

full information regarding the theft, and that nothing had been substantiated against the village.¹⁵² The same enquiry was made in other two villages mentioned by the British. He even offered, if necessary, to send the Patils of the villages to the Political Commissioner.¹⁵³ In February, 1838, Sutherland, however, came to the conclusion that justice had not been done, and he was determined to make another attempt to induce Sayajirao "to do what was proper".¹⁵⁴ Accordingly, he again addressed a note to Sayajirao, claiming that the robbery had been distinctly traced to the Booner, Peelal and Asod villages, and that the "custom of the country" was that compensation should be extracted from the villages concerned. Since nothing had been done so far, the villagers should now be compelled to make compensation. Sutherland ended the note by saying that "I, therefore, demand that immediate compensation be made to the British officers for their losses."¹⁵⁵

Sayajirao replied that such an inquiry had been made but nothing had been established as he had already stated. He also reminded the Commissioner of his offer

152. Ibid., Sayajirao to Sutherland, 11-10-1837.

153. Ibid.

154. Ibid., Sutherland to GOB, 29-9-1838.

155. Ibid., Sutherland to Sayajirao, 10-2-1838.

to send the Patils to him for inquiry.¹⁵⁶ He stated that it would be most unfair to enforce compensation on villages against whom nothing had been proved, and again offered to send the Patils to him for examination.¹⁵⁷ Sutherland sent a reply to the Gaekwad, reiterating that he considered the three villages to be responsible because of the "traces of the robbery which had been discovered within the bounds of the three villages, and demanded that there should be a "peremptory order" issued on this point.¹⁵⁸ Sutherland complained that Sayajirao allowed this matter to remain unnoticed for the next five months, which was "intolerable" as it concerned British officers and had a bearing on "their comforts and security".¹⁵⁹ Sutherland, therefore, proposed to the Bombay government that the amount of compensation should be paid out of the tribute due from Mahikanta and Kathiawad. Sayajirao was informed of this decision in August, 1838 by Sutherland, who demanded that Sayajirao exact the amount from the villages concerned within four days of his letter,

156. Ibid., Sayajirao to Sutherland, 21-2-1838.

157. Ibid.

158. Ibid., Sutherland to GOB, 2-3-1838.

159. Ibid., Sutherland to GOB, 20-9-1838.

after which he was told that the amount would be paid from his tributes.¹⁶⁰

From the cases cited in this chapter, it is obvious ^{that} how relations were precipitately deteriorating as the British left no incident however petty, ^{to} lie low and made the situation more tense. The crisis had been artificially created so that the British could now go on to the next stage in their grasp for power.

160. Ibid., Sutherland to GOB, 20-8-1838.

CHAPTER VIII

THE SECOND SEQUESTRATION

By August end 1838, the British were seriously thinking in terms of deposing Sayajirao and elevating his son to the Gadi provided his character proved to be such as to give a "tolerably fair" form of good government, and wrote to the Governor-General about it.¹

In fact, even before this letter was written, the Bombay government had been discussing the possible successor to Sayajirao with Sutherland.² Of the four sons of Sayajirao, Sutherland's opinion was that the eldest son, Ganpatrao had an appearance which was far from possessive and his countenance betrayed a "marose and solid" disposition. In his opinion, Ganpatrao had a weak mind so as to be easily led on, and also exhibited violence and had a reckless disposition. He was a thoroughly useless character, and had been involved in a conspiracy against his father about 10 years before, and was, therefore, constantly watched over by Sayajirao. Altogether, he should not be the person to be considered by the British.³ Regarding the second son, Khanderao,

1. PD(BOM), 10/896. GOB to GOI, 30-8-1838.

2. Ibid., Sutherland to GOB, 29-8-1838.

3. Ibid.

who was a boy of about 9 or 10 years, Sutherland reported that he was in everything "the opposite of his elder brother", and there was no doubt in his mind that under good guidance he would turn out well.⁴

The third and fourth sons were 6 and 3 years old respectively, and too young to be considered. Sutherland also considered the two other young males of another branch of the family. They were Govindrao and Gopalrao respectively.⁵ Govindrao was a step brother of Sayajirao, who had in 1829, raised a riot against the latter in an attempt to win the Gadi, and was considered a traitor by Sayajirao. Sutherland reported that he was also suspected of insanity as he constantly acted in a most "extraordinary manner" and had nothing to recommend him.⁶ Lastly, Gopalrao was discussed. This man, it appears, was "an ordinary quiet man", and Sutherland admitted he had never seen him. In conclusion, he recommended that it would be "most fortunate" if the second son, Khanderao were to occupy the Gadi, the particular advantage being that during his minority, a Regency of men subservient to the British could be formed to carry on the administration.⁷

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid.

6. Ibid.

7. Ibid.

However, the British did not pursue this line of thought and instead decided to sequester the district of Petlad, if the Gaekwad did not agree to the demands presented to him on the first of October, 1838.⁸ The memorandum stated by reminding Sayajirao that the British government had been calling on him to comply with their demands for the last so many years but to no avail. The British, therefore, "were compelled" to present him with twelve specific demands. If these demands were not complied with within one month, his share of the district of Petlad would be sequestered.

Further, if after two months the demands were still not complied with, the whole of the revenues of Petlad, after deducting the expenses of collection would be forfeited. The amount would be expended by the British as they deemed fit. He was further threatened that if his officers interfered during the take over, he would be held responsible for it. The note ended by advising the Gaekwad "at once to accede to the whole of the demands", which were the result of a "long period of misconduct" on his part.⁹ The following are the twelve demands as laid down in the note:¹⁰

8. Ibid., Sutherland to Sayajirao, 1-10-1838.

9. Ibid.

10. Ibid.

1. The Gaekwad must dismiss his minister Veniram Aditram through "whose evil counsels" the two governments had been brought into their present state of collision.
2. The Gaekwad must surrender Narayanrao Venkatesh, the Gaekwad's officer-in-charge of Okhamandel at the time of the 'paracies'.
3. Mehboobkhan, the officer who was formerly manager of Sayajirao's districts in Kathiawad must be punished for his offensive conduct towards the chiefs and others entitled to British protection.
4. The Gaekwad must agree to the settlement of the claims of the Chulala chiefs.
5. Surrender of all persons concerned in the barbarous murder of Manju Manick.
6. ^{Bawa} Kumaon's claims to be settled.
7. Satisfaction was required for a robbery committed by the Gaekwad's subjects in a village belonging to the Jam of Nowanagur.
8. The Kathiawad chiefs were entitled to look up to the British government for protection and the Gaekwad must therefore introduce a better system of administration.

into that province.

9. Satisfaction was demanded for all complaints against his police for lack of co-operation, as Sayajirao was asked to set up machinery to prevent such complaints in future.

10. This demand contained 3 heads:

i) The prisoners captured by Sayajirao's Vijapur officers must be surrendered.

ii) The claims and grievances of Pratapsinh must be submitted to the British arbitration.

iii) The authorities in charge of the districts of Vijapur must be removed.

11. The Gaekwad must afford reparation for the serious breach of the British guarantee, committed by him in so grossly illtreating Bhaskarrao Vithal.

12. The Gaekwad must act according to the stipulations of the treaties between the two governments, and must act in the spirit of their stipulations and must put no obstacles whatsoever to the free and unrestricted intercourse between the British representatives and all persons at Baroda whom he may have occasion to send for.

The avaricious eyes of the British had fallen on Petlad for obvious reasons. It was one of the most

fertile and rich districts of the Gaekwad. It yielded a revenue of about Rs.9,20,000, which made it the third richest district in his "rich and luxuriant dominions". It was famous for its cultivation of tobacco, and handloom weaving which was also a thriving industry.¹¹

This note was personally handed over by Sutherland to the Gaekwad on the 1st October, 1838. Sutherland began the interview which followed, ^{by} informing the Gaekwad that his government has asked him to convey the fact that had brought this on himself by his "persisting in a refusal to comply with just demands so often urged on him."¹² Sutherland further went on to inform him that the British government had felt very reluctant to resort to "measures of severity towards him".¹³ Since, however, he had manifested such a "reckless conduct" towards the British, and had set aside all warnings given to him, it had become absolutely necessary to "vindicate the honour of the British".¹⁴ Sayajirao listened to all this and observed that he would prepare a reply to the several points contained in the note. On this Sutherland informed the Gaekwad that he had not come to hear the reasons against the measures to be adopted nor discuss the grounds that

11. BG., p. 11.

12. PD(BOM), 10/896 of 1838-39. Note by Sutherland on interview with Sayajirao, 1-10-1838.

13. Ibid.

14. Ibid.

had lead to the resolution of the government. The note had to be taken by Sayajirao as containing a list of absolute demands and he "welcomed him to consider well that he should resolve on accepting them".¹⁵ Sayajirao protested against such words and threats. He claimed that the prosecution of such measure would be "an act of violence and "spoilation" on the part of the British government, which was powerful and could plunder him and do whatever it thought fit, but he reminded Sutherland that there was nothing in the Treaties warranting such "violence".¹⁶

Continuing in the same arrogant tone, Sutherland informed him that a party suffering from the infliction of "proper chastisement" seldom denoted the measure of "^{retribution}restriction" by its proper name. It was an act of justice, resolved on by the British government in support of "its own honour", and it would not be satisfied unless every demand was met in full and ample manner, along with all other claims that may be made against him.¹⁷

He was then warned of the danger of a small State "persisting in known error", to the injury of the "most powerful and influential" nation such as the

15. Ibid.

16. Ibid.

17. Ibid.

British.¹⁸ The interview continued in the same manner, and Sayajirao could get nowhere in his protestations. Sutherland left the meeting convinced that the Gaekwad was not going to give in to the wishes of the British government and was "exhibiting determination" not to make any alterations in the course he had prescribed for himself" for some time back.¹⁹

A scrutiny of the demands shows that they concern most of the matters that had been in dispute and in which the Gaekwad had, in fact, taken measures to settle as far as he could without surrendering his sovereignty. The demands now put forward were all aimed at depriving Sayajirao of what little sovereignty ^{that} remained with him. The drastic action of threatening to sequester his province was nothing but a measure of aggrandisement, not at all justified by the petty disputes and the claims arising therefrom.

After the insulting meeting described above, Sutherland waited for a reply from Sayajirao. Not receiving any, he sent his native agent Unoopram Kishandas to the Gaekwad for further discussion on these demands.²⁰

18. Ibid.

19. Ibid.

20. Ibid., Note of the Conversation between the Gaekwad and Unoopram Kishandas, 13-10-1838.

Sayajirao began the meeting by making it clear to Unoopram that unless he was prepared to listen without prejudice and had "no hostile feeling" towards his government or himself personally, he could not go on with an interview.²¹

Unoopram assured Sayajirao that he harboured no ill will towards him, but that he had no power in his own hands, and that he had merely come to convey the message of the Resident and to take back an answer. Sayajirao complained that he found every one against him and that the Resident only listened to people who misrepresented him. When questioned about the demands, Sayajirao informed him that he could not under any circumstances agree to the demands made on him, as a compliance of them would most seriously affect his position.²² With regard to ^{the} demands, he stated that he was quite secure and nothing could be done to him, as first he had not intrigued with any other State. Secondly, Sayajirao emphatically maintained that he could not, and did not oppose the "Honourable Company", and thirdly, he had never "retreated" from the contracts entered into.²³

When Unoopram questioned him why he could not at least dismiss Veneeram, the Gaekwad stated that Veneeram

21. Ibid.

22. Ibid.

23. Ibid.

had two estimable qualities - one that he was not avaricious, and two, that he told the truth. Unoopram did not accept this assessment of Veneeram.

Unoopram then went on to enquire why he could not hand over Narayanrao Venkatesh to the British. Sayajirao reminded Unoopram that he had been most willing to send Narayanrao to the Governor at the time of the investigation, but the British had insisted instead that he should be sent to Rajkot. Sayajirao had not done this because Narayanrao would not have got justice there, as the Political Agent in Kathiawad had been extremely prejudiced.

About demand No.11 regarding Bhaskerrao Withal, the Gaekwad stated that no claims were pending against him on that account. Similarly, Sayajirao protested that with regard to demand No.9, he had always delivered up criminals who had taken refuge in his districts. The British government, however, had insisted on following up fugitive criminals into his territory and were now claiming this as a right, which it was impossible for him acquiesce in.

Asked why he prevented people from going to the Residency, he stated that whenever some body had to be

sent there, he had done so. The Gaekwad pointed out that Elphinstone had told him that his subjects were to be under him, and for that reason a stop had been put to free intercourse with the Residency.

At the end of the interview the Gaekwad expressed his helplessness by pointing out that ^{were} by the measure adopted he would be thoroughly disgraced.²⁴

Another interview between these two took place on 22nd October, 1838. Unoopram stated at the outset that he had reported their conversation of the 13th October to the Resident and had been instructed to inform the Gaekwad that there could be no deviation from the demands contained in the note dated 1st October, 1838, and that he should not entertain the slightest hope that there would be any change.²⁵ Sayajirao protested that by the proposed sequestration, he would lose about Rs.25 lakhs in revenues apart from anything else. When Unoopram suggested that this could be avoided by giving in to the demands, Sayajirao again vehemently maintained that he was unable to do so as this would be contrary to the "Treaties entered into by both the governments". At this meeting²⁶ nothing further was discussed.

24. Ibid.

25. Ibid., Notes on the Conference between Unoopram and Sayajirao, 22-10-1838.

26. Ibid.

Following this meeting Sayajirao addressed a note to Sutherland on 23rd October, 1838.²⁷ Sayajirao started by protesting against the injustice of the entire action taken by the British. He accused them of acting without regard either to justice or equity in throwing him into difficulties and causing him loss of "wealth and dignity". He admitted his utmost helplessness unless the British remembered the "friendship" existing between the two governments. He reminded them of their Treaty obligations by pointing out that in the tenth para of the Treaty of the 29th June, 1802, it was stated that the Gaekwad, and the Baroda State had the "Guarantee" of the British. Therefore, accordingly, the Resident and the British government had till now protected his possession and his government. Now, however, the British government was not treating his State justly by their latest move. It was impossible for him to consent to demands made in such a forcible manner, though, if he did not agree, the British were out to cause him loss, both of dignity and wealth. He again reiterated his helplessness, but stated that there was no other decision he could take.

He then pointed out that, contrary to the Treaties, the British government was supporting his

27. Ibid., Sayajirao to Sutherland, 23-10-1838.

enemies. In the Treaty of 1805, it was stated that the enemies of the Gaekwad were also the enemies of the British. Now the British were supporting the complaints of his servants and subjects and without paying any attention to his replies, forcing him to agree to their demands, or in default threatening to sequester by force his districts and cause him loss of wealth and dignity.

With reference to the accusation against him that he had brought all this upon his own self, he declared that upto now he had never conducted himself with illwill towards the British, nor would he ever behave in such a way.

Sayajirao also pointed out that on the demands made, he had already given answers and had offered as much co-operation as was possible. He, therefore, entreated the Resident to intercede on his behalf with the Bombay government, and suggested that the Resident should take into consideration his declaration of the "firm friendship" between the two governments, and in a friendly manner, write to Bombay government, and obtain the "recall of the order" which has been issued for the sequestration of Petlad.²⁸

28. Ibid.

This note brings out the utter humiliation to which the Gaekwad had been subjected, having regard to the language of 'subordination' which he was forced to use. But it also shows the dignity and self respect which Sayajirao was clinging to. In reply, Sutherland on the same day informed Sayajirao that the demands made on him on the 1st of October, 1838, were not meant to be "discussed but to be acquiesced in".²⁹ The entire spirit of conciliation displayed by Sayajirao was insultingly ignored, and Sutherland abruptly ended by saying, "If Your Highness is determined not to do so, but to act in opposition to the British government, I shall be under the necessity of carrying the orders therein laid down into effect on the 1st of November. It is not necessary to enter into any further details on this point."³⁰ In reply, Sayajirao on the 25th October, 1838, in spite of knowing the hopelessness of his case, again reiterated his position and further informed Sutherland that there was no remedy for him as the British were not favourably inclined towards him and consequently did not take his position into consideration in a "just manner" but simply informed him that they would put the orders into effect.

29. Ibid., Sutherland to Sayajirao, 23-10-1838.

30. Ibid.

There was nothing left for him to reply. He requested Sutherland to forward his note of the 23rd October, 1838 to the Bombay government with a request to them to rescind the orders contained in their note of the 1st October, and to start the payment of the tributes without delay, all of which would reflect creditably on Sutherland.³¹

After this Sutherland informed the Government of Bombay that he had no hope that the Gaekwad would give in at present but would rather "permit" the taking over of his districts. All measures and preparations had been made for this according to instructions.³² Following upon this on 5th November, 1838, a proclamation was issued sequestering the Petlad district. The proclamation reads as follows:

"Be it known to all that after many years of useless discussions with H.H. the Gaekwar (though to save the honour of that prince every forbearance has been shown) the British Government, to maintain its own honour and character has been obliged to make certain demands on H.H. which were made to him on the 1st of October last and a period of one month was allowed to him in which his acquiescence with them was to be signified, otherwise he was informed that the district of Petlad would be sequestered.

This period of one month has now elapsed and His Highness has not complied with our just demands. Arther Malet Esquire, first Assistant Political Commissioner therefore has been directed by Government to sequester the Purgunnah of Petlad from the 1st November

31. Ibid., Sayajirao to Sutherland, 28-10-1838,

32. Ibid., Sutherland to GOB, 30-10-1838.

and according to this order the Purgunnah has been sequestered.

Let all persons therefore be aware that the district of Petlad has been taken possession of in the name of the British Government on this date. Let all persons of all descriptions remaining quiet transact their business with the officer in charge of it, no change is to be made at present nor any molestation given to any one.

If within two months the Gaekwar agrees to the demands above alluded to the district of Petlad will be restored to him, should he not agree after that period the revenues will be appropriated by the British Government".³³

The whole of the proclamation has been quoted as it reflects only too clearly the height of arrogance reached by the British in their relation with an Indian Prince, and displays the strength and power they had gained. The proclamation ended as may be seen with a threat that, if within two months the demands were not acceded to, the entire revenue would be appropriated by the British government.

Following this proclamation, fourteen additional demands based on disputes of the last few years, most of which have been discussed, were made on the Gaekwad by the Government of Bombay.³⁴ They were as follows:

33. Ibid., Proclamation dated 5-11-1838.

34. Ibid., Sutherland to Sayajirao

1. The surrender for trial of the eight horsemen charged with the murder in January, 1838, of the two Kolis of Mahikanta, and compensation for the families of the deceased.

2. (a) A suitable provision for the widow of Pillajirao Gaekwad, one of the sons of Anandrao Gaekwad.

(b) Investigation of the alleged misappropriation of the Nemnook enjoyed by Pillajirao under the British guarantee.

(c) Exemplary punishment to be meted out to Umoo Mia, the Jamadar, and all other persons concerned in the "treacherous and unprovoked" murder of the two dependants of Pillajirao, 'dependants' of a person under the Guarantee of the British government, and therefore, entitled according to it to protection.³⁵

35. Pillajirao was a son of Anandrao by Taktabai, on whom a separate settlement was made in 1833 by Sayajirao by which he was assigned Rs.53,238-0-62½ per annum. As Pillaji was a minor, his brother, Balwantrao became guardian. Shortly afterwards, Balwantrao won the enmity of Veniram, who removed Pillaji from his protection, and gave him over to his step-mother, Umed Kuverbai, who seems to have misappropriated the 'Nemnook', and thoroughly mismanaged the estate. Pillajirao died in 1838, and his estate reverted to the State. Sayajirao, it was claimed, refused to make a settlement on the widow. It was alleged by the British that two of Pillajirao's dependants had been murdered in cold blood by the Jamadar, who was in the service of Veniram. See Wallace, *Op.cit.*, Compilation of Baroda Guarantees by Capt.L.C. Barton, pp.596-98.

3. To respect of the Guarantee of the British government, given to the family of Subanji Pol, formerly Killedar or Commandant of Kaira.³⁶

4. Satisfaction for the conduct of the Gaekwad's officers in regard to certain persons who committed a robbery and murder at Rajkot on the 8th February, 1837, for conniving at the escape of several of the guilty parties in return for a bribe.

5. Satisfaction for the culpable conduct of the Gaekwad officers in Kathiawad, in conniving at the disturbance caused for several years by the 'notorious' outlaw named Champrazwalla.^{36a}

6. Afford 'justice' to Gopalrao Ganpatrao Gaekwad, a near relative of the Gaekwad, who had been deprived of his stipend by Sayajirao.

7. Satisfaction for a robbery committed in the month of January, 1837, by certain subjects of Gaekwad on the property of Captain Brown and other British officers at Baroda.

36. This guarantee was granted to Subanji Pol, as the price of his surrendering the town and fort of Kaira to the British government in 1802. The Gaekwad had made a grant in perpetuity of four villages with a revenue of Rs.1,18,000 on the condition of the family maintaining a Paga of 23 Horse. No trace was to be found of the original Sunnad. See Wallace, Op. cit., Bartons' Compilations, pp.533-46.

36a. This is the reverse of the Pratapsingh case. Here Sayajirao espoused Champrazwalla against the British officers, all to the detriment of law and order. See Chapter VII, p.298.

8. Satisfaction for a robbery committed in the month of April, 1837, by certain Waghers of Okhamandal in the house of a merchant named Hirjee Walji, in a village in Cutch.

9. That the Gaekwad adopt measures for effectually preventing offenders who were subjects of the British government from escaping into his territory. In this connection Sayajirao was also required to give redress for two outrages which had been committed in 1838 on British subjects in the Ahmedabad district, and to dismiss his Manager at Kadi for conniving at the escape of the offenders.

10. (a) The Gaekwad should recognise and confirm all the guarantees of the British government including those to Gangadhar Shastri, Dhackji Dadaji, and the Desai of Navsari, and agree to satisfy all those individuals who claimed that the British had supported their claims.

(b) Satisfaction should be given to Poonjaji Jorajee.

11. The Gaekwad should consent to the deduction from his tributes of the sum of Rs.50,000 paid by the British government at the end of 1838 to the family of Vallabhdas

Maneckchand as compensation for the "cruel treatment" they had received from the Gaekwad.

12. Redress should be given by the Gaekwad to Meersurfraz Ali and other individuals formerly belonging to the Contingent of Horse who had been "unjustly oppressed".

13. The Gaekwad should agree to such remissions as "might be deemed just", being granted from time to time, to his tributaries in the Mahikanta, Rewakanta, and Kathiawad, and admit the "right of the British government", to sanction reductions.

14. That a thorough and complete reform should be made by Sayajirao in the constitution and management of the Contingent of Horse, and maintain it according to the 8th Article of the Treaty of 1817, which required the Gaekwad to maintain and hold the Contingent at the disposal of the British to act with the Subsidiary Force. The Horse was to be under the General Command of the Officer Commanding the British troops, and be exclusively supported at the expense of the Gaekwad, who was to take the "advice and suggestions" of the British government, as to the formation and equipment of the Contingent. Every month, the Gaekwad and the Resident at Baroda

should take the muster on the pay day.

The British took actual possession of Petlad with their armed forces on 5th November, 1838. Malet had marched from Baroda on the 1st November, with the British contingent, with full political powers to take charge of the district.³⁷ In the process of taking charge, Malet found that the Gaekwad's officer at Petlad had taken away all the public account books.³⁸ The Gaekwad was asked by Sutherland to see that the records were delivered up, and he was informed that if this did not take place, whatever damage arose would rest with him.³⁹

On the same day, Sutherland delivered another note regarding the deposit of Rs.10 lakhs made as security for payment of the Contingent of Horse, during the agreement with Clare. The British government arbitrarily decided that the Rs.10 lakhs in deposit with them should be transferred to their public accounts, and that, the object of the proposed arrangement was to simply to ensure the security^{of} to the "treasure". The amount would still be available whenever required for the purpose for which the deposit was originally made. The note ended with the declaration that whatever was "set forth" would

37. PD(BOM), 10/896 of 1838-39. Sutherland to GOB, 1-11-1838.

38. Ibid., Sutherland to Sayajirao, 11-11-1838.

39. Ibid.

be "carried into effect".⁴⁰

Having treated the Gaekwad in this dictatorial fashion, the British still expected him to co-operate with them and expressed "displeasure" when this did not happen. Sutherland reporting on his visit stated that there was nothing he was aware of that could turn the Gaekwad "to a proper understanding".⁴¹ He further went on to comment that "this pusillanimous prince" did not realise his own loss of property and reputation and was so "infatuated" with his adviser (Veniram) that relying on his counsel he hoped to recover everything from the British.⁴² Accordingly, Sutherland expected from the Gaekwad nothing but recalcitrance.⁴³ Compromise was now almost impossible. Obviously, Sutherland had not a spark of sympathy or understanding. To state that Sayajirao did not "realise" the loss he was incurring was ridiculous, after all that he had written and spoken to Sutherland. He was completely blind to the effect of British action on a prince who was very rapidly being stripped of his powers and who was forced to look upon it with utter helplessness.

40. Ibid., 2nd Letter, 11-11-1838.

41. Ibid., Sutherland to GOB, 17-12-1838.

42. Ibid.

43. Ibid.

The major part of 1839 was passed in most acrimonious meetings and correspondence between the parties, the Gaekwad ultimately realising that there was no alternative for him but to accede to all the British demands.

Unable to appreciate the principles on which the Gaekwad was proceeding and his ideas about his own position, and infatuated with notions of British invincibility, Sutherland blamed the Gaekwad's refusal to come to terms with the British on Veniram.⁴⁴ There was no denying that Veniram was a clever and skilful person, who, the British believed, had made an enormous personal fortune at the expense of the State.⁴⁵ But to allege that the Gaekwad was acting according to Veniram's instructions was nothing short of lack of understanding of the real situation. Sutherland maintained that, himself devoid of a sense of judgment, the Gaekwad was solely depending on Veniram's counsel, however prejudicial it may be to his interest.⁴⁶ No doubt Veniram supported Sayajirao and encouraged him in his attempt to uphold his rights, and opposed any encroachment on the sovereignty of the Gaekwads.⁴⁷ Moreover, Sutherland was so vindictive

44. Ibid., Sutherland to GOB, 4-1-1839.

45. Ibid.

46. Ibid.

47. PD(BOM), 12/1008 of 1839. Sayajirao to Sutherland, 6-4-1839.



that he attempted repeated infractions of the Gaekwad's privileges, and had recommended to the Bombay government that it should notify Sayajirao that further opposition on his part would be at his own "risk and peril".⁴⁸ He also expressed his view that the British government should adhere not to return Petlad to Sayajirao.⁴⁹ It was obviously impossible for the Gaekwad to accept any of the terms, ^{and} however, under the circumstances, he could only try to stave off an open breach, while asserting his rightful position as occasion demanded.

Thus for instance, on the question of Vallabhdas Maneckchand and family, the British government had made demands on the Gaekwad as already discussed in chapter six. Since the Gaekwad had not acquiesced in these demands, the British had on 21st October, 1838, paid the family Rs.50,000 out of the revenues of the Gaekwad's tributaries. In spite of the weakness of his position, Sayajirao protested to the Governor against such a move and questioned the British right to make deductions from his revenues, since Maneckchand was a Gaekwad subject, and he reprimanded the British government telling it that

48. PD(BOM), 10/896 of 1838-39. Sutherland to GOB, 4-1-1839.

49. Ibid.

it was unworthy of the British to behave unjustly towards him on false charges made against him. He asked *that an* account of all this written by him be forwarded to the Governor-General.⁵⁰

Sutherland, of course, could not appreciate the assertions of independence on the part of the Gaekwad. Ultimately, on the 9th March, 1839, under instructions from the Governor of Bombay, he went to the palace accompanied by two other British officers to inform Sayajirao that the claims of the British government had remained unattended though two months had passed, since the proclamation of sequestration on the 5th November, 1838, and the Gaekwad still persisted in his opposition. Sutherland then told Sayajirao that he had forfeited all his interests in Petlad.⁵¹ This meant that the Gaekwad would lose all the revenues from Petlad. The original sequestration had meant only taking over the administration of the district, while charging the administrative costs to the Gaekwad. The Gaekwad was stunned, but kept his composure, only observing to Sutherland that the British government was all powerful, and whatever it did he had no alternative but to accept.⁵²

50. PD(BOM), 15/901 of 1838-39. Sayajirao to Governor of Bombay, 8-2-1839.

51. PD(BOM), 12/1008 of 1839. Sutherland to GOB, 15-3-1839.

52. Ibid.

Sutherland added insult to injury by observing that the Gaekwad had brought all this upon himself, and he even had the temerity to complain that he had not been received in a proper manner when he reached the palace. He said he had been conducted from the landing place by 'menials', and there had been a 'reduction in the usual attendance' at his reception.⁵³ His insensitive attitude comes out when he remarks, "I perceive that nothing whatever made any impression on His Highness and that it was quite useless to speak to an unwilling ear predetermined to listen to nothing".⁵⁴ He finally recommended to the Governor that since Petlad had become a fully British possession, the Gaekwad's flag should be taken down, and that a declaration should be made publicly to this effect. He also recommended that a new criminal court should be set up there under the British,⁵⁵ indicating thereby the legal take over of sovereignty.

Sutherland's recommendations were accepted in part by the Government. He was instructed that the Gaekwad's flag in Petlad should be taken down and the British flag be hoisted in its place.⁵⁶ At the same time, he was told that it was not necessary to issue a public

53. Ibid.

54. Ibid.

55. Ibid.

56. Ibid., GOB to Sutherland, 6-4-1839.

notification since this take over was only "temporary".⁵⁷
 Following upon this drastic action, petty complaints regarding Sayajirao's non-cooperation with regard to the specified demands, as well as others continued, and Sayajirao on his part, continued to send representations to the Governor and the Governor General, requesting that the sequestration of Petlad should be lifted.⁵⁸
 In all these, he protested against the action of the British government, repeatedly stating that the British had possessed itself of Petlad by force, and expressed his helplessness to comply with the various demands of the government, without discussing any specific point, as he had seen the uselessness of doing so. The Governor instructed Sutherland to inform the Gaekwad that it was useless for him to protest in this manner and that the British reply could only be to point out finality of their action and their refusal to discuss things further. The Gaekwad was informed accordingly by the Resident's office, and not by Sutherland personally, obviously to show him his place!⁵⁹

The British did not allow things to lie quiet, but continued to heap humiliation on the Gaekwad and started taking unilateral action on the disputed cases on which they had made claims on Sayajirao. For instance,

57. Ibid.

58. Ibid., SAYAJIRAO to Governor General and Governor, 6-1-1839, 25-3-1839, 6-4-1839, 18-4-1839, 12-5-1839, 27-5-1839, and 12-6-1839.

59. Ibid., Second Asstt. Political Commissioner to Sayajirao, 8-4-1839.

with regard to the two Kolis killed by the Gaekwad's horsemen in Patan in 1838, the British persisted in demanding compensation for the family of the deceased in spite of the Gaekwad's claim that these latter had attacked his soldiers, and consequently been killed. The details of this case have already been discussed in the previous chapter. The British now arbitrarily decided that the families of the two Kolis should be paid compensation. The Governor General authorized the grant of a pension of Rs.12 per month for the support of the family of Jaloji Punjaji - one of the Kolis, and the sum of Rs.10 per month for the family of the other Koli, Velaji Punjaji. This amount was to be paid as usual from the tributes of the Gaekwad with effect from the date on which these persons were killed.⁶⁰ Whilst conveying this decision to the Gaekwad, the Political Commissioner made no explanation or justification for this action. He stated that the purpose of the letter was only to inform Sayajirao of their decision.⁶¹

Sayajirao wrote a letter of protest to Sutherland recapitulating the whole case.⁶² He pointed out that he had earlier proposed that the relations of the deceased

60. PD(BOM), 15/901 of 1838-39. GOB to Sutherland, 25-4-1839.

61. PD(BOM), Op. cit., Sutherland to Sayajirao, 29-4-1839.

62. Ibid., Sayajirao to Sutherland, 4-5-1839.

persons should be sent to him for investigation, which would have been carried out in the presence of himself and the British. The British had done nothing about this, and therefore, he had taken depositions from his soldiers, which according to him, proved that the Kolis had been killed in self defence.⁶³ The decision to pay compensation to the family appeared to him to be very extra-ordinary. He objected to the fact that "the misrepresentation " of the relatives of the deceased had been believed, and the "representation" made by his government disbelieved. He pointedly remarked that if such strong measures were imposed for the sake of such "evil disposed persons, his government was utterly helpless," and he would not be able to control the law and order situation in his territory. Sayajirao ended the note by requesting Sutherland to get this order rescinded.⁶⁴ Of course, nothing of the sort was done and the British proceeded to deprive the Gaekwad of a part of his tribute.

After the second order whereby the Gaekwad was deprived of his entire share of the revenue of Petlad, a dispute arose about the jurisdiction of the Gaekwad's

63. Ibid.

64. Ibid.

private lands in the forfeited district. Sayajirao represented to the Governor and the Governor-General that these private possessions and his people therein should be considered as being under his "sovereignty".⁶⁵ This arose out of an incident in one of the Gaekwad's private villages in Petlad. It appears that during the Holy festival in 1839, some villagers had stolen wood for the purposes of burning and Malet who was in charge of Petlad had sent his police to arrest these villagers. Their arrest was prevented by the Gaekwad's havaladar, and Sayajirao protested to the authorities that such action against his subjects was derogatory to the "dignity of his government". He also resented the fact that the Resident had done nothing to prevent this and pointed out that this was contrary to the Treaties between the two governments. He ended the note by saying that the Resident did not care for the "preservation of his honour" which appeared to him to be very extraordinary.⁶⁶ Sutherland was of the opinion that the Gaekwad did not possess "more than a private right" over the villages held by him in Petlad, and that his private estate must be subjected to the control of the "ruling power", like that of any other person holding rent free land, and he

65. Ibid., Sayajirao to the Governor-General and Governor, 12-5-1839.

66. Ibid.

must submit to the local police rules and orders, or incur the penalty of resistance.⁶⁷ Sutherland^{was} thereupon ^{asked to} inform Sayajirao that no part of the forfeited share of Petlad could be exempted from the administration of the British authority while that district continued to be in their possession.⁶⁸ Thus even the small shreds of power and dignity left to the Gaekwad were being taken away from him, and towards the end of 1839, Sayajirao had begun to reconsider his stand and think in terms of capitulation.

67. Ibid., Sutherland to GOB, 18-5-1839.

68. Ibid., GOB to Sutherland, 9-11-1839.

CHAPTER IX

SIR JAMES CARNAC AND RECONCILIATION

Sir James Carnac became the Governor of Bombay at the end of 1839. In the beginning of his career, he had worked as Resident at the Baroda Court from 1809 to 1820. He could thus claim some knowledge of the character and disposition of Baroda affairs, and the ruling Gaekwad, though his actual acquaintance with Sayajirao as Gaekwad was only of two years duration, and did not substantiate his claim to understand the situation in Baroda.

On November 28, 1839, Sayajirao asked for an interview with Sutherland. The latter reports that Sayajirao came to the Residency in the morning of November 28, 1839, and in the "terms and demeanour of a suppliant, at times bending his head down in token of submission, taking up the corner of his garment and spreading it out, he begged the protection of the Resident, while he joined his hands in an attitude of supplication, and begged forgiveness for the past".¹ This was abject humiliation on the part of the Gaekwad, and complete victory for Sutherland.

1. PDL(BOM) to COD, 54/1840. Sutherland to GOB, 29-11-1839.

At this meeting, the Gaekwad expressed his willingness to concede most of the demands of the British government and took the first step by dismissing Veniram Aditram on that very day.² The British government immediately expressed their satisfaction at this and informed Sutherland to immediately call upon the Gaekwad to comply with the "whole of the demands" without any change whatsoever. He was instructed further to inform Sayajirao that until this was done no confidence could be placed in the sincerity of his professions.³ The government declared that no withdrawal or retraction of any of the demands would be tolerated. The first demand on the Gaekwad was the immediate dismissal, by proclamation, of Veniram Aditram from the office of minister and his entire exclusion from the future counsels of the Gaekwad. The question of public notification was particularly stressed by the British who firmly believed that otherwise, it would never be credited in Gujarat that Sayajirao had actually dismissed his trusted minister.⁴ The new Governor, Sir James Carnac was cynical enough to express the view that

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid., GOB to Sutherland, 2-12-1839.

4. Ibid., GOB to COD, 10-2-1840.

Sayajirao would feel no compunction in dropping any of his servants 'who had relied upon his protection'.⁵

Sutherland informed the government that, though the Gaekwad had consented to dismiss Veniram, he was not prepared to issue a proclamation promulgating his dismissal.⁶ The Bombay government later on decided that if the proclamation was repulsive to Sayajirao, this part of the demand should be dropped, and the Gaekwad should simply be asked to appoint another minister and make a proclamation about this.⁷ Sayajirao, however, was soon bent on full compromise with the British and on April 10, 1840, issued a proclamation⁸ announcing Veniram's disgrace, but refused to appoint a successor at this time, as he claimed that he could himself manage the affairs of the State.⁹

The second demand concerned Narayanrao Venkatesh, the Gaekwad's officer at Okhamandel, who was accused of having connived at piracy. This case has been dealt with

5. Ibid.

6. Ibid., Sutherland to GOB, 28-12-1839.

7. PD(BOM), 12A/1842-43. Sutherland to Sayajirao, 17-3-1840.

8. Ibid., Sayajirao to Sutherland, 10-4-1840.

9. PDL(BOM) to COD, 59/1841. Sayajirao to GOB, 2-4-1840.

in detail in Chapter VII. Sayajirao had on many occasions, offered to send Narayanrao to Bombay to be questioned and tried by the Governor, whereas the British were interested all the while that he should be tried before the British Court at Rajkot. The British demand had no basis whatsoever, as Okhamandel was not a part of British territory, and as the Gaekwad insisted, the British did not have any right to demand his trial in their Courts.

Sayajirao, however, now gave in to this demand and handed over Narayanrao to the Political Commissioner on 1st January, 1840.¹⁰ Sutherland sent Narayanrao to Rajkot on the 6th of January, 1840, where he was brought to trial at the end of the year on the 7th December 1840, for having instigated certain piracies on British commerce, and having participated in the booty thereby obtained.¹¹ The Political Agent's Court found him guilty of both the charges and convicted him to a sentence of a fine of Rs.3,000 or to suffer imprisonment for a period of three years.¹² This sentence was confirmed by the government on 8th March, 1841.

10. Ibid., Sutherland to GOB, 27-1-1840.

11. PD(BOM), 15/2020 of 1848. Boyd to GOB, 25-3-1841.

12. Ibid.

The third demand was for the punishment of Mehbubkhan who had been the Manager of the Gaekwad districts in Kathiawad. It has been shown in Chapter VII how the British had interfered with the Gaekwad's rights in Kathiawad and had found this officer opposing them. Obviously, it had become a matter of prestige to get him out. Sayajirao now agreed to do this and he informed Sutherland on 13th January, 1840, that he had found this individual "guilty of all the offences" he had been accused of having committed, and that he had discharged him from service and arranged that no one should employ him in his State.¹³

The fourth demand which has been discussed in Chapter VII was also acceded to by the Gaekwad. It concerned the claims of the Chulala chieftains against the Gaekwad. Mr. Blane, the British officer, had made certain recommendations. These were now accepted by the Gaekwad retrospectively.¹⁴

The fifth demand was for the surrender for trial of all the persons suspected of having been concerned in the murder of Mangu Maneck (see Chapter VII). The culprits had already been tried before the British Court at Rajkot in 1837. The point in actual dispute was the

13. PD(BOM), 12A/1842-43. Sayajirao to Sutherland, 13-1-1840.

14. Ibid., Sayajirao to Sutherland, 14-1-1840.

payment of compensation to the family of Mangu Maneck which the Gaekwad had not done. Sayajirao now sent an order to his officer in Okhamandel to apprehend and deliver up to the British Political Agent in Kathiawad all individuals concerned in this murder.¹⁵ The British, however, had to give up their insistence that the Gaekwad should pay the compensation or get it paid by the accused, as it was found that the relatives of the deceased had compromised by receiving a sum of money from Dhauda Maneck who had been accused of the suspected murder.¹⁶ The Political Agent's Court at Rajkot had thereupon acquitted this person, and the Bombay government thereupon resolved to abandon all further measures in regard to this demand.¹⁷

The sixth demand concerned the settlement of the claims of Bawa Kumaun, one of the chieftains of Kathiawad who had been declared an outlaw by the Gaekwad authority, because of the offences committed by him. The British (see Chapter VII) had claimed that he had committed these offences due to the oppression exercised over him by the Gaekwad's officers at Amreli. Upto now the Gaekwad had resisted the British demand that he should pardon this

15. Ibid., Order from Sayajirao to Gaekwad officer at Okhamandel, 14-1-1840.

16. PDL(BOM) to COD, 54/1840, 31-3-1840.

17. PD(BOM), 12A/1842-43. GOB to Sutherland, 27-5-1840.

person and redress his grievances by restoring his rights to him, as Sayajirao had taken the interference of the British as an infringement of his sovereign rights. The extent to which he now submitted becomes clear when he complied with this demand on 11th January, 1840.¹⁸

The seventh demand was that the Gaekwad should make compensation for a robbery committed by some of the Waghers in Okhamandal in some villages belonging to the Navanagar chieftain in Kathiawad. The Gaekwad gave in on this demand also in January, 1840.¹⁹

Another demand regarding Kathiawad follows. Demand eight was the general demand requiring the Gaekwad to introduce a better "system of administration" in the province of Kathiawad in "due observance of" the tributary engagement". This demand was met by an order from Sayajirao to the Manager of his districts in Kathiawad dated 1st January, 1840, directing that whatever disputes arose between the Kathiawad chieftains and the Gaekwad officers should be reported to the British Political Agent who would investigate and determine the action to be taken.²⁰ The officer was strictly enjoined not to entertain such matters independently, but always to refer to the British

18. Ibid., Sayajirao to Sutherland, 11-1-1840.

19. Ibid., Sayajirao to Sutherland, 2-1-1840.

20. PDL(BOM) to COD, 54/1840. Order from Sayajirao to the Kamavisdar of Kathiawad, 1-1-1840.

Political Agent and whatever the Agent decided should be carried out by the Gaekwad's officer.²¹

The demands nine and ten concerned the point on which the Gaekwad had been resisting as a matter of principle, since it related to his sovereignty over the maintenance of law and order in his territories. In both Chapters VII and VIII his resistance to the British on these points have been discussed at length. Demand nine was that the Gaekwad should see that his officers co-operated with the British government in matters of law and order.

After discussions with Sutherland, the Gaekwad agreed to lay down certain rules for the future guidance of his officers in the discharge of their duties.²² These rules, however, were not considered satisfactory enough²³ by the British, and discussions ensued thereon. The matter was referred to the Governor General and was finally disposed of only in 1842/43. The Government of Bombay considered the rules proposed by the Gaekwad as highly "important concessions" and conducive to peace and friendship between the two governments, but the British were not prepared to leave any discretion

21. Ibid.

22. PD(BOM), 12A/1842-43. Report of Sutherland of the meeting with Sayajirao, 23-1-1840.

23. PDL(BOM) to COD, 54/1840, 31-3-1840.

whatsoever to the Gaekwad's officers, as according to them, the latter might take advantage of the "latitude of the interpretation" rather than act on the rules actually intended.²⁴ (see Chapter X).

Demand ten, as can be seen, was again a matter of law and order which the Gaekwad had so far resisted. However, now the Gaekwad gave in to the first and second part of the demand in January, 1840, and surrendered the prisoners captured in the incident in Vijapur in 1837, and submitted the case of Pratapsinh for the British arbitration (see Chapter VII).²⁵ The third part of the demand which required the removal of his officers from the district of Vijapur had already been conceded by him on 1st January, 1840.²⁶

Demand eleven referred to a question of one of the guarantees. Reparation was sought for Bhaskarao Vithal, the uncle of Sitaram Raoji. The Gaekwad readmitted Bhaskarao Vithal to his guaranteed rights

24. Ibid.

25. PD(BOM), 12A/1842-43. Sayajirao to Sutherland, 14-1-1840 and 26-1-1840.

26. Ibid., Sayajirao to Sutherland, 1-1-1840.

and restored the benefits to him.²⁷

The twelfth demand, the last from the first set, referred to the Gaekwad's conduct vis a vis the Resident. As already seen, Sutherland had very often made complaints of "discourteous" treatment from the Gaekwad and also that the Gaekwad had not allowed his subjects to meet the Resident freely. The Gaekwad had assured Sutherland on 10th January, 1840 that he would remove all doubts of discourtesy from his mind by strictly conforming to all courtesies in the future and that he would act in strict conformity with the

27. Ibid., GOB to GOI, 17-3-1840.

After Raoji Appaji's death in 1803, his adopted son, Sitaram was continued in the Nemruk and office of minister, but he was found utterly incompetent and instead, his uncle Babaji (Khasgeewala) became Fatehsingh's confidential minister, and in 1806 November, a sunnad was granted to him. (see Chapter I). The allowances granted amounted to Rs.1,22,900, which included maintenance of a paga and office establishment. Babaji died in 1810, and his rank and emoluments were conferred on his son, Vithalrao. He died in 1828. His widow was allowed to adopt Bhaskarrao on payment of a nazarana of Rs.2 lakhs, and Bhaskarrao was granted a sunnad in 1828 with all the emoluments except Rs.8,070, with the guarantee of the British government. Bhaskarrao was thoroughly dissipated and fell into disgrace, and in 1837 he was imprisoned, and released in 1838, but committed the heinous crime of murdering one of his servants. Whereupon Sayajirao dismissed him and stopped his emoluments. Such was a person whom the British, out of a misguided sense of power, were supporting against Sayajirao. See, GBS, Vol. I, Op. cit., p. 570.

existing Treaties,²⁸ viz., to maintain "good friendship and good understanding" with the British government, "to listen to advise", to uphold a free intercourse between the two States and to throw no obstacles in the way of a free and uninterrupted intercourse between the British representatives and all persons in Baroda with whom they may have occasion to communicate.²⁹

Thus by March, 1840, all the points in the first set of demands made on the Gaekwad on October 1, 1838, were settled except for a few minor points. In order to save his position, Sayajirao had been forced to give up what he considered his "inalienable" rights as a ruler. Even on the fundamental points of his sovereignty, he could no longer resist, because it was now clear to him that the crown would be lost on the slightest resistance on his part. His action with reference to the additional demands only further strengthen this conclusion. The British had more or less become the de facto rulers of Baroda.

With reference to the additional demands made on the Gaekwad in November, 1839, Sutherland had been

28. Ibid., Sayajirao to Sutherland, 10-1-1840.

29. Aitchison, Op. cit., Vol. VI, Treaty of 6 June, 1802, Articles 5, 7 and 8, confirmed by the Treaty on 21st April, 1805, and Supplemental Treaty of 6th November, 1817.

pursuing them at the same time as the first set of demands. The first of these demands concerned the Gaekwad's eight horsemen, whom the British had been demanding for trial and which demand the Gaekwad had been resisting on the ground that they were part of his police and under his sole jurisdiction. On the 25th January, 1840, Sayajirao issued an order to his joint manager of the district of Patan directing him to send the eight horsemen to the Political Agent in Mahikanta for trial.³⁰

Sayajirao also agreed to give a pension to the families of the deceased Kolis, if his horsemen were convicted by the Political Agent in Mahikanta.³¹ At the investigation of the case in August, 1840, no one was present on the part of the deceased Kolis, although notice had been given about it to their relatives. Captain Lang, the British Political Agent in Mahikanta found it impossible therefore to ascertain the real ^{facts} ~~merits~~ of the case, and in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, felt bound to give the horsemen the benefit of their statement that these Kolis had been robbers whom they had put to death in self defence in

30. PDL(BOM) to COD, 54/1840, 31-3-1840.

31. PD(BOM), 12A/1842-43. Sayajirao to Sutherland, 25-1-1840.

the regular execution of their duty, as the robbers had offered violent resistance while being captured. Captain Lang had sent a report about this to the Government of Bombay,³² which after due consideration gave its approval to his decision that the soldiers should be acquitted.³³ Thus a case on which the Gaekwad had come to a conclusion and reported it to the British was after much harassment of him resolved in more or less the same way.

The next demand was regarding Pilajirao Gaekwad, son of Anandrao Gaekwad, and his family. The British wanted the Gaekwad to agree to three specific points regarding the family. In regard to the first head of the demand regarding Pilajirao's widow, the Gaekwad agreed to make a settlement on her of a sum of Rs.6,285 per annum.³⁴ Regarding the second head, viz., the misappropriation of Pilajirao's Nemnook, the Gaekwad requested that discussion on it should be postponed.³⁵ Subsequently, this demand was not pressed upon. The third point at issue regarding Pilajirao was the demand that Umoo Mia should be punished for the unprovoked

32. Ibid., Captain Lang to GOB, 2-8-1840.

33. Ibid., GOB to Lang, 15-10-1840.

34. Ibid., GOB to GOI, 18-8-1840.

35. Ibid.

murders of two dependants of Pilajirao. The British demanded Umoo Mia's punishment because the murdered persons had been "dependant upon a man who enjoyed the guarantee of the British government". According to their argument their guarantee stretched even to the followers and dependants of the guaranteed person, and ^{who} were, therefore, entitled to British protection. In his opposition to the entire guarantee system, Sayajirao had protested against such absurd claims by the British and had refused to accede to such demands.

Sayajirao even now tried to get out of this situation by making a counter accusation. He represented that Umoo Mia had acted under orders of Veniram who was the person, who ought properly to be punished for having caused the outrage.³⁶ Subsequently, after having been pressurised by Sutherland, Sayajirao agreed to impose the punishment of a fine of Rs.12,000 on Umoo Mia.³⁹ This was a considerably heavy punishment as it amounted to Umoo Mia's personal income for one year.³⁸ The Government of Bombay agreed to this compromise and the matter came to an end.³⁹

36. Ibid.

37. PDL(BOM) to COD, 54/1840. Report dated 15-5-1840 from Sutherland to GOB of the meeting with Sayajirao on 15-5-1840.

38. Ibid.

39. PD(BOM), 12A/1842-43. GOB to GOI, 18-8-1840.

The third demand was again a guarantee question and referred to the family of Subanji Pol, a former Killedar (Commandant) of Kaira. (see Chapter VIII foot note 36). This was one of the demands which the Gaekwad had acceded to early in 1840. On January 2, he agreed in an interview with Sutherland to release the villages assigned for the maintenance of Subanji Pol and his family.⁴⁰

The next demand was on the question of law and order, one of the many under this head which had been under dispute between the two governments. This concerned the conduct of certain Gaekwad officers who, the British claimed, had connived at the escape of four individuals who were being tried by the Political Agent's Court at Rajkot in 1837. It was one involving the Gaekwad's right over his own officers and he had consistently refused to discuss or hand over the officers at the demand of the British. Sutherland could not get the Gaekwad to agree to dismiss these officers.⁴¹ However, by August, 1840, the latter offered a compromise by way of compensating the sufferers to the tune of Rs.10,000 for the robbery and murder supposedly committed by the accused.⁴² The Government of Bombay subsequently resolved not to adopt any further measures.⁴³

40. PDL(BOM) to COD, 54/1840. Sutherland to GOB, 10-1-1840.

41. Ibid.

42. PD(BOM), 12A/1842-43. GOB to GOI, 15-8-1840 and 17-10-1840.

43. Ibid.

The fifth demand referred to another law and order question discussed ~~in the earlier chapter III~~, that of Champrazwala, one of the outlaws in Kathiawad. The British claimed that the Gaekwad's officers had been responsible for these outrages, as they had connived at the activities of this outlaw. Champrazwala was a notorious freebooter who had for several years harassed the inhabitants of Kathiawad and had ultimately been apprehended in April, 1837, and tried and convicted by the Political Agent's Court in Rajkot. Champrazwala had in his defence declared that he had been instigated by the Gaekwad's officers in Amreli to the commission of certain of the excesses committed by him, while he was an outlaw. The British had demanded that the Gaekwad should send his officers to Rajkot for questioning.⁴⁴ The Gaekwad had consistently refused to do such a thing and had instead offered to make investigation himself. As we have seen, the Gaekwad was informed that if he persisted in not sending his officers to Rajkot, the charge would be held proved against them of having connived at Champrazwala's excesses and the Gaekwad government would be held responsible for the damages occasioned by the outlaw. In discussion with Sutherland,

44. PDL(BOM) to COD, 54/1840, 10-2-1840.

the Gaekwad agreed to make good the losses to British citizen occasioned by Champrazwala's excesses, if they could be proved.⁴⁵

Thereupon the Government of Bombay called upon Blane, the Political Agent in Kathiawad, to give them a report of the actual losses.⁴⁶ Blane reported that, according to him, the class of sufferers in this case were the Gaekwad's own subjects and, therefore, the British could not claim compensation on their behalf.⁴⁷ The British then immediately demanded the expenses incurred by them in quelling the disturbances in Kathiawad. This demand was accepted by the Gaekwad and an amount of Rs.20,295 was recovered from the Gaekwad's tribute in Kathiawad.⁴⁸

The sixth demand was about a near relative of the Gaekwad, Gopalrao Ganpatrao Gaekwad. This individual had taken part in a plot against Sayajirao at the beginning of his reign. Knowing all about this circumstance, the British had taken it upon themselves to support Gopalrao, who could only be considered a traitor by Sayajirao.

45. Ibid., Report dated 15-5-1840 from Sutherland to
GOB of the meeting with the Gaekwad on 15-5-1840.

46. PD(BOM), 12A/1842-43. GOB to GOI, 18-8-1840.

47. Ibid.

48. Ibid.

Gopalrao was the brother of Govindrao, who had been adopted by the widow of the late Fatehsingh Gaekwad. At Sayajirao's accession, Govindrao was proposed as one of the claimants to the throne and the party supporting him created disturbances as described in chapter II. Subsequently, an agreement was reached between Sayajirao and that family giving them certain grants annually, on a promise that Govindrao's claim to the Gadi would be given up. In 1838, it seems that the Gaekwad discontinued an allowance of Rs.300 per mensem assigned to Gopalrao, because he had visited his brother Govindrao.⁴⁹ Sutherland was of the opinion that though no direct guarantee had been given to Gopalrao, it was his "duty" to recommend that the government should interfere in this case, because "one of the nearest heirs of the Raj is in poverty and distress" from which Sayajirao was not likely to redeem him.⁵⁰ Subsequently, since no compromise was arrived at, Gopalrao became an outlaw.⁵¹

Sayajirao had decided to send his forces against him, and requested Sutherland to send some soldiers from the subsidiary force to accompany them.⁵² Sutherland had asked the advise of the Bombay government about this

49. PDL(BOM) to COD, 54/1840, Sutherland to GOB, May, 1839.

50. Ibid.

51. Ibid., Letter from Sutherland to GOB, 1-7-1839.

52. Ibid.

matter.⁵³ In reply, he was told that if Gopalrao committed any direct act of hostility against the Gaekwad, the British government "was bound on application to afford assistance" though the British were to judge this necessity.⁵⁴ The Bombay government further directed that Gopalrao should be warned of the consequences of aggression and that Sayajirao should be informed that it was "indispensable" that Gopalrao's allowance be restored.⁵⁵ In case, the Gaekwad declined to do this, the Political Commissioner was authorised to pay the amount from his treasury to be thereafter recovered from the Gaekwad.⁵⁶ Sayajirao did not take heed of this demand at that time and pursued Gopalrao, who was ultimately apprehended by the authorities at Baria - a small Kathiawad tributary.⁵⁷ On hearing of this, Sutherland ordered Malet, the Political Agent in Kathiawad, to send Gopalrao to Baroda. At Baroda, Gopalrao was handed over to Sutherland on 9th August, 1839.⁵⁸ His arrival was reported to the Gaekwad, but no notice was taken of this communication and he did not

53. Ibid.

54. Ibid., GOB to Sutherland, 10-7-1839.

55. Ibid.

56. Ibid.

57. Ibid., Sutherland to GOB, 24-7-1839.

58. Ibid., Sutherland to GOB, 19-8-1839.

restore his stipend. However, Gopalrao was permitted to reside in the Baroda Cantonment, the British paying the allowances from their treasury. The Governor had reported the matter to the Governor General of India asking for sanction of their action.⁵⁹ The Governor of Bombay was of the opinion that though there was no guarantee in this case, the grounds of interference were based on four points. These consisted of -

- i) Prevention of the breach of peace, and
- ii) The rank and close affinity of Gopalrao to the Gaekwad family and the disrepute of a near relation living in a state of destitution.
- iii) The most important ground, according to the British, for the right of interference was founded on that of "giving advise on all matters on which it may appear conducive to the honour and advantage of the State", as well as the special ground of its being the custom in all the Indian States, excepting in cases of proved treason to provide for members of the reigning family.
- iv) Lastly, the Governor also pointed out that Gopalrao had won the enmity of Sayajirao

59. Ibid., GOB to GOI, 29-7-1839.

particularly because he had kept some of his Horse in the Contingent under Malcolm's arrangement in 1829.⁶⁰

The extent to which the British were prepared to go is again made clear in this particular case. Gopalrao had flaunted the authority of Sayajirao by visiting Govindrao who had more than once proved his treachery to the Gaekwad, and also by taking part in Malcolm's arrangement of the Contingent, which had been particularly degrading to the Gaekwad. To talk after this of "maintaining the dignity of the Gaekwad family" is nothing short of hypocrisy. The payment by them of Gopalrao's allowance and the inclusion of this very petty demand in this settlement and the prolonged discussion over it, was obviously to rub in the fact with the Gaekwad of their strength against his weakness. By 1840, the Gaekwad had realised his inability to hold out any longer and, as in many of the other cases, he complied with this demand also on 24th March, 1840.⁶¹

The next case once again referred to the interference of the British in the Gaekwad's legal rights. It referred to the theft of the property of Captain Brown

60. Ibid., Minutes of Grant, 4-7-1839, quoted in the letter to the Governor General of India, dated 29-7-1839.

61. PD(BOM), 12A/1842-43. Agreement between Sayajirao and Sutherland, 24-3-1840.

and other British officers at Baroda as already discussed.⁶² On this occasion, several persons had been wounded in attempting to ward off the robbers. In consequence, Sutherland repeatedly asked the Gaekwad to make redress to the sufferers, and on his refusal, the Government of Bombay, in October, 1838 had directed Sutherland to make good the losses out of the Gaekwad's tributaries. Sayajirao now made an agreement with Sutherland on 24th February, 1840, consenting to this arrangement.⁶³

This demand had been nothing but a show of strength once again on the part of the British, and their insistence that he should accept a fait accompli was a further humiliation to the Gaekwad.

The eighth demand was for the satisfaction from the Gaekwad government for a robbery committed in April, 1837, by certain Waghers of Okhamandal in the house of a merchant, living in a village of Kutch. The British Agent in Kathiawad had demanded that the offenders should be surrendered to him for trial.⁶⁴ As a result the Gaekwad's manager at Okhamandal delivered up three individuals who had confessed to have been concerned in

62. See Chapter VII.

63. PD(BOM), 12/1842-43. Agreement between Sayajirao and Sutherland, 24-2-1840.

64. PDL(BOM) to COB, 54/1840. Erskine to GOB, 25-8-1837.

the robbery and part of the stolen property had been found in their possession. The officer had reported to Erskine, the Political Agent in Kathiawad, that four more persons concerned in the robbery were still at large, but he feared that if he attempted to seize them, there would a riot.⁶⁵ Erskine does not seem to have made any offer of help to the Gaekwad's officer at this stage. Instead, despite the active co-operation of the Gaekwad's officers, the British government was not satisfied and⁶⁶ had directed Sutherland to give the Gaekwad three options:

- i) That the offenders should be tried by their Criminal Court in Kathiawad;
- ii) That they should be surrendered to the Rao of Kutch; or
- iii) They should be given up to his own officers, the Gaekwad government undertaking to pay the value of the lost property.

Considering the fact that some of the culprits had already been handed over to the British agent, they could very well be tried by the Criminal Court there, pending the arrest of others. Once again this was nothing but a means to harass the Gaekwad with unnecessary demands. Naturally, the Gaekwad made no further communication to the British

65. Ibid.

66. Ibid., GOB to Sutherland, 12-9-1838.

about this matter till 1840. He obviously saw no purpose in availing himself of any of these options, as all of them ultimately recoiled on him. The British were more interested, as it turned out, in getting compensation than the trial of offenders, and in February, 1840, Sutherland was informed that the case could be considered closed and that the persons concerned in the robbery should be delivered up to the Gaekwad, who was asked to afford compensation to the merchant for the value of the property lost.⁶⁷ This is a blatant case of getting the Gaekwad to pay for losses even without specific proof or even before the Courts had held the persons guilty. Sayajirao could not immediately accept such orders from the British and refused to consider the matter till September, 1840, when he ultimately agreed to pay the value of the property lost to the merchant concerned.⁶⁸

The ninth demand once again brought into question law and order problem. The British demand was that the Gaekwad should adopt measures for effectively preventing offenders who were British subjects from obtaining asylum in the Gaekwad's territory. The British further demanded that the Gaekwad's officer at Kadi should be dismissed as he had connived at the escape of certain criminals who had

67. Ibid., GOB to SUTHERLAND, 7-2-1840.

68. PD(BOM), 12A/1842-43. Agreement between Sayajirao and Sutherland, 2-9-1840.

committed offences in the Ahmedabad district in 1839. The first part regarding the surrender of the criminals had already been discussed in the ninth demand of the first set, and was left pending. The second part about the dismissal of the Gaekwad's officers in Kadi was compromised. Sayajirao agreed to levy a fine on such of his authorities as had proved to have connived at the escape of the culprits,⁶⁹ and the British government withdrew the demand for the dismissal of the officers.

The tenth demand was for the confirmation and satisfaction of all the guarantees given by the British government including those of the very controversial ones, of Gangadhar Shastri, Dhackji Dadaji and that of Desai of Navsari. It also included satisfaction to Punjaji Joraji. All these cases have been fully discussed in the foregoing chapters and it has been proved that the demands of the British were most unfair and unjust. The guarantee question had become a prestige issue to both the governments. This demand was obviously not so easy to solve and it was resolved only in slow stages during the years 1840 and 1841. Instead of tackling the question of all the guarantees Sutherland began negotiations regarding the guarantees of three specific individuals mentioned above.

69. Ibid., Agreement between Sayajirao and Sutherland, April, 1840.

In the case of Gangadhar Shastri Sayajirao agreed in March, 1840 to the deductions from his tribute of all sums paid to the Shastri family by the British government on account of their claims against him.⁷⁰ He, however, demurred when the question of confirming the Sanads to the family arose. As already shown in chapter V, Sayajirao questioned the right of the British to force him to grant the Sanad in perpetuity to the family since no such clause regarding perpetuity had been included in the original Sanad. Sutherland and the Bombay government argued that since hereditary settlements and guarantees had been given to families of others who held similar offices under the Gaekwad governments, no less could be granted to the Shastri family. They once again went back to the "original intention" of Anandrao Gaekwad when he had assured the family of the murdered Gangadhar Shastri in 1815 of "protection and maintenance".⁷¹ Sayajirao had from the beginning, objected to British interference, because in actual fact the British had not granted a formal guarantee to the sons of Gangadhar Shastri, and it may be recalled that Elphinstone had categorically declared that the British had no right to interfere in the absence of their guarantee. The Court of Directors, however, pronounced

70. Ibid., Agreement between Sayajirao and Sutherland, 19-3-1840.

71. PDL(BOM) to COD, 54/1840, 26-9-1840.

in favour of the Shastri family, and decided that they should get all the arrears of the amounts due to their late father. However, both the Government of Bombay and the Government of India had doubts and the case was left for further consideration.

Now having got the upper hand, the Government of Bombay simply stated that the question that the family of the Shastris had the British guarantee, had been finally decided, and it remained to be decided whether the "indulgence was intended to be perpetual".⁷² About the latter question Bombay government concluded that it was only necessary to refer to the cases of other ministers of the Baroda State and to follow the 'usual form' in which the Gaekwads had directed the Resident at their Courts to extend the British guarantee. On a reference to the 'usual form', at the Courts of the Gaekwad, it appeared to the British that the ministers Raoji Appaji and Babaji Appaji and their descendants had the British guarantee extended to them in perpetuity. If these persons, they argued, whose services were not more important and valuable than those of the late Shastri, had the British guarantee both for themselves and "their posterity", it could not be maintained that this indulgence could be withheld from the children of "one who fell a

72. Ibid.

sacrifice in the service of His Sovereign".⁷³ Another argument in support of their contention was that the office of Regent which had been conferred in 1815 on one of the sons of the late Gangadhar Shastri was a hereditary one like those of the other ministers, and, therefore, the guarantee given to "confirm and secure" that office with the Nemnook could also have been intended to be hereditary.⁷⁴ They further supported their argument by citing the case of one Mahadeorao Gopal Muzumdar whose original Sanad was made a personal one, but was afterwards "converted into and declared to be" a "perpetual" grant under the British guarantee.⁷⁵ The Government of Bombay concluded that the cases cited were analogous to that of the Shastri family, and maintained that "the non-execution of a regularly written instrument" formed no obstacle to one now being framed according to the "original intention and the usages of the Baroda State".⁷⁶ They argued with the Gaekwad on these lines, and insisted that he should invest the son of Gangadhar Shastri in the office held by his father and that too in perpetuity. The British action in this case is nothing if not dictatorial. The arguments used are patently false and had no legal force.

73. Ibid.

74. Ibid.

75. Ibid.

76. Ibid.

Sayajirao held out for some time but ultimately on 21st October, 1840, a new Sanad was conferred in open Darbar on the family of Gangadhar Shastri in perpetuity.⁷⁷

Dhackji Dadaji's case was also one which had been a bone of contention between the two governments in which the British again supported a questionable case. (see Chapter V). Here again the Court of Directors had insisted on Sayajirao restoring the Inam villages to Dhackji Dadaji, though Elphinstone, Clare, and Grant - all the three Governors - had said that no guarantee had been given by the British government and that Sayajirao was perfectly right to take back the Inam villages. Because of the Court's orders, the British had paid some money to Dhackji on account of the Inam villages. On 5th March, 1840, Sayajirao wrote to Sutherland that he was willing to give credit to the British government for what they had paid on account of the arrears of revenue of Dhackji's Inam villages. He further declared his willingness to make over the villages to Dhackji. He, however, requested that the British should call Dhackji to Baroda when he could personally settle all questions with him.⁷⁸ The Government of Bombay informed Dhackji about this and promised him "safe conduct" until to Baroda.⁷⁹ Dhackji explained his inability to proceed

77. PD(BOM), 12A/1842-43. Letter from the Political Commissioner for Gujarat to GOB, 22-10-1840.

78. Ibid., Sayajirao to Sutherland, 5-3-1840.

79. Ibid., GOB to Dhackji Dadaji, 18-8-1840.

to Baroda because of his failing health and advanced age and begged to be excused by Sayajirao and stated that since the villages had not been in his possession for a long time, he would not be able to manage them. He begged the British government not to disturb the existing arrangement, i.e., the British paying him the revenue whilst the villages remained in possession of the Gaekwad.⁸⁰

A copy of this letter was forwarded to Sutherland by the Government of Bombay with instructions to communicate the wishes of Dhackji Dadaji to Sayajirao and to report the result to the Government.⁸¹

Mr. Boyd who had become the Political Commissioner for Gujarat in June, 1840, held discussions with the Gaekwad on this issue, and on 16th December, 1840, the latter sent a letter to Boyd that he was willing if the British government wished him to do so, to make a payment of Rs.30,000 per annum to Dhackji on account of these villages, although he would much prefer giving up the villages to Dhackji and allow that individual to collect the revenue himself.⁸²

The Government of Bombay, however, were unwilling to give up making payments themselves to Dhackji from the Gaekwad's tribute, obviously because it gave them supremacy over him. Sayajirao, ⁸³ therefore, informed accordingly on the 2nd March, 1841.

80. Ibid., Dhackji Dadaji to GOB, 30-8-1840.

81. Ibid., GOB to Boyd, 11-9-1840.

82. Ibid., Sayajirao to Boyd, 16-12-1840.

83. Ibid., Letter from Boyd to Sayajirao, 2-3-1841.

Having no option left, the Gaekwad stated that he was willing, in compliance with the wishes of the British government to accede to their arrangement.⁸⁴ Thus another clearly unjust decision had been imposed by the British on the Gaekwad.

The third specific case was that of the family of the Desai of Navsari whose case has already been explained fully in an earlier chapter. As seen, the British had sequestered the district of Navsari in February, 1838, in consequence of Sayajirao having refused to make any settlement on the claims of this family. Subsequently, the British had asked Mr. Elliot, the British Political Agent of Surat to investigate the claim of the family. Sayajirao had been asked to depute some one on his behalf to be present at the investigation. Sayajirao refused to depute any one as he considered that the British had no right to interfere in this affair.⁸⁵ Elliot admitted that it was not possible to come to a satisfactory decision without explanations from the Gaekwad's side. However, he made out a statement of claims against the Gaekwad, on behalf of the family of Desai of Navsari amounting to Rs.4,32,404.⁸⁶ In the negotiations with Boyd, which followed, Sayajirao stated

84. Ibid., Sayajirao to Boyd, 12-3-1841.

85. PDL(BOM) to COD, 54/1840. Elliot to GOB, 27-1-1840.

86. Ibid.

that he was now willing to pay the Desai family whatever amount might be justly due to them after an investigation of the account.⁸⁷ Upto the end of 1840, the exact balance had not yet been agreed upon.

During Sir James Carnac's visit to Baroda in February, 1841, an assurance was given by the Gaekwad to him that he would settle the claims of the Desai family as soon as the accounts could be properly investigated.⁸⁸ In return, Carnac immediately ordered the return of Navsari to Sayajirao. The question of guarantee as a whole was settled by Carnac during his visit as has been discussed later.

The last part of the demand was regarding Punjaji Joraji, whose case has already been discussed. The British had demanded that the Gaekwad should grant Joraji a compensation of Rs.3,000 and a life pension of Rs.100 per month. Sayajirao had refused and the British government had made a donation of Rs.1,000 and granted him a life pension of Rs.75 per month.⁸⁹ Sayajirao now made an agreement with Sutherland on 30th March, 1840, by which the amount of money paid by the British would be deducted from his tributes, and that the arrangement would be continued by him in the future.⁹⁰ The British

87. PD(BOM), 12A/1842-43, Boyd to GOB, 22-10-1840.

88. SC(BOM), Vol. IX, No.639, GOB to COD, 26-2-1841.

89. Ibid.

90. Ibid., Agreement between Sayajirao and Sutherland, 30-3-1840.

were thus getting all their illegal actions (claims) against the Gaekwad sanctioned by the Gaekwad himself.

The eleventh demand was a similar one of getting the Gaekwad to agree to the deductions of Rs.50,000 already made by the British from his tributes for payment to Vallabhdas Maneckchand whose case was very similar to that of Punjaji Joraji. Having no option, the Gaekwad arrived at an agreement with Boyd, accepting the fait accompli, in June 1840.⁹¹

The twelfth demand was for redress to Mir Sarfaraz Ali and others formerly belonging to the Gaekwad's Contingent during Malcolm's time. As already indicated, Sayajirao had taken their action as traitorous and had refused to compromise with their demands. Here again, Sayajirao gave in and in early 1840, Mir Sarfaraz Ali and others were given back their property, restored to their positions in the Contingent and readmitted to the Gaekwad's Court.⁹²

The thirteenth demand concerned the remissions already granted by the British in the Gaekwad's tributaries in spite of his opposition. The British wanted him once again to agree to something which had already been forced

91. Ibid., Agreement between Sayajirao and Boyd, August, 1840.

92. Ibid., Agreement between Sayajirao and Sutherland, 30-3-1840.

upon him and further to admit the right of the British government to sanction reductions on their own. This issue was one involving the Gaekwad's sovereign right regarding his tributaries. He now realised that he, in fact, possessed no such sovereignty and, on the 24th April, 1840, he consented to whatever remissions that had been made so far and agreed in future to accept such remissions as might be "deemed just" by the British in Mahikanta, Revakanta and Kathiawad on the occurrence of a natural calamity. He also admitted the right of the British government to sanction such reduction on their own.⁹³

The last demand was for a complete reform in the Gaekwad's Contingent of 3,000 Horse and for its use whenever required by the British in Gujarat. The nature of the reforms proposed by the British struck at the root of the Gaekwad's authority and met with a great deal of resistance from him.

According to the British, the Gaekwad's Contingent had for many years past been in a "lamentable state of inefficiency" and could not be relied upon to perform any service of 'danger or importance'.⁹⁴ For the last

93. Ibid., Agreement between Sayajirao and Sutherland, 24-4-1840.

94. PDL(BOM) to COD, 54/1840. Summary prepared by GOB, 30-7-1838.

two years, the British government had made a series of demands on the Gaekwad regarding the "inefficient and almost useless state" of this body.⁹⁵ According to them nothing came out of these complaints, and on the contrary, the Contingent had been daily "sinking into a still more inefficient condition" than before, and there was little chance of improvement under the Gaekwad's own management.⁹⁶ The Government of Bombay in consultation with the Governor-General now proposed that the Contingent should be reduced to half the number i.e., 1500 with the requisite proportion of European and Indian commissioned and non-commissioned officers, and that the whole body be under the control of the British government. The pay of the Contingent was to be deducted directly from the Gaekwad's tributes.⁹⁷ The Gaekwad naturally refused to accept such an arrangements, and maintained that the whole question was one of great importance and difficulty because of the involvement of many of his old Sardars, and others who were connected with his "Raj" and whose Nemnooks had by degrees been diminished. Many of them were greatly in debt and it would land them in great difficulties if they were deprived of their services in the Contingent.⁹⁸

95. Ibid., Letter from GOB to COD, 10-2-1840.

96. Ibid.,

97. Ibid.

98. Ibid.

Sayajirao pointed out the fact that he felt a great "sense of degradation" to put his relations and old family adherents to such hardships.⁹⁹ He declared in a discussion with Sutherland that the proposed measures would be "fatal" to his dignity and character", and that nothing that the British government could do would be so "hurtful to his feelings".¹⁰⁰ He further assured Sutherland that he was ready to do anything required in preference to that and would most cheerfully keep up the full number of 3,000 Horse in any degree of increased efficiency which the Bombay government required retaining only its present form and constitution.¹⁰¹

Sutherland further reported that Sayajirao appealed for a hearing by the Governor before a final decision was taken on this subject, and declared that he had never wished to "disobey" the government in this particular matter, and had trusted that "nothing more or less than what is laid down in the Treaty may be exacted". He also assured Sutherland that with regard to the efficiency of the Horse, he undertook that he would do everything till it fully satisfied the Bombay government.¹⁰²

99. Ibid.

100. PDL(BOM) to COD, 62/1841, No. 4, Sutherland to GOB, 15-5-1840.

101. Ibid.

102. Ibid.

Sayajirao had many reasons for refusing to disband or to reduce the old Contingent, apart from the one mentioned above. It would mean a reduction of patronage and influence over his own people. The Contingent was a matter of great pride to the Gaekwad and represented his power in the eyes of his subjects and other Indian rulers. It may be recalled that Clare had returned the responsibility of the Contingent to Sayajirao after accepting a deposit of Rs.10 lakhs in case there was a default in payment. Upto now no specific case of maladministration or non-payment of the Contingent had been proved. Proof of this was that the Gaekwad's Rs.10 lakhs were still lying intact in deposit in the British Treasury. This particular demand seems to have been based on the general idea of the British to reduce the stature of the Gaekwad as far as possible by taking away whatever little real power he possessed. In spite of knowing his helplessness, Sayajirao held out against this demand, and humbly requested Carnac to pay a visit to Baroda and settle matters with him directly.^{102a} Sayajirao humbled himself completely and assured the Governor that he was his "Protector and Friend", and begged for forgiveness.¹⁰³ Sayajirao explained that most of the matters had been

102a. Ibid., Sayajirao to Carnac, January, 1841.

103. Ibid.

settled or could be settled through the Resident, except the matter of the Contingent, which was "of great consequence" to his government, and was part of the Treaty obligations. Therefore, without a meeting with the Governor, the matter could not be solved. He urged that for his sake Carnac should immediately prepare to come to Baroda.¹⁰⁴ He also assured the Governor that he would agree to whatever decisions were arrived at the meeting.¹⁰⁵ Sayajirao expected that Carnac who had been in Baroda much earlier in his career would perhaps understand the need for some compromise.

Carnac was definitely more inclined to reach some understanding with the Gaekwad now that he had been laid so low. The Court of Directors also were having second thoughts about the two major issues of guarantees and the Contingent of Horse and ~~and~~ about the general trend of affairs between the British and the Gaekwad in the last few years. In a letter to the Governor of Bombay in July, 1840, the Court of Directors observed that it indeed appeared fruitless to hope for a permanent maintenance of good understanding between the British government and its "ancient ally" whilst the present

104. Ibid.

105. Ibid.

"anomalous" state of things continued to exist. They admitted that there were cases in which, it would be equitable for the British to share in whatever "sacrifices" may be necessary in order to get rid of the "mischievous consequences" that had arisen.¹⁰⁶ This was a complete change from the attitude of the very same Court who, a year ago had insisted in their vindictive attitude towards the Gaekwad, forcing him to make payment to such discredited and traitorous persons like Dhackji Dadaji.

As a result of repeated requests from Sayajirao, Sir James Carnac left Bombay on 21st January, 1841, and reached Baroda on 26th January, 1841,¹⁰⁷ where he was met with all due courtesy. Sayajirao went out to meet Carnac, a short distance from the city and received him with every mark of attention and cordiality with the honours customary on such occasion.

Regarding the Gaekwad's Contingent, the Court of Directors had advised that the reforms could not be imposed on the Gaekwad under the existing Treaties, but should be voluntarily acquiesced to by Sayajirao.¹⁰⁸

The Bombay government was, however, unwilling for so total a change. Before this meeting with Sayajirao

106. SC(BOM), IX, No.639. COD to GOB, 2-7-1840.

107. PDL(BOM) to COD, 62/1841 No.4, 26-2-1841.

108. SC(BOM), IX, No.639, COD to GOB, 2-7-1840.

Carnac had expressed his opinion to the Governor-General that Sayajirao had by "repeated violation" of many articles in the Treaties existing between the two governments, and by "long and systematic series of unfriendly acts" had placed himself at the mercy of the British. The British government should, therefore, dictate the terms on which it would permit a renewal of friendly relations with Sayajirao, and that in its opinion, it spoke much for its "moderation" that amongst all the demands it had been "compelled" to make on him, the reform of the Contingent was the only one which was directly in the British interests.¹⁰⁹ That Sayajirao was not going to meet with any real concessions from even Carnac is clear from this.

The Bombay government also complained that Sayajirao had never kept up the Contingent of Horse in the manner prescribed by the 8th Article of the Treaty of 1817, and that, if the British government now gave in it would encourage a person like Sayajirao to imagine that since the British government had once relinquished its demands, which it had repeatedly declared to be "irrevokable", it would show the same "vacillation" in other future claims. He would, it feared, flatter himself

109. Ibid., GOB to GOI, 11-11-1840.

that he could have no difficulty in "eluding by evasion" other demands also. The British considered this attitude adopted by Sayajirao, to be a "serious and irretrievable evil".¹¹⁰

The Governor General in reply had advised that the Contingent should be retained only as a disciplined Force under a British officer, and on the satisfactory settlement of all other pending disputes, the Governor was authorized to restore Petlad and other sequestered districts ^{to} Sayajirao giving full security that no molestation or persecution would take place on his subjects in these territories because of their co-operation with the British during the "occupation".¹¹¹ Carnac's attitude thus was prejudiced to a certain extent, and is reflected in the proposals he made to Sayajirao.

Carnac held meetings with Sayajirao from 29th January, 1841 to 8th February, 1841, and declared his feeling of "friendship" and a desire for good understanding between the two governments.¹¹² He was able to settle mainly the questions of the Contingent of Horse and the outstanding guarantees.

110. Ibid.

111. PDL(BOM) to COD, 62/1841 No.4, GOI to GOB, 4-1-1841.

112. Ibid. PD(BOM) 12A/1842-43. Minutes of Carnac, 13-2-1841.



He proposed the following terms to Sayajirao with regard to the Contingent which were proposed at the first meeting:

i) Sayajirao should maintain the Gujarat Irregular Horse known as Robert's Rissala composed of 640 horsemen raised by the British in the beginning of 1839 with the sanction of the Government of India. This body was paid out of the revenues of the sequestered district of Petlad and was completely under British control.¹¹³

ii) That on restoration of Petlad, ^{to} Sayajirao "as an act of grace", the expenses for the maintenance of the maintenance of the Gaskwad's Contingent of Horse should be met from his tributes in Kathiawad, and the Contingent should be reduced to 1500 Horse, and kept in an "efficient state" for service with the British in the tributary districts.

The Gaskwad remonstrated against these proposals stating that they were contrary to the terms of the existing Treaties. To suit his purposes, Carnac informed Sayajirao that the Treaties were not to be taken "exclusively" as the basis of the arrangements and that they had already been broken by Sayajirao at various times, for which he

113. The Gujarat irregular Horse had been raised in March, 1839 to take the place of the Contingent and paid from the revenues of Petlad with the idea that it would ultimately form a part of the Reformed Contingent.

had subjected himself to the "severe and just displeasure" of the British government. The Governor further informed Sayajirao that he had no option but to agree to these proposals, and that no modification was now possible, as the government was "finally and unalterably determined".¹¹⁴ He advised Sayajirao to accept the "liberal" conditions offered and reminded him that on his acquiescence lay "his sole hope" of restoration of the "friendship and favour" of the British government and that his rejection of them might be attended with the most "serious consequences to his future welfare".¹¹⁵

Sayajirao asked for a few days time in which to consider the proposals. At the next meeting on 1st February, 1841, Sayajirao entered into a lengthy discussion on the subject of the Gujarat irregular Horse. He urged that the burden of maintaining this body should not be imposed upon him. On seeing, however, that the Governor was adamant, he finally consented to defray the expenses of this Corps which amounted to Rs.3 lakhs per annum, and to leave it under the exclusive control of the British government, provided he would be allowed to maintain the whole of his Contingent of 3,000 Horse according to the Treaty of 1817.¹¹⁶

114. PD(BOM), 12A/1842-43. Minutes of Carnac, 13-2-1841.

115. Ibid.

116. Ibid.

The Governor was aware that the consent had been forced out of Sayajirao by his fear of permanently losing the district of Petlad. The Governor, however, was sure that Sayajirao would exert every means in his power to get rid of this burden of the Irregular Horse.¹¹⁷ Carnac accepted this offer from the Gaekwad, and an agreement was reached between the two.¹¹⁸

The Gujarat irregular horse of 640 horsemen would be maintained at the expenses of the Gaekwad and all past expenses incurred in the maintenance of that body would be deducted from the revenues of Petlad. The Gaekwad's Contingent was to remain at 3,000 Horse and would be kept up in an efficient state.

The other outstanding issue discussed during this visit was the question of guarantees. Carnac took up the claims of 17 guarantees with hereditary obligations involving pledges of personal protection, often extending to agents and dependants of these persons. The Court of Directors had suggested that some portion of these dues should be paid by the British government.¹¹⁹ At long last, they had realised the inequity of the position they had so far maintained. Writing to the Government of Bombay,

117. Ibid.

118. Ibid., Agreement between Sayajirao and Carnac, 1-2-1841.

119. PDL(BOM) to COB, 62/1841, No.4, COB to GOB, 2-7-1840.

they ^{had} pointed out that when the British undertook to protect for all time to come the "lives, honour and property" of the descendants of certain persons against their Sovereign, they also had to enforce "for ever" the payment to them of "large and onerous allowances" from the Gaekwad State, as the salary of nominal offices of which the duties were not performed by the persons concerned. This could not have been necessary for the objects of their policy. The reigning Gaekwad at the time these guarantees were given could not have imposed such burdens upon his successors, had not the British given their guarantee. They now opined that the Gaekwad had a "just complaint" in these cases.¹²⁰ The Court of Directors showed their willingness to come to a compromise on this issue, by suggesting an arrangement for taking upon the British a part of the financial burden, provided the Gaekwad would consent to assign to them a fixed annual sum equivalent to his share from his tributes.¹²¹

In this way, the Nannooks and other allowances would be paid from the British treasury. This would no doubt assure that the guaranteed persons would remain permanently indebted to the British as opposed to their sovereign. The advantage, however, was that the constant

120. Ibid.

121. Ibid.

discussion regarding the complaints would cease.

The Governor General, however, did not agree to this till he received the final orders from the Court of Directors. The Governor General ^{had been} was of the opinion that the pecuniary part of the guarantees could most easily be enforced, as the British government had in its hand the collection of considerable revenues of the Gaskwad. On the other hand, experience had shown that the "pledge of personal protection" to the guaranteed persons was the greatest obstacle full of "embarrassment and collusion", and he thought that the British government could legally not free itself from this duty.¹²² He advised that no mention be made to Sayajirao of the British taking upon themselves any portion of the payments made under the guarantees on a sharing basis as suggested by the Court of Directors.¹²³ He, in fact, did not feel justified in taking such a step without further consideration, and had referred the matter back to the Court of Directors.¹²⁴ He opined that the British could not "honourably" release themselves from their obligations of personal guarantees without the "consent" of the concerned. He was of the opinion that, in fact, a "greater part of the benefit" of these guarantees which in many instances had been "solicited" by "the reigning prince", accrued "materially to the

122. Ibid., GOI to GOB, 4-1-1841.

123. Ibid.

124. Ibid.

preservation, existance and prosperity of the Baroda State".¹²⁵
 The problem of guarantees could not be solved just by
 partially alleviating the monetary burden, because, as
 he rightly put it, the assurance given, on general terms,
 to the life, honour and property of the guaranteed persons,
 had deprived the Gaekwad of his independent authority.¹²⁶

Accordingly the Governor General ^{had} asked the
 Governor of Bombay that to supply a detailed analysis of
 the existing guarantees to him, after which he would
 consider the "propriety" of the Directors' recommendation.¹²⁷

Carnac, however, on receipt of Court of Directors
 letter had thought that it would be possible to arrive at a
 satisfactory adjustment on the question of guarantees. He
 had meant to act according to the spirit of the Court's
 letter and to propose to Sayajirao an arrangement for the
 future payment of the guarantees, favourable to Sayajirao
 in proportion to "the disposition" he should manifest with
 regard to the Contingent.¹²⁸ Carnac had been prepared to
 propose the following arrangement:

i) To obtain a correct valuation of the existing
 guarantees, analytically reviewing each individual case.

ii) The British to take over the entire annual
 payment of every claimant on receipt of a portion of

125. Ibid.

126. Ibid.

127. Ibid.

128. BBB(BAR), 1840 and 1853. Minutes of Carnac,
 21-1-1841.

revenues determined by the Governor according to each case.

iii) Problems arising from the complaints of the holders of the personal guarantees should be settled by "active and vigilant" local authorities without allowing them to become a source of important disputes between the two governments.

However, after having received the Governor General's instructions, Carnac did not disclose these proposals to Sayajirao. Instead, he informed the Gaekwad that the British government would insist on the fulfilment of all the guarantees to the minutest particular.¹²⁹ Sayajirao thereupon promised that he would faithfully observe all such engagements but represented that the possessors of the British guarantees should be enjoined to treat him with due respect and to forget that the British government was bound to protect them against him. He wanted them to realise that he was still their
¹³⁰
Sovereign.

Carnac assured Sayajirao that he had every desire to uphold his authority as head of the State and informed him that he had already warned all holders of British guarantees to desist from any action as could be construed

129. Ibid., Minutes of Carnac, 13-2-1841.

130. Ibid.

into even a "slight or disrespect" towards him. He also assured him that he fully recognized his rights over these persons, as over the rest of his subjects.¹³¹ However, he of course, maintained that the British could not relinquish their "privilege of interference" in order to secure these persons from "injustice and oppression".¹³² Thus, Carnac once again went back to the very crux of the problem inspite of all the assurances given above, and thereby made these assurances worthless. Carnac also assured the Gaekwad that in all other matters the British would desist from all interference in the internal affairs and management of his State where he was "free and unrestrained" to act as he might think proper for the welfare of his people and the maintenance of his own honour".¹³³ These assurances must have sounded wonderful to Sayajirao, who for the last so many years had suffered all manner of interferences, in the minutest detail, from the British. No specific settlement of the individual guaranteed persons could be arrived at during Carnac's visit to Baroda because he had to await instructions from the Governor General and the Court of Directors. In the meantime after giving these assurances, Carnac again impressed most solemnly upon the Gaekwad that the British Government would insist

131. Ibid.

132. Ibid.

133. Ibid.

on the "strict and entire fulfilment" of every article for which they "stood pledged".¹³⁴

In return Sayajirao assured the Governor that he would settle, in consultation with the Resident the existing differences and refrain from any act which would oblige the British to interfere between him and his subjects.¹³⁵ Carnac, however, was not satisfied with the way he had to leave things unsettled about these guarantees. In his minute, he confessed that the possessors of the British guarantees had in many instances presumed on their right to British interference and had been wanting in "that respectful obedience which they are bound to pay to the Gaekwad as their sovereign".¹³⁶ Carnac also recognized the duty of the British to insist that every Gaekwad subject, who had a British guarantee should regard the Gaekwad as his sovereign, and should never be placed outside his jurisdiction. He stated that the duty of the British was to see that the Gaekwad's authority, was fairly and justly exercised towards these persons, but the British were not a "tribunal" by which these "privileged" persons were to be judged.¹³⁷ He instructed the Resident to be guided by these principles, and to maintain both the "good faith" of the British and the "dignity and honour"

134. Ibid.

135. Ibid.

136. Ibid.

137. Ibid.

of the Gaekwad. He cautioned the Resident to desist from interfering in every case, unless the British were solemnly bound to do so. In short, as he said, the Resident should consider Sayajirao, except in these particular cases, as a free and independent sovereign of his dominion.¹³⁸ Carnac regretted that he could not go into these detailed questions and had to leave the whole guarantee problem to the Resident, Boyd, who he hoped, would not find "an insuperable difficulty" in arriving at a satisfactory settlement of all the pending disputes.¹³⁹ Carnac was obviously completely mixed up about his attitude to the Gaekwad and the Baroda problems, contradicting himself at every turn.

The next pending dispute was that of the appointment of a new minister by Sayajirao. As already pointed out, after dismissing Veniram, Sayajirao had not appointed another minister in his place. Carnac agreed that the British could not insist upon Sayajirao appointing a new minister as long as he continued in the same friendly terms with the Resident and "listened to his advise" and avoided all breach of his engagements. At the same time, Sayajirao promised that whenever he wanted to appoint a minister, he would select an individual against whom the

138. Ibid.

139. Ibid.

British government had no objection.¹⁴⁰ Carnac warned Sayajirao in the most solemn manner of the "utter ruin" which would devolve on him should he hereafter hold the least intercourse with Veniram.¹⁴¹ Sayajirao, accordingly agreed to this proposal.¹⁴¹

After reaching these settlements regarding the Contingent, the guaranteed subjects and the minister Veniram, the districts of Petlad and Navsari were returned to Sayajirao along with those parts of the tributes that had been appropriated from Kathiawad, Mahikanta and Rewakanta, retaining the amount due to the Desai of Navsari. The deposit of Rs.10 lakhs was also immediately restored to Sayajirao and lastly, it was agreed that the British authorities and troops should participate in the Ganapati and Dassera festivals which they had stopped doing for several years. The last point was conceded as a special favour to Sayajirao, who attached much prestige on it. The Governor, however, refused to allow the Resident to be in the procession as desired by Sayajirao. According to the Governor, it would be contrary to the principle of the British government to allow officers and troops to take part in any religious observance of the nature of Dassera though they had been

140. PDL(BOM) to COD, 62/1841, No.4. Settlement between Sayajirao and Carnac, February, 1841.

141. Ibid., GOB to COD, 26-2-1841.

doing this earlier. Along with accumulation of power, their ideas of 'propriety' were also changing.¹⁴²

The visit of Carnac ended with more or less "satisfactory" adjustments of all former outstanding differences between the British and the Gaekwad's government, for all outward purposes. In actual fact, the British government had succeeded in getting the Gaekwad to accept all of their demands, and then alone had returned back his provinces and money. In no way had the British given up their ultimate right of interference or their right as final arbiters of the Gaekwad's action as seen by these many agreements. There was no retreating from the stand of imperium which the British had adopted with reference to Sayajirao and all other princely states of this time.

However, Carnac's friendly behaviour and attitude may have opened out fresh hopes in Sayajirao's mind about the future and he may have entertained hopes that he would be able to really exercise sovereignty within his own territory. The change also on the part of the Court of

142. Ibid. This last point regarding attendance at the festivals arose out of Sutherland's refusal to attend on such occasion though Williams and other Residents had continuously done so. Sutherland, as in everything else, had made this an issue of prestige. Carnac's refusal to allow the participation in the actual festival reflects the change in the British attitude towards Indian social and religious customs after 1832.

Directors had definitely brought about some moderation in the 'show' of power exercised by the British. After a period of extreme bitterness and hostility, Baroda was now to see a period of comparative friendliness.

CHAPTER X

THE LAST YEARS

Carnac returned from Baroda, having laid the foundations for better understanding between the two governments. He, however, was to leave India shortly and the actual work of reconciliation was left in the hands of the regular political department officers, whose attitudes and prejudices were too deeply ingrained to allow for a radical change. Sayajirao had also developed deep distrust against the British, which he was unable to shed completely.

The history of this last period of Sayajirao's reign is one of comparative peace between the two governments, interspersed with conflicts arising mainly from the unsettled guarantee cases and the arrangements regarding the Contingent of Horse, matters of law and order and the tributary States. In this period we see the further erosion of whatever little sovereignty the Gaekwad still possessed in spite of all Carnac's assurances to the contrary. There was also the case of attempted fraud and robbery on the part of Dadaji Dhackji and others, which once again brought into play the conflict of interests between the two governments,

with accusation and counter accusations put forth by both sides.

The law and order question had formed Nos. 9 and 10 of the demands made by the British government in 1829 and were settled partly in January, 1841. The Gaekwad had agreed to lay down certain rules for the guidance of his officers in the discharge of their duties.¹ These rules were not found adequate enough by the British and for the time being they had been left for further consideration after consultation with the Governor General and the Court of Directors. The British took a one sided view of the Treaty obligations, and according to them, the Gaekwad was expected to hand over offenders taking refuge in his territory with no reciprocal action on their part. Article 16 of the original Treaty between the Gaekwad and the British dated 21st April, 1805, and the Article 9 of the Treaty dated 6th November, 1817 stated that offenders taking refuge in the jurisdiction of either party should be surrendered on demand without delay or hesitation on the part of the party concerned, and that frivolous claims should not be entertained.²

1. See Chapter IX.

2. Aitchison, Op. cit., Vol. VI, pp.345 and 357.

During these negotiations the British made all efforts to upset the letter and spirit of these clauses.

Sayajirao had obviously been trying, during the earlier negotiations with Sutherland to make the British accept their part of the Treaty obligations. The rules that the Gaekwad had proposed for his officers included the handing over of the offenders to the British when they had taken refuge in his territories after committing a crime in the British territory. Stolen property was likewise to be given up, if found within the Gaekwad's territory. The Gaekwad also agreed to send persons required as witnesses by the British and effect the recovery of debts from revenue defaulters of the British government taking refuge in his territory.³

In May, 1840, the Gaekwad entered into an agreement regarding these rules and also appended a request that similar arrangements should be introduced in the British territories on the basis of reciprocity.⁴ On receipt of this communication, the Government of Bombay immediately reacted in a typical manner, though the suggestion of reciprocity was completely in accordance with the Treaties. The Government called upon the judges of their court in Ahmedabad to report whether there was

3. PD(BOM), 12A/1842-43. Report of Sutherland of the meeting with Sayajirao held on 23-1-1840.

4. PD(BOM), 15/2020 of 1848. Sutherland to GOB, 16-5-1840.

anything in the Gaekwad's proposals which were repugnant to the Regulations of the Government regarding the British territory. The judges reported that the proposed rules could be adopted subject to clause 2, Section 5 of Regulation 12 of 1827.⁵ According to this rule, the British Magistrates in Gujarat had the right to investigate dereliction of duty on the part of the police establishment of the Gaekwad with regard to prevention, detection or apprehension. This had been a blatant interference in the affairs of the Gaekwad. On these lines instructions were ^{again} issued to several British magistrates of Gujarat on 23rd September, 1840.

The Gaekwad naturally reacted adversely and held discussions with Boyd, and on the 25th March, 1841, submitted a memorandum to the Bombay government through

5. Ibid., Section ~~XIV~~^V of Regulation XII of 1827:

^{2nd} Clause 1st: "When robbery has been committed within the boundary of a Gaekwad village or the perpetrators of a robbery have been satisfactorily traced thereto, and neglect or connivance be charged against the inhabitants or the police establishment, with regard to prevention, detection or apprehension, it shall be competent to the British Magistrate to investigate the matter as a criminal offence, and if the fact be well substantiated, to exact a fine not exceeding the value of the property lost, the whole or part of which may be awarded in compensation to the owner according as the degree of caution and activity, which he received on the occasion, may deserve."

Boyd, requesting some modifications in the rules he had proposed.⁶ The purpose of these changes was to apply the same rules specifically to the British authorities. Boyd urged upon the government to accept the alterations suggested.⁷ Boyd also pointed out that the alterations had been suggested by Sayajirao to indicate his position as a sovereign prince and not with any desire to withhold, resist, or screen the guilty. The Government of Bombay reported that their regulations did not permit compelling any person to leave the British territory or to enforce

6. Ibid., Memorandum of Sayajirao to GOB, 25-3-1841.

The proposals in the Memorandum are:

- i) That the confessions of and evidence against British subjects, apprehended within the Gaikwar territory, recorded before His Highness's officers at the time of seizure, be received as evidence in the British Courts, and not to be upset by the mere denial of the accused, on the plea that their confessions had been extorted by force.
- ii) That the evidence recorded in His Highness's Courts against British subjects, who, having committed robbery within the Gaikwar territory, escape to, and are apprehended within, British bounds, should be similarly received as evidence in the British courts.
- iii) That the Gaikwar's subjects committing offences in the British territory, and others seized, be made over to the Durbar (together with the evidence against them taken before the British authorities) for trial and punishment.
- iv) That British as well as Gaikwar subjects, after undergoing the punishment to which they are sentenced, should be made over to the Government to which they are subject to exact securities from them before release.

7. Ibid., Boyd to GOB, 25-3-1841.

attendance at the Gaekwad's Court as witnesses etc. Boyd was directed to try to impress upon Sayajirao that the British would not accept these changes and to convince him that the alterations demanded by him would not affect his administration in "any substantial and material manner".⁸

Subsequent to these discussions with Boyd, Sayajirao sent two letters to him urging compliance with his request for the amendment of the clauses and the rules.⁹ He stated in these letters that unless his request was complied with, justice would suffer and he himself would suffer great "loss of prestige" by degradation to his dignity.¹⁰ While forwarding these letters Boyd particularly drew the attention to the fact that these letters had been written in English and not in Marathi. He interpreted this as a sign that the Gaekwad wished to "escape mortification" of its being publicly known that his ideas were not taken seriously by the British, though the peace of his country and the prosperity of his subjects lay behind his suggestions.¹¹ Boyd was

8. Ibid., GOB to Boyd, March, 1842.

9. Ibid., Sayajirao to Boyd, 17-5-1842 and 9-6-1842.

10. Ibid.

11. Ibid., Boyd to GOB, 23-6-1842.

of the opinion that Sayajirao would never yield on these points.

The Government of Bombay then submitted the entire correspondence to the Governor General with the remark that if Sayajirao persisted in his proposals, the British would have to consider whether they should compel Sayajirao to agree to their original demands, since most probably he would not agree to these rules voluntarily.¹²

The Government of India replied that it was of the opinion that it would be "injudicious and improper" to press the Gaekwad further about these rules, and advised the Bombay government that it should accept the amendments proposed by the Gaekwad.¹³ Once again, the Bombay government referred the matter to their judges, who expressed the opinion that there was no objection to accepting the amendments with a proviso that the witnesses to be handed over to the Gaekwad should be "guaranteed" against contempt of Court and punishment by the Gaekwad authorities.¹⁴ Boyd agreed with this arrangement but stated that there was very little danger of ill treatment of witnesses and that the Government could safely rely

12. Ibid., GOB to GOI

13. Ibid., GOI to GOB, 16-8-1842.

14. Ibid., Minutes of Governor, 25-2-1843.

upon the protection of the Resident to guard the rights of the British citizens, without asking for specific guarantees.¹⁵ The judges were then called upon to frame and submit a draft of an Act to provide for these modifications.¹⁶ On 8th April, 1843, the judges submitted their draft to the Government of Bombay,¹⁷ who in turn referred it to the Governor General.¹⁸ The Governor General informed the Bombay government that he did not see any need to pass any legislature on this subject but recommended that the same mode of proceedings should be adopted as in Calcutta.¹⁹

According to the Calcutta procedure, the witnesses were forwarded through the Resident who would satisfy himself about their protection and proper remuneration. As regards exchanging offenders, these were taken to the border and handed over to any person willing to take charge of them.

15. PD(BOM), 12A/1842-43. Boyd to GOB, 14-12-1842.

16. PD(BOM), 15/2020 of 1843. GOB to Sadar Fauzdari Adalat, 27-2-1843.

17. Ibid., Sadar Fauzdari Adalat to GOB, 8-4-1843.

18. Ibid., GOB to GOI, July, 1843.

19. Ibid., GOI to GOB, No. 429, August, 1843.

The judges, however, gave their opinion that these procedures could not be adopted by the Bombay government without a legislative enactment. It was, therefore, resolved by the Bombay government to let the matters rest there until some incident made it necessary to bring up the question once again,²⁰ and in the meantime, it had referred the matter to the Court of Directors.²¹

The Court of Directors were of the opinion that the Gaekwad was asking for these amendments rather for the sake of his dignity than for the furtherance of justice. They, however, felt that Sayajirao had "a reasonable claim to reciprocity", and advised the Bombay government to once again ask the Government of India to pass the necessary legislation.²² Accordingly, the Government of Bombay once again approached the Government of India with the request that it should pass into law the draft sent earlier by it.²³ The Government of India kept the whole matter in abeyance, and in the meantime, in the absence of proper co-ordination, the law and order situation began to deteriorate, till in 1847, the Bombay government asked the Resident, Colonel Outram to breach

20. Order of the Government of Bombay, dated 16-2-1844, No. 531.

21. PDL(BOM) to COD, 76/1842-43, 2-10-1843.

22. PD(BOM), 15/2020 of 1848. COD to GOB, 4-12-1844.

23. Ibid., GOB to GOI, 9-4-1845.

the question of law and order again with the Gaekwad.²⁴ Sayajirao met Outram on 3rd July, 1847, and after discussions presented him with a memorandum written in Gujarati,²⁵ which he insisted should be translated by some person in his own confidence. Colonel Outram reacted to this in the same way that Boyd had done earlier in 1842. He felt that Sayajirao was anxious to prevent the original in Gujarati being seen by the Resident's staff, in order to save himself from the mortification of it becoming publicly known that his suggestions would be rejected or lightly treated.²⁶ Outram went on to recommend that the Government should look favourably upon some of the points in the memorandum, and gave his opinion that Sayajirao's suggestions were worth considering as coming from a "sovereign who had gained much experience from a reign of 28 years", and was according to him, a "shrewd and practical person capable of forming a correct judgement".²⁷ He also felt that the Gaekwad could be

24. Ibid., GOB to Outram, 18-5-1847.

Boyd had been succeeded in August, 1844 by his assistant T.Ogilvie. In July, 1845, he was replaced by Sir R.K.Arbutnot, who continued till April, 1846. Mr.W.Andrews became acting Resident in April, 1846, and was succeeded by Colonel J.Outram in June, 1847.

25. Ibid., Memorandum of Sayajirao to Outram, 3-7-1847.

This memorandum contains in essence the same proposal as in the earlier memorandum submitted on 25th March, 1841. (Please see P.No.6 of this Chapter).

26. Ibid., Outram to GOB, 3-8-1847.

27. Ibid.

persuaded to work in conjunction with the British to bring about a reformed system of Police. The remarks of Colonel Outram were significantly different from those made by Sutherland a decade ago, and heralded a period of real co-operation - unfortunately, it came too late for Sayajirao.

The Government of India did refer to the matter again until 5th December, 1847,²⁸ when it sent a draft of an Act which was ultimately approved by the Bombay government.²⁹ Thus for seven long years, a simple matter like this had been handed back and forth on a matter of prestige and to the detriment to the law and order in this region. Of the amendments asked for by the Gaekwad (see F.No.6), the most important was the question of the acceptance of the recorded evidence against British subjects caught in his territory and recorded by his officers. The practice had very often been that when such a criminal was handed over for trial to the British Court, the mere denial or plea that his confessions had been forcibly extracted was accepted by the British Courts. Also, the British Courts were unwilling to accept evidence recorded in the Gaekwad Courts against their subjects. For years, the Gaekwad had been pointing out that these

28. Ibid., GOI to GOB, 5-12-1847.

29. Ibid., Minutes of Governor of Bombay, 7-8-1848.

actions of the British had given criminals an easy way out of justice. Experience had convinced Indian jurists that the confessions taken immediately after capture, especially of those belonging to the aboriginal group such as Kolis, Bhils and Waghers were generally to be relied upon and were usually supported by sufficient circumstantial evidence, such as footprints etc.³⁰ Unfortunately, the British had consistently refused to accept these confessions and other evidences, with the result that the proceedings of the Gaekwad's authorities were generally invalidated. The British Magistrate did not consider Gaekwad's officials competent enough authorities and the evidence recorded by them, if not admitted by the prisoners, was generally not accepted. This had been a great source of heartburning to the Gaekwad and his officers, and naturally in the course of time they had become disinclined to strenuous police activities as no respect was paid to their judicial proceedings. Sayajirao complained that the British gave more importance to the denial of the professional thieves and vagabonds whom his administration had brought to justice than to the records made by his judicial officers, and that his officers had been deterred from

30. Ibid., Memorandum in Gujarati of Sayajirao to the Resident, 3-7-1847.

adopting energetic measures against such persons by the fear of bringing their sovereign into trouble with the British.³¹ The Gaekwad went on to point out several cases in which such one-sided evidence had been accepted by the British and reparation demanded from his government.³²

Sayajirao also proposed steps to be taken to curb the tribes of Kolis, Bhils and Waghers. He suggested that any person from these tribes going from one district to another, or from one State to another, should have to obtain a pass from the chief officers of his village and give security for good behaviour before he could proceed on his travels. Further that he would be allowed to move about only with a stick and no other weapons. In spite of this, if he committed any crime he should be immediately seized and punished.

Outram recommended to the Bombay government that reciprocity regarding confessions and evidence should be accepted. He agreed that the British government should be interested in the "humane object" of preserving the innocent from unjust accusation, but the present system, he pointed out, protected the guilty at the cost of the innocent.³³

31. Ibid.

32. Ibid., Also see Chapter VII.

33. Ibid., Outram to GOB, 3-8-1847.

The third amendment proposed was giving over to the Gaekwad government his subjects seized by the British for trial and punishment. Outram supported this also. The Gaekwad in the memorandum pointed out that in the absence of this procedure, criminals did not hold his government in dread, and as a consequence, his administration failed to make any impression on the conscience of the criminals who were encouraged to commit crimes in his territory and take refuge in the British territory.³⁴ Outram supported this demand further by pointing out that the summary punishment which such offenders underwent in the Gaekwad's Court, but which the subtlety of English law enabled them to escape, would enhance the maintenance of law and order.³⁵

Outram was supported in his view by another English administrator, Lieutenant-Colonel Sutherland, who gave his opinion that under the Indian princes there was "more substantial justice and a greater degree of prosperity" than in the British territory, and that the Indian administration of criminal justice was more "effectual" than that of the British in repressing crimes.³⁶

In his memorandum Sayajirao urged upon the British to accept the Indian system of taking security

34. Ibid., Memorandum of Sayajirao to Outram, 3-7-1847.

35. Ibid., Outram to GOB, 3-8-1847.

36. Ibid., Report on the affairs of Jodhpur by Lt.Col. Sutherland, 1-8-1847.

from known criminals, arresting them if found wandering at unreasonable times and at places, and seizing them when found running away. On such capture, if the offenders were wounded, the Police should not be prosecuted for doing their duty. He also proposed that stolen property found in the house of any persons should be taken as enough proof for his guilt, and the lengthy process of British law, which first tried to account for the way the property came into the hands of such persons should be eliminated.³⁷ Outram stated that he was very much struck by the failure of the authority of both the Gaekwad and the British to repress crimes in Gujarat, and opined that the principal cause of such an unsatisfactory result was the little reciprocal exertions between the two governments, and that unless there was cordial co-operation between the two, no radical improvement could take place.³⁸

The true cause, as Outram informed the British Government of the troubles, was the lack of "reciprocal measure" between the British and the Gaekwad governments and the decay of the indigenous Indian system in the State because of the introduction of English law, which afforded facility for escape to the criminals. Conviction had

37. Ibid., Memorandum from Sayajirao to Outram, 3-7-1847.

38. Ibid., Outram to GOB, 3-8-1847. Compared to 1832, when the total recorded cases of crimes in Gujarat was 124, the year 1846 recorded 1538 cases of gang robbery, highway robbery, burglary, cattle stealing etc.

become so difficult that criminals had lost their fear of the law.³⁹ In this struggle between the two powers, the Gaekwad and his subjects seemed to be always on the losing side.

After Carnac's return to Bombay, the British government discovered that certain persons from Baroda had been claiming that high British officials had been bribed in order to get decisions in favour of the Gaekwad. In December, 1842, the government ordered W. Howard, the officiating Advocate General to investigate into the allegations and report to the Governor.⁴⁰ At the same time, Boyd was ordered to investigate and report to the government, and was instructed to apprise the Gaekwad of these reports.⁴¹ Boyd asked the Gaekwad to come to the Residency where he was informed that it was suspected that the ten lakhs of rupees he had received back from the British government had been distributed for the purpose of bribing certain officials through Dhackji Dadaji. Boyd also asked the Gaekwad to co-operate with the British to find out the guilty persons and to send a respectable person as an Advocate on his behalf to Bombay to co-operate with the Bombay government.⁴²

39. Ibid.

40. PD(BOM), 12A/1842/43. Secret Consultations No. 3710. GOB to Howard, officiating Advocate General, 20-12-1842.

41. Ibid., GOB to Boyd, 3-12-1842.

42. Ibid., Boyd to Sayajirao, 14-12-1842.

Sayajirao emphatically denied any connection with such an intrigue, but admitted that he had heard various stories which he was sure his enemies had fabricated. He did not discuss this further, but asked Boyd to put all the questions in writing, because on other occasions personal discussions such as this had been misinterpreted by the British.⁴³ On the same day, getting the points in writing, he gave a detailed reply. He acknowledged that he had received back the amount of ten lakhs of rupees from the British treasury. He tried to explain the money paid through his banker in Bombay to Dhackji Dadaji during 1840-41. According to him, whilst the negotiations between him and the British were going on, he had been threatened by Dhackji that further claims would be made by him. In order to avoid this trouble, in addition to all the other troubles at that time, he had decided, regardless of the loss, in order to stop Dhackji from instituting a suit in the Court, to pay him through his Bankers, Gopalrao Myral in Bombay. The Gaskwad admitted that nearly seven lakhs of rupees had thus been given to Dhackji during this period.⁴⁴

It was actually these payments to Dhackji that had aroused suspicion in the minds of the British, as it

43. Ibid., Sayajirao to Boyd, 14-12-1842.

44. Ibid.

was most unlikely that Sayajirao would pay Dhackji anything unless such a claim had been recognized and pressed by the British government. Enquiries were thus set afoot.

In 1840, as already shown, Sayajirao had been put into an absolutely untenable position by the British. After the second sequestration of Petlad, Sayajirao seemed to have grasped at any opportunity to make things turn in his favour. With the appointment of Sir James Carnac, a one-time sympathetic Resident at Baroda as the new Governor of Bombay, hopes were aroused in him that the Governor and the other officials could be turned in his favour, through pressure of old acquaintances. It was represented to him that Dhackji Dadaji who had been extremely close to James Carnac as his 'native' agent, when he was Resident, could put pressure upon him.

The desperate state of Sayajirao's mind can be judged from the fact that he allowed himself to fall into this trap, and to think that a man such as Dhackji Dadaji, who had betrayed him time and again, could now be trusted to help him.

The Gaekwad, it was claimed by the British, had sent Bapuji Anand, the confidential agent of Gopalrao Myral, to Bombay with instructions to pay certain sums of money

to Dhackji Dadaji to bribe the following officers:⁴⁵

1.	Sir James Carnac	Rs. 10.00 lakhs
2.	Mr. Willoughby (Secretary to GOB)	Rs. 2.50 lakhs
3.	Mr. Reid (Asstt. Secretary to GOB)	Rs. 0.60 thousand
	and	
4.	Other minor officials	Rs. 1.46 lakhs

	Total	Rs. 14.56 lakhs
		=====

However, when the Gaekwad realised, after Carnac's visit to Baroda and the settlement he had been forced to agree to, that the British officials had not changed their attitude in any perceptible way, he began to suspect that he was being double crossed by Dhackji and others. He, therefore, sent Hiralal, a confidential agent to Bombay in April, 1842. Hiralal was instructed to demand back all the money so far spent by Bapuji Anand in the Gaekwad's name which amounted to Rs. 7 lakhs upto now. The Gaekwad also, according to Hiralal, expressed his doubts that the British officials would ever take bribes.⁴⁶ The report received by the Gaekwad from Bapuji Anand had been that Dhackji had paid Rs. 5 lakhs to James Carnac during the spring of 1841, and Rs. 2 lakhs to Mr. Willoughby during 1840.⁴⁷ The Gaekwad had admitted that he had paid to

45. Ibid., Correspondence found in the possession of Balaji Pant, Gopalrao Myral's chief Manager, by W. Howard.

46. Ibid., Evidence of Hiralal recorded by W. Howard during the investigation.

47. Ibid.

Dhackji Rs. 7 lakhs. An examination of Gopalrao Myral's books in Bombay definitely showed that the two payments⁴⁸ were made to Dhackji.

During the spring of 1841, it had become well known in Bombay that Dhackji had received Rs.5 lakhs from the Gaekwad. He seems to have used this money to pay off several of his own creditors, amongst them, Jagannath Shankerset.⁴⁹ Howard also produced a letter written by Dhackji on the 22nd May, 1841, to a friend in England claiming that the Gaekwad had paid this money as part payment of his claim. The Bombay government, however, does not seem to have known of this, because they were corresponding with the Court of Directors at this time regarding the memorandum sent to the Court by Dhackji asking for payment of his claims against the Gaekwad.⁵⁰ An examination of Dhackji's books of account by Howard showed the entry of two sums of Rs.5 lakhs and Rs.2 lakhs under the single head of "Baroda Account" and entered as received from Ganpat Baba, who was an intermediary between Bapuji and Anand and Dhackji.⁵¹

On Howard's examining Dhackji about the circumstances under which these sums were paid to him,

48. Ibid., Report of W.Howard, 31-1-1843, on examination of Gopalrao Myral's books of Accounts.

49. Ibid.

50. Ibid., Memorandum of Dhackji to COD, 26-11-1840.

51. Ibid., Report from W.Howard on examination of Dhackji Dadaji's books of accounts given on



the only reply he received was that since Carnac had left the guarantee question to be settled between the persons concerned and Sayajirao directly, he had sent Ganpati Baba to the Gaekwad for discussion, and had received this settlement from the Gaekwad. He disclaimed any knowledge of where the money came from. He also stated that no receipt had been given for this money to Ganpati Baba or to any officer of the Gaekwad. When asked to show any correspondence regarding this affair with the Gaekwad's officers, he declared that there had been none since he had no friends to write to.⁵² The whole matter is definitely open to various interpretations. It seems most improbable that the Gaekwad, who had for so long refused to recognize any of Dhackji's claim should suddenly pay him Rs.7 lakhs without any petition or correspondence from him, and in fact, no such correspondence is to be found in the files.

An examination of Ganpati Baba followed upon this. Ganpati Baba admitted that a letter had been written to the Gaekwad by one Sakharan Baba, Joint Manager of Gopalrac Myral's Bank in Bombay, and a confidant of Sayajirao, putting forth Dhackji's demand for Rs.7½ lakhs.

52. Ibid., Note of W.Howard's examination of Dhackji Dadeji given in the Report dated 31-1-1848.

Ganpati Baba also admitted that he had received the money not directly through the Banker, Gopalrao Myral, but through Sakharam Baba and had given no receipt for it to Sakharam Baba.⁵³ Howard admitted that this search of Dhackji's office produced no correspondence in Marathi between him and people at Baroda, nor could he find anything else in writing connected with these large payments. Howard concluded from this that Dhackji had destroyed all these papers and that his guilt should thereby be proved.⁵⁴ Howard's conclusion was that all the secrecy involved in the manner of the payments showed that Sayajirao, if he had paid the sums had done so, under a totally false representation made to him by Dhackji.⁵⁵ He pointed out that, though Carnac's settlement had given back the Inam villages to Dhackji as well as the arrears of revenue of that village, the claim of Rs. 7½ lakhs by Dhackji had not been conceded, and that in fact Dhackji's position vis a vis the Gaekwad had perhaps never been lower than in the beginning of 1841.⁵⁶ If this had been a payment to Dhackji on account of his claims, a formal communication to this effect would certainly have been made to Dhackji from the Gaekwad and a full receipt would have been

53. Ibid., Report of the examination of Ganpati Baba by Howard, 31-1-1843.

54. Ibid., Report of W. Howard, 31-1-1843.

55. Ibid.

56. Ibid.

obtained. Sayajirao would also have kept the British government informed of these negotiations, and Dhackji would also have communicated to the British government that he no longer pressed his memorandum of 26th November, 1840, since his demands had been met.⁵⁷ It is difficult not to agree with Howard's conclusions that Dhackji did not receive this money on account of his claims but for another questionable transaction. Howard came to the conclusion that the money was paid to Dhackji for secret ^{payments and} services performed or to be performed.

A further examination of Hiralal and the letters taken from him showed that Dhackji Dadaji had before, during and after Carnac's visit to Baroda impressed upon the Gaekwad and his immediate advisers that he could turn things in the Gaekwad's favour.⁵⁸ Dhackji Dadaji, it seems, had taken fullest advantage of the Gaekwad's weakness and desperate position to misappropriate this money for himself. He had put up a show during Carnac's visit to Baroda of being the Governor's confidante. He wrote letters to the Governor and his wife which he showed to the Gaekwad and others as proof of what he was doing.⁵⁹

In fact, there was nothing in these letters except fulsome praise of the Governor and his wife written

57. Ibid.

58. Ibid., Report of W. Howard, 31-1-1843. Letters from Bapuji Anand to Motilal Purushottam, a clerk in the office of Willoughby and Ganpati Baba. (Date not known).

59. Ibid., Letters from Dhackji to Carnac & Lady Carnac, 20-1-1841.

in an involved and colourful style. His explanation to the Gaikwad about this was that the Governor would understand and that the bribe could not be openly mentioned.

When the settlement made by Carnac proved unsatisfactory, Dhackji assured Sayajirao that he could make Carnac change his mind, especially about the payment of Rober's Rissala.⁶⁰ As part of his game, Dhackji had introduced Balaji Pant and Sakharam Baba to Carnac in Bombay, soon after his return from Baroda, and had artfully turned the topic towards Baroda. It seems that Carnac had made some remarks that he could not do anything about Baroda as he was working under the orders of the Court of Directors. Dhackji had thus created an impression that he was on confidential and friendly terms with the Governor, and succeeded in deceiving Balaji and Sakharam about his real intentions.⁶¹

On receiving the Report from Howard, the Governor and his Council once again decided to ask Sayajirao's help in definitely fixing the fraud on Dhackji.⁶² The Council also agreed to take action against Dhackji as the prime figure in this episode. They were particularly angered

60. Ibid., Statement of Hiralal made to W. Howard, cited in the Report of Howard, 31-1-1843.

61. Ibid., Letters from Balaji Pant and Sakharam Baba to Sayajirao's Secretary at Baroda by W. Howard in his report 31-1-1843.

62. Ibid., Minutes of Governor of Bombay, 25-2-1843.

at what they felt was the "disrespect" brought upon the European character in the eyes of the Indian people by attaching the "stigma of the vilest kind" on their character.⁶³ It was decided that Dhackji should be suitably punished. Accordingly, on 24th July, 1843, the Bombay government ordered that in consequence of his gross misconduct in receiving a bribe of Rs.7 lakhs under the false pretention from the Gaekwad, his name should be struck off from the commission of peace. Further, the arrangement which Carnac had made to pay the rent of his Inam villages from the Bombay treasury was to be discontinued. He was henceforth to be excluded from all Durbars in Bombay and Baroda, and he was to make his own arrangement about getting his revenue from the Inam villages.⁶⁴

This report of attempted bribery on the part of the Gaekwad and, his betrayal by Dhackji seems to be substantially correct from the examination of the papers cited in the report of Howard. There were no papers to be found from the Baroda archives, since obviously, to disclaim any connection in this case, they might have been destroyed. That Sayajirao thought it possible to change the course of events through bribery is not so preposterous as the British at that time made it out to

63. Ibid.

64. Ibid., Order of the Government of Bombay, dated 24-7-1843. Dhackji was in the first group of Indian Justices of Peace appointed by Clare.

be. The general character of the political administration at this time in India made this quite possible. In fact, as is evident from the Register of Letters of the Baroda Records Office, on every occasion of a visit from English officials from the Governor downwards to Baroda involved the presentation of costly gifts by Sayajirao.⁶⁵ The Gaekwad must have, therefore, believed Dhackji's claims and become a part to this whole sorry transaction.

Carnac had left Baroda with most of the remaining questions of the guarantees to be settled between the Gaekwad and the Resident. As seen in the previous chapter, both the Court of Directors and Carnac were having second thoughts on the correctness of the British stand on the guarantees. The Political Commissioner had been asked to prepare a note of the outstanding guarantees before Carnac's visit to Baroda. Boyd had presented a report to the Bombay government, giving a list of 23 such outstanding guarantees then existing.⁶⁶ Carnac and the Governor General could not agree on the action to be taken and the whole unfavourable problem of guarantees remained unsolved. The Court of Directors were in the meantime receiving petitions from some of the guaranteed persons who felt that their privileges might be curtailed if the

65. Historical Selections from Baroda Records, New Series, Vol.I and Historical Selections from Baroda State Records, Vol.VII, Government Press, Baroda, 1955 and 1948.

66. Baroda Blue Book, 1840-1853. Baroda Guarantees, Report of Boyd, 18-11-1840. See Appendix A.

guarantees were abandoned. Amongst them was Dhackji Dadaji.⁶⁷

As seen, the Governor General had been disinclined to accept the proposal of the Court of Directors that the Bombay government take upon itself a portion of the payment to be made under their guarantees, on receiving from the Gaekwad an annual assignment from his tributes, sufficient to cover the remainder of the amount. The Governor General's stand had been that this would involve an additional burden on the British finances without doing away with the inconveniences of the guarantees.

It became clear from the report of Boyd that there were 17 guarantees of hereditary obligations involving pledges of personal protection. According to the Governor General, the plan of the Court of Directors would have involved the British government in an expense of nearly Rs.2 lakhs per annum.⁶⁸ He wondered whether the Court of Directors would press their proposal once they were aware of this commitment. He had, therefore, written to the Court of Directors and was awaiting their reply.

As a result the Gaekwad was plagued with big and small indignities by the British government and his

67. Ibid., Dhackji to COD, 26-11-1840.

68. BBB(BAR), Op. cit., GOI to GOB, 8-3-1841.

guaranteed subjects. Till the very end of his life, the problems could not be solved though the British did not press on these demands as heavily as they had done earlier. A study of some of the outstanding cases will show how, between the Court of Directors, the Governor General and the Bombay government, there was no consistent policy about this matter.

Carnac had left it to the Resident to decide on the actual amount to be paid by the Gaekwad to the Desai family for arrears due to them, and Elliot, the Governor's agent at Surat, was asked to proceed with the investigation of the arrears claimed by the Desai of Navsari.⁶⁹ Elliot's investigation again brought out some doubts about the claims of the Desai.⁷⁰ Hearing about this, Sayajirao immediately took advantage of it and, with the consent of the Resident, again took possessions of the Desai's property.⁷¹

The Desais immediately petitioned to the British government, and on their requisition, the Gaekwad was once again made to remove his attachment on the estate of the Desais.⁷² The question of arrears was still left undecided

69. BBB(BAR), Op. cit., GOB to Elliot, 20-2-1841.

70. Ibid., Elliot to Boyd, March, 1841.

71. BRO(BAR), Baroda Guarantees, 5664/2, No.4384.

72. PDL(BOM) to COD, 62/1841, No.14, GOB to Sayajirao, 27-4-1841.

and Sayajirao was obviously in a state of unrest about this matter. The Bombay government transferred Elliot, and asked his successor Sir R. Arbuthnot to examine and report on the whole subject.⁷³ Arbuthnot submitted his report on 15th December, 1843, and according to this, the Desai was entitled to an aggregate sum of Rs.2,44,269-3-0.⁷⁴ The Gaekwad had upto date paid him Rs.1,20,403-9-3 leaving a balance of Rs.1,23,885-9-9.⁷⁵ This amount had included the interest of 9 per cent per annum charged on all the items owed by the Gaekwad.⁷⁶ The Government of Bombay ordered the Resident to pay this amount from the Gaekwad's tributes forthwith.⁷⁷

The Gaekwad naturally opposed such arbitrary action, and wrote to the Governor of Bombay protesting against the imposition on him, and the charge of such a high rate of interest.⁷⁸ Sayajirao pointed out that he had not been a party to the investigation, and completely rejected the British account and submitted his own whereby he claimed that he owed the Desai only Rs.80,820-7-0.⁷⁹ In reply the Government of Bombay

73. SC(BOM), 98, GOB to Arbuthnot, 19-9-1843.

74. Ibid., Report from Arbuthnot to GOB, 15-12-1843.

75. Ibid.

76. Ibid.,

77. Ibid., GOB to Boyd, 23-3-1844.

78. PD(BOM), 102/1844-45, Sayajirao to GOB, 15-4-1844.

79. Ibid.

instructed the Resident to stop further discussion with Sayajirao and to implement its instruction.⁸⁰

The Resident was instructed to inform the Gaekwad that the orders of the government were final and that it could not comply with the Gaekwad's request for reconsideration till it had approached the Court of Directors,⁸¹ and the representatives of the Desai family were called to Baroda and informed of the government's decision.⁸² After the representatives of the Desai family arrived in Baroda, a meeting was arranged between them and the Gaekwad by Gopalrao Myral and others, and the representatives of the family expressed the wish to come to private understanding with the Gaekwad and matters were allowed to remain pending for some time.⁸³ In the next six months, the Desais were constantly in touch with Sayajirao and ultimately arrived at a settlement in the presence of the Political Commissioner, Mr. T.Ogilvy, early in 1845. In February, 1845, the settlement was finally arrived at whereby the amount of land belonging to the Desais was finally settled, and the Gaekwad granted

80. PDL(BOM) to COD, 94/1844, No.47. GOB to Boyd, 24.5-1844.

81. Ibid., Boyd died in June, 1845. He was ailing for sometime. Remington was appointed as the Acting Resident from 1844 July, and was followed in August by Mr.T.Ogilvy. In July, 1845, Sir Robert Arbuthnot took over as Resident and Political Commissioner of Gujarat.

82. PD(BOM), 102/1844-45. Commissioner for Gujarat to Muncherji Desai, 16-6-1844.

83. Ibid., Report from the Acting Political Commissioner to GOB, 4-7-1844.

hereditarily to the Desais Rs.300 per annum for a carriage, Rs.1,000 per annum for a Palanquin, and Rs.250 per annum for a clerk. The Desais also accepted Rs.68,000 in full payment for all their pecuniary demands. This agreement was reached and recorded in the presence of Ogilvy,⁸⁴ and ratified by the Bombay government on 22nd May, 1845,⁸⁵ and also finally accepted by the Court of Directors in July, 1846.⁸⁶

The settlement was of course a relief to the Gaekwad but it needs to be pointed out that he had to give up his claims in the guarantee matters. As seen in Chapter V, Sayajirao had emphatically pointed out that the Desais did not have a hereditary guarantee, nor were the British able to produce the original Sanad or an authentic copy of the same.

The Gaekwad obviously arrived at this compromise in order to save himself from the large amount of money being claimed by the British on behalf of the Desais, who obviously accepted a much lesser sum in view of the fact that the Gaekwad accepted their hereditary claim and that also under British guarantee. In spite of the

84. BRO(BAR), File No.3, Ogilvy to GOB, 15-2-1848.

85. Ibid., Ogilvy to Sayajirao, 26-5-1845.

86. PD(BOM), 15/2020 of 1848. COD to GOB, 29-7-1846.

change in tone from 1841-42 on the part of Carnac and the Court of Directors, the British were here giving a fresh guarantee instead of gradually eliminating them, as one would have supposed from their utterances, a few years earlier. It was only in 1854, much after the death of Sayajirao, that Outram submitted to the government a report on all the guarantees then existing, and pointed out that the British guarantee given in 1845 to the Desais was not binding, because the original Sanad had not made any specific mention of heirs or future generations and for 15 long years Sayajirao had refused to acknowledge such a hereditary right.⁸⁷ However, even at this late stage, the Governor General decided that the guarantee was hereditary and informed the Government of Bombay about this in January, 1856. This situation lasted till the reign of Sayajirao III in the early 20th century.⁸⁸

The pernicious character of the guarantee system cannot be better illustrated than in the case of Dhackji Dadaji. Even after the diabolical case of bribery and corruption in which he was involved and his fraud against the Gaekwad, which had entailed his disgrace from the

87. The whole question of guarantee has been discussed in detail in the papers relating to the British guarantee to the subjects of His Highness, the Gaekwad - Huzur Political Office Library, U-5-7, No.49.

88. Ibid.

social life of Bombay, he very soon got the fear of the British again about his guarantee.

On the 15th of August, 1844, Dhackji petitioned to the Government of Bombay to rescind their decision to stop payment of the rent of his Inam villages from the Bombay treasury.⁸⁹ In reply, instead of refusing to get involved in the case, the Bombay government informed him that it had no objection to his applying directly to the Gaekwad to put him in possession of his Inam villages or to pay him their annual value.⁹⁰ Dhackji informed the Bombay government that the Gaekwad was willing to pay him if the British government had no objection.⁹¹

The Bombay government thereupon instructed Ogilvy, In-charge at Baroda Residency, that he should inform the Gaekwad that he was at liberty to make over the Inam villages to Dhackji or pay him the annual rent.⁹² The Gaekwad had not made any commitment to Dhackji though Dhackji had thus reported to the Bombay government, and he, once again, wrote to the Government of Bombay in July, 1845, asking them to intervene on his behalf.⁹³ The Bombay government now wrote to the new Resident, Sir Robert

89. PDL(BOM), 112/1846. Petition from Dhackji Dadaji to the Governor of Bombay, 15-8-1844.

90. Ibid., GOB to Dhackji, 12-9-1844.

91. Ibid., Dhackji to GOB, 19-12-1844.

92. Ibid., GOB to Ogilvy, 17-1-1845.

93. Ibid., Dhackji to GOB, 5-7-1845.

Arbuthnot asking for an explanation of Sayajirao's conduct, and requesting him to discuss the matter with Sayajirao.⁹⁴ The Gaekwad refused to discuss the matter with the Resident, and instead sent a letter to the Governor in which he recounted the entire history of Dhackji's claim, pointing out particularly how he had been cheated time and again, and reminded the British that only in 1843, they had themselves disgraced Dhackji. Sayajirao, therefore, declared that he would not restore the Inam villages to Dhackji.⁹⁵

Incapable of really changing its attitude, the Government of Bombay could not accept this reply, and instructed Arbuthnot to inform Sayajirao that he must either restore the villages to Dhackji or give better reason for not doing so.⁹⁶ The Resident thereupon had a meeting with Sayajirao, who, aware of the past pressure put on him, ultimately agreed to pay Dhackji the actual revenue realised at that time from the Inam villages and not the grant of Rs.30,000.⁹⁷

The Bombay government now insisted that Sayajirao should either pay the full sum of Rs.30,000 per year or restore the Inam villages to Dhackji.⁹⁸ On 26th January,

94. Ibid., GOB to Arbuthnot, 20-9-1845.

95. Ibid., Sayajirao to Governor of Bombay, 13-11-1845.

96. Ibid., GOB to Arbuthnot, 26-11-1845.

97. Ibid., Arbuthnot to GOB, 10-1-1846.

98. Ibid., GOB to Arbuthnot, 21-1-1846.

1846, Dhackji died leaving a note to the British government, commending his adopted son, Kashinath Dhackji, to their protection. He also urged the government to use its influence on Sayajirao to continue the Inam villages in favour of his adopted son.⁹⁹ The British at least now, refused to interfere with regard to this adoption, leaving the matter between the adopted son and Sayajirao. All the same, Sayajirao was asked to pay the arrears due to Dhackji from June, 1843 (when the British had passed their order against Dhackji) to 26th January, 1846 at the rate of Rs.30,000 per annum.¹⁰⁰

Sayajirao absolutely refused to do this and claimed that the revenue of the villages had fallen to Rs.18,000 per annum and that he would pay only so much.¹⁰¹ The Resident sent this letter on to the Government of Bombay who insisted that Sayajirao should pay the full amount minus the collection charges, and gave Sayajirao 14 days to consider, and, if he did not agree, the Resident was instructed to pay the amount from the Gaekwad's tribute.¹⁰² Once again the Gaekwad had to give in and on the 23rd May, 1846, he paid the full amount into the ^{British} ~~Baroda~~ treasury under protest and asked

99. Ibid., Note to GOB from Dhackji Dadaji, 25-1-1846.

/Ibid.,

100. /GOB to Arbuthnot, 26-3-1846.

101. Ibid., Sayajirao to Arbuthnot, 25-4-1846.

102. Ibid., GOB to W.Andrews, Acting Resident, 23-5-1846.

the Acting Resident to allow him to refer the whole matter to the Governor General.¹⁰³ On receipt of this information, the Bombay government perversely decided to keep the money in reserve and pay only what Sayajirao had agreed to pay.¹⁰⁴

It took another two years for the matter to be finally resolved. Ultimately, on the 22nd July, 1848, the Governor of Bombay decided that the adoption had no validity whatsoever without the sanction of Sayajirao which had never been received. Kashinath Dhackji had been unable to produce any proof that Sayajirao had sanctioned the adoption. The Governor General, therefore, recommended that Kashinath Dhackji should be informed accordingly and also told that he had no right whatsoever to the Inam villages or anything else granted to Dhackji Dadaji.¹⁰⁵ Accordingly, Kashinath Dhackji was so informed and the thoroughly vexatious and unjust case was put to rest.¹⁰⁶

The other remaining guarantees were also more or less settled by Sayajirao^{by} generally giving in to the British demands. It is not possible here to discuss each of them separately. From what has been said so far

103. Ibid., Sayajirao to the Acting Resident, 23-5-1846.

104. PD(BOM), 135/1848 No.118. Minutes by the Governor of Bombay, 22-7-1848.

105. Ibid.

106. Ibid., GOB to Kashinath Dhackji Dadaji, 29-7-1848.

about the guarantee system it is clear that it had been a source of incalculable injury to the Gaekwad, and had created immense bad feeling between him and the British government. Particularly, it had enabled the British to interfere between the Gaekwad and his subjects leading to the erosion of the Gaekwad's sovereignty. The British policy regarding the guarantee had been unbending and had been deliberately used to enhance their position and to belittle the Gaekwad. However, there had also been a certain amount of inconsistency in their attitude. Mount Stuart Elphinstone, Sir John Malcolm, Lord Clare and Sir James Carnac, as well as the Court of Directors, all in turn, had declared their aversion to the continuance of this system of giving guarantees, but at the same time, had not only continued the old ones, but had at times given new ones. Sayajirao till the very end suffered from this system and obviously fully realised that his power was extremely limited and circumscribed. It took another 80 years before the Gaekwads of Baroda could free themselves from this particular problem.

During the discussion with Carnac, Sayajirao had experienced a great deal of difficulty in keeping in tact his Contingent of Horse. Ultimately, he had been allowed to retain the full Contingent of 3,000 Horse

only on condition that he maintain the additional Gujarat Irregular Horse (Robert's Rissala). Sayajirao had hoped that sooner or later he would be excused from this additional burden. The maintenance of this additional force amounted to Rs. 3 lakhs a year. Soon after Carnac's departure from Baroda, Sayajirao petitioned the Governor of Bombay to free him from this payment. He represented that he had consented to the demand only to please the Governor, but pointed out that it was opposed to the Treaty and that his State would be placed in great difficulty by this burden. Sayajirao also asked the Governor to send his petition on to the Governor General and the Court of Directors.¹⁰⁷ In reply, the Governor informed Sayajirao that he could write directly to the Governor General about his case.¹⁰⁸ Since no relief was granted to him till September, 1841, Sayajirao again wrote to the Governor in the same way.¹⁰⁹

Instead of relieving the Geekwad of this burden, the Government of Bombay, had demanded in addition certain reforms of his Contingent of Horse with a view, they claimed, of bringing about more efficiency. Boyd had been asked

107. BRO(BAR), File No.464. Sayajirao to Governor of Bombay, 8-2-1841.

108. Ibid., Governor of Bombay to Sayajirao, 18-4-1841.

109. PD(BOM), 9/1224 of 1841-43. Sayajirao to Governor of Bombay, 21-9-1841.

to discuss this matter with Sayajirao.¹¹⁰ The demand was that the Gaekwad should agree to the appointment of a European officer, Major Robert as Inspector General of the Contingent of Horse. This was over and above the four European officers who were already supervising the Contingent.¹¹¹ Sayajirao objected to this supervisory officer but promised to take any measure that the British government thought necessary to improve his Contingent.¹¹² Boyd expressed his opinion to the Governor that the Contingent was well looked after and that the Gaekwad's promise of improvement could be relied upon.¹¹³

The new Governor, Sir George Arthur, was not at all pleased by these remarks of Boyd and stated in a minute that there was no ground at all from deviating from their demand and that the Political Commissioner should be reprimanded for breach of etiquette and insubordination.¹¹⁴ Having received no sympathy from the Bombay government, Sayajirao sent a letter to the Governor General Ellenborough on the 25th July, 1842.¹¹⁵ In this letter Sayajirao again

110. Ibid., GOB to Boyd, 14-5-1841.

111. Ibid.

112. Ibid., Sayajirao to the Governor of Bombay, 28-9-1841.

113. Ibid., Boyd to GOB, 13-10-1841.

114. Ibid., Minutes of Governor of Bombay (date not known).
Sir James Carnac had left India in April 1841,
and had been succeeded by Sir George Arthur.

115. BRO(BAR), File No.464. Sayajirao to Ellenborough,
25-7-1842.

pleaded for relief from the burden of Rs.3 lakhs imposed on him for the Gujarat Irregular Horse, and recapitulated all the points he had made to the Governor of Bombay, and requested the Governor General to take definite measure to relieve him. Instead of reply to this letter, Sayajirao was informed on the 8th of February, 1843, by the Resident that the Government was determined not to have any further discussion on the subject.^{115a} Thereupon Sayajirao once again addressed a letter to the Governor General on 16th March, 1843.¹¹⁶ The latter did not reply to this either, but informed the Governor of Bombay that no notice should be taken of the letter and that the Gaekwad should be informed that further applications would be of no avail and should be discontinued.¹¹⁷

The Governor thereupon wrote to Sayajirao informing him that the Governor General had refused his application for relief from the expenses of the Irregular Horse (Roberts Rissala), and that no further correspondence should be addressed to him on this matter.¹¹⁸

115a. PD(BOM), 9/1224 of 1841-43. Boyd to Sayajirao, 8-2-1843.

116. Ibid., Sayajirao to the Governor General, 16-3-1843.

117. Ibid., GOI to GOB, 10-4-1843.

118. Ibid., Governor to Sayajirao, 20-4-1843.

Sayajirao had to continue making this additional payment till the end of his reign. The matter was taken up again by his successor, Khanderao Gaekwad, and ultimately, as a reward for remaining faithful to the British during the revolt of 1857, the Governor General Lord Canning freed the Gaekwad from the payment of Rs.3 lakhs per annum for the maintenance of the Gujarat Irregular Horse with retrospective effect from the date of Khanderao's accession to the throne.¹¹⁹

Another vexed question was the jurisdiction of the Gaekwad's Kathiawad and Mahikanta tributaries. Steadily over the years, the British had encroached on his rights till, by now, practically the entire administration of these territories was controlled by the British. Amongst the many questions arising out of the collection of the tribute by the British were the questions of remission, suspension and reduction of the tributes. In acting in these issues between the Baroda government and the chieftains concerned, the British had steadily taken over the right to decide these matters, much to the chagrin of the Gaekwad, whose interest, prestige and dignity were thus affected. *His powers, in fact were being usurped.*

119. Aitichison, Op. cit., Vol. VI, Kharita from Lord Canning to Khanderao Gaekwad, dated 31-5-1858, p.375.

According to the original settlements regarding the Kathiawad tributes, entered between Anandrao Gaekwad and Colonel Walker and Mr. Ballantyne in 1808 and 1812¹²⁰ respectively, there was a provision for the remission of tribute whenever, owing to natural causes the tributary could not pay the full amount. Relief to tide over the difficulty of that year was to be granted. The procedure followed was that the requests were to be preferred to the Gaekwad by the Chiefs and Thakores for remission in tribute, after which an inquiry was supposed to be made by the British officer of the Political Agency as to the correctness of the case, and refer his decision to the Gaekwad,¹²¹ and the final decision in actual fact was made by the Government of Bombay. Through the years, the Bombay government had often played the chiefs against the Gaekwad in order to get an upper hand.¹²² A permanent tendency had, therefore, developed on the part of the chieftains to demand the remission on the most trifling ground and the British Political Agent had continuously backed them up. In the agreement of 1840-41, Sayajirao had agreed to extend these remissions even to the Mahikanta tributes even though no specific provision for granting relief existed in the original settlement regarding this area.

120. HPO(BAR), File No.166/43, See Chapter I.

121. Ibid.

122. See Chapter VII.

On many occasions, Sayajirao had in fact, on his own, given relief to his subjects, but objected to being forced to do so on flimsy grounds,¹²³ and he objected to the arbitrary methods enforced by the British of granting remissions. The same problem continued during this last period also.

In 1845, according to the British, the province of Kathiawad once again was in a state of scarcity due to the failure of the monsoon,¹²⁴ and the British had granted a remission of tribute without the Gaekwad's consent, only informing him of what they had done.¹²⁵ In reply, Sayajirao had grudgingly given his assent to the remission, requesting, however, that in future no remissions ought to be granted until an enquiry could be made by both the governments and the necessity of it established to the satisfaction of both of them.¹²⁶ On being informed of this request, the Bombay government refused to give their consent to this arrangement.¹²⁷

123. BRO, Register of Letters October-November, 1834. Relief granted of Rs.10,000 to the Surat cultivators on account of floods of the Tapti river - Extract from a letter dated 7th October to the Sarsuba of Surat District;

Register of Letters, dated September, October, 1824. Order dated 26th September, 1824 to the Jamadar of Variaval to extend relief to the farmers by opening wells and to collect dues without putting the farmers to distress as conditions were bad owing to scanty rains.

124. PD(BOM), 138/1848, No.14. GOB to COD, 13-1-1847.

125. Ibid., Acting Resident, Andres to Sayajirao, 20-4-1847.

126. Ibid., Sayajirao to Andrews, 23-4-1847.

127. PD(BOM), 15/2020 of 1848. GOB to Andrews, 18-5-1847.

On being informed about this, the Gaekwad made a further request through Colonel Outram, the new Resident at Baroda.¹²⁸ Sayajirao requested that in future, whenever occasions arose for remission, a detailed estimate of the losses sustained by each tributary affected should be forwarded by the Political Agent for his information.¹²⁹ The Bombay government acceded to this request and directed Major Lang, the British Political Agent in Kathiawad, that in future, before applying to the British government for sanction to grant remission, he should communicate to the Resident at Baroda whatever information was available. Major Lang was also told that in case the Gaekwad differed from him on any occasion, concerning the necessity for remission, the Bombay government would review the arguments on both sides before coming to a decision.¹³⁰ Major Lang, however, thought that the procedure suggested would be very lengthy, as the Gaekwad would immediately not be in a position to check the accuracy of the estimates of the losses submitted by him and may set enquiries afoot. He, therefore, suggested that the

128. Colonel James Outram succeeded as Resident on 8th June, 1847.

129. PD(BOM), 138/1848, No.14. Sayajirao to Outram, June, 1847.

130. Ibid., GOB to Lang, 4-7-1847.

Gaekwad's Muzumdars, who were his hereditary officers, be entrusted with his tributary interests along with the British officers, to examine the reports of the chiefs and make a joint estimate, reporting back to Sayajirao. The Political Agent should also scrutinize¹³¹ these reports and make the necessary observations.

Lang's suggestions immediately started heated discussions in Bombay, particularly from Reid and Willoughby, members of the Governor's Council, who felt that the Gaekwad should not be allowed to interfere in the management of his tributaries. They felt that, if he was allowed to do so, the government would be opening a door for discussions which might lead to much embarrassment. They considered that the management of the Gaekwad's possession in Kathiawad and Mahikanta were now under the direct management of the British government and that these provinces were not governed in concert with the Gaekwad.¹³² The Governor came to the decision, at long last, that the government ought to listen to the objections of the Gaekwad against any remissions though he agreed that since the Gaekwad's possession in Kathiawad had been placed "entirely" under the British government, ultimately, it alone had the right to decide when remissions were required.¹³³ Lang was, therefore, informed that his

131. Ibid., Lang to GOB, 14-7-1847.

132. Ibid., Minutes of Reid and Willoughby, 12-8-1847.

133. Ibid., Minutes of Governor G. Clark, 18-9-1847.

suggestion of joint consultation was not acceptable and that he should follow instructions from the government originally given to him of informing the Resident at Baroda with details about the remissions proposed.¹³⁴

Not satisfied with depriving the Gaekwad of his dues through the remission of his tributes, the British government in 1846 claimed that the Gaekwad should share a proportion of the losses that the British incurred in their own villages. These villages in Gujarat were what the British had acquired from the Peshwa. The Gaekwads had a claim to a certain tax for Ghasdana from these villages.¹³⁵ The British now proposed that they should reduce the proportion of Ghasdana in their villages, whenever remissions were made. Outram was asked to inquire whether any such demand had previously been made on the Gaekwad.¹³⁶ When Outram took over as Resident, he completed the inquiry and informed the Bombay government that there was no instance on record of any demand having at any time been made by the British government upon the Gaekwad to bear any portion of the loss occasioned by the grant of remission in their villages.¹³⁷ On receiving this information, the Governor

134. Ibid., GOB to Lang, 18-10-1847.

135. Ghasdana was originally the contribution of grass and grain levied by the Gaekwads on these villages when he sent his troops to collect the tribute on behalf of the Peshwas. It became later a fixed levy.

136. PD(BOM), 124/1847, Minutes of Governor G.Clark, 10-7-1847.

137. Ibid., Outram to GOB, 2-7-1847.

was of the opinion that the British government should not attempt to do anything that was not already there in practice.¹³⁸ Willoughby, however, deferred and suggested that further information may be collected from the Mahikanta villages. This inquiry also proved that no proportion of the losses in the British villages had been shared by the Gaekwad.¹³⁹

In spite of this report, Willoughby still insisted that the Gaekwad should bear at least 5 per cent of the losses borne by the British government.¹⁴⁰ The Governor at this time observed that the British government seemed to treat the Gaekwad rather "as a dependant vassal" than as an ally, and he attributed much of the reserve and obstinacy of Sayajirao to the treatment he had received from the British. Nevertheless he felt that the Gaekwad could be asked to share 5 per cent of the losses. He also felt, however, that the concurrence of Sayajirao was necessary, as the British were the sole judges in these cases for making the remission.¹⁴¹ Since the Bombay Council could not come to an agreement, the matter was referred to the Court of Directors. The decision of the Court of Directors

138. Ibid., Minutes of Governor G.Clark, 10-7-1847.

139. Ibid., Letter from T.A.Crompton, First Assistant-in-Charge, Kaira Collector to the Secretary to the Government of Bombay, 8-10-1847.

140. Ibid., Minutes by Willoughby, 23-10-1843.

141. Ibid., Minutes of Governor G.Clark, 23-10-1847.



was that the loss from remission should not fall wholly on the British government and that the Gaekwad should be asked to pay 5 per cent of the losses. This decision, however, came after the death of Sayajirao and he was spared a further ignominy.¹⁴²

It was in the midst of such controversy that Sayajirao died on 28th December, 1847, after a short illness at the age of 49.¹⁴³ He was immediately succeeded by his son Ganpatrao Gaekwad who was 31 years of age.¹⁴⁴

For 29 long years, Sayajirao had waged an unceasing struggle for retaining his sovereign power against the British. It had, as we have seen, been a steadily losing struggle. By 1840, Sayajirao had more or less resigned himself to the fact that the British were the ultimate paramount power and, by the agreement with Carnac, he had hoped that, by giving in to their major demands, he would be able to retain some vestige of his power. He was unable to prevent the gradual passing of his sovereignty from his hands, and during the last seven years, as the examples cited in this

142. PDL(BOM) from COD, 19/1848, 7-6-1848.

143. PDL(BOM) to COD, 135/1848, No.1, Colonel Outram to GOB, 29-1-1847.

144. Ibid.

chapter make it clear, he also found it beyond his capacity to oppose infringements on his powers.

For a prince who had begun his reign with a high sense of purpose to maintain himself as an independent ruler, the entire history of his reign must have been an unrelieved tragedy.

APPENDIX "A"

(Chapter V, Footnote 69, p.236)

BARODA BLUE BOOK, 1840 and 1853BARODA GUARANTEE, pp.11-17List of British Guarantees in force at Baroda,

(Copied from the statement submitted to Government by
Mr. Boyd in November, 1840, with the omission of those
which have since expired).

No.	Name of the persons Guaranteed	Date and substance of the agreement	
1.	Kushalchand Ambadass and Purbhudass Moolji	5th Feb., 1801	A guarantee for personal security for himself and family, and his gomastha, Parmanand, had been granted by the Guicowar Government which, on the removal of the Arabs, was exchanged for that of the British Government, and will exist while the firm remains at Baroda.
2.	Muncherjee Khurshedjee Desai of Navsari	29th March, 1801.	A guarantee for the personal security of self, family, Gumastha and dependents, to enable them to reside at Nowsaree, and for his office, unmolested. It is hereditary.
3.	Shankerji Sunderji Desai of Bulsar.	27th April, 1801	Guarantee for the enjoyment of certain hucks in villages, and a village for payment of palanquin expense. This is hereditary, and secures to himself and family the perpetual enjoyment of his rights as Desai of Bulsar.
4.	Amrutlal Tuljaram	10th Juma, 1802	Protection for himself and family, and certain gumasthas, specified by name, while trading as merchants, in any part of the Guicowar territory either at Ahmedabad or Baroda, and the village Mucklampur, in the zillah of Ahmedabad, formerly.

No. Name of the persons Guaranteed	Date and substance of the agreement	
		granted an enam from the Peishwa, to be continued in his possession.
5. Rowjee Appajee Dewan	8th June, 1802	This man was dewan or minister at the Guicowar Durbar at the time of its first alliance with the British Government, and in consideration of the eminent services he performed for both Government, the late Mr. Duncan gave him a paper confirming him in that situation, and, moreover, making it hereditary in his family, and containing a pledge on our part for the personal protection of himself, his Bros., nephews, sons-in-law, and dependents against any injury from the Guicowar Govt. This engagement is also specifically referred to in the different treaties entered into by the allied governments.
6. Kandas Patel and Bhaichand Desae.	26th Jan. 1803.	The guarantee is for personal protection for himself, and family agents and dependants, and security in the possession of <u>Pusalia</u> lands, houses, and all other just rights. This person and Bhaichand Desae are both deceased, but the guarantee is still enjoyed by their families. The protection is not declared hereditary being.
7. Mungal Sakeedas	5th Feb. 1803.	Mangal Sakeedas is dead. His son, Lallo Mangal, conducts his father's business in Baroda. The late Governor, Mr. Duncan, gave him a separate guarantee, 8th June, 1802, securing to him in perpetuity the British protection for the defence of his house, trade and property, and for the safety of himself, wife, family and property.

No. Name of the persons guaranteed		Date and substance of the agreement.
8. Subanji Pol	12th July, 1801	For the protection of self, family, property, dependents, and Karkuns and security of nemnook amounting to 11,800 rupees, assigned for his support. This person was Killedar of Kaira when the town was ceded to the British Government. This guarantee is hereditary.
9. Dowlutao Gaekwad	1806 Date Not known	Out of the nemnook of Kanojirao Gaekwad amounting to 50,000 rupees, a sum of 4,000 rupees was assigned to his son, Dawlutao, the payment of which is guaranteed by the British Government. It is not hereditary.
10. Mulharao Gaekwad	1801.	A pension of 50,000 rupees was assigned, after the capture of Mulharao Gaekwad on his second rebellion by Colonel Walker, for the maintenance of himself and family, and the same was guaranteed by the British Government.
11. Martandrao Gaekwad	28th Dec. 1808.	Permission to come and reside at Baroda, without molestation, guaranteed by the British Government; not hereditary.
12. Maneckchund Rupchand	23rd March, 1809.	The Gaekwad Government granted to this person, an inhabitant of Surat, a permanent permit to establish a commercial house at Baroda, promising that he should not be molested. It will remain in force, while the firm exists at Baroda, under the guarantee of the British government.
13. Samel Becher Sole Proprietor of the firm of Hari Bhakti.	1808	Guaranteeing to Naratbai the widow of Samel Bhakti, and her adopted son, Samel Becher protection, as the representative of the firm of Hari Bhakti at Baroda, with Potedari management and emoluments, and the possession of enam villages, preservation of their rights and privileges, with residence in the Gaekwad territory, during good behaviour. This guarantee will be in force while the firm exists.

No. Name of the person Guaranteed	Date and substance of the agreement	
14. Daribai Gaekwad	10th Feb. 1820	On the death of Anandrao Gaekwad a pension of 13,000 rupees per annum, for herself and son, by name Luxman Rao, was settled by the Gaekwad government upon them.
15. Umed Kuverbai	10th Feb. 1820	A pension of 9,000 rupees was granted by the Gaekwad government during her life time, but the guarantee is for two lives, viz., for herself and her son, Gopalrao Gaekwad. It is not hereditary.
16. Gunpatrao Gaekwad	10th Feb. 1821.	A pension of 4,000 rupees per annum was assigned to him, the payment of which is guaranteed, by the British government, for life.
17. Family of Fatehsinghrao Gaekwad	28th April, 1826	Grant for life to Radhabai, widow of Fatehsinghrao, a stipend of 10,400 rupees, and also to her adopted son, Govindrao, the payment of 12,400 rupees terminate at his death.
18. Narainrao Mahadeo Mazumdar	3 June, 1828	The office of Mazumdar, and all its emoluments was guaranteed by the British government as well as his enam villages, and palanquin and is hereditary.
19. Bhaskarrao Withal	18 August, 1828	This guarantee is for personal protection to himself, family and dependants, as well as for the security of his office of Khasgeewala dewan, and nemnook connected therewith, according to the original sunad granted to Babajee Appajee. The guarantee is hereditary.
20. Nevrao Deshmukh, 4th father-in-law of Pillajee rao.	4th Feb. 1833.	Nothing Known
21. Panchand Pillajeerao's agent.	4th Feb. 1833.	Nothing known

No.	Name of the person Guaranteed	Date and substance of the agreement

22.	Poonjajee Jorajee	30 March, 1840
		Guaranteeing for life the payment of a monthly stipend, amounting to 75 rupees.
23.	Gopalrao Guicowar	24 April, 1840
		Stipulation on the part of the Guicowar Government to pay Gopalrao, the son of Gopalrao Gaekwad of Sukkera, the monthly stipend of 300 rupees, communicated by His Highness, dated 24th April, 1840.

Political Commissioner's Office,
Baroda, 18 No. 1841.

GLOSSARY

Bakshi	:	Paymaster of the Army
Bigah	:	Measure of land (about 5/8 acre)
Chauth	:	One fourth of revenue paid as tribute. Originally imposed by the Marathas.
Darakhdar	:	State Administrative official
Darbar	:	Royal Court
Daskrai, Daskrai	:	20 miles are round a property - haveli or land.
File Zameen	:	Security for good behaviour/Personal security against misbehaviour.
Gadi	:	Throne
Giras	:	Originally exacted as 'protection money'. Later became a fixed tax.
Girasia	:	Petty chiefs who exacted Giras dues from their villages.
Gumasta	:	Clerk
Varats	:	Note given to treasurer by State for payment.
Watandar	:	Holder of Jagir/estate
Yad, Yadi	:	Memorandum, Petition.
Haveli	:	Big Manor of ruler or nobleman
Havaldar	:	Police official
Inam	:	Gift of land from Ruler for services performed.
Jamabandi	:	Land revenue settlement

Kamavisdar	:	Revenue Collector of a Mahal
Khasgi Daulat	:	Private wealth
Kattri, or Katti:		Title of petty chief
Killedar	:	Officer in charge of a Fort
Kharagat	:	Tax exacted to cover expense of collection of tributes
Karkun	:	Clerk
Kolambandi	:	Agreement/Contract
Lascar	:	Army
Mamlatdar	:	Revenue Officer of a Taluka
Mulkgiri	:	Expedition to collect tribute
Mutalik	:	Regent
Nemnuk	:	Appointment with allowance/stipend/grant/endowment.
Nazarana	:	Gift, payment made to the ruler for various favours such as adoption, titles, positions.
Paga	:	Body of Horse or Cavalry.
Pagadar	:	Officer in Charge of Cavalry
Parwana	:	Licence, permit
Potdar, Potedar:		State Bankers
Potedari	:	System of collection and distribution of revenue through State Bankers.
Prant	:	District
Raval	:	Title of petty chief
Sadar Adalat	:	Chief Civil Court or High Court
Sadar Fauzdari Adalat	:	Chief Criminal Court

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Sanad	:	Charter or grant
Sarkar	:	Government
Sarkari Daulat	:	Government Treasury
Sarsubah	:	Chief Officer of a district
Senapati	:	Commander-in-Chief
Samsher Bahadur	:	Honorary Military Title
Sena Khas Khel	:	Commander of the Special Band
Sepoy	:	Soldier
Sidi	:	Title of petty Chief in Kathiawad
Subah	:	Deputy Officer of a district
Surat Atthavisi	:	28 districts of Surat
Thakur	:	Title of petty chief



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BRITISH BARODA RELATIONS, 1818 to 1848

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CHAPTER X

THE LAST YEARS

Carnac returned from Baroda, having laid the foundations for better understanding between the two governments. He, however, was to leave India shortly and the actual work of reconciliation was left in the hands of the regular political department officers, whose attitudes and prejudices were too deeply ingrained to allow for a radical change. Sayajirao had also developed deep distrust against the British, which he was unable to shed completely.

The history of this last period of Sayajirao's reign is one of comparative peace between the two governments, interspersed with conflicts arising mainly from the unsettled guarantee cases and the arrangements regarding the Contingent of Horse, matters of law and order and the tributary States. In this period we see the further erosion of whatever little sovereignty the Gaekwad still possessed in spite of all Carnac's assurances to the contrary. There was also the case of attempted fraud and robbery on the part of Dadaji Dhackji and others, which once again brought into play the conflict of interests between the two governments,

with accusation and counter accusations put forth by both sides.

The law and order question had formed Nos. 9 and 10 of the demands made by the British government in 1829 and were settled partly in January, 1841. The Gaekwad had agreed to lay down certain rules for the guidance of his officers in the discharge of their duties.¹ These rules were not found adequate enough by the British and for the time being they had been left for further consideration after consultation with the Governor General and the Court of Directors. The British took a one sided view of the Treaty obligations, and according to them, the Gaekwad was expected to hand over offenders taking refuge in his territory with no reciprocal action on their part. Article 16 of the original Treaty between the Gaekwad and the British dated 21st April, 1805, and the Article 9 of the Treaty dated 6th November, 1817 stated that offenders taking refuge in the jurisdiction of either party should be surrendered on demand without delay or hesitation on the part of the party concerned, and that frivolous claims should not be entertained.²

1. See Chapter IX.

2. Aitchison, Op. cit., Vol. VI, pp.345 and 357.

During these negotiations the British made all efforts to upset the letter and spirit of these clauses.

Sayajirao had obviously been trying, during the earlier negotiations with Sutherland to make the British accept their part of the Treaty obligations. The rules that the Gaekwad had proposed for his officers included the handing over of the offenders to the British when they had taken refuge in his territories after committing a crime in the British territory. Stolen property was likewise to be given up, if found within the Gaekwad's territory. The Gaekwad also agreed to send persons required as witnesses by the British and effect the recovery of debts from revenue defaulters of the British government taking refuge in his territory.³

In May, 1840, the Gaekwad entered into an agreement regarding these rules and also appended a request that similar arrangements should be introduced in the British territories on the basis of reciprocity.⁴ On receipt of this communication, the Government of Bombay immediately reacted in a typical manner, though the suggestion of reciprocity was completely in accordance with the Treaties. The Government called upon the judges of their court in Ahmedabad to report whether there was

3. PD(BOM), 12A/1842-43. Report of Sutherland of the meeting with Sayajirao held on 23-1-1840.

4. PD(BOM), 15/2020 of 1848. Sutherland to GOB, 16-5-1840.

anything in the Gaekwad's proposals which were repugnant to the Regulations of the Government regarding the British territory. The judges reported that the proposed rules could be adopted subject to clause 2, Section 5 of Regulation 12 of 1827.⁵ According to this rule, the British Magistrates in Gujarat had the right to investigate dereliction of duty on the part of the police establishment of the Gaekwad with regard to prevention, detection or apprehension. This had been a blatant interference in the affairs of the Gaekwad. On these lines instructions were ^{again} issued to several British magistrates of Gujarat on 23rd September, 1840.

The Gaekwad naturally reacted adversely and held discussions with Boyd, and on the 25th March, 1841, submitted a memorandum to the Bombay government through

5. Ibid., Section ~~XIV~~^V of Regulation XII of 1827:

^{2nd} Clause 1st: "When robbery has been committed within the boundary of a Gaekwad village or the perpetrators of a robbery have been satisfactorily traced thereto, and neglect or connivance be charged against the inhabitants or the police establishment, with regard to prevention, detection or apprehension, it shall be competent to the British Magistrate to investigate the matter as a criminal offence, and if the fact be well substantiated, to exact a fine not exceeding the value of the property lost, the whole or part of which may be awarded in compensation to the owner according as the degree of caution and activity, which he received on the occasion, may deserve."

Boyd, requesting some modifications in the rules he had proposed.⁶ The purpose of these changes was to apply the same rules specifically to the British authorities. Boyd urged upon the government to accept the alterations suggested.⁷ Boyd also pointed out that the alterations had been suggested by Sayajirao to indicate his position as a sovereign prince and not with any desire to withhold, resist, or screen the guilty. The Government of Bombay reported that their regulations did not permit compelling any person to leave the British territory or to enforce

6. Ibid., Memorandum of Sayajirao to GOB, 25-3-1841.

The proposals in the Memorandum are:

- i) That the confessions of and evidence against British subjects, apprehended within the Gaikwar territory, recorded before His Highness's officers at the time of seizure, be received as evidence in the British Courts, and not to be upset by the mere denial of the accused, on the plea that their confessions had been extorted by force.
- ii) That the evidence recorded in His Highness's Courts against British subjects, who, having committed robbery within the Gaikwar territory, escape to, and are apprehended within, British bounds, should be similarly received as evidence in the British courts.
- iii) That the Gaikwar's subjects committing offences in the British territory, and others seized, be made over to the Durbar (together with the evidence against them taken before the British authorities) for trial and punishment.
- iv) That British as well as Gaikwar subjects, after undergoing the punishment to which they are sentenced, should be made over to the Government to which they are subject to exact securities from them before release.

7. Ibid., Boyd to GOB, 25-3-1841.

attendance at the Gaekwad's Court as witnesses etc. Boyd was directed to try to impress upon Sayajirao that the British would not accept these changes and to convince him that the alterations demanded by him would not affect his administration in "any substantial and material manner".⁸

Subsequent to these discussions with Boyd, Sayajirao sent two letters to him urging compliance with his request for the amendment of the clauses and the rules.⁹ He stated in these letters that unless his request was complied with, justice would suffer and he himself would suffer great "loss of prestige" by degradation to his dignity.¹⁰ While forwarding these letters Boyd particularly drew the attention to the fact that these letters had been written in English and not in Marathi. He interpreted this as a sign that the Gaekwad wished to "escape mortification" of its being publicly known that his ideas were not taken seriously by the British, though the peace of his country and the prosperity of his subjects lay behind his suggestions.¹¹ Boyd was

8. Ibid., GOB to Boyd, March, 1842.

9. Ibid., Sayajirao to Boyd, 17-5-1842 and 9-6-1842.

10. Ibid.

11. Ibid., Boyd to GOB, 23-6-1842.

of the opinion that Sayajirao would never yield on these points.

The Government of Bombay then submitted the entire correspondence to the Governor General with the remark that if Sayajirao persisted in his proposals, the British would have to consider whether they should compel Sayajirao to agree to their original demands, since most probably he would not agree to these rules voluntarily.¹²

The Government of India replied that it was of the opinion that it would be "injudicious and improper" to press the Gaekwad further about these rules, and advised the Bombay government that it should accept the amendments proposed by the Gaekwad.¹³ Once again, the Bombay government referred the matter to their judges, who expressed the opinion that there was no objection to accepting the amendments with a proviso that the witnesses to be handed over to the Gaekwad should be "guaranteed" against contempt of Court and punishment by the Gaekwad authorities.¹⁴ Boyd agreed with this arrangement but stated that there was very little danger of ill treatment of witnesses and that the Government could safely rely

12. Ibid., GOB to GOI

13. Ibid., GOI to GOB, 16-8-1842.

14. Ibid., Minutes of Governor, 25-2-1843.

upon the protection of the Resident to guard the rights of the British citizens, without asking for specific guarantees.¹⁵ The judges were then called upon to frame and submit a draft of an Act to provide for these modifications.¹⁶ On 8th April, 1843, the judges submitted their draft to the Government of Bombay,¹⁷ who in turn referred it to the Governor General.¹⁸ The Governor General informed the Bombay government that he did not see any need to pass any legislature on this subject but recommended that the same mode of proceedings should be adopted as in Calcutta.¹⁹

According to the Calcutta procedure, the witnesses were forwarded through the Resident who would satisfy himself about their protection and proper remuneration. As regards exchanging offenders, these were taken to the border and handed over to any person willing to take charge of them.

15. PD(BOM), 12A/1842-43. Boyd to GOB, 14-12-1842.

16. PD(BOM), 15/2020 of 1843. GOB to Sadar Fauzdari Adalat, 27-2-1843.

17. Ibid., Sadar Fauzdari Adalat to GOB, 8-4-1843.

18. Ibid., GOB to GOI, July, 1843.

19. Ibid., GOI to GOB, No. 429, August, 1843.

The judges, however, gave their opinion that these procedures could not be adopted by the Bombay government without a legislative enactment. It was, therefore, resolved by the Bombay government to let the matters rest there until some incident made it necessary to bring up the question once again,²⁰ and in the meantime, it had referred the matter to the Court of Directors.²¹

The Court of Directors were of the opinion that the Gaekwad was asking for these amendments rather for the sake of his dignity than for the furtherance of justice. They, however, felt that Sayajirao had "a reasonable claim to reciprocity", and advised the Bombay government to once again ask the Government of India to pass the necessary legislation.²² Accordingly, the Government of Bombay once again approached the Government of India with the request that it should pass into law the draft sent earlier by it.²³ The Government of India kept the whole matter in abeyance, and in the meantime, in the absence of proper co-ordination, the law and order situation began to deteriorate, till in 1847, the Bombay government asked the Resident, Colonel Outram to breach

20. Order of the Government of Bombay, dated 16-2-1844, No. 531.

21. PDL(BOM) to COD, 76/1842-43, 2-10-1843.

22. PD(BOM), 15/2020 of 1848. COD to GOB, 4-12-1844.

23. Ibid., GOB to GOI, 9-4-1845.

the question of law and order again with the Gaekwad.²⁴ Sayajirao met Outram on 3rd July, 1847, and after discussions presented him with a memorandum written in Gujarati,²⁵ which he insisted should be translated by some person in his own confidence. Colonel Outram reacted to this in the same way that Boyd had done earlier in 1842. He felt that Sayajirao was anxious to prevent the original in Gujarati being seen by the Resident's staff, in order to save himself from the mortification of it becoming publicly known that his suggestions would be rejected or lightly treated.²⁶ Outram went on to recommend that the Government should look favourably upon some of the points in the memorandum, and gave his opinion that Sayajirao's suggestions were worth considering as coming from a "sovereign who had gained much experience from a reign of 28 years", and was according to him, a "shrewd and practical person capable of forming a correct judgement".²⁷ He also felt that the Gaekwad could be

24. Ibid., GOB to Outram, 18-5-1847.

Boyd had been succeeded in August, 1844 by his assistant T.Ogilvie. In July, 1845, he was replaced by Sir R.K.Arbutnot, who continued till April, 1846. Mr.W.Andrews became acting Resident in April, 1846, and was succeeded by Colonel J.Outram in June, 1847.

25. Ibid., Memorandum of Sayajirao to Outram, 3-7-1847.

This memorandum contains in essence the same proposal as in the earlier memorandum submitted on 25th March, 1841. (Please see P.No.6 of this Chapter).

26. Ibid., Outram to GOB, 3-8-1847.

27. Ibid.

persuaded to work in conjunction with the British to bring about a reformed system of Police. The remarks of Colonel Outram were significantly different from those made by Sutherland a decade ago, and heralded a period of real co-operation - unfortunately, it came too late for Sayajirao.

The Government of India did refer to the matter again until 5th December, 1847,²⁸ when it sent a draft of an Act which was ultimately approved by the Bombay government.²⁹ Thus for seven long years, a simple matter like this had been handed back and forth on a matter of prestige and to the detriment to the law and order in this region. Of the amendments asked for by the Gaekwad (see F.No.6), the most important was the question of the acceptance of the recorded evidence against British subjects caught in his territory and recorded by his officers. The practice had very often been that when such a criminal was handed over for trial to the British Court, the mere denial or plea that his confessions had been forcibly extracted was accepted by the British Courts. Also, the British Courts were unwilling to accept evidence recorded in the Gaekwad Courts against their subjects. For years, the Gaekwad had been pointing out that these

28. Ibid., GOI to GOB, 5-12-1847.

29. Ibid., Minutes of Governor of Bombay, 7-8-1848.

actions of the British had given criminals an easy way out of justice. Experience had convinced Indian jurists that the confessions taken immediately after capture, especially of those belonging to the aboriginal group such as Kolis, Bhils and Waghers were generally to be relied upon and were usually supported by sufficient circumstantial evidence, such as footprints etc.³⁰ Unfortunately, the British had consistently refused to accept these confessions and other evidences, with the result that the proceedings of the Gaekwad's authorities were generally invalidated. The British Magistrate did not consider Gaekwad's officials competent enough authorities and the evidence recorded by them, if not admitted by the prisoners, was generally not accepted. This had been a great source of heartburning to the Gaekwad and his officers, and naturally in the course of time they had become disinclined to strenuous police activities as no respect was paid to their judicial proceedings. Sayajirao complained that the British gave more importance to the denial of the professional thieves and vagabonds whom his administration had brought to justice than to the records made by his judicial officers, and that his officers had been deterred from

30. Ibid., Memorandum in Gujarati of Sayajirao to the Resident, 3-7-1847.

adopting energetic measures against such persons by the fear of bringing their sovereign into trouble with the British.³¹ The Gaekwad went on to point out several cases in which such one-sided evidence had been accepted by the British and reparation demanded from his government.³²

Sayajirao also proposed steps to be taken to curb the tribes of Kolis, Bhils and Waghers. He suggested that any person from these tribes going from one district to another, or from one State to another, should have to obtain a pass from the chief officers of his village and give security for good behaviour before he could proceed on his travels. Further that he would be allowed to move about only with a stick and no other weapons. In spite of this, if he committed any crime he should be immediately seized and punished.

Outram recommended to the Bombay government that reciprocity regarding confessions and evidence should be accepted. He agreed that the British government should be interested in the "humane object" of preserving the innocent from unjust accusation, but the present system, he pointed out, protected the guilty at the cost of the innocent.³³

31. Ibid.

32. Ibid., Also see Chapter VII.

33. Ibid., Outram to GOB, 3-8-1847.

The third amendment proposed was giving over to the Gaekwad government his subjects seized by the British for trial and punishment. Outram supported this also. The Gaekwad in the memorandum pointed out that in the absence of this procedure, criminals did not hold his government in dread, and as a consequence, his administration failed to make any impression on the conscience of the criminals who were encouraged to commit crimes in his territory and take refuge in the British territory.³⁴ Outram supported this demand further by pointing out that the summary punishment which such offenders underwent in the Gaekwad's Court, but which the subtlety of English law enabled them to escape, would enhance the maintenance of law and order.³⁵

Outram was supported in his view by another English administrator, Lieutenant-Colonel Sutherland, who gave his opinion that under the Indian princes there was "more substantial justice and a greater degree of prosperity" than in the British territory, and that the Indian administration of criminal justice was more "effectual" than that of the British in repressing crimes.³⁶

In his memorandum Sayajirao urged upon the British to accept the Indian system of taking security

34. Ibid., Memorandum of Sayajirao to Outram, 3-7-1847.

35. Ibid., Outram to GOB, 3-8-1847.

36. Ibid., Report on the affairs of Jodhpur by Lt.Col. Sutherland, 1-8-1847.

from known criminals, arresting them if found wandering at unreasonable times and at places, and seizing them when found running away. On such capture, if the offenders were wounded, the Police should not be prosecuted for doing their duty. He also proposed that stolen property found in the house of any persons should be taken as enough proof for his guilt, and the lengthy process of British law, which first tried to account for the way the property came into the hands of such persons should be eliminated.³⁷ Outram stated that he was very much struck by the failure of the authority of both the Gaekwad and the British to repress crimes in Gujarat, and opined that the principal cause of such an unsatisfactory result was the little reciprocal exertions between the two governments, and that unless there was cordial co-operation between the two, no radical improvement could take place.³⁸

The true cause, as Outram informed the British Government of the troubles, was the lack of "reciprocal measure" between the British and the Gaekwad governments and the decay of the indigenous Indian system in the State because of the introduction of English law, which afforded facility for escape to the criminals. Conviction had

37. Ibid., Memorandum from Sayajirao to Outram, 3-7-1847.

38. Ibid., Outram to GOB, 3-8-1847. Compared to 1832, when the total recorded cases of crimes in Gujarat was 124, the year 1846 recorded 1538 cases of gang robbery, highway robbery, burglary, cattle stealing etc.

become so difficult that criminals had lost their fear of the law.³⁹ In this struggle between the two powers, the Gaekwad and his subjects seemed to be always on the losing side.

After Carnac's return to Bombay, the British government discovered that certain persons from Baroda had been claiming that high British officials had been bribed in order to get decisions in favour of the Gaekwad. In December, 1842, the government ordered W. Howard, the officiating Advocate General to investigate into the allegations and report to the Governor.⁴⁰ At the same time, Boyd was ordered to investigate and report to the government, and was instructed to apprise the Gaekwad of these reports.⁴¹ Boyd asked the Gaekwad to come to the Residency where he was informed that it was suspected that the ten lakhs of rupees he had received back from the British government had been distributed for the purpose of bribing certain officials through Dhackji Dadaji. Boyd also asked the Gaekwad to co-operate with the British to find out the guilty persons and to send a respectable person as an Advocate on his behalf to Bombay to co-operate with the Bombay government.⁴²

39. Ibid.

40. PD(BOM), 12A/1842/43. Secret Consultations No.3710. GOB to Howard, officiating Advocate General, 20-12-1842.

41. Ibid., GOB to Boyd, 3-12-1842.

42. Ibid., Boyd to Sayajirao, 14-12-1842.

Sayajirao emphatically denied any connection with such an intrigue, but admitted that he had heard various stories which he was sure his enemies had fabricated. He did not discuss this further, but asked Boyd to put all the questions in writing, because on other occasions personal discussions such as this had been misinterpreted by the British.⁴³ On the same day, getting the points in writing, he gave a detailed reply. He acknowledged that he had received back the amount of ten lakhs of rupees from the British treasury. He tried to explain the money paid through his banker in Bombay to Dhackji Dadaji during 1840-41. According to him, whilst the negotiations between him and the British were going on, he had been threatened by Dhackji that further claims would be made by him. In order to avoid this trouble, in addition to all the other troubles at that time, he had decided, regardless of the loss, in order to stop Dhackji from instituting a suit in the Court, to pay him through his Bankers, Gopalrao Myral in Bombay. The Gaskwad admitted that nearly seven lakhs of rupees had thus been given to Dhackji during this period.⁴⁴

It was actually these payments to Dhackji that had aroused suspicion in the minds of the British, as it

43. Ibid., Sayajirao to Boyd, 14-12-1842.

44. Ibid.

was most unlikely that Sayajirao would pay Dhackji anything unless such a claim had been recognized and pressed by the British government. Enquiries were thus set afoot.

In 1840, as already shown, Sayajirao had been put into an absolutely untenable position by the British. After the second sequestration of Petlad, Sayajirao seemed to have grasped at any opportunity to make things turn in his favour. With the appointment of Sir James Carnac, a one-time sympathetic Resident at Baroda as the new Governor of Bombay, hopes were aroused in him that the Governor and the other officials could be turned in his favour, through pressure of old acquaintances. It was represented to him that Dhackji Dadaji who had been extremely close to James Carnac as his 'native' agent, when he was Resident, could put pressure upon him.

The desperate state of Sayajirao's mind can be judged from the fact that he allowed himself to fall into this trap, and to think that a man such as Dhackji Dadaji, who had betrayed him time and again, could now be trusted to help him.

The Gaekwad, it was claimed by the British, had sent Bapuji Anand, the confidential agent of Gopalrao Myral, to Bombay with instructions to pay certain sums of money

to Dhackji Dadaji to bribe the following officers:⁴⁵

1.	Sir James Carnac	Rs.10.00 lakhs
2.	Mr. Willoughby (Secretary to GOB)	Rs. 2.50 lakhs
3.	Mr. Reid (Asstt.Secretary to GOB)	Rs. 0.60 thousand
	and	
4.	Other minor officials	Rs. 1.46 lakhs

	Total	Rs.14.56 lakhs
		=====

However, when the Gaekwad realised, after Carnac's visit to Baroda and the settlement he had been forced to agree to, that the British officials had not changed their attitude in any perceptible way, he began to suspect that he was being double crossed by Dhackji and others. He, therefore, sent Hiralal, a confidential agent to Bombay in April, 1842. Hiralal was instructed to demand back all the money so far spent by Bapuji Anand in the Gaekwad's name which amounted to Rs. 7 lakhs upto now. The Gaekwad also, according to Hiralal, expressed his doubts that the British officials would ever take bribes.⁴⁶ The report received by the Gaekwad from Bapuji Anand had been that Dhackji had paid Rs. 5 lakhs to James Carnac during the spring of 1841, and Rs.2 lakhs to Mr.Willoughby during 1840.⁴⁷ The Gaekwad had admitted that he had paid to

45. Ibid., Correspondence found in the possession of Balaji Pant, Gopalrao Myral's chief Manager, by W.Howard.

46. Ibid., Evidence of Hiralal recorded by W.Howard during the investigation.

47. Ibid.

Dhackji Rs. 7 lakhs. An examination of Gopalrao Myral's books in Bombay definitely showed that the two payments⁴⁸ were made to Dhackji.

During the spring of 1841, it had become well known in Bombay that Dhackji had received Rs.5 lakhs from the Gaekwad. He seems to have used this money to pay off several of his own creditors, amongst them, Jagannath Shankerset.⁴⁹ Howard also produced a letter written by Dhackji on the 22nd May, 1841, to a friend in England claiming that the Gaekwad had paid this money as part payment of his claim. The Bombay government, however, does not seem to have known of this, because they were corresponding with the Court of Directors at this time regarding the memorandum sent to the Court by Dhackji asking for payment of his claims against the Gaekwad.⁵⁰ An examination of Dhackji's books of account by Howard showed the entry of two sums of Rs.5 lakhs and Rs.2 lakhs under the single head of "Baroda Account" and entered as received from Ganpat Baba, who was an intermediary between Bapuji and Anand and Dhackji.⁵¹

On Howard's examining Dhackji about the circumstances under which these sums were paid to him,

48. Ibid., Report of W.Howard, 31-1-1843, on examination of Gopalrao Myral's books of Accounts.

49. Ibid.

50. Ibid., Memorandum of Dhackji to COD, 26-11-1840.

51. Ibid., Report from W.Howard on examination of Dhackji Dadaji's books of accounts given on



the only reply he received was that since Carnac had left the guarantee question to be settled between the persons concerned and Sayajirao directly, he had sent Ganpati Baba to the Gaekwad for discussion, and had received this settlement from the Gaekwad. He disclaimed any knowledge of where the money came from. He also stated that no receipt had been given for this money to Ganpati Baba or to any officer of the Gaekwad. When asked to show any correspondence regarding this affair with the Gaekwad's officers, he declared that there had been none since he had no friends to write to.⁵² The whole matter is definitely open to various interpretations. It seems most improbable that the Gaekwad, who had for so long refused to recognize any of Dhackji's claim should suddenly pay him Rs.7 lakhs without any petition or correspondence from him, and in fact, no such correspondence is to be found in the files.

An examination of Ganpati Baba followed upon this. Ganpati Baba admitted that a letter had been written to the Gaekwad by one Sakharan Baba, Joint Manager of Gopalrac Myral's Bank in Bombay, and a confidant of Sayajirao, putting forth Dhackji's demand for Rs.7½ lakhs.

52. Ibid., Note of W.Howard's examination of Dhackji Dadeji given in the Report dated 31-1-1848.

Ganpati Baba also admitted that he had received the money not directly through the Banker, Gopalrao Myral, but through Sakharam Baba and had given no receipt for it to Sakharam Baba.⁵³ Howard admitted that this search of Dhackji's office produced no correspondence in Marathi between him and people at Baroda, nor could he find anything else in writing connected with these large payments. Howard concluded from this that Dhackji had destroyed all these papers and that his guilt should thereby be proved.⁵⁴ Howard's conclusion was that all the secrecy involved in the manner of the payments showed that Sayajirao, if he had paid the sums had done so, under a totally false representation made to him by Dhackji.⁵⁵ He pointed out that, though Carnac's settlement had given back the Inam villages to Dhackji as well as the arrears of revenue of that village, the claim of Rs.7½ lakhs by Dhackji had not been conceded, and that in fact Dhackji's position vis a vis the Gaekwad had perhaps never been lower than in the beginning of 1841.⁵⁶ If this had been a payment to Dhackji on account of his claims, a formal communication to this effect would certainly have been made to Dhackji from the Gaekwad and a full receipt would have been

53. Ibid., Report of the examination of Ganpati Baba by Howard, 31-1-1843.

54. Ibid., Report of W.Howard, 31-1-1843.

55. Ibid.

56. Ibid.

obtained. Sayajirao would also have kept the British government informed of these negotiations, and Dhackji would also have communicated to the British government that he no longer pressed his memorandum of 26th November, 1840, since his demands had been met.⁵⁷ It is difficult not to agree with Howard's conclusions that Dhackji did not receive this money on account of his claims but for another questionable transaction. Howard came to the conclusion that the money was paid to Dhackji for secret ^{payments and} services performed or to be performed.

A further examination of Hiralal and the letters taken from him showed that Dhackji Dadaji had before, during and after Carnac's visit to Baroda impressed upon the Gaekwad and his immediate advisers that he could turn things in the Gaekwad's favour.⁵⁸ Dhackji Dadaji, it seems, had taken fullest advantage of the Gaekwad's weakness and desperate position to misappropriate this money for himself. He had put up a show during Carnac's visit to Baroda of being the Governor's confidante. He wrote letters to the Governor and his wife which he showed to the Gaekwad and others as proof of what he was doing.⁵⁹

In fact, there was nothing in these letters except fulsome praise of the Governor and his wife written

57. Ibid.

58. Ibid., Report of W. Howard, 31-1-1843. Letters from Bapuji Anand to Motilal Purushottam, a clerk in the office of Willoughby and Ganpati Baba. (Date not known).

59. Ibid., Letters from Dhackji to Carnac & Lady Carnac, 20-1-1841.

in an involved and colourful style. His explanation to the Gaikwad about this was that the Governor would understand and that the bribe could not be openly mentioned.

When the settlement made by Carnac proved unsatisfactory, Dhackji assured Sayajirao that he could make Carnac change his mind, especially about the payment of Rober's Rissala.⁶⁰ As part of his game, Dhackji had introduced Balaji Pant and Sakharam Baba to Carnac in Bombay, soon after his return from Baroda, and had artfully turned the topic towards Baroda. It seems that Carnac had made some remarks that he could not do anything about Baroda as he was working under the orders of the Court of Directors. Dhackji had thus created an impression that he was on confidential and friendly terms with the Governor, and succeeded in deceiving Balaji and Sakharam about his real intentions.⁶¹

On receiving the Report from Howard, the Governor and his Council once again decided to ask Sayajirao's help in definitely fixing the fraud on Dhackji.⁶² The Council also agreed to take action against Dhackji as the prime figure in this episode. They were particularly angered

60. Ibid., Statement of Hiralal made to W. Howard, cited in the Report of Howard, 31-1-1843.

61. Ibid., Letters from Balaji Pant and Sakharam Baba to Sayajirao's Secretary at Baroda by W. Howard in his report 31-1-1843.

62. Ibid., Minutes of Governor of Bombay, 25-2-1843.

at what they felt was the "disrespect" brought upon the European character in the eyes of the Indian people by attaching the "stigma of the vilest kind" on their character.⁶³ It was decided that Dhackji should be suitably punished. Accordingly, on 24th July, 1843, the Bombay government ordered that in consequence of his gross misconduct in receiving a bribe of Rs.7 lakhs under the false pretention from the Gaekwad, his name should be struck off from the commission of peace. Further, the arrangement which Carnac had made to pay the rent of his Inam villages from the Bombay treasury was to be discontinued. He was henceforth to be excluded from all Durbars in Bombay and Baroda, and he was to make his own arrangement about getting his revenue from the Inam villages.⁶⁴

This report of attempted bribery on the part of the Gaekwad and, his betrayal by Dhackji seems to be substantially correct from the examination of the papers cited in the report of Howard. There were no papers to be found from the Baroda archives, since obviously, to disclaim any connection in this case, they might have been destroyed. That Sayajirao thought it possible to change the course of events through bribery is not so preposterous as the British at that time made it out to

63. Ibid.

64. Ibid., Order of the Government of Bombay, dated 24-7-1843. Dhackji was in the first group of Indian Justices of Peace appointed by Clare.

be. The general character of the political administration at this time in India made this quite possible. In fact, as is evident from the Register of Letters of the Baroda Records Office, on every occasion of a visit from English officials from the Governor downwards to Baroda involved the presentation of costly gifts by Sayajirao.⁶⁵ The Gaekwad must have, therefore, believed Dhackji's claims and become a part to this whole sorry transaction.

Carnac had left Baroda with most of the remaining questions of the guarantees to be settled between the Gaekwad and the Resident. As seen in the previous chapter, both the Court of Directors and Carnac were having second thoughts on the correctness of the British stand on the guarantees. The Political Commissioner had been asked to prepare a note of the outstanding guarantees before Carnac's visit to Baroda. Boyd had presented a report to the Bombay government, giving a list of 23 such outstanding guarantees then existing.⁶⁶ Carnac and the Governor General could not agree on the action to be taken and the whole unfavourable problem of guarantees remained unsolved. The Court of Directors were in the meantime receiving petitions from some of the guaranteed persons who felt that their privileges might be curtailed if the

65. Historical Selections from Baroda Records, New Series, Vol.I and Historical Selections from Baroda State Records, Vol.VII, Government Press, Baroda, 1955 and 1948.

66. Baroda Blue Book, 1840-1853. Baroda Guarantees, Report of Boyd, 18-11-1840. See Appendix A.

guarantees were abandoned. Amongst them was Dhackji Dadaji.⁶⁷

As seen, the Governor General had been disinclined to accept the proposal of the Court of Directors that the Bombay government take upon itself a portion of the payment to be made under their guarantees, on receiving from the Gaekwad an annual assignment from his tributes, sufficient to cover the remainder of the amount. The Governor General's stand had been that this would involve an additional burden on the British finances without doing away with the inconveniences of the guarantees.

It became clear from the report of Boyd that there were 17 guarantees of hereditary obligations involving pledges of personal protection. According to the Governor General, the plan of the Court of Directors would have involved the British government in an expense of nearly Rs.2 lakhs per annum.⁶⁸ He wondered whether the Court of Directors would press their proposal once they were aware of this commitment. He had, therefore, written to the Court of Directors and was awaiting their reply.

As a result the Gaekwad was plagued with big and small indignities by the British government and his

67. Ibid., Dhackji to COD, 26-11-1840.

68. BBB(BAR), Op. cit., GOI to GOB, 8-3-1841.

guaranteed subjects. Till the very end of his life, the problems could not be solved though the British did not press on these demands as heavily as they had done earlier. A study of some of the outstanding cases will show how, between the Court of Directors, the Governor General and the Bombay government, there was no consistent policy about this matter.

Carnac had left it to the Resident to decide on the actual amount to be paid by the Gaekwad to the Desai family for arrears due to them, and Elliot, the Governor's agent at Surat, was asked to proceed with the investigation of the arrears claimed by the Desai of Navsari.⁶⁹ Elliot's investigation again brought out some doubts about the claims of the Desai.⁷⁰ Hearing about this, Sayajirao immediately took advantage of it and, with the consent of the Resident, again took possessions of the Desai's property.⁷¹

The Desais immediately petitioned to the British government, and on their requisition, the Gaekwad was once again made to remove his attachment on the estate of the Desais.⁷² The question of arrears was still left undecided

69. BBB(BAR), Op. cit., GOB to Elliot, 20-2-1841.

70. Ibid., Elliot to Boyd, March, 1841.

71. BRO(BAR), Baroda Guarantees, 5664/2, No.4384.

72. PDL(BOM) to COD, 62/1841, No.14, GOB to Sayajirao, 27-4-1841.

and Sayajirao was obviously in a state of unrest about this matter. The Bombay government transferred Elliot, and asked his successor Sir R. Arbuthnot to examine and report on the whole subject.⁷³ Arbuthnot submitted his report on 15th December, 1843, and according to this, the Desai was entitled to an aggregate sum of Rs.2,44,269-3-0.⁷⁴ The Gaekwad had upto date paid him Rs.1,20,403-9-3 leaving a balance of Rs.1,23,885-9-9.⁷⁵ This amount had included the interest of 9 per cent per annum charged on all the items owed by the Gaekwad.⁷⁶ The Government of Bombay ordered the Resident to pay this amount from the Gaekwad's tributes forthwith.⁷⁷

The Gaekwad naturally opposed such arbitrary action, and wrote to the Governor of Bombay protesting against the imposition on him, and the charge of such a high rate of interest.⁷⁸ Sayajirao pointed out that he had not been a party to the investigation, and completely rejected the British account and submitted his own whereby he claimed that he owed the Desai only Rs.80,820-7-0.⁷⁹ In reply the Government of Bombay

73. SC(BOM), 98, GOB to Arbuthnot, 19-9-1843.

74. Ibid., Report from Arbuthnot to GOB, 15-12-1843.

75. Ibid.

76. Ibid.,

77. Ibid., GOB to Boyd, 23-3-1844.

78. PD(BOM), 102/1844-45, Sayajirao to GOB, 15-4-1844.

79. Ibid.

instructed the Resident to stop further discussion with Sayajirao and to implement its instruction.⁸⁰

The Resident was instructed to inform the Gaekwad that the orders of the government were final and that it could not comply with the Gaekwad's request for reconsideration till it had approached the Court of Directors,⁸¹ and the representatives of the Desai family were called to Baroda and informed of the government's decision.⁸² After the representatives of the Desai family arrived in Baroda, a meeting was arranged between them and the Gaekwad by Gopalrao Myral and others, and the representatives of the family expressed the wish to come to private understanding with the Gaekwad and matters were allowed to remain pending for some time.⁸³ In the next six months, the Desais were constantly in touch with Sayajirao and ultimately arrived at a settlement in the presence of the Political Commissioner, Mr. T.Ogilvy, early in 1845. In February, 1845, the settlement was finally arrived at whereby the amount of land belonging to the Desais was finally settled, and the Gaekwad granted

80. PDL(BOM) to COD, 94/1844, No.47. GOB to Boyd, 24.5-1844.

81. Ibid., Boyd died in June, 1845. He was ailing for sometime. Remington was appointed as the Acting Resident from 1844 July, and was followed in August by Mr.T.Ogilvy. In July, 1845, Sir Robert Arbuthnot took over as Resident and Political Commissioner of Gujarat.

82. PD(BOM), 102/1844-45. Commissioner for Gujarat to Muncherji Desai, 16-6-1844.

83. Ibid., Report from the Acting Political Commissioner to GOB, 4-7-1844.

hereditarily to the Desais Rs.300 per annum for a carriage, Rs.1,000 per annum for a Palanquin, and Rs.250 per annum for a clerk. The Desais also accepted Rs.68,000 in full payment for all their pecuniary demands. This agreement was reached and recorded in the presence of Ogilvy,⁸⁴ and ratified by the Bombay government on 22nd May, 1845,⁸⁵ and also finally accepted by the Court of Directors in July, 1846.⁸⁶

The settlement was of course a relief to the Gaekwad but it needs to be pointed out that he had to give up his claims in the guarantee matters. As seen in Chapter V, Sayajirao had emphatically pointed out that the Desais did not have a hereditary guarantee, nor were the British able to produce the original Sanad or an authentic copy of the same.

The Gaekwad obviously arrived at this compromise in order to save himself from the large amount of money being claimed by the British on behalf of the Desais, who obviously accepted a much lesser sum in view of the fact that the Gaekwad accepted their hereditary claim and that also under British guarantee. In spite of the

84. BRO(BAR), File No.3, Ogilvy to GOB, 15-2-1848.

85. Ibid., Ogilvy to Sayajirao, 26-5-1845.

86. PD(BOM), 15/2020 of 1848. COD to GOB, 29-7-1846.

change in tone from 1841-42 on the part of Carnac and the Court of Directors, the British were here giving a fresh guarantee instead of gradually eliminating them, as one would have supposed from their utterances, a few years earlier. It was only in 1854, much after the death of Sayajirao, that Outram submitted to the government a report on all the guarantees then existing, and pointed out that the British guarantee given in 1845 to the Desais was not binding, because the original Sanad had not made any specific mention of heirs or future generations and for 15 long years Sayajirao had refused to acknowledge such a hereditary right.⁸⁷ However, even at this late stage, the Governor General decided that the guarantee was hereditary and informed the Government of Bombay about this in January, 1856. This situation lasted till the reign of Sayajirao III in the early 20th century.⁸⁸

The pernicious character of the guarantee system cannot be better illustrated than in the case of Dhackji Dadaji. Even after the diabolical case of bribery and corruption in which he was involved and his fraud against the Gaekwad, which had entailed his disgrace from the

87. The whole question of guarantee has been discussed in detail in the papers relating to the British guarantee to the subjects of His Highness, the Gaekwad - Huzur Political Office Library, U-5-7, No.49.

88. Ibid.

social life of Bombay, he very soon got the fear of the British again about his guarantee.

On the 15th of August, 1844, Dhackji petitioned to the Government of Bombay to rescind their decision to stop payment of the rent of his Inam villages from the Bombay treasury.⁸⁹ In reply, instead of refusing to get involved in the case, the Bombay government informed him that it had no objection to his applying directly to the Gaekwad to put him in possession of his Inam villages or to pay him their annual value.⁹⁰ Dhackji informed the Bombay government that the Gaekwad was willing to pay him if the British government had no objection.⁹¹

The Bombay government thereupon instructed Ogilvy, In-charge at Baroda Residency, that he should inform the Gaekwad that he was at liberty to make over the Inam villages to Dhackji or pay him the annual rent.⁹² The Gaekwad had not made any commitment to Dhackji though Dhackji had thus reported to the Bombay government, and he, once again, wrote to the Government of Bombay in July, 1845, asking them to intervene on his behalf.⁹³ The Bombay government now wrote to the new Resident, Sir Robert

89. PDL(BOM), 112/1846. Petition from Dhackji Dadaji to the Governor of Bombay, 15-8-1844.

90. Ibid., GOB to Dhackji, 12-9-1844.

91. Ibid., Dhackji to GOB, 19-12-1844.

92. Ibid., GOB to Ogilvy, 17-1-1845.

93. Ibid., Dhackji to GOB, 5-7-1845.

Arbuthnot asking for an explanation of Sayajirao's conduct, and requesting him to discuss the matter with Sayajirao.⁹⁴ The Gaekwad refused to discuss the matter with the Resident, and instead sent a letter to the Governor in which he recounted the entire history of Dhackji's claim, pointing out particularly how he had been cheated time and again, and reminded the British that only in 1843, they had themselves disgraced Dhackji. Sayajirao, therefore, declared that he would not restore the Inam villages to Dhackji.⁹⁵

Incapable of really changing its attitude, the Government of Bombay could not accept this reply, and instructed Arbuthnot to inform Sayajirao that he must either restore the villages to Dhackji or give better reason for not doing so.⁹⁶ The Resident thereupon had a meeting with Sayajirao, who, aware of the past pressure put on him, ultimately agreed to pay Dhackji the actual revenue realised at that time from the Inam villages and not the grant of Rs.30,000.⁹⁷

The Bombay government now insisted that Sayajirao should either pay the full sum of Rs.30,000 per year or restore the Inam villages to Dhackji.⁹⁸ On 26th January,

94. Ibid., GOB to Arbuthnot, 20-9-1845.

95. Ibid., Sayajirao to Governor of Bombay, 13-11-1845.

96. Ibid., GOB to Arbuthnot, 26-11-1845.

97. Ibid., Arbuthnot to GOB, 10-1-1846.

98. Ibid., GOB to Arbuthnot, 21-1-1846.

1846, Dhackji died leaving a note to the British government, commending his adopted son, Kashinath Dhackji, to their protection. He also urged the government to use its influence on Sayajirao to continue the Inam villages in favour of his adopted son.⁹⁹ The British at least now, refused to interfere with regard to this adoption, leaving the matter between the adopted son and Sayajirao. All the same, Sayajirao was asked to pay the arrears due to Dhackji from June, 1843 (when the British had passed their order against Dhackji) to 26th January, 1846 at the rate of Rs.30,000 per annum.¹⁰⁰

Sayajirao absolutely refused to do this and claimed that the revenue of the villages had fallen to Rs.18,000 per annum and that he would pay only so much.¹⁰¹ The Resident sent this letter on to the Government of Bombay who insisted that Sayajirao should pay the full amount minus the collection charges, and gave Sayajirao 14 days to consider, and, if he did not agree, the Resident was instructed to pay the amount from the Gaekwad's tribute.¹⁰² Once again the Gaekwad had to give in and on the 23rd May, 1846, he paid the full amount into the ^{British} ~~Baroda~~ treasury under protest and asked

99. Ibid., Note to GOB from Dhackji Dadaji, 25-1-1846.

/Ibid.,

100. /GOB to Arbuthnot, 26-3-1846.

101. Ibid., Sayajirao to Arbuthnot, 25-4-1846.

102. Ibid., GOB to W.Andrews, Acting Resident, 23-5-1846.

the Acting Resident to allow him to refer the whole matter to the Governor General.¹⁰³ On receipt of this information, the Bombay government perversely decided to keep the money in reserve and pay only what Sayajirao had agreed to pay.¹⁰⁴

It took another two years for the matter to be finally resolved. Ultimately, on the 22nd July, 1848, the Governor of Bombay decided that the adoption had no validity whatsoever without the sanction of Sayajirao which had never been received. Kashinath Dhackji had been unable to produce any proof that Sayajirao had sanctioned the adoption. The Governor General, therefore, recommended that Kashinath Dhackji should be informed accordingly and also told that he had no right whatsoever to the Inam villages or anything else granted to Dhackji Dadaji.¹⁰⁵ Accordingly, Kashinath Dhackji was so informed and the thoroughly vexatious and unjust case was put to rest.¹⁰⁶

The other remaining guarantees were also more or less settled by Sayajirao^{by} generally giving in to the British demands. It is not possible here to discuss each of them separately. From what has been said so far

103. Ibid., Sayajirao to the Acting Resident, 23-5-1846.

104. PD(BOM), 135/1848 No.118. Minutes by the Governor of Bombay, 22-7-1848.

105. Ibid.

106. Ibid., GOB to Kashinath Dhackji Dadaji, 29-7-1848.

about the guarantee system it is clear that it had been a source of incalculable injury to the Gaekwad, and had created immense bad feeling between him and the British government. Particularly, it had enabled the British to interfere between the Gaekwad and his subjects leading to the erosion of the Gaekwad's sovereignty. The British policy regarding the guarantee had been unbending and had been deliberately used to enhance their position and to belittle the Gaekwad. However, there had also been a certain amount of inconsistency in their attitude. Mount Stuart Elphinstone, Sir John Malcolm, Lord Clare and Sir James Carnac, as well as the Court of Directors, all in turn, had declared their aversion to the continuance of this system of giving guarantees, but at the same time, had not only continued the old ones, but had at times given new ones. Sayajirao till the very end suffered from this system and obviously fully realised that his power was extremely limited and circumscribed. It took another 80 years before the Gaekwads of Baroda could free themselves from this particular problem.

During the discussion with Carnac, Sayajirao had experienced a great deal of difficulty in keeping in tact his Contingent of Horse. Ultimately, he had been allowed to retain the full Contingent of 3,000 Horse

only on condition that he maintain the additional Gujarat Irregular Horse (Robert's Rissala). Sayajirao had hoped that sooner or later he would be excused from this additional burden. The maintenance of this additional force amounted to Rs. 3 lakhs a year. Soon after Carnac's departure from Baroda, Sayajirao petitioned the Governor of Bombay to free him from this payment. He represented that he had consented to the demand only to please the Governor, but pointed out that it was opposed to the Treaty and that his State would be placed in great difficulty by this burden. Sayajirao also asked the Governor to send his petition on to the Governor General and the Court of Directors.¹⁰⁷ In reply, the Governor informed Sayajirao that he could write directly to the Governor General about his case.¹⁰⁸ Since no relief was granted to him till September, 1841, Sayajirao again wrote to the Governor in the same way.¹⁰⁹

Instead of relieving the Gaekwad of this burden, the Government of Bombay, had demanded in addition certain reforms of his Contingent of Horse with a view, they claimed, of bringing about more efficiency. Boyd had been asked

107. BRO(BAR), File No.464. Sayajirao to Governor of Bombay, 8-2-1841.

108. Ibid., Governor of Bombay to Sayajirao, 18-4-1841.

109. PD(BOM), 9/1224 of 1841-43. Sayajirao to Governor of Bombay, 21-9-1841.

to discuss this matter with Sayajirao.¹¹⁰ The demand was that the Gaekwad should agree to the appointment of a European officer, Major Robert as Inspector General of the Contingent of Horse. This was over and above the four European officers who were already supervising the Contingent.¹¹¹ Sayajirao objected to this supervisory officer but promised to take any measure that the British government thought necessary to improve his Contingent.¹¹² Boyd expressed his opinion to the Governor that the Contingent was well looked after and that the Gaekwad's promise of improvement could be relied upon.¹¹³

The new Governor, Sir George Arthur, was not at all pleased by these remarks of Boyd and stated in a minute that there was no ground at all from deviating from their demand and that the Political Commissioner should be reprimanded for breach of etiquette and insubordination.¹¹⁴ Having received no sympathy from the Bombay government, Sayajirao sent a letter to the Governor General Ellenborough on the 25th July, 1842.¹¹⁵ In this letter Sayajirao again

110. Ibid., GOB to Boyd, 14-5-1841.

111. Ibid.

112. Ibid., Sayajirao to the Governor of Bombay, 28-9-1841.

113. Ibid., Boyd to GOB, 13-10-1841.

114. Ibid., Minutes of Governor of Bombay (date not known).
Sir James Carnac had left India in April 1841,
and had been succeeded by Sir George Arthur.

115. BRO(BAR), File No.464. Sayajirao to Ellenborough,
25-7-1842.

pleaded for relief from the burden of Rs.3 lakhs imposed on him for the Gujarat Irregular Horse, and recapitulated all the points he had made to the Governor of Bombay, and requested the Governor General to take definite measure to relieve him. Instead of reply to this letter, Sayajirao was informed on the 8th of February, 1843, by the Resident that the Government was determined not to have any further discussion on the subject.^{115a} Thereupon Sayajirao once again addressed a letter to the Governor General on 16th March, 1843.¹¹⁶ The latter did not reply to this either, but informed the Governor of Bombay that no notice should be taken of the letter and that the Gaekwad should be informed that further applications would be of no avail and should be discontinued.¹¹⁷

The Governor thereupon wrote to Sayajirao informing him that the Governor General had refused his application for relief from the expenses of the Irregular Horse (Roberts Rissala), and that no further correspondence should be addressed to him on this matter.¹¹⁸

115a. PD(BOM), 9/1224 of 1841-43. Boyd to Sayajirao, 8-2-1843.

116. Ibid., Sayajirao to the Governor General, 16-3-1843.

117. Ibid., GOI to GOB, 10-4-1843.

118. Ibid., Governor to Sayajirao, 20-4-1843.

Sayajirao had to continue making this additional payment till the end of his reign. The matter was taken up again by his successor, Khanderao Gaekwad, and ultimately, as a reward for remaining faithful to the British during the revolt of 1857, the Governor General Lord Canning freed the Gaekwad from the payment of Rs.3 lakhs per annum for the maintenance of the Gujarat Irregular Horse with retrospective effect from the date of Khanderao's accession to the throne.¹¹⁹

Another vexed question was the jurisdiction of the Gaekwad's Kathiawad and Mahikanta tributaries. Steadily over the years, the British had encroached on his rights till, by now, practically the entire administration of these territories was controlled by the British. Amongst the many questions arising out of the collection of the tribute by the British were the questions of remission, suspension and reduction of the tributes. In acting in these issues between the Baroda government and the chieftains concerned, the British had steadily taken over the right to decide these matters, much to the chagrin of the Gaekwad, whose interest, prestige and dignity were thus affected. *His powers, in fact were being usurped.*

119. Aitchison, Op. cit., Vol. VI, Kharita from Lord Canning to Khanderao Gaekwad, dated 31-5-1858, p.375.

According to the original settlements regarding the Kathiawad tributes, entered between Anandrao Gaekwad and Colonel Walker and Mr. Ballantyne in 1808 and 1812¹²⁰ respectively, there was a provision for the remission of tribute whenever, owing to natural causes the tributary could not pay the full amount. Relief to tide over the difficulty of that year was to be granted. The procedure followed was that the requests were to be preferred to the Gaekwad by the Chiefs and Thakores for remission in tribute, after which an inquiry was supposed to be made by the British officer of the Political Agency as to the correctness of the case, and refer his decision to the Gaekwad,¹²¹ and the final decision in actual fact was made by the Government of Bombay. Through the years, the Bombay government had often played the chiefs against the Gaekwad in order to get an upper hand.¹²² A permanent tendency had, therefore, developed on the part of the chieftains to demand the remission on the most trifling ground and the British Political Agent had continuously backed them up. In the agreement of 1840-41, Sayajirao had agreed to extend these remissions even to the Mahikanta tributes even though no specific provision for granting relief existed in the original settlement regarding this area.

120. HPO(BAR), File No.166/43, See Chapter I.

121. Ibid.

122. See Chapter VII.

On many occasions, Sayajirao had in fact, on his own, given relief to his subjects, but objected to being forced to do so on flimsy grounds,¹²³ and he objected to the arbitrary methods enforced by the British of granting remissions. The same problem continued during this last period also.

In 1845, according to the British, the province of Kathiawad once again was in a state of scarcity due to the failure of the monsoon,¹²⁴ and the British had granted a remission of tribute without the Gaekwad's consent, only informing him of what they had done.¹²⁵ In reply, Sayajirao had grudgingly given his assent to the remission, requesting, however, that in future no remissions ought to be granted until an enquiry could be made by both the governments and the necessity of it established to the satisfaction of both of them.¹²⁶ On being informed of this request, the Bombay government refused to give their consent to this arrangement.¹²⁷

123. BRO, Register of Letters October-November, 1834. Relief granted of Rs.10,000 to the Surat cultivators on account of floods of the Tapti river - Extract from a letter dated 7th October to the Sarsuba of Surat District;

Register of Letters, dated September, October, 1824. Order dated 26th September, 1824 to the Jamadar of Variaval to extend relief to the farmers by opening wells and to collect dues without putting the farmers to distress as conditions were bad owing to scanty rains.

124. PD(BOM), 138/1848, No.14. GOB to COD, 13-1-1847.

125. Ibid., Acting Resident, Andres to Sayajirao, 20-4-1847.

126. Ibid., Sayajirao to Andrews, 23-4-1847.

127. PD(BOM), 15/2020 of 1848. GOB to Andrews, 18-5-1847.

On being informed about this, the Gaekwad made a further request through Colonel Outram, the new Resident at Baroda.¹²⁸ Sayajirao requested that in future, whenever occasions arose for remission, a detailed estimate of the losses sustained by each tributary affected should be forwarded by the Political Agent for his information.¹²⁹ The Bombay government acceded to this request and directed Major Lang, the British Political Agent in Kathiawad, that in future, before applying to the British government for sanction to grant remission, he should communicate to the Resident at Baroda whatever information was available. Major Lang was also told that in case the Gaekwad differed from him on any occasion, concerning the necessity for remission, the Bombay government would review the arguments on both sides before coming to a decision.¹³⁰ Major Lang, however, thought that the procedure suggested would be very lengthy, as the Gaekwad would immediately not be in a position to check the accuracy of the estimates of the losses submitted by him and may set enquiries afoot. He, therefore, suggested that the

128. Colonel James Outram succeeded as Resident on 8th June, 1847.

129. PD(BOM), 138/1848, No.14. Sayajirao to Outram, June, 1847.

130. Ibid., GOB to Lang, 4-7-1847.

Gaekwad's Muzumdars, who were his hereditary officers, be entrusted with his tributary interests along with the British officers, to examine the reports of the chiefs and make a joint estimate, reporting back to Sayajirao. The Political Agent should also scrutinize¹³¹ these reports and make the necessary observations.

Lang's suggestions immediately started heated discussions in Bombay, particularly from Reid and Willoughby, members of the Governor's Council, who felt that the Gaekwad should not be allowed to interfere in the management of his tributaries. They felt that, if he was allowed to do so, the government would be opening a door for discussions which might lead to much embarrassment. They considered that the management of the Gaekwad's possession in Kathiawad and Mahikanta were now under the direct management of the British government and that these provinces were not governed in concert with the Gaekwad.¹³² The Governor came to the decision, at long last, that the government ought to listen to the objections of the Gaekwad against any remissions though he agreed that since the Gaekwad's possession in Kathiawad had been placed "entirely" under the British government, ultimately, it alone had the right to decide when remissions were required.¹³³ Lang was, therefore, informed that his

131. Ibid., Lang to GOB, 14-7-1847.

132. Ibid., Minutes of Reid and Willoughby, 12-8-1847.

133. Ibid., Minutes of Governor G. Clark, 18-9-1847.

suggestion of joint consultation was not acceptable and that he should follow instructions from the government originally given to him of informing the Resident at Baroda with details about the remissions proposed.¹³⁴

Not satisfied with depriving the Gaekwad of his dues through the remission of his tributes, the British government in 1846 claimed that the Gaekwad should share a proportion of the losses that the British incurred in their own villages. These villages in Gujarat were what the British had acquired from the Peshwa. The Gaekwads had a claim to a certain tax for Ghasdana from these villages.¹³⁵ The British now proposed that they should reduce the proportion of Ghasdana in their villages, whenever remissions were made. Outram was asked to inquire whether any such demand had previously been made on the Gaekwad.¹³⁶ When Outram took over as Resident, he completed the inquiry and informed the Bombay government that there was no instance on record of any demand having at any time been made by the British government upon the Gaekwad to bear any portion of the loss occasioned by the grant of remission in their villages.¹³⁷ On receiving this information, the Governor

134. Ibid., GOB to Lang, 18-10-1847.

135. Ghasdana was originally the contribution of grass and grain levied by the Gaekwads on these villages when he sent his troops to collect the tribute on behalf of the Peshwas. It became later a fixed levy.

136. PD(BOM), 124/1847, Minutes of Governor G.Clark, 10-7-1847.

137. Ibid., Outram to GOB, 2-7-1847.

was of the opinion that the British government should not attempt to do anything that was not already there in practice.¹³⁸ Willoughby, however, deferred and suggested that further information may be collected from the Mahikanta villages. This inquiry also proved that no proportion of the losses in the British villages had been shared by the Gaekwad.¹³⁹

In spite of this report, Willoughby still insisted that the Gaekwad should bear at least 5 per cent of the losses borne by the British government.¹⁴⁰ The Governor at this time observed that the British government seemed to treat the Gaekwad rather "as a dependant vassal" than as an ally, and he attributed much of the reserve and obstinacy of Sayajirao to the treatment he had received from the British. Nevertheless he felt that the Gaekwad could be asked to share 5 per cent of the losses. He also felt, however, that the concurrence of Sayajirao was necessary, as the British were the sole judges in these cases for making the remission.¹⁴¹ Since the Bombay Council could not come to an agreement, the matter was referred to the Court of Directors. The decision of the Court of Directors

138. Ibid., Minutes of Governor G.Clark, 10-7-1847.

139. Ibid., Letter from T.A.Crompton, First Assistant-in-Charge, Kaira Collector to the Secretary to the Government of Bombay, 8-10-1847.

140. Ibid., Minutes by Willoughby, 23-10-1843.

141. Ibid., Minutes of Governor G.Clark, 23-10-1847.



was that the loss from remission should not fall wholly on the British government and that the Gaekwad should be asked to pay 5 per cent of the losses. This decision, however, came after the death of Sayajirao and he was spared a further ignominy.¹⁴²

It was in the midst of such controversy that Sayajirao died on 28th December, 1847, after a short illness at the age of 49.¹⁴³ He was immediately succeeded by his son Ganpatrao Gaekwad who was 31 years of age.¹⁴⁴

For 29 long years, Sayajirao had waged an unceasing struggle for retaining his sovereign power against the British. It had, as we have seen, been a steadily losing struggle. By 1840, Sayajirao had more or less resigned himself to the fact that the British were the ultimate paramount power and, by the agreement with Carnac, he had hoped that, by giving in to their major demands, he would be able to retain some vestige of his power. He was unable to prevent the gradual passing of his sovereignty from his hands, and during the last seven years, as the examples cited in this

142. PDL(BOM) from COD, 19/1848, 7-6-1848.

143. PDL(BOM) to COD, 135/1848, No.1, Colonel Outram to GOB, 29-1-1847.

144. Ibid.

chapter make it clear, he also found it beyond his capacity to oppose infringements on his powers.

For a prince who had begun his reign with a high sense of purpose to maintain himself as an independent ruler, the entire history of his reign must have been an unrelieved tragedy.
